The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  After examining the claims of both sides, McMahon convened the second meeting of the conference on 18 November. However, he neither had an approved draft of the convention that he could place before the plenipotentiaries nor a clear idea of the southern limits of Tibet along the eastern Himalayas, as some of the important survey reports had not yet come in. The draft prepared earlier, in March 1913, by the India Office did not cater for a tripartite meeting, as initially the deliberations were envisaged to be bilateral, without the participation of the Tibetans.

  Between the north-eastern corner of Bhutan and the tri-junction of India, Tibet and Burma, there remained many unsurveyed ‘grey’ areas along the frontier of over 1,000 kilometres. Often shrouded in mist or clouds, this area had virgin, snow-covered mountains, which neither afforded easy access nor allowed for their positions to be fixed, particularly from the south, using the rudimentary survey equipment carried by the explorers of those times. Reports of the latest reconnaissance and survey carried out by Captains Bailey and Morshead and other inputs were anxiously awaited so that the existing maps could be updated. So McMahon continued to put up appearances to avoid giving the impression that he was intentionally delaying the proceedings, while at the same time acting as an ‘honest broker’.

  McMahon opened the conference by sharing his dilemma with his colleagues. He laid on the table a skeleton map, on which the widely divergent boundary claims of both sides were marked. He was ‘at a loss as to what was really Tibet’. He forthrightly conveyed to the Chinese and the Tibetans that it would not be possible to proceed further without an agreement on the ‘limits of Tibet’. Lonchen Shatra agreed with him, but Ivan Chen insisted on discussing the first two clauses of the Chinese document—relating to the status of Tibet and positioning of their Amban with an escort at Lhasa. Besides, Chen had no desire to discuss areas east of Batang as those were, according to his contention, part of China. He laboured hard on his position, stating that he was acting on specific instructions from his government. He also said he was under clear instructions not to discuss the issue of compensation at all.24

  Eventually, McMahon ended the debate by suggesting that the two sides hold informal meetings, iron out their differences and submit their claims so that he could form an opinion on them. At that stage, Chen said he would have to refer back to Peking for directions. In the meanwhile, to save time, McMahon proposed that he would continue discussions on the ‘limits of Tibet’ with the Tibetan plenipotentiary, although he would have preferred to do so with the Chinese delegate too present. Lonchen urged McMahon to share the revised claims and additional evidence of Tibetan claims with Ivan Chen ‘at the same time as the latter communicated the Chinese evidence to him, and not before (emphasis added)’. McMahon and Ivan Chen gave their assent to this request.25 After this meeting had concluded, Chen claimed illness and took to bed! McMahon appreciated that China would be uncomfortable with the idea of Britain’s bilateral parleys with the Tibetans, and would soon acquiesce to addressing the limits of Tibet. Not surprisingly, within a few days, on 23 November, the Chinese authorized Chen to enter into negotiations on the boundary.

  Keeping in mind the severe Simla winter and the fact that life almost came to a standstill here because of the copious snow and near-freezing temperatures, the venue of the conference was shifted to Delhi after the second meeting on 18 November. During their stay in Simla, the Chinese delegation had been accommodated in a cottage named ‘Oakover’, and the Tibetan delegation housed in a bungalow named ‘Mythe’.26 As in Simla, where ‘comfortable homes’ had been provided to the delegations by the British government, suitable accommodation was arranged for them in Delhi too.

  Informal Meetings: Delhi, December 1913

  The month of December 1913 was largely spent on a series of informal discussions between the Chinese and Tibetan delegates, moderated by McMahon’s able assistants, Bell and Rose, in the salubrious Delhi winter. McMahon believed that such discussions would allow the two plenipotentiaries to evolve the ‘best method of dealing with the intricate question of the frontiers’27 while helping him gain the much-needed time to finalize the memorandum in consultation with Whitehall.

  The first of these informal meetings took place on 5 December in Delhi at the request of Ivan Chen, who suggested that these ‘free and informal discussions’ should not be minuted, and that the decisions arrived at not be considered binding, until they had been confirmed at a formal meeting of the conference. This was agreed to by all.28 Thereafter, Chen proposed that the area under dispute between the Tibetan and Chinese claims should be discussed on ‘broad and general lines’. After some discussion, both sides concurred on this. Lonchen Shatra then announced that he would ask for a meeting as soon as the Tibetan archives fetched up and he was ready with his brief.

  Shatra called for the next meeting on 11 December, during which the two plenipotentiaries highlighted ‘their general cases for the frontiers claimed by their respective Governments’.29 It was clear that both sides had only reiterated their earlier stands and neither was prepared to concede any ground. Ivan Chen claimed that since the ‘time of the Mongol Dynasty (13th century)’ and until 1911, during the rule of the Manchus, China had ‘maintained an effective occupation of the country’. This conferred on China a ‘substantive right in international law’. The Chinese territorial claim extended ‘as far west as Giamda (Chiangta), and included the districts of Pomed, Zayul, Markham, Derge, Draya and Gyade’.

  Shatra countered Chen by saying: ‘Tibet had always been an independent country (emphasis added).’ Tibet had fought wars with China, and on one occasion a Chinese princess was given in marriage to the Tibetan monarch. A pillar exists at Marugang near Kokonor marking the boundary line, which touches the well-known bend of the Yellow River and goes down to Chorten Karpo in the vicinity of Tachienlu. Though titles were given by the Chinese to some border princes, the administration and collection of revenues and taxes in the country was always in Tibetan hands. After Shatra had had his say, it was decided that deliberations on these issues should be scheduled for the next day and continued on subsequent days, whenever any side wished to present ‘evidence in support of their claims’.30

  On 12 December, as the meeting progressed, it became obvious that the focus had begun to shift from definition of the boundary to the ‘political status’ of the border region. Chen, quoting from a book authored by a Chinese Amban at Lhasa, emphasized that a boundary pillar had been erected along the Ching Ning range in 1727 about 125 miles (201 kilometres) west of Batang. It had an inscription in Chinese, saying, ‘The country to the east is Chinese, the country to the west of it Tibetan.’31 This was dismissed by Lonchen Shatra, who said he ‘could not accept the evidence of a book which appeared to have no official authority’. He had proof that land titles of areas east of the pillar were granted by Lhasa authorities, who also administered the country inhabited by Tibetans extending to Tachienlu.32 The dichotomy of the Chinese position was clearly discernible. On one hand, Chen was emphasizing that Batang was the historical boundary, and on the other advancing the Chinese frontier westwards to Giamda near Lhasa.

  During the next meeting on 15 December, Ivan Chen, in order to buttress his claims, read out excerpts of John Jordan’s statement in an interview at the Wai Chiao-pu (Chinese Foreign Office) on 30 January 1913, saying that, according to Sir Alexander Hosie, the boundary pillar had been placed in the vicinity of Batang during emperor Kang Hsi’s rule.33 Chen went on to emphasize that although this pillar was a ‘historical boundary-mark’ the Chinese claim did not rest at that, and in fact their territories had been extended further west by Chao Erh-feng. Chen was resting his case heavily on the account in General Fu Sung-mu’s book highlighting the ‘frontier campaigns’ of Chao Erh-feng, and also on books by foreign authors like Thomas Holditch, an English geographer and author. To this, Lonchen retorted sharply that ‘Chao’s campaigns were rather in the nature of illegal raids than recognized conquests’.34 He demanded that documenta
ry evidence be furnished by Chen to admit the validity of his claim.

  When Lonchen Shatra was asked by Rose to produce evidence in support of the frontier pillars at Marugong and Chorten Kaspo (sic) mentioned in his statement, he proceeded to lay on the table copies of the Tibetan inscriptions on the pillars signifying the Sino-Tibetan Treaty of AD 822. Besides, Lonchen also cited an ‘original reference’ to these inscriptions in a book compiled by the fifth Dalai Lama on the history of Tibet, titled ‘The Golden Tree of the Index of the Sole Ornament of the World’ (Dzo-dan-zhonui Gaton Serdang Dzamling Gyanchig-gyi Karchap).35 Lonchen Shatra agreed to provide translations of these inscriptions during the next meeting.

  McMahon was content to allow these deliberations over a better part of December so that Whitehall had adequate time to consider his draft convention of 10 November. Besides, the vast spatial ‘divergence’ of the Chinese and Tibetan claims, which had been accompanied by a lot of wrangling and browbeating, did not offer much hope for resolution. This dead end, McMahon inferred, would allow both sides to get ‘disheartened’ with their respective stands and become more amenable to the ‘inevitable compromise’.36 The final informal meeting was called for on 19 December by the British representative. The discussions focused on the status of Nyarong and Derge, but Chen refused to discuss the subject as these places lay east of Batang. Instead, he was prepared to discuss Gyade and Gyamda, but Lonchen Shatra was not.

  Since the discussions were not making much headway even after several meetings, Chen proposed that both sides should hand over their ‘complete evidence’ regarding the frontier to the British plenipotentiary at the next meeting of the full conference. After examination of all the evidence, McMahon could then convey his opinion to his colleagues for their consideration. Both sides agreed on this, much to the relief of McMahon, who was grappling with the impasse caused by the vastly exaggerated, uncompromising and unreasonable stands of the two parties. The British team also felt that agreement to the proposed Indo-Tibetan frontier (to cover as much of the frontier as time permitted) should be obtained from the Tibetans before McMahon gave his opinions on the Tibet–China boundary.37

  The conference then adjourned and the plenipotentiaries took a break. Taking advantage of the Christmas holidays, Ivan Chen motored by road to Agra and other places of interest, and Lonchen Shatra decided to go on a pilgrimage to a Buddhist shrine. Both agreed to submit their comprehensive boundary claims in writing by 2 January, and with this the informal meetings came to an end.38

  McMahon had a monumental challenge ahead of him. He had to work out a solution that would satisfy the two contending parties while also keeping the best interests of the British Empire and the recent international events uppermost in mind. He had to keep in mind the Russo-Mongol Treaty of 1912, the Tibet–Mongol Treaty of 11 January 1913 (although not convincingly documented) and the Sino-Russia Treaty of 5 November 1913. He was aware that the Tibetan historical claims to Kokonor and other areas along the Marches down to Tachienlu were well substantiated with documentary evidence. However, the report dated 27 October 1913 of Louis King, the British intelligence officer positioned at Chengtu/Tachienlu to keep the Indian government informed of Chinese actions and other developments in the Marches, clearly indicated that Chinese presence and control in the Marches was more ‘substantial’ than what was accepted by the British.

  Under these circumstances, McMahon, with his vast experience and deeper understanding of the strategic dimensions of such a dispute, came up with the brilliant idea of creating two zones in Tibet. The core area of Tibet proper, extending up to Chiamdo, which was both politically and geographically under greater control of Lhasa, was to be called Outer Tibet; this region would enjoy a large degree of autonomy. The remainder of extended Tibet, inhabited mostly by Tibetans and encompassed within the boundaries claimed by Lonchen Shatra, of areas up to Kokonor, Batang and Tachienlu, and matching with the frontiers of the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang, Szechuan and Yunnan, would comprise Inner Tibet. Not akin to a Chinese province, Inner Tibet would see the Dalai Lama and the principal monasteries being permitted to exercise only religious control, whereas the Chinese would be free to ‘station officials, establish colonies and send troops there’.39

  This idea was apparently modelled on the zoning done by Russia in the case of Mongolia during 1912–13. McMahon’s reasoning and logic was sound and in consonance with the underlying British strategic thought. This step would ‘perpetuate and safeguard Tibetan (and, indirectly, British) interests in Inner Tibet (emphasis added)’,40 and also create a buffer around Tibet proper. Further, by including Chiamdo and Zayul in Outer Tibet, McMahon had endeavoured to secure an effective barrier between the frontier of north-east India and China. A tranquil border in north-east India with Tibet would prevent any friction between the British and Chinese Empires. However, the president of the conference did not share this idea of zoning with the other two plenipotentiaries till much later.

  Chamdo assumes strategic importance not only because it is an important communication hub but also because this region controls the main road, known as ‘Janglam’, from Peking to Lhasa, and some other routes. This area also dominates a number of difficult high-altitude passes and, in McMahon’s words, ‘is of greatest strategic importance between the Chinese headquarters and Lhasa’. Therefore, it came as no surprise when Chamdo emerged as a serious bone of contention between the Tibetans and the Chinese as the convention progressed.

  Third Meeting: Delhi, 12 January 1914

  Having analysed the two detailed claims, McMahon called for a full conference. Accordingly, the third meeting was held at Delhi on 12 January 1914. The specific purpose of this event was to give an opportunity to the Chinese and Tibetan plenipotentiaries to produce and present ‘statements of the evidence in regard to the respective frontiers claimed by them’.41 That having been accomplished, copies of the documents were then exchanged. It must be admitted that (as recorded in the proceedings) the Tibetans had brought to the conference a huge lot of records and documents (over ninety), many of which were in their original form. Amongst the important documents were ‘three original prints from the Lhasa Doring (stone pillar) showing both Chinese and Tibetan characters’.42 These were supported by Chinese, English and Tibetan translations. Going by the Tibetan records presented at the conference, this pillar was erected ‘about 1020 years ago’, as a consequence of Tibetan victories during the reign of King Nga-dag Tri-ral. He had ‘overrun several Chinese provinces and cities’, and a peace treaty was finally concluded using the good offices of important Chinese Hoshangs (Buddhist priests) and Tibetan lamas. Another document contained an extract from the fifth Dalai Lama’s book, Dzo-dan Zhon-nui Ga-ton (‘Delightful Feast for the Youth’). It was in block print and described the ‘setting up of the Doring (pillar)’, and the defining of the Sino-Tibet boundary from Merugang near Sining, going southwards to the well-known bend of the ‘Ma-chu (Huang Ho) river’ and finally joining ‘Chortenkarpo’, which was in the close vicinity of ‘Ya-chao in Szechuan’.43

  The Chinese representative stated that he and Lonchen Shatra had had five informal meetings on the Tibetan boundary since the last time the conference met at Simla. Being unable to arrive at any definitive conclusion on the Sino-Tibet frontier, they had agreed to hand over their claims for Sir McMahon’s ‘consideration and decision’. On receipt of his decision, they would convey it to their respective governments and seek directions.44

  Ivan Chen then placed on the table his statement of evidence to support the Chinese claims in Tibet. The areas claimed by the Chinese to the west of the historical boundary line that existed from 1727 to 1910, which ran in the north–south direction through Bum La on the Yangtze–Mekong watershed near Batang, were the areas where the short-lived raids (as the Tibetans referred to them) or ‘conquests’ of Chao Erh-feng were made during 1910–11. The prominent among these areas were Giamda (Chiangta), Shobando, Lhojong, Gyade, Dam, Pomed (Poyul), Pemakoi-chen, Zayul, Darge, Riwoche,
Enta, Chamdo, Gartok, Draya, Markham, and Tenk’e, some of them being the newly proposed districts of Hsikang province, the brainchild of Chao. Providing only broad justification—and little by way of original documentary evidence—for including these areas in China, Ivan Chen mentioned the ‘historic connections’ and ‘effective occupation’ of all these places, which would sanctify Chinese claims by international law.

  What he did not admit was that the Chinese had been evicted from most places west of Batang and the Mekong–Salween watershed by 1912 in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1911. The Chinese statement dealt with each region and advanced maximalist claims, some of them unsubstantiated or even incorrect. For example, it stated that Zayul was entirely ‘outside the pale of Tibetan control’, whereas in actual fact, on arrival for the first time in history at Rima in 1910, the Chinese had evicted the Tibetan Dzongpons who were till then controlling the villages near Rima extending to the southernmost limit—the Tibetan village of Sama. Beyond that lay the Mishmi tribal territory under the control of British India, its control exercised through the political officer based at Sadiya, Assam. The Chinese statement also recorded the passing of a bill by the National Assembly in Peking in 1912 making areas west of the historical Sino-Tibet boundary the ‘eighth division of the Parliamentary election districts of Szechuan’.45

  The list of these districts, along with their Chinese names ending with Fu, Chow, Ting or Hien (also called Hsien), was appended to the statement. The bill’s relevance is questionable, as by 1912 Chinese power and presence in Tibet had already begun to dissipate, and by early 1913 had almost disappeared; there were no Chinese left in Tibet proper for the first time in many centuries. It is significant that the Chinese side did not produce any authentic historical map (other than from the Tang dynasty period) that included the claimed territories or the claimed Sino-Tibet boundary, and relied heavily on a book by General Fu Sung-mu, Chao Erh-feng’s successor, and a book on Tibet authored by the Chinese Amban, Sung of Lhasa. According to Sung, there existed a pillar at Nyin-jin Shan-lin, the mountain range that forms the Yangtze–Mekong divide. This had an inscription of eight characters defining the boundary; it read: ‘East of this is China, west of this is Tibet (emphasis added).’46