by J J Singh
Curiously, on 14 June 1913, a presidential order was issued appointing Ivan Chen and Hu Han-min, governor of Canton, as ‘Pacificators’ in Tibet. This measure was apparently a kind of red herring. The British questioned the Chinese motive for such a step while conveying their strong objection to Ivan Chen’s appointment as negotiator while he held the title of pacificator, and also conveyed to them that Hu Han-min was not acceptable at the conference because of his antecedents. The Chinese responded saying their order could not be rescinded but would be superseded. They also assured the British that the title of pacificator ‘carried no territorial powers’. It was at this juncture that the Chinese were cautioned that until the geographical limits of Tibet were determined in the conference, further advance of their army in eastern Tibet and the Marches was forbidden, and that hostilities must be suspended immediately. At the same time, the Chinese were also cautioned against further delay in dispatch of their plenipotentiary to the conference. They were told in no uncertain terms that the convention would commence on 6 October, with or without Ivan Chen.
Eventually, despite a lot of prodding, it was only on 2 August 1913 that a Chinese presidential order was signed formally appointing Ivan Chen as the special plenipotentiary for the Tibetan negotiations. The wording of the order is noteworthy:
It becomes the duty of this Government to order said plenipotentiary speedily to proceed to India, there to negotiate provisional treaty jointly with the plenipotentiary appointed by Great Britain and the Tibetan plenipotentiary, and to sign articles which may be agreed upon in order that all difficulties which have existed in the past may be dissolved.12
After a lot of dilly-dallying, Ivan Chen joined Archibald Rose for the voyage to India. They set sail from Shanghai for Calcutta on 3 September and arrived at Simla on 5 October 1913, in the nick of time for the convention.13
The Times, London, carried a report from Peking on 2 September 1913 on the departure of Ivan Chen for the Simla Conference. It said he was authorized to ‘conclude an agreement which shall comply with the requirements stated in the British Note of August, 1912’.
The article went on to say: ‘Naturally, China would now gladly accept any arrangement by which, through the good offices of Great Britain, her ancient position in Tibet would be restored.’ The British maintained that ‘we have done China a service in arranging the conference, but we have stipulated that the Tibetan and Chinese representatives shall meet on equal terms, and we are not likely to be guilty of tyrannically pressing upon Tibet the acceptance of any relationship with China that the Tibetans do not desire’.
In a report dated 30 August 1913 on the situation in Tibet, the British Legation in Peking said:
The question of the status of the Chinese and Tibetan delegates at the forthcoming conference continued to exercise the minds of the Chinese, and every effort was made to secure the subordination of the Tibetan representative. Finding that His Majesty’s Government was firm on this point, however, the President eventually withdrew his objections, and on 7 August a note was received from the Wai Chiao-pu duly recording the appointment of Mr Ivan Chen as Chinese Plenipotentiary for the purpose of concluding an agreement with the British and Tibetan representatives thus recognizing the tri-partite character of the negotiations.14
It was learnt by Viceroy Lord Hardinge as early as 17 June 1913 that Lonchen Shatra had been earmarked by the Grand Lama to be his representative for the tripartite talks in India, but it was officially announced only some time in July. The Dalai Lama announced that his prime minister, Lonchen Shatra, would be the Tibetan delegate at the convention, and empowered him appropriately. ‘“The Chief Minister, Shatra Paljor Dorje, is hereby authorised to decide on all questions which may benefit Tibet, and to seal all documents relating thereto”. He carried with him the seals of the three monasteries, of the National Assembly and of the Lonchens (ministers), and, on Bell’s advice, received later that of the Dalai Lama.’15 Lonchen Shatra had been part of the Dalai Lama’s entourage during the period of his exile in India, and was thus known to McMahon, and more closely to Bell. He was, goes a description, ‘a man of great ability and patriotism’; he had seldom travelled outside Tibet and was not a trained diplomat. But he had a charming and dignified presence and displayed ‘knowledge of men and a grasp of political affairs that came as a surprise to many at the Conference’.16 McMahon was highly impressed by the Tibetan plenipotentiary and spoke of his ‘simplicity and charm’, appreciating at the same time his ‘very great shrewdness and capability’. McMahon noted in his final memorandum: ‘The Lonchen proved quite his [Chen’s] match in debate and political acumen.’ These qualities ‘endeared’ him to all in Simla and Delhi.17 He was assisted by ‘Trimon, who had prepared detailed documentation on the legal status of Tibet, especially of the eastern border areas’.18
Both Ivan Chen and Lonchen Shatra were men of charming personality. The former had passed many years of his life in European chancelleries. Courteous and honourable, he did what he could to maintain the attitude of his Government, but remained on terms of personal friendship with us all.19
Unsure of the Chinese intentions in eastern Tibet, the Dalai Lama’s regime was anxious to see early commencement of the tripartite negotiations. Also, the Tibetan delegation, which included monastic representatives, was more than enthused by the prospect of sitting at the high table as equals of the British and the Chinese. They had arrived in Simla well in time, and evidently were well prepared, armed with voluminous data and documents.
13
The Conference Proceedings
Picturesque Simla, summer capital of the British Indian Empire, has been described as the ‘queen of hill stations’ in India. Nestled in the south-western ranges of the Himalayas at an average height of 2,400 metres, Simla was in its glory during the first decade of the twentieth century. With the Viceregal Lodge and the GHQ of the British Indian Army co-located there, the Raj, as the British Indian Empire came to be known, was governed from Simla during the summer months. With the presence of the viceroy and his staff and the commander-in-chief of the army and the General Staff, Simla was the most appropriate venue for the historic tripartite conference of the British, Chinese and Tibetan plenipotentiaries in 1913–14. McMahon’s task at the conference was facilitated immensely by the advice and guidance, as well as approvals, of the viceroy and the General Staff, who were readily forthcoming with help because of their proximity to the conference. Besides, assistance from the staff of the surveyor general, in terms of provision of constantly updated maps, was an invaluable contribution to the conference deliberations.
In anticipation of heightened political and diplomatic wranglings, Simla began to buzz with spies, efforts at subversion of delegates, intrigues and subterfuge. The main players in these matters were—besides, of course, British India—China, Russia and Japan. Russia wanted to have their consul general moved temporarily to Simla—but was discouraged from doing so on the pretext that he would be required in Calcutta by the Government of Bengal.1 The Japanese consulate general had their people snooping on the goings-on at the conference. In fact, the plenipotentiaries of both Tibet and China complained to McMahon of the overbearing presence of the Japanese in Simla.
The Chinese were keeping a watch on the proceedings through the collaborators of their secret agent, Lu Hsing-chi, based in Calcutta, as has been explained earlier. He had been occupied with a series of intrigues with the Tibetans and had ‘succeeded in introducing Tashi Wangdi as an intelligence officer into Lhasa’.2 In addition, going by his messages to Wai Chiao-pu, which were intercepted by the British, he seemed to have even won over a member of the Tibetan delegation, thus planting his mole at the conference to keep himself abreast of the latest developments there. Lu Hsing-chi is reported to have advised the Chinese government in the spring of 1914 to send ‘small forces’ to show their flag in Pomed and Zayul to justify their claim of ‘effective occupation’ of these areas at the conference. This the Chinese were attempting to d
o, considering the strategic importance to them of a direct link between Tibet and Yunnan, as highlighted earlier. Reports emanating from the British Legation in Peking also alluded to continuation of the Chinese advance into the Marches, despite the formal denials. The Chinese were therefore warned not to disturb the status quo. At the same time, the Chinese complaints alleging aggressive actions by the Tibetans appeared to have been exaggerated, possibly to create grounds to resume their offensive when the opportunity presented itself.3 The British, not to be left out, had also been keeping a close watch on the activities of the delegates and other foreigners in Simla. And of course they had been continuously and secretly monitoring all communications and other activities of Lu.
The Simla conference, described by Neville Maxwell, a journalist and a well-known author with a pro-China bias, as ‘an exercise in diplomacy, power politics, and espionage (emphasis added)’,4 commenced on 6 October 1913, although nothing more than introductions and the making of acquaintances occurred on that day. The schedule for the first formal meeting was finalized for 13 October. ‘When Tibetan, Chinese and British delegations finally met in the palace of the Maharaja of Darbhanga in Simla on October 6, 1913, the question was who could get most out of whom (emphasis added),’5 observed Dorothy Woodman. This palace was the erstwhile ‘Wheatfield’ house. Today it is a well-known residential school, Tara Hall.
The three plenipotentiaries had been asked, well in advance, to assemble at Simla on 6 October and did in fact meet on that day. This was also the time when the Chinese National Assembly elected Yuan Shih-k’ai as their president and Britain’s announcement of its recognition of the newly formed Republic of China was made (on 7 October). It was as if on cue that the British, along with a few other powers who had held back recognition of the Chinese republic as a lever all these days, were conceding it recognition. One can discern a pattern in these developments,6 but whether this was deliberate or a coincidence is still a matter of conjecture.
First Meeting: Simla, 13 October 1913
The conference proper was set in motion on 13 October with the election of McMahon as president. He welcomed the other two plenipotentiaries and their delegations, and commenced the proceedings with ‘interchange’ of the appointment warrants issued by the governments concerned. An agreement on the rules and procedures to be followed during the conference was also signed by all the delegates.
Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan plenipotentiary, then placed on the table the statement of Tibetan claims. This document was prefaced with a historical background of the centuries-old choe-yon (disciple and guru) relationship between the Manchu emperors and the Dalai Lamas. It also highlighted the recent Chinese acts of oppression in Tibet, specially the wanton killing of monks and the laity, and the razing of monasteries and destruction of religious scriptures. The conference then adjourned to study the documents.7
The essence of the Tibetan statement was that after the ‘defeat’ and subsequent ‘eviction’ of the Chinese from Tibet, Tibet now had an independent status. The document comprised six elements:
It sought ‘Repudiation by Tibet of the Anglo-Chinese Convention, 1906, and recognition of Tibet as independent State’.8 The material change in the situation in Tibet and its relations with China after the Chinese Revolution of 1911 was highlighted.
The Tibetan claim of the boundary was elaborated. It was based on history, tradition and ethnicity, and comprised areas inhabited by Tibetans. Its alignment was described as follows, ‘On the north of the Kuenlung range, the Altyn Tagh, the Tsedam range connecting the Altyn with the Ho Shili range, the Kakang Poto range … to the border of Kanshu Province of China, then in a southerly and south-easterly direction, including country of … Nyarong … Dartsendo, thence in a southerly direction to junction of boundaries of Szechuan and Yunnan, and thence along the boundary of Tibet to Rima.’9 In other words, this implied that Tibet was laying claim to territories and past revenues of Tibetan-inhabited areas such as the ‘district of Kokonor and the March country as far east as Tachienlu’.10 This issue consumed enormous time and created a fair bit of acrimony between the Tibetans and Chinese during the deliberations.
The document contained this statement: ‘That Great Britain and Tibet will revise Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 in mutual agreement, China having no longer any concern with them.’11
It emphasized that ‘in view of past troubles no Chinese Ambans or other officials and no Chinese soldiers or colonists would be allowed to enter or reside in Tibet, but that Chinese traders be admitted if authorised by Tibetan permits’.12
The document stipulated that the Dalai Lama should continue to exercise his present rights to ‘select the incarnation of the … Hutukhtu of Urga, and appoint his subordinate Lamas and officials’, and the present practice, in which ‘the people of Mongolia and Tibet send monks and pay large tribute to monasteries in Tibet and by which Buddhist monasteries and other religious institutions in Mongolia and Tibet recognise Dalai Lama as their religious head should continue’.13
The final clause related to compensation by China to Tibet ‘for all recent forcible extractions of money and property taken from Tibetan Government, for the revenue of Nyarong and other districts, for the destruction of houses and property of monastery officials and people of Tibet, and for damage done to persons and property of Nepalese and Ladakhis’.14
After his arrival in Simla around the beginning of October, and while awaiting commencement of the convention, Lonchen Shatra had probably sounded out or, more likely, taken the informal counsel of McMahon and his aide, Charles Bell, on his opening statement and the overall stand of the Tibetans. He had earlier consulted with Bell at Shigatse while on his way to India. Besides mentioning to Bell the terms the Dalai Lama wanted in the agreement, he had also also shown him letters sent by Chinese officials to the Dalai Lama, pressuring him to negotiate with them at Chamdo.15 Accordingly, as was evident from his depositions, Shatra adopted a logical, albeit maximalist, approach keeping a reasonable cushion for subsequent bargaining.
The Chinese delegation, not as well prepared as the Tibetans as far as documentary evidence was concerned, responded on 30 October by presenting the Chinese counter-claims. Ivan Chen had rendered a background brief describing the historical ties between the two nations since the seventh century. The brief highlighted, among other things, the military aid provided by the Chinese to evict the Zungarians in 1717, and later the Nepalese, and their payment of the recent indemnity to India as a consequence of the British expedition to Lhasa. The Chinese laid the blame squarely on the Dalai Lama and on his ‘intractability’ and his ‘ignorance of the international situation’ for the current state of relations ‘between the two peoples’.16 Refuting the claims of the Tibetans, which Chen dismissed as ‘inadmissable’, he proceeded to lay down China’s demands, stipulating that they were the ‘only basis’ for the deliberations on Tibet.17
The salient aspects of his document were:
First and foremost, that ‘Tibet forms integral part of territory of the Republic of China. Tibet will respect and Great Britain recognise all existing rights of China due to above territorial integrity.’ Also, in the preamble of this document, it had been emphasized that the Chinese republic ‘engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province, and Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it (emphasis added)’.
China wanted to retain the right to station an Amban in Lhasa with all ‘past privileges and rights, including escort of 2600 Chinese soldiers, of whom 1000 will be in Lhasa and remainder posted where Resident thinks fit’.18
As far as the ‘foreign and military affairs’ of Tibet were concerned, Tibet ‘undertakes to be guided’ by the Chinese and to ‘not enter into negotiations with any foreign Powers except through intermediary of Chinese Government’.19 This would not, it was clarified, apply to British commercial agents on ‘matters as are provided for’ by the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 and ‘confirmed’ by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.20
All Tibetans, including officials who had sided with the Chinese and who were facing the wrath of the Dalai Lama, were to be given amnesty, released from prison, and their properties restored.
The Chinese were prepared to discuss Clause 5 of the Tibetan claim relating to the Dalai Lama’s spiritual authority and religious donations.
If required, the Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908 may be revised by ‘all parties concerned’, based on ‘Article III of Adhesion Convention 1906’.21 That Convention effectively excluded the Tibetans.
Lastly, the Chinese defined the frontier between Tibet and China proper in an accompanying map to their document: ‘From Kunlum going south-east to Giamda and then runs southwards to the Tsangpo and follows the river to Gyala, and thence runs roughly in straight line through Menilkrai to N’Maikha river (Burma).’22 As one can appreciate, this boundary had been illogically and arbitrarily drawn, cutting across mountain ranges, rivers and valleys. This ridiculous and exaggerated claim was without much basis, except for vague assertions based on Chao Erh-feng’s forays and escapades, which had perhaps only touched some points along this line. Evidently, McMahon had anticipated cartographic aggression from both sides, but not to such an extent. The east–west claim lines running through Chiangta/Giamda (Chinese) and Tachienlu (Tibetan) were almost 1,600 kilometres apart (Figure 8)!23
Second Meeting: Simla, 18 November 1913