At the other end of the line, at Essling, Rosenberg had failed to achieve much in the morning. His repeated and uncoordinated attacks failed, the granary proving a stronger defensive position than the church-cemetery position at Aspern. Liechtenstein arrived after noon to organize the first organized assault and Charles in person arrived with d’Aspre and Merville’s four-battalion Grenadier Brigade to reinforce the action. At about 3 p.m. Boudet was forced out of the small village, but the general and a few hundred grenadiers were able to maintain themselves in the granary. Aware that the loss of Essling would endanger any orderly retreat, Napoleon ordered Colonel Seruzier to support efforts to retake Essling. ‘I count on you,’ Napoleon told him, ‘to save the army.’16 He also dispatched Generals Georges Mouton and Jean Rapp, both senior aides, to restore the situation with five battalions of the Young Guard. Interpreting their orders liberally, the two stalwarts not only evicted the Habsburg troops from the village but also pressed Rosenberg back toward Gross-Essling. The effective action of these two young generals had an important, perhaps decisive, effect. Essling remained in French hands, protecting the retreat. The only French reserves now were the Old Guard battalions stationed near the bridge to the Lobau. Perceiving that the battle was dying down and his presence in front of the Old Guard was no longer required, and with the Guardsmen threatening to down arms if he did not remove himself to safety, Napoleon retired to the rear and Lannes was entrusted with the overall command of all troops on the left bank.
In the centre, though hard pressed, Lannes, assisted by a number of mounted charges, had, retiring step by step, managed to maintain his line. This, combined with the counter-attack at Essling, convinced Charles that Napoleon had received major reinforcements and at about 3.30 p.m. he halted action in the centre and assumed a defensive posture, though maintaining the bombardment of the French infantry with some fifty guns. Between 3 and 4 p.m. this fire mortally wounded Lannes. A small cannon ball, presumably a 3-pounder ricochet, shattered both his knees. Taken to the rear and eventually to a hospital on the right bank of the Danube, the marshal would linger on until 31 May. It was a great pity because the battle was practically over. Charles’s reasons for his decision to halt are not clear. To be sure, his troops were exhausted and he no longer had any reserves, though the story that he was also low on ammunition does not appear to be correct, while the outnumbered French were in any case even worse off. The sudden shift to the defensive was perhaps best demonstrated at Aspern where at around 4 p.m. Hiller, after seven assaults, was preparing to roll up the French line along the river. He was stopped when Wimpffen, accompanied by several senior staff officers, appeared to order a furious Hiller to ‘halt and not start a new battle’. And when Hiller insisted that this was the opportunity for a final and decisive assault there was a violent scene.17 In the end, of course, Wimpffen, acting with the archduke’s authority, prevailed.
There would be no determined pursuit of the French rearguard as, harassed only by intermittent skirmish and artillery fire, they fell back in good order. They first moved to the bridgehead defences and then during the night retired in phased order over the bridge to the Lobau, artillery first, then the Guard, heavy cavalry and finally the infantry. The marshal remained almost to the last in the bridgehead until, at dawn, the last defenders left their fortifications and the bridge was taken up. Even then pockets of French troops still held on along the riverbank and in the Essling granary. The last of this rearguard, the voltigeurs of the 18th Line of Legrand’s division, were only taken off by two large boats on the morning of the next day, 23 May.
Napoleon had left the Mühlau salient for the Lobau in the afternoon and towards evening he summoned his marshals to a conference. Berthier and Davout, the latter having come over from the right bank, were already present, while Masséna arrived after some delay. Lannes, however, failed to appear. At 7 p.m. the conference proceeded. Initially all the marshals favoured a retreat to the right bank but Napoleon changed their mind. He pointed out that the artillery and the wounded brought to the Lobau would have to be abandoned, encouraging the enemy to believe he had gained a great victory. This, the emperor maintained, was not the case, but the perception of such a French defeat might turn allies and neutrals against him and force a retreat to the Rhine. No, he maintained, the battle had been a victory and only the Danube had defeated him. But with the Lobau held in preparation for a second crossing, the Austrian main army would be fixed, while reinforcements, the rest of the Imperial Guard and the Armies of Italy and Dalmatia, would arrive within a short time. His reasoning was persuasive. Masséna was entrusted to accelerate the retreat and given command of all troops on the left bank, the islands in the river and the Lobau.
As the meeting broke up Napoleon was shaken by the news that Lannes, the marshal closest to him, and Saint-Hilaire had both been seriously wounded. Napoleon dictated some additional instructions for Masséna, who had already returned to the north bank. Accompanied by Berthier, Napoleon then left the Lobau by boat to Kaiser-Ebersdorf. The battle was over. The attempt to cross the Danube by a sudden assault had failed.
THE BATTLE EVALUATED AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
It had been a bloody soldier’s battle. Neither commander-in-chief performed brilliantly. Despite being celebrated as the victor, Archduke Charles had not been able to exploit his vast superiority in men and guns for a decisive victory. His plan of operations repeated the preferred Austrian tactics of a concentric attack, failing to take into account the need for coordination of movement on an extensive battlefield. As for Napoleon, he had gambled, though he would claim then and later that victory had been snatched from him by the collapse of the main bridge on the second day. Indeed, had the bridge held for a couple more hours, enabling Davout’s 3 Corps to pass, Napoleon probably would have achieved a major victory.
Losses were heavy on both sides. The Austrians lost 5,200 dead and 21,500 wounded; French losses, contrary to Napoleon’s claims, were about the same. As usual, casualties of French senior officers were heavier than the Austrians’. Besides Lannes, the first marshal to be killed in battle, three generals were killed and eighteen wounded. Austrian losses included one general killed and thirteen high-ranking officers wounded. Both commanders had reason to be satisfied with the conduct of their troops. Despite a minor panic towards noon of the second day, soon ended by the Guard, the French had maintained good order during a difficult retreat. The Austrians captured only three dismounted guns, seven ammunition wagons and one set of colours, though also picked up some 14,000 muskets. But facing a numerically superior enemy and superior firepower, their backs to the river and with no assurance of reinforcement, all fighting units of Napoleon’s forces, veterans and recruits alike, Frenchmen as well as Confederation of the Rhine troops, had fought tenaciously. The Austrian combat performance, especially that of their line infantry fighting in defensive masses, had been excellent, though their cavalry had been disappointing. Their artillery also had done very well. If Aspern–Essling remained only a tactical victory, the troops could not be blamed.
As was his habit, the archduke had fought a cautious defensive battle aiming to repulse but not destroy the enemy. By the end of the second day, his earlier optimism had faded and he did not order an all-out pursuit. Only on the evening of 23 May did he issue orders to Hiller and Rosenberg to ‘disturb the French’. Hiller and his advance guard were to bombard the Lobau while Rosenberg was to throw a pontoon bridge across the Stadler Arm and attack into the Lobau with one brigade of infantry and one squadron of cavalry.
The proposed scale of the operation indicates that nothing more than a raid was planned and the orders also warned the commanders to take no risks that might require commitment of strong reinforcements. In the end, nothing came of this half-hearted scheme. Hiller limited himself to some light cannon fire. Rosenberg, finding that the rise of the Danube had swollen the Stadler Arm and made it uncommonly rapid, was unable to throw a bridge across the stream. The French were astonished and
relieved by the Austrian inaction. While crossing into the Lobau would have been a losing gamble, a heavy bombardment would have inflicted serious casualties on the dense masses huddling on the island.
But having repulsed Napoleon, Charles believed that a tactical victory was enough to fan the embers of revolt in Germany and to induce Prussia and Russia to join Austria, prospects that might persuade Napoleon to come to terms. But although newspapers in Bohemia, Prussia and elsewhere trumpeted that Napoleon had been totally defeated, the emperor himself killed and his army in complete disarray, in the end the truth emerged. Repulsed, yes, but not crushed and a partial success would convince neither Prussia nor Russia to risk intervention; meanwhile, there was still no sign of the promised British support. Napoleon was not dead or even wounded, but he was exhausted and for a day and a half remained in a state of near indecision. Crucially, the fighting morale of his army remained high, he still disposed of substantial reserves and a second and better-prepared attempt was likely to succeed.
CHAPTER SIX
Across the Danube
THE AFTERMATH OF ASPERN–ESSLING
The reaction to the battle varied between the French and Austrians, revealing marked differences of character and style of command between the two commanders as well as between their respective objectives. Napoleon refused to evacuate the Lobau and rejected suggestions that he fall back to Vienna. Aware that the rebuff might have wider consequences in Europe, he was determined to attempt another crossing of the Danube from the Lobau: his objective remained the destruction of the main Austrian army. But he realized that this would take the most careful preparations: secure bridges would have to be constructed, more troops assembled and additional artillery procured. Recovering his enormous energy, he was everywhere, supervising and spurring on preparations. By contrast, Archduke Charles, curiously depressed, seldom left his headquarters in Deutsch-Wagram. Although defeated in Bavaria, his troops had fought well at Aspern–Essling but the heavy losses incurred in the battle had sapped his confidence. His main objective was to exploit his success and use his improved strategic position to enter peace negotiations on favourable terms. But he failed to convince his imperial brother and had to continue his struggle against the intrigues of the war faction. Anton Baron Baldacci, an ever-scheming confidant of the Emperor Francis, observed that ‘Napoleon was an utterly common general and certainly would have been destroyed if Archduke Charles had not been an even more incompetent leader’.1 Such intrigues could not remain hidden, and contributed to the lack of cooperation from his corps commanders, above all Archduke John. Meanwhile, though his forces were still well over 90,000 strong and being further reinforced, the archduke lapsed into lethargy and remained passive for the next crucial weeks. By contrast, with Napoleon’s sole authority unchallenged, he alone on the French side took the important strategic and administrative decisions and he was determined to reverse his defeat.
LOBAU ISLAND CONVERTED INTO AN OFFENSIVE BASE
After recovering from his physical exhaustion, Napoleon worked furiously. His first priority was to restore firm communications with the south bank to the Lobau, now packed with 60,000 men – including 20,000 wounded – guns and limbers, wagons and other impedimenta. There was no shelter and hardly any rations, and the energetic Surgeon-General Larrey commandeered and slaughtered the horses even of senior officers and used inverted cuirasses to make a nourishing broth for his charges. The emperor pushed hard to replenish Masséna’s ammunition, provide rations and evacuate the wounded. With the Danube subsiding, by 25 May a provisional bridge had been built, largely by the effort of the just-arrived naval battalions. The wounded were taken off the island first, then the empty ammunition wagons, then the Imperial Guard, 2 Corps, which reincorporated Saint-Hilaire’s division, now commanded by Pacthod, and Demont’s reserve division.
In contrast with his precipitate actions at Aspern–Essling, the next battle was minutely prepared by Napoleon, with the river crossing designed almost like an attack against a fortress. The Lobau, now designated as the Ile Napoleon, was to be the jumping-off place and the emperor remained concerned about its security. On 27 May the bridge collapsed again, and that day he detailed Colonel Charles Sainte-Croix, serving on Masséna’s staff, to visit all outposts and report on the situation on the island every morning. On 31 May he instructed Generals Rogniat, a gunner, and Foucher, an engineer, to determine the work necessary to construct solid bridges to support another crossing and to establish batteries to secure the Lobau. They reported back to Masséna on 3 June and the marshal endorsed and forwarded their recommendations two days later. The generals recommended that multiple strong trestle-bridges be built from Kaiser-Ebersdorf to the Lobau, but advised against a repeat crossing at the location used on 20 May, though they suggested that this might well serve as a deception. They proposed crossing on a broad front making use of the small islets in the Stadlau branch on the east side of the Lobau as stepping stones. Going from west to south-east, these were designated as the Ile Masséna, upstream from the original crossing, then a small island named Ile Saint-Hilaire, both providing excellent fields of fire towards Aspern– Essling. Directly across from Essling was the Ile Bessières, and further downstream the Ile de Moulin and the Ile Montebello. Facing east were Iles Pouzet, Lannes and Alexandre. Because the riverbank below the Ile Alexandre was swampy and covered with thick brush, they suggested a possible amphibious landing further down river below the Ile Alexandre, close to where the Stadlau branch rejoined the main stream of the Danube, an area called the Hanselgrund. With the Austrians apparently fortifying the river line from Aspern to Enzersdorf, a landing near this point would enable the emperor to turn their positions. In this report, endorsed on 6 June by Masséna, the basic elements of Napoleon’s evolving battle plan for Wagram can be discerned.
BUILDING THE BRIDGES ACROSS THE DANUBE
Never a man to lose time, Napoleon had already instructed Bertrand to organize the construction of several great bridges protected by a palisade upstream and capable of withstanding the current and the ramming craft that had destroyed the original bridge connecting the south shore with the Lobgrund–Lobau Island. After consulting with his fellow engineer officers, Bertrand reported to Napoleon. Given time, manpower and equipment, he assured the emperor that such bridges could be built. Napoleon ordered their immediate construction, providing Bertrand with command of all the engineer and pioneer companies, the naval artificers and all the necessary civilian workers and bridge-building and maintenance engines from the Austrian stores in Vienna. ‘I will’, Bertrand boasted to a fellow engineer, ‘build solid bridges.’2 Actual work started on 1 June. By then the three naval battalions (not to be confused with the marines of the Imperial Guard who arrived only after the battle), one battalion of naval artificers and two battalions of sailors, each about 500 men strong, commanded by Captain Baste of the imperial navy, joined the hard-pressed corps engineers and pontonniers. In addition, the Army Engineer Reserve was pressed into service. The naval battalions proved especially versatile. Carrying their own tools, the sailors performed an amazing amount of work. They built bridges, gunboats, landing barges capable of holding 200 men, and a floating battery. They repaired damaged pontoons, organized water transport and, manning ten gunboats (including three gunboats captured from the Austrians) and several lesser craft, gave Napoleon control of the Danube.
Material for the bridging projects, captured or manufactured in the huge depots of the river administration in Vienna, was assembled at Kaiser-Ebersdorf. Over 4,000 wagons carried wooden beams, cordage, iron fastenings and anchors to the bridge depot there, while pontoons and rafts manufactured in Vienna were floated downstream. While the main bridges were built, a forward depot on the Lobau received materials for the smaller bridges to be thrown from the various islands to the left bank. Iron-shod and ordinary beams were no problem, but there was a shortage of cordage and anchors. Austrian civilian artisans manufactured cordage and, when this did not suffice, Napoleon had
the church bell ropes dismantled. Though only French troops were allowed near the bridges, civilian labourers were employed in manufacturing bridging components, while Davout and Eugène were instructed to bring everything in the way of bridging material they could find. But this proved difficult, especially the problem of finding enough anchors to replace the provisional stone-filled barrels used in May. In the end Davout could find only seven anchors, but Eugène managed to procure sixty heavy iron anchors which he sent to Kaiser-Ebersdorf.3
The bridgeworks envisaged by Napoleon and his engineering staff were indeed impressive. Utilizing seven large and a number of smaller floating pile drivers from the magazines in Vienna, an 800-yard double stockade of strong iron-shod piles was driven into the bed of the fast-flowing river from the shore to the Schneidergrund and from there to the Lobgrund. This provided protection against any future Austrian attempts to rupture the bridgeworks. The main bridge was to be a reinforced trestle-bridge. To make its piers withstand the strong current, they were placed in groups of five about 2 feet apart, tied together with diagonal and horizontal trusses. In all there were sixty piers, forty-one over the first arm of the river to the Schneidergrund and nineteen from there to the Lobgrund, providing a firm base for the heavy planks of the three-carriage-wide roadway.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 12