by J J Singh
Tibet was invaded in 1841 by a Dogra force from Ladakh led by General Zorawar Singh of the Sikh army of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Zorawar Singh advanced along the Indus Valley and captured areas up to Taklakot in the proximity of Lake Manasarovar and Mount Kailash. In retaliation, a combined force of Chinese and Tibetan armies was dispatched from Lhasa and the battle was joined by 10 December 1841. After an intense fight, during which Zorawar Singh was mortally wounded, the Dogra forces suffered a decisive defeat. The Dogra army of 6,000 under the Lahore flag was practically destroyed by both the enemy and Tibet’s murderously cold conditions. Reinforcements arrived from Kashmir by the spring of 1842 and the battle was joined once again near Chushul. The Chinese and Tibetan forces were prevented from capturing Leh and subsequently defeated. The Tibetan general was killed, and his forces retreated to Tibet. ‘Thus ended the war, and since its occurrence peace has remained undisturbed. In 1842, the frontier was demarcated by a party of Dogra and Chinese officials, together with Captain Cunningham and Lieutenant Strachey.’ At that time, the treaty of Chushul signed by the Chinese and the Sikhs clearly contained the words: ‘… to respect the old boundaries of Ladakh.’17 These boundaries, apparently, were well known to both sides, at least along the traditional routes and areas of settled populations. The gist of this treaty is given below (details in Appendix 1):
On this auspicious occasion, the second day of the month Asuj in the year 1899 we—the officers of Lhasa, viz. firstly, Kalon Sukanwala, and secondly Bakshi Sapju, commander of the forces of the Empire of China, on the one hand, and Dewan Hari Chand and Wazir Ratnu, on behalf of Raja Gulab Singh, on the other—agree together and swear before God that the friendship between Raja Gulab Singh and the Emperor of China and Lama Guru Sahib Lassawala [of Lhasa] will be kept and observed till eternity; for the traffic in shawl, pasham, and tea. We will observe our pledge to God, Gayatri, and Pasi. Wazir Mian Khusal Chu is witness.
In 1888, the British took advantage of a Tibetan incursion into Sikkim in the area of Jelep La and launched a military expedition to evict the Tibetans. Led by Colonel Graham, the British forces stormed the Tibetan stockade and entrenchments and drove the Tibetan forces over the Jelep La and into the Chumbi Valley, following them into it. But later, the British army were recalled to the Sikkimese side of the frontier in order to avoid complications with the Chinese. However, skirmishes and minor clashes continued for some time afterwards.
Apparently, the casus belli for the Tibetan incursion was the British penetration of Sikkim and their road developments there, the British possession of Darjeeling, issues relating to British India’s trade with Tibet and perceived loss of the sphere of influence of the lama king. From a British perspective, their military actions were undertaken to consolidate their acquisitions in the Darjeeling area and secure the flanks of Sikkim, which was their protectorate. After almost two years of negotiations, a treaty was signed between China and Britain in Calcutta on 17 March 1890. The Tibetan claim to suzerainty over Sikkim was given up, and the Sikkim–Tibet boundary was delimited. It was decided that trade issues would be settled later. However, as the Tibetans were neither a party to this convention nor concurred with it, they refused to comply with the terms of the agreement. Notwithstanding the Tibetan response, after hard bargaining by the two sides, the British and Chinese signed a ‘set of trade regulations’ on 5 December 1893. However, these were not allowed to be implemented by the Tibetans, who were in connivance with or had the tacit approval of the Chinese themselves!18
The intransigence of the Tibetans and the cold-shouldering by the Dalai Lama and his officials of British overtures to develop cordial relations and trade with Tibet led to strained relations between the two sides. Even letters from the office of the viceroy of India in 1900–01 were returned unopened from Tibet, an insult not easy for the British Empire to swallow. On the other hand, during the same period, the Grand Lama was corresponding with the Russian Tsar through his special envoys. This communication channel was facilitated by Lama Dorjieff, a suspected Russian plant in the Dalai Lama’s inner council and the mastermind of Russian intrigue and influence in Tibet. Though a Russian subject from the region of Lake Baikal, he was a Mongolian Buriat, and was to play an important role in Tibetan politics. He had been a monk at the famous Drepung monastery since 1880, and by 1888 had worked his way up to become the tutor and confidant of the young Dalai Lama. In 1901, he even led a group of Tibetans as the ‘Envoy Extraordinary of the Dalai Lama’ and was granted an audience by the Tsar.
The British were growing apprehensive of Russia gaining a hold over Tibet while the Chinese feared that Tibet might become a protectorate of the British. The ‘Great Game East’ was in full play; it was a period of high intrigue and machinations by Russia, China and Britain to bring Tibet into their respective spheres of influence. The Chinese Manchu Empire had been weakened by successive wars, beginning with the Opium Wars of 1839–42 and 1856–60, the Sino-French war of 1883–85, and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95. All these wars culminated in humiliating treaties being thrust on the Chinese. The impact of these treaties and subsequent events on the psyche of the Chinese led to the coinage of the phrase ‘a century of humiliation’, in reference to the period from the late 1840s to 1949, when the communists took power in China.
By virtue of the British Indian empire, with its headquarters at Calcutta, being the closest ‘power’ to Tibet proper, it took upon itself the responsibility of keeping all the other powers away, Tsarist Russia in particular. Though Lord Curzon had strong views on China’s questionable control over Tibet, which he described as a ‘constitutional fiction’, Whitehall did not see eye to eye with its Indian administration with regard to recommendations coming from India, which called for greater British involvement and presence in Tibet.
The British policy on Tibet swung from one extreme to another. Sometimes it was one of non-interference in or indifference to the internal affairs of Tibet, and sometimes it was to build cordial relations with Tibet in order to enhance the empire’s trade and commerce with it. From another standpoint Britain sometimes dealt with Tibet as if it were an independent entity and sometimes as if it were a country under Chinese suzerainty. There were many factors simultaneously at play, not easily comprehended by the policy initiators in British India, but which restrained the home government in England. On one occasion, in a rebuke, John Morley, the Secretary of State for India, had this to say to Lord Minto, the Viceroy and Governor General, in July 1906, ‘Britain “cannot have two foreign policies (emphasis added)”. The decision to discuss Central Asian questions with Russia had been made, and the Indian Government would have to abide by that decision. “Be we right or wrong,” he declared, “that is our policy (emphasis added)”.’19 The Foreign and India Offices of the home government believed they were able to see the big picture, and therefore were the unquestioned keepers of British imperial interests. The international power play, particularly Britain’s agreements on power, trade and influence-sharing with Russia, China, France and Japan, as also the impact of events in Tibet on developments in Afghanistan, Persia, Mongolia and South-East Asia had to be weighed and analysed before any actions could be taken on the ground. The image of Great Britain and the British Empire had to be upheld.
The Tibetans, the thirteenth Dalai Lama in particular, were extremely wary of British expansionism as they had witnessed the forced acquisition by the British of Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas from Sikkim and Bhutan, respectively, the British eviction of the intruding Tibetan army from Natong (presently called Nathang) in east Sikkim in 1888 by the use of overwhelming force, and British forays into Bhutan. At the same time, under the advice of Dorjieff, the Dalai Lama was emboldened to adopt a policy of indifference towards both the British and the Chinese, on the premise that he could depend on a benign Tsarist Russia for protection. The stage for Younghusband’s expedition to Lhasa was thus set.20
PART II
THE YOUNGHUSBAND EXPEDITION
Colonel F.E.
Younghusband
3
Clouds over Lhasa
At the turn of the nineteenth century the British Raj in India was at its zenith. India was the jewel in the crown of the British Empire. In China, on the other hand, the Qing dynasty was on its last legs. And Tibet, under the thirteenth Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso, was witnessing a period of absolute autonomy veering towards independence. The Tsarist Russian Empire was expanding southwards in an endeavour to exercise control over trade along the silk routes and to seek an outlet in the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The Great Game was being played out in the Central Asian highlands by the British and the Russians. Both powers were eyeing Tibet and intriguing and jockeying for influence in Lhasa. At this juncture, China’s influence in Tibet was almost non-existent. Nonetheless, all three players were keeping an eagle eye on the activities of the Dalai Lama.
Tibetan society, as at the dawn of the twentieth century, was lucidly described by Charles Bell thus:
It is the priests who exercise the check on the feudal lords. For the Tibetans believe devoutly in their form of Buddhism, and the powerful influence embraces all. Even Buddha himself can do but little without the priests … Thus it comes that this people, simple but intelligent, independent yet orderly, hospitable yet suspicious, fear foreign intrusion as they fear little else.1
The Viceroy of India at that time, Lord Curzon, needed no stimulus to demonstrate Britain’s determination to show the obstinate Dalai Lama his place and establish a hold on Tibet, and at the same time secure trading rights that were as beneficial to Britain as possible. The Russophobe that he was, keeping the Russian bear at bay was the pivot of his Tibet policy, even if that involved helping China regain its stature and prestige in Tibet. A categorical statement in an important communication to the home government on 8 January 1903 by Curzon explains his stance:
We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction—a political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to both parties.2
The weakening of the Chinese empire’s hold on Tibet at the turn of the century, coupled with British apprehensions about the expanding Russian influence over Tibet and the indifferent attitude evinced by the Grand Lama towards them, resulted in the famous British venture—the expedition led by Colonel F.E. Younghusband to Lhasa in 1903–04. This civil–military mission crossed the frozen heights of Jelep La in Sikkim in the winter of 1903 and entered Tibet through the Chumbi Valley. Their advance met with unexpected success and did not face any worthwhile resistance, except at Gyantse. Eventually, they pushed on to Lhasa, even though the expedition was not initially authorized to penetrate so deep into Tibet. This was the beginning of British involvement in the affairs of the hidden kingdom of Tibet. Though the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa before the expedition arrived at the gates of the ‘Forbidden City’, Younghusband was able to extract a treaty from the Tibetans that gave the British far-reaching influence in Tibetan affairs, greater presence in Tibet and greater trade between British India and Tibet.
Younghusband’s expedition provided an excellent opportunity to the British to launch a number of exploratory missions to uncharted tribal territories, both to the south as well as to the north of the Himalayan crest line. The aim of the British was to determine their natural and political boundary with Tibet, as also the northern limit of the sub-Himalayan tribal territory. (Among other things, the mystery of the Tsangpo river and its great bend, which was reported to cut across the Himalayas through one of the greatest gorges in the world, in the Pomed region, had to be conclusively resolved!) The Chinese reaction to this turn of events brought about an increased presence of their army and administration in south-eastern and central Tibet and also led to the fierce subjugation of eastern Tibet. A reign of terror was unleashed by the Chinese army under General Chao Erh-feng. His campaigns in the Marches in the Kham and other areas along the northern slopes of the eastern Himalayas are remembered to this day for their savage repression of the people. In fact, the resurgence of Chinese power in Tibet led to the thirteenth Dalai Lama fleeing to India in 1910. These events set in motion a chain reaction, and, for the first time, Chinese activity was witnessed in one or two places in close vicinity of the traditional border during 1910–12 in the hitherto unexplored tribal territories in the southern slopes of the Himalayas. The British surveyors and explorers were the first outsiders to enter this remote and extremely rugged, mountainous, high-altitude terrain inhabited by fiercely independent tribes. It is important to highlight that there was no credible presence of the Chinese ever in the territories south of the formidable Himalayan massif.
The ‘incremental invasion’ (more commonly referred to as ‘expedition’) of Tibet by British India, led by F.E. Younghusband in 1903–04, was an epochal mission. The strength and scope of the expedition also increased as it ventured deeper into Tibet. It ended Tibet’s seclusion and commenced a complex relationship between British India and Tibet. The reasons for the launch of this mission have been described earlier, but this event is historically significant as far as the geopolitics of the Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan frontier region is concerned, and it has had an enormous fallout over a full century and a decade, its reverberations being felt even today.
Cautious as the British were in their relations with China while safeguarding their ‘imperial interests’, primarily not wanting to upset their commerce and trade in the Shanghai region, the home government at first authorized a peaceful ‘expedition’ to Khamba Dzong in mid-1903. Khamba Dzong is an important border settlement, two days’ march into Tibet from north Sikkim across the 5,030-metre Kongra La. A British commission led by then major F.E. Younghusband was tasked with proceeding to Khamba Dzong to discuss and resolve trade and other contentious matters arising from non-adherence to the Sino-British Convention of 1890 and the Trade Agreement of 1893 by the Tibetans. The meeting had been agreed on by the three parties—British India, Tibet and China. Khamba Dzong was accessible only by an extremely difficult foot track going upstream along the Teesta river. Connecting the small villages of Lachen and Giaogong, going past the ‘crumbling mountain’, where temperature variations and the mildest of tremors of the earth send huge boulders and rocks rolling off the mountains even today, the track ascends to altitudes of over 4,500 metres, almost going up to the source of the Teesta in the glaciers of north Sikkim.
Khamba Dzong was probably chosen by the Tibetans to keep the negotiations away from the public eye and prevent the ‘firangis’ (the British) from entering the Chumbi Valley along the more frequented trade route from Darjeeling to Lhasa. It had been decided that the Tibetans would depute officials of appropriate status or rank to meet the British at the designated meeting point. In fact, the Chinese government had assured the expedition that their Amban would participate in these deliberations along with high-ranking Tibetan officials. Despite a wait of almost five months, it became apparent that neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans intended to honour their commitment to meet the British commission. As no high-ranking and influential Chinese official had been deputed, and those commissioners who arrived at the rendezvous were ‘uninfluential and of inferior rank’, the British referred the matter to Peking. They received a vague reply that indicated no firm date for the arrival of the Amban. Underscoring their indifference, the Tibetans too only sent low-ranking and ‘unapproachable’ officials to Khamba Dzong many weeks later. Meanwhile, a Tibetan force of about 3,000 was amassed, demanding withdrawal of the British mission that comprised, in addition to Younghusband, J.C. White, the resident of Sikkim, two officer-interpreters and an armed escort of 200 soldiers of the Sikh Pioneer Regiment. There was a backup reserve force of 300 British soldiers on the Sikkim side at Tangu. However, the stand-off remained peaceful.
As the Khamba Dzong mission had become abortive, in November 1903 the Government of India ordered occupation of Chumbi Valley and resumption of negotiations at Gyantse.
Lord Curzon was thus able to drive home the
necessity of launching an armed mission into Tibet in order to restore the prestige of the British Empire, bring to heel the Tibetan Grand Lama and his ministers and set the almost defunct commercial and trade relations between British India and Tibet on an even keel. This mission would also endeavour to prevent the Russians from consolidating their influence over Tibet and, the British hoped, put a stop to the intrigues being indulged in by Dorjieff and others at the Dalai Lama’s palace in Lhasa. ‘In fact, Agvan Dorjiev had met with Czar Nicholas in 1898, 1900 and 1901, each time having been sent by the Dalai Lama to establish closer relations with Russia. Dorjiev had convinced the Dalai Lama that the Russian Czar was sympathetic to Buddhism,’3 as narrated by Warren W. Smith.
According approval on 6 November 1903 to Lord Curzon’s recommendations based on his perceived aims, the home government of Britain assigned three tasks to the mission. The first was for it to advance without delay as far as Gyantse, using force if necessary, and insist that the Tibetans fulfil their treaty obligations. The second was to occupy the Chumbi Valley to display the earnestness of the mission, and the last was to withdraw as early as possible once ‘reparation’ had been ‘exacted from the Lamas’.4 This expedition was to be led by F.E. Younghusband, a commissioner with an acting rank of colonel, and its military component by Colonel James Ronald Leslie Macdonald, an officer from the Royal Corps of Engineers who was given the temporary rank of brigadier-general and placed under the command of Younghusband. At the same time, Macdonald began reporting directly to the commander-in-chief, India, from 29 September 1903.5