by Dwayne Day
The corona problem never went away entirely. Since it was most noticeable on the first frames when the film had been exposed to the vacuum of space for some time, the cameras were usually started a few frames before reaching the target so that only unaffected film was used over the target. After changes were made to the film rollers, and careful precautions were taken, corona ceased to be a major problem.74
While the corona problem required a special committee and a lot of effort to find a solution, CORONA program engineers continued to work on correcting other flaws and making improvements to the system. After each mission, project engineers made minor adjustments to equipment being prepared for future flights. More important, top officials from the major contractors (Lockheed, Itek, and General Electric) met with representatives from NPIC, the CIA, and the Air Force. First they discussed the mission’s performance, evaluating the quality of the images and any problems (such as film stretching or flaking). After discussing possible fixes, they proposed improvements to the overall system.
CORONA satellites were procured in “batches” of six spacecraft each. The general rule was that no design changes would be made inside a batch; adjustments would be allowed only when starting a new batch. But ideas for improvements came so rapidly—particularly from the photo-interpreters at NPIC who were using the imagery and running head-first into its limitations—that the CORONA engineers began inserting changes within the batches.75 Horizon and stellar cameras were added to provide accurate positioning data on the spacecraft. A stereo camera system was placed on the KH-4, an Index camera essentially took the place of the KH-5 ARGON, and fiducia markers (small, evenly spaced lines) were incorporated for taking measurements from the film.
SAMOS
As CORONA evolved, unplanned developments had an impact on the program. The original plan called for the use of only nineteen Thor rockets, but rocket—and camera—quotas had been reached by late 1960, with only one successful film-return mission. The ARGON mapping mission, with its own requirement for Thor boosters, had been added to the program, taking over a mission previously handled by the Air Force. The Air Force’s SAMOS program, which had been expected to replace the “interim” CORONA program, was running into delays and cost overruns. Concern about this situation, as well as a desire to ensure that the program was focused on national intelligence needs as opposed to Air Force intelligence needs, led to the creation of the Office of Satellite and Missile Systems in the Pentagon in August 1960.76 This office did not report through the normal chain of command at the Air Force, but to upper levels of the Pentagon.77
A float test of a CORONA film-return bucket off the coast of California (probably near Santa Barbara) in the mid-1960s. The buckets had a salt plug that after a day would completely dissolve, and the bucket would fill with water and sink, assuring that it would not be retrieved by an adversary. (Photo courtesy of A. Roy Burks)
Since CORONA was showing the first signs of success, and SAMOS was delayed while its management was overhauled, the CORONA program was extended and improvements made to its camera system. This kept the CIA in the satellite reconnaissance business. Although CORONA was still not intended to be a permanent program, it would continue until SAMOS could replace it.
By 1960, SAMOS consisted of four separate reconnaissance projects: SAMOS E-1, a readout satellite that would broadcast its data to the ground via radio and with 100-foot resolution of ground targets (it was primarily a test of the equipment); SAMOS E-2, a readout high-magnification surveillance camera with a design resolution of 20 feet; SAMOS E-5, a film-return high-magnification satellite with a design resolution of 5 feet; and SAMOS E-6 (sometimes referred to as SAMOS 201), a film-return high-magnification satellite with a design resolution of 8 feet.78 SAMOS E-6 was to be manufactured by a different contractor than the other satellites to create a redundant satellite production capability.79 SAMOS also consisted of dedicated ELINT (electronic intelligence) satellites, as well as attached payloads and smaller “ferret” satellites.80
The Air Force’s SAMOS program included a film-recovery program as well as the film-readout system because top Air Force officials eventually recognized that film return, even though slower than film readout, had its own benefits—specifically higher resolution. So the Air Force decided to develop a film-return satellite independent of CORONA before CORONA became operational. But in June 1959, ARPA deferred developing a recoverable capsule for the SAMOS program; it withdrew support for it in the 1960 budget, halting the Air Force’s plan for a film-return satellite of its own.81 This action greatly displeased Lieutenant General Bernard Schriever, who was then head of the Air Research and Development Command. Schriever sent a letter to Air Force Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White: “Should the ARPA decline to continue the recovery program … it is recommended that the Air Force immediately support this urgent development.”82 Responding for White, Deputy Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay replied, “I am completely sympathetic with your point of view and have taken action through Secretarial channels to restate the Air Force requirement to the director of ARPA and request reconsideration of its support in FY 60.”83
ARPA had been established in February 1958 to oversee the United States’ military space programs. Although it had some oversight of the “Discoverer” aspect of the CORONA program, it did not exert much real authority on the covert reconnaissance program; CORONA managers strove to keep ARPA in the dark about what they were doing. In other areas of the military space program, however, ARPA exerted a great deal of control, such as over SAMOS and MIDAS. ARPA was not popular with the Air Force, which viewed it as infringing on its decisionmaking authority on space issues. ARPA was not popular with the other services for many of the same reasons, although they also feared that the Air Force would predominate if ARPA was simply eliminated.
In April 1959, the Chief of Naval Operations urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to create a single military space agency. The Army, rapidly losing its space program to NASA, agreed. The Air Force Chief of Staff objected and stated that this would remove weapons systems from the unified commands. Within three months White House and DoD officials were exploring the idea of a separate military space agency, tentatively called the Defense Astronautical Agency, which would report directly to the JCS; command would rotate among the services.84
That September, the Secretary of Defense rejected the idea of a separate military space agency. He returned military space responsibility to the separate services from ARPA. Booster development went to the Air Force; payload development went to the Army, Navy, and Air Force based upon competence and primary interest.85 ARPA now became simply a technology development agency for the Department of Defense. With ARPA out of the way, the Air Force began full-scale development of its own film-recovery system, the SAMOS E-5, followed in 1960 by a second film-recovery program, SAMOS E-6.
The first SAMOS film-readout satellite launch took place on October 11, 1960. The associated press release contained considerable information on the satellite, including the fact that it carried a photographic payload. But the satellite never reached orbit. A second SAMOS launch took place in January 1961; this time the press release omitted a reference to the photographic payload. The satellite successfully reached orbit and its film-readout system began operating. But by this time, SAMOS E-2 was only a technology demonstrator and not intended to become operational.
The Air Force pursued the film-readout version of SAMOS as a means of obtaining battlefield reconnaissance. For this mission, timeliness—getting the images back quickly so that military actions could be based on them—was more important than resolution or area coverage. SAMOS E-2 was intended to fulfill this requirement and to stay in orbit much longer than the short-lived CORONA satellites. One of the limitations on such a system was that the satellite had to carry enough film for its entire mission. Another, more important limitation was the amount of data that could be transmitted over the radio link to the ground. As the satellite passed over the ground station
with its nose pointed at the earth, it would slowly rotate in order to keep the side with the radio antenna pointed at the ground station to extend the data transmission time.86 Because of the need for security, the ground stations had to be located within the United States. There was just no way to transmit a great amount of data from the satellite before the satellite moved out of range of the ground station.87
The Air Force began flying the SAMOS E-5 satellites in 1961. Equipped with solar panels and a more sophisticated panoramic camera than CORONA, the E-5 was expected to produce higher-resolution coverage of a smaller area. The first E-5, launched in November, failed to reach orbit; a subsequent mission in December reached orbit but did not return successfully. A third mission in March 1962 also reached orbit, but failed to return its film. SAMOS E-5 was soon canceled, and the remaining four or five cameras built for the program were placed in a classified government warehouse.
SAMOS E-6 conducted five launches beginning in April 1962. Like all reconnaissance systems, it suffered startup problems and did not successfully return film until November 1962. By this time its capabilities were not really any better than the KH-4 with its MURAL cameras. SAMOS E-6 was eventually canceled like its predecessors. The “intended successor” to CORONA had proved to be a bust.
FAILED PHOENIX: KH-6 LANYARD
In April 1960, the last successful U-2 mission over the Soviet Union photographed a prototype ABM facility at Sary Shagan. Two years later, CORONA returned a similar image from near Tallinn in Estonia. CIA officials were worried that this was an indication of Soviet deployment of an operational ABM system. But they needed more information to determine if the missiles were intended to shoot down ballistic missiles or aircraft; the CORONA images were not adequate.
In 1962, the director of the CIA’s newly created Directorate of Research was Dr. Herbert “Pete” Scoville. After learning of the unusual facilities at Tallinn, Scoville asked Undersecretary of the Air Force and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office Joseph V. Charyk for help. Charyk agreed to pull the SAMOS E-5 cameras out of storage and develop a “crash” program to place them aboard rockets and launch them into orbit.88 Their target would be the suspected Tallinn ABM facility. This effort was envisioned at best as a temporary program.
Two Lockheed engineers from the CORONA program, Bob Leeper and Bill Cotrell, traveled to the warehouse to evaluate the condition of the cameras for operational use. The E-5 had a 66-inch focal length, which required that it not be mounted through the diameter of the satellite (like the CORONA cameras), but lengthwise. The camera was a single-lens cell that obtained stereoscopic coverage by swinging a mirror through a 30-degree angle. Leeper and Cotrell found the cameras in good condition.89 Soon thereafter, the E-5 cameras were transported to Itek for refurbishment. The E-5 camera and the spacecraft that Lockheed built for it were named the KH-6 and given the code name LANYARD. They were adapted for use with an Agena D upper stage and an uprated Thor booster.90
Five LANYARD spacecraft were produced. Of these, only three were launched. The first launch took place on March 18, 1963, atop the second “Thrust Augmented Thor,” or TAT, Agena D rocket. The TAT was a Thor rocket with three small solid rocket boosters strapped alongside. The Agena D was a more powerful version of the basic Agena vehicle with bigger fuel tanks. The Agena D was developed by Lockheed due to the fact that the company had practically custom-built several different versions of the Agena B for military and civilian payloads. The Agena D standardized the basic spacecraft control bus. Systems unique to each payload could be plugged into the forward section of the Agena, thereby increasing its versatility. Its reliability and precise pointing capability were valuable assets for reconnaissance missions. A few years later, the Agena would be adapted for tests with NASA’s Gemini spacecraft and become the standard upper stage for U.S. military space missions for the next 24 years, with over 360 launches.
The first LANYARD mission, given the designation Mission 8001, also carried a Lockheed-built P-11 scientific subsatellite. It did not reach orbit due to a problem with the Agena D. Mission 8002, launched in May, reached orbit, but its Agena D malfunctioned in flight. Mission 8003, launched at the end of July, also reached orbit, but its camera failed after 32 hours. The camera suffered from lens-focusing problems due to thermal failures. The thermal effects were corrected in cameras still on the ground.91 Intended to produce imagery with two-feet resolution, LANYARD reportedly achieved no better than six feet resolution—which was still better than CORONA imagery at the time. The stopgap LANYARD program was soon canceled. After many years of debate, it was determined that the Tallinn site was not really an ABM facility. Despite the lack of success with LANYARD itself, it did test several systems for later use: the Agena D saw use on KH-4 Mission 9038 in June 1962 and then was adopted for CORONA as the standard upper stage to be combined with the TAT.
THE “INTERIM” PROGRAM BECOMES PERMANENT
The next major upgrade of the CORONA came with the introduction of the KH-4A, first launched on August 24, 1963.92 Because of the substantial differences in this vehicle, KH-4A launches were given a new mission launch sequence. Thus, even though it was the fifty-eighth launch in the CORONA/ARGON series, it was labeled Mission 1001.
The primary modification to the basic KH-4 design was the addition of a second SRV behind the first. This was commonly referred to as a “two-bucket system.” For the KH-4A the film strips had to be sent to two take-up spools in two separate reentry vehicles. Engineers designed a transfer roller into the hub of the take-up spool in the second satellite recovery vehicle (SRV-2), which was closest to the cameras. This allowed the film to wind around the transfer roller and exit the SRV. They also installed an intermediate roller assembly, which was mounted to a vehicle bulkhead just in front of the forward panoramic camera.
As the film strip left the camera, it went into the intermediate roller assembly and then into and out of SRV-2 by means of the transfer roller in the hub of SRV-2. The film then went back to the intermediate roller assembly, which redirected it past SRV-2, through a film-cutter and into SRV-1, where it was connected to the take-up reel.
When the two film take-up reels in SRV-1 were full, or when ground controllers felt that the SRV contained critical information, the controllers sent a command to the spacecraft to cut the film. The forward cut ends of the two film strips (one per camera) would be wrapped up into SRV-1 and then the door seal closed. The rear cut ends of the film would be wrapped onto the SRV-2 spools.93 SRV-1 would then detach from the spacecraft, leaving SRV-2 ready to accept film from the cameras.
The spacecraft could be stored in orbit in a passive, or “zombie,” mode for up to 21 days, although missions usually lasted no more than 15 days.94 This change in mission profile required a major redesign of the command and control mechanisms on the spacecraft. It also allowed a significant increase in the film load. While KH-1 and KH-2 had flown with no more than 20 pounds of film, the KH-4A eventually carried up to 160 pounds of film for its two buckets. The camera system, known as the J-1, was essentially identical to the MURAL camera. The only changes required were to double the capacity of the film-supply cassette and to strengthen the main support plates to accommodate the increased weight.95 Resolution was slightly improved to 9 to 25 feet, although it was occasionally as good as 7 feet.96
Several other improvements were incorporated into the KH-4A during its lifetime. An independent, self-contained subsystem known as LIFEBOAT was built into the Agena. LIFEBOAT could be activated to recover the SRV in the event of an Agena power failure. The more powerful Thorad rocket was introduced with Mission 1036 and became standard five missions later, in May 1967. The Thorad was a TAT version of the Thor with more fuel. Small “drag make-up units” were also added to the Agena. Because CORONA operated with a low perigee to increase its resolution, it suffered from atmospheric drag, which threatened to de-orbit it prematurely. The drag make-up units were small rockets that could be fired individually at desired intervals to increa
se the vehicle’s velocity and boost it back up to the proper orbit.97
The KH-4A had some troubles. Initially it experienced a severe heat problem, later corrected by improving shielding, altering the paint pattern on the vehicle, and reducing the thermal sensitivity of the camera. On the first mission, the master horizon camera remained open for extended periods of time, seriously fogging the panoramic photography. Its current inverter also failed in midflight, making it impossible to recover the second SRV.
During the peak of the CORONA program, there was a standing requirement to have six spacecraft at the AP facility ready to launch within 30 days. CORONA was never launched that often, however, and usually maintained a pace of approximately one satellite launch per month.98 The KH-4A returned a truly massive amount of intelligence data. KH-1 through KH-4 had returned a total of 285,472 feet of film; KH-4A alone returned 1,293,025 feet.99 This flood of data revolutionized the field of intelligence analysis in general and photo-interpretation in particular.
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF CORONA
At the time the KH-4A was introduced in 1963, the CIA was still in charge of the CORONA payload. It managed the CORONA program from the Operations Division of the Office of Special Activities under the Directorate of Research, headed by Deputy Director (Research) Pete Scoville.100 The Operations Division had five branches: the Control Center, OXCART Branch, CORONA/ARGON Branch, IDEALIST Branch, and the Weather Branch. OXCART was the code name for the supersonic A-12 reconnaissance airplane. IDEALIST was the code name for the U-2. OXCART, an exciting and challenging program, was occupying the time of many of those in the Operations Division. By contrast, CORONA had become routine, almost boring.