by J J Singh
During another path-breaking visit by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee to China in 2003, both countries forged a commitment at the highest political level to move ahead purposefully and to resolve the boundary question peacefully. The two sides agreed to raise the level of discussions and appoint ‘special representatives’ at the apex level, handpicked by their respective premiers, to ‘explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement’. This step was necessitated as the deliberations of the JWG and the Experts Group had not yielded worthwhile results, despite a decade and a half of negotiations. It was realized by both sides that without a political stimulus, resolution of the boundary problem would be impossible.
Taking note of the growing entente in Indo-US relations as the twenty-first century got under way, the Chinese were compelled to try a different tack in their strategy and begin to mend fences with India. In a very significant visit to India during April 2005 by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, both sides in an accord underscored that Sino-Indian ties ‘have now acquired a global and strategic character’. The two countries agreed to establish a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity.17
Along with this, a historic, and in my view one of the most important, agreement between India and China, titled Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question, was concluded by the two sides on 11 April 2005 (Appendix 7). In this agreement, the emphasis was on finding a ‘political’ resolution of the boundary problem keeping in mind the countries’ ‘long-term interests and overall bilateral relationship’.18 India reiterated its one-China policy and re-emphasized that Tibet was an autonomous region of China (Appendix 7). In a conciliatory and belated reciprocal gesture, the Chinese, for the first time, acknowledged that Sikkim was a state of India. Trade between Sikkim and Chumbi Valley in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) commenced via the historic Nathu La (as agreed in 2003). Significantly, China admitted India was an important developing country and had an increasingly important influence in the international arena. It said it understood and supported India’s aspirations to play an active role in the UN and in international affairs.
Articles III, V and VII of the agreement (Appendix 7) are of great significance, as they can greatly assist in defining the framework of the proposed solution to the boundary problem in the future. Article III talks of ‘mutually acceptable adjustments to their (the two countries’) respective positions on the boundary question so as to arrive at a package settlement’; Article V has spelt out factors for consideration—such as ‘historical evidence’, ‘national sentiments’ and ‘sensitivities’ of both sides; and Article VII has underscored that ‘both sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations’.
This agreement might pave the way forward, as considerable pragmatism and flexibility have been introduced to help achieve a breakthrough. Any mutually acceptable solution will eventually have to be an exercise carried out objectively and pragmatically, based on this agreement. Importantly, the two countries have decided to put in place a ‘strategic cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity’, thereby raising the level of ties between them. After arduous efforts of almost a decade, a framework for this agreement is being evolved as a ‘strategic objective’ by the special representatives of the prime ministers of the two nations as part of their negotiations to arrive at an ‘early solution’ to this thorny issue. Another agreement signed during the Wen Jiabao’s visit related to the protocol governing the modalities for implementation of the CBMs along the LAC.19
During the China visit of India’s defence minister, Pranab Mukherjee, in 2006, the first Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation was signed, ushering in an era of enhanced defence exchanges involving ‘annual defence dialogue, joint military exercises and cooperation in “search and rescue”, counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations’. Building on this, in May 2007, as chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, I led a tri-service delegation to China. We were very warmly welcomed and accorded high protocol. We called on Vice President Zeng Quinghong and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechie. While shaking hands with the vice-president, I summoned the courage to say, ‘Excellency, when our two nations shake hands, the world sits up to watch.’ He acknowledged that with a smile. Having met the Chinese military hierarchy and visited their army, naval and air force bases, we worked out the details of the first defence dialogue and the joint training exercises to be held in 2007–08 and beyond. These events have taken place regularly thereafter, barring one or two years in between. President Hu Jintao paid a four-day visit to India in November 2006, during which a ‘ten-pronged strategy’ was drawn up in a joint declaration intended to take the India–China relationship to a ‘qualitatively new level’. Besides a number of initiatives launched under this agreement to reinforce the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, it was agreed to establish new consulates general in Guangzhou and Kolkata.
This relationship was further extended by the articulation and signing of a protocol titled ‘A Shared Vision for the 21st Century’ by Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao at Beijing on 14 January 2008, in which the two leaders resolved to ‘promote the building of a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity’.20 This document also underlined the countries’ common positions on a number of international and regional matters, and some bilateral ones. It concluded by emphasizing that ‘the two sides recognise the responsibilities and obligations of the two countries to the international community. The two sides are determined to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between the people of China and India, for the betterment of both countries and to bring about a brighter future for humanity.’21 (See Appendix 8.)
China regards its ties with India as one of its most important bilateral relationships, said President Xi Jinping, during his meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in March 2013. He said he saw the current period as one of strategic opportunities, and said both countries had ‘a similar mission to boost their social and economic development’. On the boundary issue, he said both countries should make good use of the mechanism of special representatives and ‘strive for a fair and rational solution framework as soon as possible’.22 With a new regime led by President Xi Jinping having taken charge in China from March 2013 and with the new BJP government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi assuming power in India in 2014 with a massive mandate, the expectations of the people have risen as far as a solution to our boundary problem and other issues are concerned. The two powerful leaders represent one-third of the world’s population, and are expected to mould relations between India and China to create a stable and peaceful environment in the region.
We have witnessed two important reciprocal visits by these two leaders, the first by President Xi Jinping in September 2014 and the second by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2015. These visits have further consolidated our strategic partnership and strengthened the foundation of a mutually respectful relationship, with a large number of multidimensional agreements and MoUs being signed. On the complex boundary issue, Modi highlighted the importance of ‘resuming the process of clarification of the LAC as a first step’. As conveyed by Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to his counterpart Nehru, on 4 November 1962, ‘in the east it [the LAC] coincides with the McMahon Line and in the west and in the middle sector it coincides with the traditional boundary as put forth by the Chinese’; therefore taking the matter forward and demarcating the LAC on the ground should be feasible with some accommodation by both sides.
The Chinese could have been more forthcoming and positive on India’s permanent membership of the reformed UN Security Council and for India’s membership of export control regimes like Nuclear Suppliers Group,23 thus forging closer cooperation with India in international affairs. As explained earlier, it is an acknowledged fact that the Chinese are very sensitive to the growing strategic partnership between the US and India since the beginning of this century. T
he four-day visit by President Bill Clinton to India in May 2000, with a five-hour halt in Pakistan en route, was a clear indicator of the direction in which relations between the US and India were headed. This wide-ranging and meaningful relationship has continued to ‘blossom’ during the terms of US presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama and now Donald Trump. Accordingly, China has displayed a large measure of warmth and a positive approach to evolving a strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity with India—particularly starting with the visit of Wen Jiabao to India—hoping to lure India away from the US, or at least prevent our bonds with that country from becoming stronger. There is undoubtably an all-encompassing relationship that is emerging between India and China which, besides the security dimension, also spans the political, economic and cultural aspects, and people-to-people ties. Besides these bilateral deliberations, the aspect of cooperation on many multilateral issues relating to the war against terror, climate control and World Trade Organization (WTO) has enhanced the scope of our engagement with China. Based on policy decisions taken during the high-level meetings described above, mechanisms have been put in place to evolve answers to various complex issues we are faced with, beginning with the boundary problem.
At the highest political level are the special representatives appointed by the two governments. Based on the ‘political parameters and broad framework’ enunciated by this apex body, which was created in 2003 during Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit, the officials who form part of the JWG undertake follow-up actions. They are assisted by the officials of the multidisciplinary Expert Groups who work at the functional level. These bodies had been meeting regularly, and although progress appeared to be slow, it was in the right direction. However, in due course of time these groups were to be replaced by a group referred to as Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs, created in 2012 by an agreement between the two countries. The aim of this mechanism, comprising joint secretary–level officials of the MEA and MoD, including the army form the Indian side, and their counterparts from China, is to handle important border matters.
Specifically, they have been tasked with ensuring peace and tranquility and to enhance CBMs along the border, in keeping with the agreements of 1993, 1996, and 2005. They have been designated to act as mediators in case the mechanism of Border Personnel Meetings (BPMs) fails to resolve problems on the ground, and to ‘study ways and means to conduct and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between military personnel and establishments of the two sides in the border areas’.
This mechanism has been seriously tested on a few occasions—when there were tense face-offs at Depsang Valley in the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) sector (2013), at Chumar in Demchok area (2014), both in Ladakh, and at Doklam (2017)—and has acquitted itself with credit by preventing the situations from escalating out of control.
The special representatives adopted a ‘three-stage process’ for their assignment. The first step was accomplished when both sides came to a landmark comprehensive agreement on the ‘guiding principles and political parameters’ in 2005. Now they are focusing on evolving a ‘framework’ for the settlement of the LAC as their second step. The third and last step will entail delineation of the boundary based on the agreed framework. They have had nineteen rounds of talks so far, during which there has been little tangible progress. It appears that the process has again been stalemated while evolving the framework for resolution of the boundary dispute. As a matter of fact, since the boundary problem is very complex, the scope of this high political-level dialogue between the special representatives has been enlarged to include macro-level bilateral and multilateral issues covering subjects such as security and counter-terrorism, sharing of river waters, trade and commerce, WTO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), nuclear energy and the enhancing of mutual trust and cooperation. These are issues also discussed during the ‘strategic dialogues’ at the foreign secretary level. It is apparent that there are various layers of mechanisms ascending from the ground level to the national leadership to ensure peace on the India–China border.
That this approach has worked is borne out by the fact that there has been no armed skirmish or encounter along the long frontier of over 4,000 kilometres for the past half-century. Regular visits on a reciprocal basis have been taking place by the defence ministers and the chiefs of the three forces of the two countries, and military-to-military ties have shown a remarkable rise. Regular meetings between field commanders take place at selected places on the border to resolve local issues as part of the various CBMs in force and to create goodwill by celebrating each other’s national days and holding sports competitions.
There are incursions across the LAC by both sides on account of their varying perceptions as to where the border lies in certain areas, but there has never been an armed clash since the 1967 flare-up at Nathu La in Sikkim and the tense and conflict-prone situations at a few places: the Sumdurong Chu incident in Arunachal Pradesh during 1986–87 and the Doklam crisis of 2017 being two examples. A number of CBMs are now in place in the military field along the LAC which have helped to reduce tensions at the border considerably. A hotline between the HQs of both militaries is under consideration, and the details are being worked out. These negotiations are expected to throw up solutions that would be mutually acceptable, fair and reasonable.
While this process is on, top priority must be given to determination and demarcation of the Line of Actual Control, albeit without prejudice to the position of both sides as far as the boundary is concerned. To resolve a complex problem like this it has to be understood that no straightforward or universally applicable principle can be rigidly applied. Geography does not follow cardinal directions or make available an unbroken chain of mountains to facilitate the creation of an undisputable boundary, so there are going to be problems. But mutual adjustments have to be made by both countries so that the impasse is broken. Leaving aside the populated areas, small adjustments of the boundary in the uninhabited high-altitude Himalayan wilderness would be in the interest of both countries. This would be an eminently commendable and viable step to take at this historical juncture, when both nations are moving to centre stage in world affairs. Although finding a solution to a complex problem such as the boundary dispute between China and India is not going to be easy, our understanding of present-day China must factor in the Chinese psyche and their civilizational traits, as I have explained earlier, to arrive at a resolution. Ultimately, if we take pains to study and analyse the Chinese, they would not appear 8 feet tall!
22
The Way Forward
‘To follow a path of peaceful development and development through cooperation not only meets the common interests of China and India, the two largest developing countries in the world, but also does a great service to Asia and the world at large.’
—Xi Jinping (Xinhua PLA Daily)
Going by history, custom and tradition, Asian countries had frontiers that were not barriers to people-to-people contact and trade. With the advent of the colonial era, the concept of ‘nation states’ and colonies with defined boundaries and ‘spheres of influence’ was introduced in South Asia. Can South Asia become like Europe, where people live peacefully and where seamless movement from one nation to the other is possible, with only the language on the signboards indicating change of country? What we need in the twenty-first century is a peaceful environment in the region, free movement of people and ease of trade. We could begin this within some of the SAARC or BIMSTEC countries as a first step. That this has commenced to some extent is true in the case of India with respect to Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. Perhaps the same is achievable in the foreseeable future with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives too. This would definitely engender a ripple effect in other countries of South-East Asia and ASEAN too. Next we should pursue with vigour and perseverance the resolution of the boundary and other problems with China and Pakistan. This will augur well for a stable, peaceful a
nd prosperous Asia.
Relations between the two Asian giants, barring the border war of 1962, have been friendly for centuries together. During the first decade and a half of our Independence, we were dealing with the new communist People’s Republic of China, with its hard-core communist leadership and war-hardened People’s Liberation Army bloodied in the Korean War. This army was led by generals who had survived the Long March and the civil war and had fought in Korea too. Chairman Mao Zedong had a demi-god kind of persona and enjoyed unquestioned political and military power. Zhou Enlai was a pragmatic and mature veteran of the civil war, endowed with a sharp mind. He had a phenomenal memory, and quickly acquired enviable diplomatic finesse. He appeared to have mastered the art of changing goalposts when required, and of adroitly fielding embarrassing questions with vague replies such as ‘the time is not ripe’ or referring to vexing matters as ‘issues left over by history’ and so on. However, this genre of leadership and their mandarins did not hesitate to employ chicanery, deceit and force to achieve their aims.
On the Indian side, there were few leaders besides Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel with any world vision. Unfortunately, Patel passed away prematurely and Nehru, though a visionary, was found wanting as far as understanding of matters military was concerned. What is of great significance is that he was held in such awe that no one questioned his policy decisions, especially on foreign affairs. At the professional and functional level, most of the leadership in the bureaucracy, foreign service, military and intelligence had been catapulted into the higher ranks at the time of Independence even when they did not possess the desired level of experience and maturity. This led to a general lack of coordination and teamwork, and to incorrect assessments and decision making. It was this flawed understanding on both sides that led to the Sino-Indian border war in 1962.