THE BATTLE OF ZNAIM, 10–11 JULY
But Charles had already left the Jetzeldorf position on the evening of 9 July and, force marching his troops through the night, arrived at Znaim at about 4 a.m. on 10 July just ahead of Marmont’s advance guard. He immediately set about occupying the hills around the town, especially the dominating heights to the east around the village of Tesswitz. Marmont realized that his 10,000 men would not be able to defeat the Austrians, roughly 60,000 men from the Reserve Corps, II, VI and V Corps, the last, forming the rearguard, already under pressure from Masséna. But following the long-established Napoleonic precedent that the first corps of the army encountering the enemy was to engage at once in the hope of fixing him until the bulk of the French army came up, Marmont attacked. Pending the arrival of reinforcements, Marmont sent forward skirmishers supported by several formed companies of the 6th Bavarian Infantry to drive the Austrians from the heights around Tesswitz. After this was accomplished, some two hours after noon, Marmont ordered Generals Minucci and Clauzel to break through the Austrian centre, but Charles had plenty of reinforcements available, mainly units of I Corps, and in bitter fighting the village changed hands at least four times before night fell. The Bavarian division suffered 900 casualties, its heaviest loss during the 1809 campaign.9
Marmont’s position was less than brilliant, but Masséna was hurrying to the battle, and at 10 o’clock that night Napoleon arrived with the infantry and the horse batteries of the Imperial Guard. Moreover Nansouty’s heavy cavalry division reached Znaim by early morning on 11 August and by 10 a.m. Masséna’s advance division, Legrand’s, attacked Schalersdorf, a suburb of Znaim defended by V Corps, while Marmont attacked Zuckerhandl, a village to the north-east. Davout and Oudinot were not yet present but were expected to arrive the next day, by which point Napoleon would dispose a total of nearly 84,000 men against, at best, 60,000 Austrians. In the afternoon the French broke into Znaim where after several hours of sharp fighting in the streets, with Austrian losses totalling some 6,200, Archduke Charles decided to sign an armistice on his own responsibility. ‘My army,’ he explained to Emperor Francis, ‘had not been able to cook for several days and was much fatigued and further retreat in the face of the enemy [was] risky, while an attack against his strong positions was even more dangerous. Under these circumstances I sought an armistice.’10
Although Berthier and other senior commanders recommended the battle be pressed the next day after Davout’s and Oudinot’s arrival and that Austria’s main army be destroyed and its monarchy – ‘the cause of so many wars’ – demolished, Napoleon agreed to the archduke’s proposal. He considered his army too exhausted; furthermore, for the moment he did not have enough troops to defeat the archduke’s six corps around Znaim, though this would change once French reinforcements arrived the next morning. Meanwhile, he wanted to prevent the Austrians from slipping away north on the road to Iglau. ‘Enough blood has been spilled’, he declared. Around 7 p.m. on 11 July the fighting died down after a provisional ceasefire was arranged; a formal armistice, which only concerned military matters and was initially limited to one month, was signed early the following morning. This ended the active phase of the Wagram campaign. The same day Napoleon elevated both Marmont and Oudinot to the marshalate. He added, however, in a personal letter to Marmont that ‘between ourselves, you have not yet done enough to entirely justify my choice’.11
ARCHDUKE CHARLES RESIGNS
Charles had sought to preserve his army in being and to prevent the breakup of the monarchy when he entered negotiations with Napoleon. In fact, undercutting the archduke’s authority again, Francis had already appointed his own emissary, Prince Liechtenstein, one of Charles’s corps commanders, to seek out Napoleon and arrange for an end to hostilities, an attempt which came to nothing when Napoleon dismissed Liechtenstein out of hand. None the less, Francis reacted furiously to Charles’s initiative, though the armistice, negotiated by Wimpffen, had been limited to purely military matters, and, given the situation on the ground, was quite generous. But in Francis’s view Charles, not for the first time, had interfered in matters beyond the scope of his authority and, by concluding an armistice on his own, had strayed across the boundary dividing military matters and politics, exactly what the emperor had always feared and resisted. In every campaign since 1796 the archduke had tried to play a political role, usually attempting to persuade the emperor to make peace. But in 1809 he had finally gone too far and his removal from supreme command was now just a matter of time.
Imperial disapproval was expressed in a series of letters. Charles tried to explain his reasons for wishing to end hostilities to his brother, while Francis answered that obviously control of the entire military establishment was too much for one general. He now reduced the archduke’s authority, demoting him from his position as generalissimus, leaving him in command only of the troops under his immediate control, and demanding the removal of Grünne who was widely disliked at court. In a letter that reached Charles’s headquarters on 18 July the emperor, now again totally under the influence of the war party, added that hostilities would continue in the near future after he had assembled a 60,000-strong army in Hungary. With the existence of the monarchy threatened, Francis continued, he intended to assume the supreme command personally.12 This was the last straw. On 23 July the weary archduke resigned his command. ‘A commander who has aroused Your Majesty’s displeasure to such a degree can no longer have your confidence and therefore can no longer hold command of the army. These considerations lead me to lay command of the army at the feet of Your Majesty.’13 The emperor accepted the resignation and placed Liechtenstein in command of the main army. Charles left the army on 30 July and retired until November to the estate of Duke Albert at Teschen. By this time many high ranking-officers had lost confidence in Charles and were no longer willing to serve under him.
NAPOLEON AND ARCHDUKE CHARLES COMPARED
It has been widely asserted that by 1809 Napoleon’s military genius was in decline. Napoleon himself observed that ten years of war would burn out any commander. Even so, in 1809 and at Wagram in particular, he was clearly the better of the two supreme commanders. He practised a personal, highly centralized style of command aiming always to fight on the offensive. Even after a reverse such as at Aspern–Essling, he remained determined to seek victory and, with rare exceptions, he did not blame his senior subordinates after a setback, but immediately prepared for a new battle. A charismatic commander and a great battle captain, he imposed his genius and personality on his army and inspired his troops, veterans or recruits, Frenchmen or foreigners alike, with fierce pride, loyalty and devotion. Not just Frenchmen but Saxons, Bavarians, Württembergers and Italians cheered him wherever he appeared. Even the severely wounded would shout ‘Vive l’Empereur!’ when he came close. Another reason for high morale in the French ranks was the willingness of senior officers to share the risks of battle itself to a much higher degree than their Austrian counterparts.
One of the advantages of the Napoleonic method of waging war, sometimes considered a drawback, was that one individual, Napoleon himself, devised his own strategic, operational and, sometimes, tactical plans. Further, he was prepared to attend not only to great affairs but to the smallest details. For all practical purposes he was his own operations officer. The major drawback was that even a commander of his talents, energy and ability could not do everything. This centralization of authority had other adverse consequences. His senior subordinates were capable, often admirable, generals when operating under his supervision, but were rarely allowed to exercise independent command. He did not encourage independent initiative among his marshals, was often unfairly critical and tended to play off one against another. As his wars became multi-frontal, and with none among his often-quarrelling chief subordinates able to replace him, the result was, as one noted historian observed, that ‘wherever Napoleon was, success was assured; but wherever he was not, it was disaster’.14 But this unfortunate develo
pment emerged in full force only later, especially in Spain, Russia and, in 1813, in Germany. At Wagram, however, he still was able to command and order his subordinate commanders directly. In Berthier he was supported by an outstanding chief-of-staff, though he did not participate in planning but was the interpreter and executor of Napoleon’s plans. None the less, even if it was only in accordance with the orders given by Napoleon, it was Berthier’s detailed arrangements that enabled the army to cross the Danube to the Marchfeld on the night and early morning of 4–5 July, by any measure a most substantial achievement.
Napoleon’s marshals, other than Bernadotte, who at Wagram failed him not for the first time, were all capable and competent battle captains, superior to their Austrian counterparts. On an extensive battlefield like Wagram they showed themselves capable of a considerable and surprising degree of initiative and judgment when needed. Masséna and Davout should be singled out for praise and were duly rewarded. Davout was named Prince of Eckmühl and Masséna Prince of Essling. For his contributions to organizing the assault crossings, Berthier became Prince of Wagram. Three senior generals received their marshal’s batons. Their promotions were described by a popular ditty chanted by the ranks that showed the troops’ perceptions: ‘Macdonald is France’s choice; Oudinot is the army’s choice; Marmont is friendship’s choice.’ The ditty was at least partially wrong. None of the three had strategic talents. Macdonald was a fine tactician and he was the only marshal to receive his baton on the battlefield. Oudinot was brave but had angered the emperor by attacking without waiting for orders on the afternoon of the second day. Marmont, who received his baton only after Znaim, had often been harshly criticized by Napoleon for his slow movements – ‘a turtle’, the emperor had called him – and, in fact, he was surprised by his elevation.
Napoleon’s marshals, if not a devoted band of brothers, though their rivalry and quarrels have been exaggerated, usually cooperated well enough when Napoleon was present. However, the case of Bernadotte was singular. He was the least able and reliable of the marshals and, though a good tactician, had an inflated opinion of his capabilities. Married to Désirée Clary, one of Napoleon’s old flames, he was allegedly involved in several plots to overthrow the first consul and, later, emperor. His relations with Napoleon were always tense and often hostile. Even so, he was among the first eighteen marshals, fourteen active and four honorary, made in 1804. A fair field commander, he had served with distinction in 1805, but the following year nearly ruined his career by failing to employ his corps at either Jena or Auerstädt. At Wagram he mishandled his 9 Saxon Corps during the night attack and the next morning he evacuated the key village of Aderklaa without orders. He had already criticized Napoleon’s battle handling the night before and, after being relieved from command, he issued a proclamation to his Saxons in which he made the most inflated claims for their conduct during the battle. Harshly rebuked, with his corps broken up, he remained in charge of the brigade-strength remnant until the final battle and was only then removed from the army. He returned to Paris in semi-disgrace, but was saved by the belated British landings in Walcheren in August when he was given a temporary appointment to command a hastily collected army to contain the British, though even now his boastful conduct led to further friction with the emperor. It was a relief for both sides when in 1810 he was elected Crown Prince of Sweden and the two men parted with insincere flattery.
Overall Napoleon was lavish in distributing awards, favours and promotions: he awarded over 1,000 medals of the Légion d’Honneur after Wagram. Recognizing the important, perhaps decisive, role of artillery, he presented the medal to all surviving non-commissioned officers of the artillery of the Guard and promoted Drouot to colonel. He praised the conduct of his troops, giving credit above all to the French units though perhaps neglecting the German contribution; distributed substantial amounts of money; and made many of his spot promotions on the recommendations of unit commanders.
By contrast, Archduke Charles had to contend with the distrust of, and constant interference by, his brother, the Emperor Francis, as well as by government ministers and a court clique. Though personally brave, he did not enjoy the kind of devotion from his officers and men Napoleon aroused. Charles’s victory at Aspern–Essling is usually regarded as the high point of his military career, and over time he achieved near-iconic stature in Habsburg historical literature, entering the pantheon of great Habsburg military commanders. Yet Aspern–Essling remained a tactical victory only. Indeed Charles’s planning and conduct of the war of 1809 was faulty from the very outset though, of course, he was always subjected to interference from Vienna. Still, always overawed by Napoleon, and never more so than after his defeats in Bavaria, the archduke looked on the coming battles with trepidation, no longer longing for victory but willing to make peace at almost any price. Of course, he lacked the authority of his opponent and was burdened with the mistrust of his imperial brother and his entourage. Some of the blame for his defeat at Wagram must also be attributed to the cumbersome and slow Austrian system of command and control. But then, always concerned with asserting his position as a member of the dynasty, relations with his commanders remained formal and he never took them into his confidence. There were no conferences before battle and he did not reveal his battle plans to his commanders. Wagram exposed these shortcomings. Having left the Advance Guard and VI Corps exposed for too long on the first day, and with orders issued too late during the night of 5 July, the next day his commanders could only act according to his standing instructions that left them little flexibility or initiative. Handling a major battle with a frontage of over 12 miles according to a rigid eighteenth-century command system was at best slow and at worst led to hesitation, lack of coordination and missed opportunities.
Ever since, there has been debate as to who was responsible for the defeat. Charles, as is only right, has not escaped criticism. He was blamed for not keeping a battle reserve (V Corps was left in reserve to cover an eventual retreat, not as a battle reserve proper). In the weeks between Aspern–Essling and Wagram he inexplicably failed to fortify his main line of resistance on the Russbach plateau. Also, as repeatedly noted, he was wrong in leaving too many troops, the Advance Guard and VI Corps, along the river line and for not permitting them to retreat earlier and thus cutting their losses. Finally, his dispositions for the general attack on the morning of 6 July, perhaps an attempted double envelopment, though Charles later maintained that he had merely planned a general attack, were clearly faulty. He should have brought VI and III Corps and the Grenadier Reserve closer to the battle area. The crucial discrepancy in the timing of the attacks due to the delayed issue of orders during the night has been blamed on Grünne and Wimpffen, with Charles allegedly too exhausted to speed up the cumbersome process. However, because these two were the archduke’s immediate subordinates, their shortcomings have not attracted much attention.
Archduke John, whose advance patrols only reached the battle area after 4 p.m., when it already was too late, has become a favourite scapegoat. On 7 July Charles sent an angry note to John, declaring that ‘I am sorry to have to note that your appearance a few hours earlier and even with a few thousand men would have been decisive for the outcome of the battle’.15 But this remains speculation. Up until almost the last minute Napoleon retained the ability to disengage Marmont’s corps for action on the right wing and there always remained the infantry of the Old Guard. Even when, in the afternoon, Napoleon had committed almost all his reserves, it is doubtful that the appearance of some second-rate Austrian forces on the right French wing would have changed the situation in the centre. But this, too, is speculation. What is clear, however, is that John had been dilatory in executing his orders. After a long delay before marching out, he had moved with slow deliberation. He had heard the sound of the guns but failed to hurry and arrived eleven hours too late.
Of course, if John had arrived on the first day, the Austrian left wing would have been strengthened, though again wh
ether this would have altered the ultimate outcome remains doubtful. As it was, the archduke’s ire concentrated on Rosenberg, whom he blamed for losing the battle by his poor handling of troops. All the other corps commanders – Bellegarde, Kolowrat, Hohenzollern, Klenau and Liechtenstein – were promoted or decorated, though none had shown extraordinary combat leadership and certainly no initiative. Klenau had managed to conduct a competent retreat on the first day and, offsetting his hesitation to attack in the morning of the second day, that afternoon he again managed his retreat with great skill. Finally, Nordmann, the commander of the Advance Guard, has been unjustly criticized for allegedly having been totally surprised by the French river crossing; it has even been suggested that had he not been killed on 6 July at Markgrafneusiedl he would have been court-martialled.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 21