When all these detached formations and units are subtracted, John had fewer than 46,000 men available to attack Eugène, though he had retained one major advantage: his troops were organized in corps. By 9 April both corps were deployed concentrated in their jump-off positions at Villach and Tarvis in Carithia, from where they were to surprise the two unsupported divisions of the Army of Italy between the Isonzo and the Piave. On 10 April the Austrians advanced in several columns through the valleys to Pordenone. The main force of VIII and IX Corps, heavy snowfalls and mist notwithstanding, moved via Caporetto to Cividale and on 13 April occupied Udine. Meanwhile, Eugène had originally decided to execute the defensive scheme prescribed by Napoleon calling for a delaying action falling back to the Adige, a scheme based on the assumption of an enemy offensive driving from the east. But if Eugène’s previous thinking had disregarded intelligence reports about the coming Austrian offensive, he now swung to the other extreme and believed the exaggerated news coming from the Tyrol. Here the small Bavarian garrison, six battalions and a cavalry squadron distributed in small stations at Innsbruck, Prunecken, Brixen and Sterzing, had been overrun by the combined forces of Chasteler’s division, which Eugène overestimated at 18,000, even 20,000 strong, supported by Tyrolean insurgents. Also two columns of French troops, 4,500 in all, marching north to join the Army of Germany, had been forced to surrender or driven back to Trent. These events seemed to compromise a defensive north–south front along the Piave, Brenta or Adige rivers and appeared to threaten the strategic left and rear of the Army of Italy.
But the apparent division of two enemy forces also presented an offensive opportunity if Eugène could use his central position to defeat one part of the enemy first and then turn against the second. On 11 April Eugène ordered d’Hilliers to take charge of all French and allied troops in the Tyrol. He allocated Fontanelli’s division to Baraguey, while the 112th Infantry and the 7th Dragoons, together with the remnants of the French column at Trent, formed a provisional division under General Honore Vial. By 14 April Baraguey disposed of 10,300 foot and 1,100 horse, adequate to protect Eugène’s exposed and vulnerable left flank. Greatly overestimating the strength of Chasteler’s Austro-Tyrolean forces, however, by the end of the month Baraguey had retired to Rivoli, north of Verona. But with clear orders not to retreat further, here he held, protecting the strategic left of the Army of Italy.
Meanwhile Eugène concentrated his forces to deal with John’s offensive. Broussier and Serras were ordered to fall back east to the Livenza river, where a total of five infantry divisions and one of light cavalry were assembling near Sacile, with two additional divisions, Lamarque’s infantry and Pully’s dragoons, expected to arrive by 15 April. The day before, the viceroy had sent an over-confident letter to the emperor explaining that events in the Tyrol had forced him to abandon the defensive and attack John. He continued that reinforcements had already arrived, a lie, as Lamarque was still at Vicenza and Pully at Padua, and that he expected to defeat the Austrians within two days.6 On 16 April, near Sacile, a small town 25 miles south-west of Udine, Eugène, with about 41,000 men, including 2,000 cavalry and 64 guns, prematurely attacked the Austrians, nearly equal in strength though with 4,000 horse and 148 guns. After severe fighting Eugène was repulsed and fell back with 3,000 killed and wounded, losing 3,500 prisoners, an eagle and 15 guns. Although John, who always tended to move slowly, still had fresh troops, he did not conduct an energetic pursuit and this gave Eugène time to make an orderly retreat to the Adige–Alpone line, the position originally recommended by the emperor, where he halted and reorganized. He now received permission for his army to adopt the corps formations and in consequence created an army artillery reserve under General Sorbier, an experienced gunner. Finally, pressure against Baraguey was slackening as Chasteler moved his troops north to hold a new Bavarian offensive. Eugène now gathered additional reinforcements and for the first time managed to concentrate almost his entire army.
But Eugène had been defeated at Sacile and though in his communications to Napoleon he tried to minimize the affair, the emperor was exasperated. On 30 April he sent an angry letter threatening his stepson with possible relief from command. ‘War is a serious business,’ Napoleon wrote, ‘in which one can compromise one’s reputation and country.’ The letter continued that a serious mistake had been made in giving Eugène command of the army and that the emperor wished that he had sent Masséna to take charge. ‘If circumstances become pressing, you should write to the king of Naples [Marshal Murat] asking him to join the army, you will give up command to him and place yourself under his orders.’7 Clearly, the emperor was concerned about John’s possible appearance on his right flank along the Danube.
However, much delayed by events in the Tyrol, the letter arrived only on 6 May, and by then the situation in Italy had changed radically. After Sacile, John had reverted to the customary Austrian rate of advance. Though the distance from Sacile to the new French positions at Caldiero, located in the fork between the Alpone and Adige, 10 miles east of Verona, was only 60 miles, he took eleven days and arrived there only on 27 April. If he had ordered an all-out pursuit after Sacile things might have turned out differently. But when John finally arrived at Caldiero he faced a reconstituted and fully concentrated Army of Italy, almost double his strength, and he also was aware of the Austrian defeat in Bavaria. On 29 April John had received orders from the Emperor Francis to withdraw his army north along the Inn valley to join the main army, a course of action that had become patently impossible.
Eugène, meanwhile, had developed a plan to destroy the Austrians once they closed up to the Adige–Alpone line. He would use the Adige line as a screen to mass his army and hurl it across the river, bringing superior forces to bear against a part of the Austrian front. Simultaneously, the division-sized garrison of Venice, commanded by General Auguste Cafarelli, some 8,000 strong, was to attack and threaten John’s left. Thus the Army of Inner Austria would be caught between converging forces.
In the end there was no need for this ambitious plan. After repulsing a foolish sortie by Eugène on 27 April, John retreated north with FML Johann Frimont’s division as his rearguard. On 8 May he attempted to slow the pursuing Army of Italy, further reinforced by the Venice garrison and Fontanelli’s division, at the Piave. Using good tactical sense, showing that he had learned his lessons at Sacile, Eugène carefully concentrated most of his army, a divisional-size Advance Guard, six infantry and three cavalry divisions and the Royal Guard, a total of between 45,000 and 48,000 men. Despite being hampered by the swollen river that became too dangerous to ford in the afternoon, the Army of Italy broke Austrian resistance by evening. Although his actual casualties were small and the viceroy called off his pursuit prematurely, the Austrians were dispirited. Eugène had shown himself a competent battle captain and compensated for his defeat at Sacile. This time he sent a detailed report to the emperor boasting of his success.8
ARCHDUKE JOHN RETREATS INTO HUNGARY
John’s army was now outmatched. When he rallied his troops after Sacile, he found but 24,000 men and ordered a general withdrawal from Italy. However, still hoping to rally local support, he split his army. Ignaz Gyulai, Ban of Croatia and authorized to call out the Croatian insurrectio, was ordered to Laibach in Slovenia with part of VIII Corps, there to join Stojevich’s corps repelled from Dalmatia by Marmont. The remainder of his corps joined IX Corps moving on Villach in Carinthia. In turn, Eugène divided his army into two main columns, one under Eugène and the other under Macdonald. The Austrians could find some moral solace when, in the narrow valley passes towards Carinthia, Eugène’s progress was impeded by the heroic defence of two reinforced blockhouses at Malborgeth and Predil, the ‘Austrian Thermopylae’. Each of these works, a blockhouse with an additional redoubt and stockade, was manned by a few gunners and some 250 Croat Grenzer but could not hold out for long. None the less, their resistance bought three days, while Macdonald proceeded towards Laibach. Malborgeth was o
utflanked by a French division before being stormed on 17 May; Predil held out under heavy bombardment before its defenders were overwhelmed by a two-regiment assault on the next day, 18 May.9
On 19 May, John had received orders to march north and join with Kolowrat, then on the north bank of the Danube near Linz, in operations against Napoleon’s rear. But John correctly judged this enterprise hopeless and indeed, on 18 May, Kolowrat’s attempt to cross the Danube had been repelled with heavy losses. Instead, he marched to Graz in Styria where he hoped to unite with Jellacic’s strong division, 8,000 men who had been forced out of Bavaria and would have provided a most useful reinforcement for the Army of Inner Austria. While waiting at Graz, John missed an opportunity to fall on either Eugène or Macdonald, each of their columns weaker than his own force. Instead he waited for Jellacic to join him, but Jellacic, a remarkably unlucky and inept general, did not manage to bring many reinforcements. After making a successful retreat through the Tyrol and fighting off Wrede’s pursuing Bavarian division, Jellacic blundered, while still in line of march, into Grenier’s two divisions at Saint Michael near Leoben on 25 May, still some 30 miles north of Graz. Dispersed and defeated, only a remnant of 2,000 Austrians joined John the next day. Grenier lost but 600 men. Informed that John’s army was in retreat, Marmont had taken the offensive on 14 May and, after demolishing Stojevic’s forces on 16 May, reached Laibach on 3 June. Here instructions reached him to continue his advance to Graz which he took on 26 May, only to receive orders three days later to join Napoleon’s army preparing for a second crossing of the Danube.
John remained at Graz for four days. Then, leaving Gyulai and several battalions of VIII Corps behind with orders to retard the French pursuit, he began his retreat to Körmend (Komorn) on the Hungarian frontier. On reaching this fortress the Army of Inner Austria, including the remnants of Jellacic’s division, counted hardly 15,000 men. At Körmend John picked up supplies and reinforcements and now his forces numbered 14,000 regulars, 3,000 Landwehr and 4,000 horse, of which half were insurrectio cavalry. Ignaz Gyulai’s IX Corps still was at Agram in Croatia, 100 miles to the south-west. At this point Napoleon, who on 21–22 May had been repulsed in his attempt to cross the Danube against Charles at Aspern–Essling, became perhaps overly concerned about the possible junction of John and the Austrian main army and now ordered deployments to prevent such an eventuality. Davout’s 3 Corps was sent to Pressburg, the Army of Italy ordered to Neustadt, some 18 miles south of Vienna, and Macdonald’s Corps, little more than Lamarque’s division, was instructed to take Graz. This decided John to redirect his retreat, and he now attempted to concentrate whatever formations were still detached and in reach at Raab where Archduke Joseph, the palatine of Hungary, had assembled some 20,000 insurrectio troops, predominantly cavalry, good riders but lacking combat skills. John arrived at Raab on 13 June.
One day later, the Army of Italy attacked the combined Austrian forces, numbering some 30,000 men, at Raab. On 6 June, Napoleon, still concerned about a possible recovery of the Army of Inner Austria, had instructed Eugène to attack the Austrians at Raab and attached two cavalry divisions, Colbert and Montbrun, to the Army of Italy.10 The battle of Raab was the climax of the 1809 Italian campaign for Eugène. John had deployed his forces in an excellent defensive position, anchored on the marshy and steep-banked river Raab and with a ridge and a stone farmhouse dominating the centre. Marshy ground prevented any outflanking moves to the north, leaving only the southern approach open to a flank attack. Throughout the day there was bitter fighting in the centre, where John had tried to stiffen his troops by interspersing regular units with insurrectio troops. With only one Italian division, Severoli’s, left, Eugène attacked across the river but was initially unable to bring artillery across. Suffering severe casualties, Severoli was at first forced back and General Durutte’s French division was brought in to assault the farm position, which would change hands five times.
Eugène now sent Montbrun’s and Grouchy’s cavalry to seek a ford across the Pancsa creek to the south. One was found, though it was defended by a small three-gun Austrian battery. Bringing forward two horse artillery companies, twelve guns, the Austrian guns were silenced and Montbrun’s and Grouchy’s horsemen engaged the Austrian cavalry, mainly insurrectio squadrons. The Austrian cavalry was put to flight within a short time, while in the centre Pacthod’s division and the Royal Italian Guards took the farmhouse. The battle was lost and John retreated. His forces divided, the Hungarians seeking refuge in the town and citadel of Raab, which fell on 23 June, the remainder moving north across the Danube to Komorn and eventually to Pressburg to be contained by a force under Baraguey. This was Eugène’s second major victory, won, moreover, on the anniversary of Marengo, 14 June 1800. It renewed the emperor’s confidence in the abilities of his stepson. On 28 June Napoleon told Eugène that the Army of Italy was no longer independent but was to be incorporated into his main army.11 On 1 July it was ordered to join the great concentration at Vienna.
There remained one more dramatic episode. Broussier’s weak division, fewer than 4,000, had been left at Graz where the citadel remained in Austrian hands. He was also supposed to be joined by Marmont’s 11 Corps. But the Duke of Ragusa moved so slowly, despite a reprimand from Napoleon, that he arrived only on 27 June. As a result, between 25–27 June Broussier was engaged by almost 22,000 Austrians of IX Corps, albeit mainly insurrectio, and compelled to retreat. During the engagement the 84th Line of Broussier’s division demonstrated the mettle of French infantry, withstanding repeated attacks by Austrian troops who outnumbered it ten to one. When news of the engagement and the splendid performance of the 84th reached Napoleon, he ordered that the regimental flag be embroidered with the phrase ‘Un contre dix’ (‘one against ten’), making the regiment the equal of the famed ‘terrible’ 57th Line. If the often-stated assertion that the calibre of Napoleon’s troops had deteriorated in 1809 had any currency, the 84th Line had not heard of it. On 29 June Marmont and Broussier were ordered to evacuate Graz and join the army near Vienna. Only one weak division, General Jean-Baptiste Rusca’s, was to maintain a blockade at Graz, garrison Klagenfurth in Carinthia and guard communications with Italy.
THE TYROLEAN INSURRECTION
As has been repeatedly pointed out, the picture of a great national German uprising to support the Habsburgs in 1809 has been greatly overstated. Despite the introduction of the Landwehr, the ruling classes always remained reluctant to arm the populace at large, fearing they might get out of hand. For their part, though willing to make a fine show when the enemy was far away, the population as a whole was not really prepared to fight. In the words of an English historian, ‘Popular resistance simply lacked the potential to justify the weight it has been given’.12 With one exception, the various risings in the spring and summer in Germany at best had nuisance value for the French, who in any case promptly wiped them out, and had no influence on the main theatre of operations in the Danube valley.
The exception was the Tyrolean insurrection, which though short-lived at times approached the level of popular revolt on the Iberian Peninsula. It not only maintained itself in the face of serious reverses, but continued after Austria made peace with Napoleon in October. Most important, however, the insurrection, pre-planned in Vienna, played an integral role in Austrian strategy. Supported from the outset by a substantial detachment of regulars under FML Chasteler, the Tyrolean insurgency threatened the right flank of Napoleon’s advance in Germany and at times appeared to menace Eugène’s advance into Inner Austria.
Under Habsburg rule, the Tyrol had enjoyed a privileged status, with limited exemption from conscription – troops recruited here were genuine volunteers – the right to retain its own militia, the Landes Schützen, and the privilege to determine its own taxation in a provincial assembly largely drawn from the free peasantry and the burghers of the towns. When the centralizing Emperor Joseph II had tried to impose uniform government, conscription, taxation and church reform thro
ughout his domains in 1789, he was confronted by resistance across the Tyrol and rapidly obliged to revoke his military and administrative reforms. In 1792 and again in 1799, sharpshooter levies had been called out but achieved little. But there was much resentment when, after the Tyrol was ceded to Bavaria in 1805, the new centralizing administration immediately began to demolish the ancient liberties of the Tyroleans. Interfering with the ecclesiastical affairs of a deeply Catholic population, changing the civil administration and even abolishing the name of Tyrol and dividing the country into three administrative districts caused serious resentment that was exploited by Archduke John and the war party in Vienna. The final cause for the Tyrolean revolt was the Bavarian attempt to introduce conscription in late 1808 and early 1809. Secret meetings had taken place since as early as 1806 and plans were laid for any insurrection to be immediately supported by a substantial Austrian troop detachment and arms deliveries. It should also be noted that the indigenous sharpshooter guilds were well armed and highly competent in the use of their privately owned short carbines. None the less, the idea of a popular insurrection worried the reactionaries in Vienna. It was during one of these planning meetings that Andreas Hofer, an innkeeper and leader of the incipient revolt, was introduced to the Emperor Francis II as a ‘genuine patriot’, a statement that evoked Francis’s famous observation: ‘But is he a patriot for me?’
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