by J J Singh
Soon the Chinese appeared to have had a change of heart, and their attitude suddenly became more purposeful as they did not want a ‘rupture’ of the conference. Chen spent about ten hours at the Foreign Office in serious deliberations, going over the draft convention ‘clause by clause’. Besides deletion of the indemnity clause, there was only some minor rephrasing of the text to make it sound more acceptable to the Wai Chiao-pu, and save face for China amongst the international community.69
Despite these back-breaking efforts, at the last minute the Chinese put another spanner in the works by making five new demands. These related to the proposed Sino-Tibetan boundary, specifically the limits and status of Tibet, which continued to be the main ‘stumbling block’. The Chinese, giving in incrementally, were now prepared to accept the Salween as their boundary with Tibet, but made some other vague and unreasonable demands. These, in brief, were:
Areas west of the Salween up to Giamda to have a level of autonomy that is different from the autonomy recognized for the core of Tibet around Lhasa (another red herring);
East of Salween, as well as Kokonor region, to be sovereign China;
Lastly, the Amdo region of thirty-nine tribes to remain autonomous but under loose Chinese control.
Despite McMahon’s (and others’) patience having been stretched to breaking point, McMahon acted maturely, agreeing to put these conditions on the agenda for the next day’s meeting.
Seventh Meeting: Simla, 22–27 April 1914
Although McMahon was clear in his mind that the conference was heading towards a dead end, he put up a brave front, believing that they were entering a decisive phase of the deliberations. Beginning with a résumé of the proceedings thus far, he drew the attention of the other two plenipotentiaries to the draft convention and the attached map, and asked them if they were prepared to initial them. Ivan Chen gave a negative response, on the grounds that the fresh demands made by his government were yet to be discussed. Lonchen Shatra replied that, considering the Chinese attitude, he could not be a party to an accord that would make Tibet sacrifice the prosperous districts of Derge and Nyarong and reinstate the Chinese Amban at Lhasa. The theatricals culminated in McMahon ordering the draft convention to be ‘withdrawn’. And, to the consternation of the other two colleagues, ‘it was removed from the table with as much ceremony as possible (emphasis added)’.70
Ivan Chen realized that he had probably made a miscalculation and that McMahon had not been making idle threats after all. However, much to the relief of the participants, McMahon announced that the conference was being adjourned for a day as he desired to give them one final chance to reconsider their stand. He also clarified that ‘the withdrawal of the Convention would not be absolute till the meeting actually terminated (emphasis added)’.71
Considering the fervent appeal by Ivan Chen to be provided another opportunity for consultations with the Wai Chiao-pu, McMahon agreed to reschedule the meeting after five days. The discussions were renewed on 27 April. The Chinese government’s latest instructions had been received by Ivan Chen only the previous evening. The Chinese had generally accepted the articles of the draft convention and the principles enunciated in it, but for Article IX relating to the boundary (China-Tibet). On this issue they insisted that their new demands be met, and Ivan Chen refused to initial the documents. He was then asked to retire to an adjacent room while McMahon, in a last-ditch attempt, asked Lonchen Shatra if a tract in the region of Kokonor lake could be excluded from Inner Tibet and made a part of China proper, and if it was acceptable that representation of Tibetans in the Chinese National Assembly would not apply to Outer Tibet. On getting Lonchen Shatra’s nod, both the draft convention and the accompanying map were duly modified and initialled by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra. On a closer examination of the map, one cannot fail to notice that a large strip of land in the vicinity of Kokonor lake and adjacent areas of Amdo and upper Huang Ho Valley had been sliced from Inner Tibet and made a part of China proper. This amendment of the boundary line was apparently carried out on 27 April itself, and had been initialled/signed and authenticated at both ends by the three plenipotentiaries, as shown in Figure 16 (in the case of Ivan Chen and Lonchen Shatra, one can notice their full signatures, which have been circled for emphasis). This area included the famous monastery of Kumbum near Sining, and was a substantial final concession given to China, in the hope that it would induce the Chinese plenipotentiary to come on board. That concession ploy indeed worked as intended.
Rose was then assigned the task of explaining to Chen the latest concessions offered by the Tibetans, as also the ramifications of China not initialling the convention. Most importantly, Rose told him, there was a distinct possibility of China losing its place in the tripartite conference and an Anglo-Tibetan accord being signed, excluding the Chinese. Thereafter, he left Ivan alone to contemplate what he had said and to deliberate over the documents already initialled by McMahon and Lonchen Shatra. Eventually, Ivan made up his mind to initial both the draft and the map. He re-entered the conference chamber and, much to the relief of all who were present, proceeded to complete the formalities. But not without a cautionary statement, according to an account: ‘He would feel bound to await definite authority from his Government before the Convention was formally signed and sealed.’72 (It needs to be pointed out that even on the documents which had to be initialled, the full signatures of Ivan Chen and Lonchen Shatra are clearly discernible.) At last, without any doubt, the concurrence of all three plenipotentiaries was obtained, on both the convention and the attached map.
Earlier, on 24–25 March, the Indo-Tibet boundary had been delineated and sanctified by signature and seal on large-scale maps by the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries and ratified by the two countries. This historic boundary has later acquired fame as the ‘McMahon Line’. This boundary was part of the ‘red line’, even though it was incorporated into a small-scale map, which formed an important adjunct of the Simla convention. A small-scale map condenses distance whereas in a large-scale map, it is zoomed in and hence contains more details.
McMahon thanked his colleagues and also felicitated them for the successful conclusion of the convention, saying it would be in ‘the best interests of our three countries (emphasis added)’.73
Alas, this was not to be, for on 29 April, Chen informed the foreign office that the Chinese government had ‘repudiated’ his signing of the convention! Though this announcement was not entirely unexpected, McMahon felt frustrated that the Chinese had disavowed a fair and just dispensation, completely unmindful of their current status in Tibet. This, according to him, displayed ‘their proverbial inability to recognise finality in any issue’.74 After repeated last-minute postponements of meetings to accommodate the Chinese plenipotentiary’s requests, having conceded most of the Chinese demands for changes in the wording of the convention, and after the territorial concessions granted to the Chinese side, this was extremely disappointing and ungracious on the part of the Wai Chiao-pu. The conniving role played by Lu Hsing-chi became well known by this time. Apparently, he was able to prevail upon the Wai Chiao-pu, not only to repudiate any agreement but to take other actions also. In one of his communications to the Chinese cabinet, dated 13 November 1913, he had counselled them to say: ‘I think that if, at the present conference, we can show some strength and can hold out for a short time, we may reap the fruit of success.’75 Besides, he had reassured Peking that the British had ‘no intention of usurping Tibet’.76 One British account says that Lu, in a note on 5 March 1914 to Peking, urged the Chinese ‘to hold fast to their present military position in Eastern Tibet, to meet our [British] proposals with a categorical refusal in Delhi, and a protest in London; to seize Pomed and Gyade, and, if possible, to make a forced march on Lhasa’. The ‘result of this Conference will have a far- reaching effect on China’s relations with other powers’, Lu assured Peking. His concluding remark on the situation was: ‘It will be impossible for the British to force upon China
any agreement which is distasteful to her.’77
In the event, the Chinese, acting as advised by Lu, raised the Tibet issue in Peking on 30 April through Dr Wellington Koo, deputed by Wai Chiao-pu, and on the next day in London through the Chinese minister, Lew Yuk-lin, who recommended that the venue of the conference should ‘forthwith’ be shifted to either Peking or London. In fact, Dr Koo had even alluded to Ivan Chen having been forced to agree to the convention. He held out a threat: ‘If the Indian Government tried to insist on the validity of this agreement … British commercial interests in the Yangtze valley might suffer (emphasis added).’78
Britain’s freedom of action during the Simla conference was restrained by its self-denying agreement of 1907 with Russia. It was now obliged to keep Russia informed of the essentials of the convention, particularly those aspects impinging on the agreed parameters of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. In view of many important developments since that accord—such as changes in Russo-Mongolian and Mongol-Tibet relations and the changed status of Tibet—the need to make necessary modifications in that agreement became unavoidable. The British policymakers at Whitehall were fully aware that the Russians, while acceding to their demands on Tibet, would definitely seek concessions in Persia, Afghanistan and perhaps Sinkiang too.79
During May 1914, parleys took place at St Petersburg, but Sazanov, the Russian foreign minister, proved to be a difficult negotiator. He made it clear that the ‘Tibetan and Mongolian question could not be related, because Mongolia had not been dealt with in the 1907 Convention’.80 As Russia had been assured that it would be apprised of the proceedings of the Simla Conference, the draft convention and the map showing the boundaries of Inner and Outer Tibet, the draft text of the new trade regulations, and the notes exchanged with respect to the Indo-Tibetan boundary (without the maps) were shared with the Russians on 4 May.81
Negotiations between Britain and Russia, specially with respect to three articles of the Simla Convention, consumed the whole of May 1914. The Russians wanted equal commercial and mining rights as would accrue to Britain, as contained in Article VI. The right granted to the British trade agent to visit Lhasa along with his escort to resolve issues which could not be settled by ‘correspondence or otherwise’, vide Article VIII, was requested to be offered to Russian trade agents too. Thirdly, Article X was unacceptable to the Russians, as its wording conveyed the sense that Tibet was a protectorate of Britain. The Russians said they would readily agree with the British if, ‘in case of any difference of opinion’, instead of the British being called upon to make an ‘equitable adjustment’, the article was rephrased to conclude ‘that the English text of the convention be deemed authoritative’.82
Compared with Russia’s unabashed involvement in Mongolia, the British appeared to be overly cautious and defensive in dealing with Tibetan affairs, even though the security of India’s north-eastern frontiers and the huge British investments in upper Assam were at stake. Moreover, China’s aggressive intent had become quite clear, right at the outset of the negotiations at Simla. Additionally, as a price for its concurrence, Russia wanted to secure some more concessions, such as the occasional visits by Russian agents to Herat, recognition of Russia’s ‘predominant interest’ in northern Persia, and an undertaking that British subjects’ demands for irrigation works, railways or industrial enterprises in northern Afghanistan would not receive any support from the British government. The Russians also demanded unhindered access for Russian subjects to Lhasa through India for pilgrimage purposes, which had been denied in some cases in the past.83
The Chinese attitude was dichotomous, intended to drag on negotiations interminably to avoid committing to a final decision. But the Chinese did not want to be seen as the party that broke off the negotiations. So they made allegations suggesting that their plenipotentiary had been pressured to initial the convention and that McMahon had been ‘partial’ to Tibet. It appears from the disavowal of their plenipotentiary’s signing of the convention that the Chinese doubted both the sincerity of McMahon and the capability or commitment of their plenipotentiary to safeguard China’s interests. This was why they sought to change the venue of the conference. Not being able to succeed in taking the parleys to London or Peking, the Chinese came up with a memorandum on 13 June, which was marginally different from their earlier position, but again quite unreasonable and unacceptable to the Tibetan and British sides.
Besides other reasons brought out forcefully by the Tibetan plenipotentiary, from the geostrategic perspective, the British too considered it essential that Outer Tibet should include both Gyade and Chamdo regions, as they dominated the northern and eastern roads to Lhasa and the difficult passes in their proximity.
On 25 June, Jordan was asked to hand over to the Wai Chiao-pu the British response to the Chinese memorandum of 13 June. In their memorandum, which rejected the Chinese claims, the British firmly conveyed a final concession, which, presumably, McMahon would be able to extract from the Tibetans. This was to consider the Kunlun, instead of the Altyn Tagh range, as the boundary between Tibet and China. With that the British memorandum went on to emphatically convey that the Chinese must withdraw all other claims and sign the convention without further delay, failing which, as they had cautioned earlier, Britain and Tibet would proceed to do so independently.84 The Chinese responded promptly on 30 June but their reply, in McMahon’s words, was ‘vague in its terms and unintelligible in its practical application’, and hence ‘entirely unacceptable’.85
Final Meeting: Simla, 3 July 1914
After almost nine months of gruelling and mostly frustrating discussions, presentations, diplomatic manoeuvring and the inevitable procrastination on China’s part, the final meeting was held on 3 July 1914, at 11:15 p.m. Amidst a lot of drama, McMahon, as a special gesture, had delayed the meeting to accommodate the Chinese envoy’s request for more time as he was awaiting a response to his latest recommendation to Peking. It would be no exaggeration to say that McMahon had yielded to the utmost to satisfy Chinese demands, even at the cost of Tibetan interests at times, in the hope that China would eventually sign the convention. Alas, all his efforts proved to be in vain. Realizing that the Chinese plenipotentiary was unable to append his signature on the document, McMahon then asked Lonchen Shatra whether he was prepared to initial the convention. His response was that having accepted the agreement on 27 April he would sign it, as instructed by his government. He remarked pointedly that it was despite some reservations about the agreement that his government had given the go-ahead to him. The British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries proceeded to initial and seal the convention, and to safeguard their national interests they also signed a ‘declaration that the Convention was binding on them and that so long as the Chinese Government withheld its signature it would be barred from the enjoyment of privileges accruing from the agreement (emphasis added)’.86 (See Appendix 4 for text.)
Ivan Chen made it known then that ‘the Chinese Government would not recognise any treaty or similar document that might now or hereafter be signed between Great Britain and Tibet (emphasis added)’.87 It may be of interest to note that notice of this final meeting, along with the draft of the convention, was intimated to the Chinese government well in advance. It was also conveyed to them that in the absence of accord from the Chinese, the British and the Tibetan plenipotentiaries would proceed to conclude the agreement ‘in the form (tri-partite) in which it had been communicated to the Chinese Government at Peking’.88 During the signing of the documents by Britain and Tibet, Ivan Chen retired to another room. However, he rejoined his contemporaries in the conference chamber for the closing event. A sombre McMahon delivered his concluding remarks, whose sentiment was shared by Lonchen Shatra too. McMahon acknowledged that the work of the conference had been arduous and trying for them all, and that in spite of the fact that their Chinese colleague had found it necessary to maintain an attitude of opposition and to meet their proposals in an uncompromising spirit, his courtesy througho
ut had been unfailing, and their personal relations had been unimpaired.89
As has been described above, every effort was made till the very end to persuade the Chinese plenipotentiary to obtain the approval of his government. As a matter of fact, McMahon conveyed to Ivan Chen through Rose the benefits China would derive by adhering to the convention. Briefly, they were:
Tibet would be under Chinese suzerainty, thereby implying that it may give up its claim to independence.
Tibetans would be prevailed upon to continue to accept the validity of the Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention of 1906, much against their will.
Acceptance of Tibet as a part of China was conveyed in an accompanying note, and not as a part of the text of the convention.
Posting of a high-ranking Chinese official at Lhasa with an escort of not more than 300 soldiers.
A say in the appointment of the Dalai Lama.
Possession of the rich and prosperous regions of Nyarong and Derge, although at the same time loss of the strategically located town of Chamdo, which at that moment was under Chinese control.
An end to the costly, exhausting and unending conflict in the eastern Kham region and peace and prosperity in the region—the principal reason for initiating the tripartite conference.
An opportunity to restore China’s lost prestige among the Tibetans.
In case the Chinese demurred, the field would be left open for Britain to operate freely in Tibet, without any restrictions on the size of their military escorts.90
Consequently, a window of a few days was kept open for Ivan Chen to consult with his government and endeavour to change their mind so that he could append his signature to the Simla Convention before the departure of the other two plenipotentiaries. The convention even indicated readiness to reassemble on 6 July should Ivan Chen by then be ‘in a position to sign the convention’.91