by J J Singh
Unlike in 1913, when it would have been possible to enter Tibet and survey the territory along the Rong Thod Chu valley to determine the alignment from the Tibetan side of the range rising to the Kangri Karpo peak, the short-lived Chinese presence in the Zayul region had prevented such an endeavour during 1911–12. There is a stretch of unbroken ridge dividing the Dibang and Zayul Valleys going in the north-west–south-east direction along the entire length of the Rong Thod Chu, from its source at the foot of Kangri Karpo to its confluence with Zayul Chu near Rima, from where it is known as the Lohit. Had an explorative venture eastwards, akin to Bailey’s and Morshead’s, from across the Kangri Karpo Pass been undertaken during 1913, it would have definitely helped McMahon draw his line with greater accuracy along the crest of the Kangri Karpo’s south-eastern ridge and down to the Glei Dakhru Pass, and eventually to the Lohit Valley, a distance of approximately 195 kilometres. That an anomaly was created by inaccurate or incomplete surveys is apparent. Based on the watershed principle, this inaccuracy could be easily rectified, as such small corrections and modifications on the basis of later surveys had been provided for in the Simla Convention.
It needs to be pointed out that in his confidential note written on 1 June 1912, the chief of General Staff had categorically said:
Although the survey and exploration work of the past season (October–May 1911–12) has not been so fruitful in results as might have been hoped for, yet much remains to be done before we shall be in a position accurately to define our frontier with China, much useful geographical and political information has been gained from which an indication can be given of the line the frontier should take.5
He recommended the following actions:
An exploring party, accompanied by a survey party, should proceed up the Delei valley to the top of the Glei Dakhru Pass. Last season the Mission only penetrated as far as Tajobum in this valley and the position of the Glei Dakhru Pass does not appear to have been correctly fixed, according to tribal evidence. It is necessary to determine the configuration of the watershed proposed as a frontier line in this region…6
An exploring and survey party should proceed up the Dibang valley to determine the course of the main river and configuration of the main ranges.7
This explains why the need to make minor variations in the agreement based on information or facts subsequently discovered was accepted by both India and Tibet in March 1914 at the time of their signing of the maps showing the Indo-Tibetan boundary. Basically, the McMahon Line followed the watershed alignment of the eastern Himalayas comprising three segments—the Zangnan Gudi range, including the glacial region of Gorichen and its knot of snow-covered peaks and glaciers; the range between the Subansiri and the Tsangpo/Siang, which rises gradually to end at the towering massif of Namcha Barwa (Figure 12); and the ridge that climbs sharply from the eastern edge of the Tsangpo gorge to the Kangri Karpo and then continues in the south-eastern direction to the Lohit Valley south of Rima. These three ranges formed the basis of the McMahon Line along the eastern Himalayas.
The western extremity of the line was decided by McMahon after very careful and detailed deliberations between him and Charles Bell and consultations with Bailey and Morshead. From the south of Mela Pass, moving eastwards along the most prominent ridge, the red line was fixed referencing the village of Pangchen on the Indian side and Le in Tibet. As described by Bailey, the people of Le were dressed differently from the people on the Pangchen side. Even though there were Monpa villages up to Trimo, which lay 16 kilometres upstream along the Namjyang Chu, the people here looked ‘very Tibetan in their appearance’. Halfway between Le and Trimo there was a Tsukang or custom collection point, where tax was collected on all goods, people and animals moving up into Tibet. As recorded by Bailey and Morshead, the tax was 10 per cent of the cost of the merchandise; and half a tanka per person and one tanka per animal (four tankas equalled one Indian rupee). The official who collected the tax was an agent of the Dzongpon of Tsona Dzong, the district headquarters, located about 40 kilometres to the north-east. There was another Tsukang on the eastern trade route to Tsona Dzong from Tawang (passing through the area referred to as the Bumla Pass). Interestingly, no taxes were levied for ‘goods going down from Tsona’, whereas the Monpas and other tribal people going up from Tawang area had to pay the same.8 Keeping all this in mind, McMahon concluded, with a fair degree of accuracy, that the alignment of the boundary should lie on the southern side of the two custom houses (Figure 10). As highlighted by McMahon in his memorandum of 28 March 1914:
… the boundary line in the west follows the crest of the mountain range [Zangnan Gudi] which runs from peak 21431 [Gori Chen] through Tu Lung La and Menlakathong La to the Bhutan border. This is the highest mountain range in this tract of country. To the north of it are people of Tibetan descent; to the south the inhabitants are of Bhutanese and Aka extraction. It is unquestionably the correct boundary.9
It may be of interest to note that Desideri, a Jesuit missionary who lived in Lhasa for several years during the second and third decades of the eighteenth century, had written of Tsari as a place lying on the extreme borders of Tibet. He writes that further east of Tsari lay Congbo, which marched with the ‘people called Lhoba, which means southern people … Not even the Tibetans, who are close neighbours and have many dealings with them, are allowed to enter their country, but are obliged to stop on the frontier to barter goods.’10
China was not directly involved when these deliberations were taking place, but once this boundary was formalized it formed an intrinsic part of the tripartite discussions on delimitation of the frontiers of Tibet. The boundary was clearly indicated with a thick red line on the maps, but on a small scale (1 inch=60 miles). This line, when transposed on modern maps, could mean a band about 2 kilometres wide. A discerning Wai Chiao-pu could not possibly have missed the boundary alignment showing the southern limits of Tibet in the Kongbo, Pomed, Zayul and Taraon Valley areas along the Himalayan watershed, particularly when the Chinese themselves had designs to create their new province, Hsikang, which would encompass some of these areas as well as the Marches along the Kham region. At no stage of the deliberations did the Chinese raise any objections or make observations on the McMahon Line as it appeared in the maps in question, right from 17 February 1914—when Tibet’s limits as a geographical and political entity were laid on the table for the first time during the fourth meeting of the conference held at Delhi—till the final meeting on 3 July 1914, when the conference terminated in Simla.
As a matter of fact, during Chao Erh-feng’s campaign in 1910–11, the Chinese had planned (though never executed) an extensive survey of their projected boundary running eastwards from Chiangta (Gyamda) in Kongbo to Pomed and then in an absurd southward thrust to Mebo near Pasighat along the Brahmaputra, then continuing further eastwards to Sama in the Rong Thod Chu Valley and thereafter crossing over the Irrawaddy headwaters to Sung-t’a on the Salween (the southern boundary of Hsikang). This survey team was to be led by the chief of the survey section at Chengtu, Fu Hsieh-ch’en, who had two other members, Ch’u Cen-hsieng and Chao Chuang-hsuan. The team was asked ‘to map the frontiers adjacent to Assam and northern Burma, in order that the diplomatic blunders in the Kachin Hills of Yunnan may be avoided when negotiations are begun for the delimitation of this part of the border’.11
At about the same time, another team under Chiang Feng-ch’i, accompanied by an English-speaking interpreter, Chao Yang-yun, and a guide, Shu Chin-liang, was sent from Chengtu straight to Zayul to parley (chiao-she) with an English forces, as the Chinese had learnt that ‘English troops were furtively entering’ the Zayul area.12 It is therefore difficult to believe that the Chinese were not aware of the alignment of McMahon’s red line, which delineated Tibet’s southern boundary with north-east India. That China had at no stage raised any objection to this part of the boundary is also a known fact.
As mentioned earlier, the Indo-Tibetan boundary along the eastern Himalayas w
as delineated on a set of fairly large-scale maps (1 inch: 8 miles) that were formally signed and sealed on 24–25 March 1914. McMahon’s formal note of 24 March 1914 to Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan plenipotentiary, said:
In February last you accepted the India–Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your Government and the undermentioned conditions:
The Tibetan ownership in private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.
If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day’s march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.
I understand that your Government has now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions. I shall be glad to learn definitely from you that this is the case.
You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Jong and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr. Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished him the further information, which you have promised.
The final settlement of this India–Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.
Delhi, 24th March 1914, A.H. McMahon.
Lonchen Shatra had already received approval for this from the Dalai Lama’s government, and he replied to McMahon the next day. A translated version of his reply says:
As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you, subject to the conditions mentioned in your letter, dated the 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.13
Sent on the 29th day of the 1st Month of the Wood-Tiger year (25th March 1914) by Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary.
Seal of Lonchen Shatra.
These historical documents have not merely been signed by the plenipotentiaries of Tibet and British India but have the approval of the two governments too. The Indo-Tibetan boundary shown in the two map sheets on a fairly large scale, duly signed by both plenipotentiaries, has thus acquired a high standing and sanctity. It needs to be appreciated that in those times dispatch of dak by courier from Simla to Lhasa and back would have involved travel by train to Siliguri, thereafter by pony, then by yak and on foot to Lhasa via the Chumbi Valley. The whole process could easily take three to four weeks by the fastest means! It is to the credit of Charles Bell and Lonchen Shatra that these vital inputs were obtained in time for the convention to be signed. What has not received the desired recognition and acclaim was the delimitation of the Indo-Tibetan boundary by McMahon on a large-scale map-set, which was indeed a far-sighted and visionary idea. It has been aptly described that his ‘object in obtaining this detailed mutual agreement with the Tibetan Government regarding this section of the India–Tibet boundary has been to minimise as far as possible the chances of future misunderstanding and dispute on the subject. This section of frontier in question, although over 1,280 kilometres in length, has hitherto been absolutely undefined.’14
PART VI
POST-SIMLA, WORLD WAR I
AND AFTER
‘Unless we learn how to protect our land, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, the Father and the Son, the upholders of the Buddhist faith, the glorious incarnations, all will go under and leave no trace behind.’1
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama
15
Dalai Lama’s Temporal, Spiritual Rule Reinstated
The Simla Convention failed to conclude on a tripartite basis. However, it was fairly successful from the point of view of British India and Tibet, and both countries benefited from it. Having refused to sign the convention, China was deprived of the benefits the convention would have fetched it, such as having suzerainty over Tibet, almost total control (save ecclesiastical) over Inner Tibet, and a presence at Lhasa after reinstatement of its Amban with an escort. However, the Tibet issue was overtaken by events in Europe, as the First World War started within a month of the Simla Conference ending. The fate of an orphan-like Tibet was thus consigned to the sidelines of history for the next four decades.
The somewhat inconclusive and abrupt ending of the Simla Conference should not be seen as a failure, as some scholars have held it to be. Though it was given no publicity, as the British wanted to keep the Tibetan issue low-key, the outcome of the deliberations from October 1913 to July 1914 was significant in many ways. Britain, China and Tibet, the three protagonists, were impacted geopolitically, strategically and economically. While Britain played the role of an ‘honest broker’, there were in this exercise huge stakes for the British Indian Empire, which McMahon never lost sight of. Foremost among them was the security of India’s northern frontier, the north-eastern segment in particular. As far as the Chinese were concerned, their continued procrastination and reluctance to conclude any agreement except on unreasonably favourable terms to themselves, which were totally out of tune with reality, deprived them of a number of advantages. Their loss from not signing the convention was Tibet’s gain, and the British Empire’s too.
Tibet’s new-found independence from the Chinese yoke made it yearn for international recognition. That is why the Dalai Lama had readily agreed, from the outset, to be part of the tripartite convention to discuss the Sino-Tibetan situation. And now Tibet found the convention an excellent opportunity with which to consolidate its status, which was analogous to that achieved recently by Mongolia. Tibet did not have to accept being ‘a part of China’ which, much against its wishes, adherence of China to the convention would have implied. Besides, the division of Tibet into ‘Inner Tibet’ and ‘Outer Tibet’ was avoided, and the prestige and authority of the Dalai Lama as its spiritual and temporal ruler, as the Chen-re-zi and avatar of Buddha, were restored.
Tibet also gained the reassurance and support of a world power (Great Britain) that had no aspirations of making her a protectorate or acquiring her territory. This support was not completely wholehearted, and was carefully nuanced by Britain, keeping in mind its larger imperial interests. That was why, in spite of the obdurate and uncooperative attitude of China during the entire period of the Simla Conference, Britain had continued to maintain that Tibet should be ‘fully autonomous’ yet remain under Chinese ‘suzerainty’, notwithstanding the ambiguous interpretation of these terms in the Asiatic context.
Although Tibet felt secure from the south, its eastern flank continued to be inflamed because of the border war with China. Also, threat of a Chinese invasion from Szechuan, like the one led by Chao Erh-feng, loomed large. But this time the Tibetans were determined to resist any Chinese advance; their resolve was somewhat strengthened by the supply of British arms, ammunition and military training.
Significantly, during the Simla Conference, Britain and Tibet formalized, with signatures and seals, the Indo-Tibetan boundary, the now-famous McMahon Line, delineated from the north-eastern corner of Bhutan to Isu Razi Pass in northern Burma on a set of two large-scale maps as mentioned earlier.
The British were always cognizant of the natural geographical divide running along the Himalayan watershed, although they restricted their administrative boundary to the foothills. Though the Chinese were not co-opted in the boundary discussions between the Tibetans and the British team led by Charles Bell, they were provided the map, although one on a much smaller scale (1 inch: 60 miles), which was part of the draft convention which was initialled or signed by all the three plenipotentiaries on 27 April 1914. The prominent
ly marked red line outlining the limits of Tibet, commencing from the north-eastern tip of Bhutan to Isu Razi Pass on the Mekong–Salween divide, following the traditional frontiers with Yunnan, Szechuan and Xinjiang provinces and terminating near the western extremity of the Kunlun range, was definitely scrutinized by the Chinese delegation prior to the signing of the document. The map, despite its small scale, had the latitude and longitude grids as well as prominent place names in English, Tibetan and Chinese, leaving little ground for misinterpretation.
The Chinese did accept the boundary delineated by the ‘red line’ (McMahon’s alignment) from the tri-junction of India, China and Burma to the Isu Razi Pass, but they have not agreed to the validity of this very line up to the present day, as far as settling their boundary with India is concerned. Incidentally, near its western extremity, this line runs between Tsona Dzong and Tawang (both marked on the map), showing Tawang well on the Indian side of the boundary. In fact, there was a much lesser known but equally prominent ‘blue line’ marked on the same map, defining the boundary between Tibet and China. This was vehemently opposed by the Chinese, and this was the reason why the Simla Convention eventually failed to fetch their adherence. But the Chinese had no problem with the red line and McMahon’s alignment of the Indo-Tibetan boundary, either during the conference or even later. In light of this, their objection to this line in the present times is difficult to reconcile with.
The Military General Staff and survey teams attached to the politico-military British expeditions provided extremely valuable inputs and reports to McMahon for formulation of the boundary. But for these timely inputs, including vital information on the geography, geopolitics, Tibet’s southern limits, the country’s administrative reach and the ethnicity of peoples on both sides of the Himalayan divide gathered by the intrepid adventurers Captains Bailey and Morshead, McMahon would not have been in a position to draw up the Indo-Tibetan boundary.