by Dwayne Day
26. Robert A. McDonald, “CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance, A Look into the Cold War, and a Revolution for Intelligence,” PE&RS 61 (June 1995): 694–95.
27. There was a horizon photo on each end, so about 33 inches of film was transported during each cycle.
28. Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 13.
29. Later, Itek hired and trained enough craftsmen to fabricate all elements internally. The production rate increased from one lens every two months to eight lenses every month (ibid., 19–22).
30. McDonald, “CORONA,” 718.
31. In 1954, Kodak film expert Henry Yutzy told Edwin Land about a new thin-based Mylar film under development at Kodak. Yutzy said that Kodak saw little future for such films, but Land knew that such films were vital to aerial reconnaissance and convinced Yutzy that Kodak should continue such research out of patriotic duty. Donald E. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology: Origins of a Directorate,” Studies in Intelligence 30 (Summer 1986): 25, found in RG 263, NARA.
32. The performance of a rocket as it exhausts its fuel becomes somewhat unpredictable. The Atlas rocket had sufficient power to spare and could be shut down before running out of fuel, thus allowing a more accurate orbit to be attained. The Thor, however, was already being pushed to its limits early in the CORONA program.
33. Greer, “CORONA,” 19.
34. Col. C. L. Battle, USAF, and J. W. Plummer, “The Discoverer Program,” Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 2175–61, [n.d.], 13.
35. Greer, “CORONA,” 20–21.
36. “CORONA Program Profile,” Lockheed Press Release, May 1995. It should also be noted that the morale of those working on the program is somewhat disputed by those were involved at the time. Several people, such as Charlie Murphy and Frank Buzard, have stated that they did not think the program was in jeopardy at that time. Clearly, however, CORONA was using up its initial batch of allocated Thor booster rockets and the SAMOS program was already conducting launches, albeit without success.
37. Greer, “CORONA,” 21.
38. Buzard interview.
39. Ibid.
40. According to Charlie Murphy, Jim Plummer was responsible for installing the flag aboard the capsule. Plummer did this under a classified Air Force contract—something that he found quite amusing.
41. The CORONA development team in Palo Alto celebrated at a local hotel and threw Jim Plummer into the swimming pool.
42. Usually the entire bucket was transferred to the West Coast sealed inside a light-tight bag and a large steel drum. Light-sensitive film was placed inside the bag to help determine if any accidental exposure occurred during the trip.
43. As the missions became routine, the film canisters were shipped east with a CIA courier via commercial airline flights. Bob Leeper, interview by Dwayne A. Day, June 27, 1996.
44. “A Point in Time,” and Greer, “CORONA,” 24.
45. Bill Crimmins, interview by Dwayne A. Day, August 8, 1996.
46. Clouds were always a worry for satellite photoreconnaissance. Early CORONA missions averaged 50–60 percent cloud cover. This improved over the lifetime of the program due to two reasons: improved satellite control technology, and better weather forecasting equipment and models. For early CORONA missions, there was no way to alter the camera switch-on and -off commands after launch. The commands were all on a piece of Mylar tape. If controllers knew that there was going to be heavy cloud cover over a target, they could not do anything about it. This was even more problematic because during the early days of the program they could not accurately control the period of the satellite (the time it took to orbit the earth, which was determined by the altitude). The period determined the satellite’s ground track. The result was that a satellite could be a considerable distance from where it was supposed to be after launch and the controllers would not know precisely what territory it was covering at any specific moment. Eventually the Lockheed team, led by Jim Plummer, was able to insert a command function into the spacecraft that allowed controllers to tell it to obey or ignore a camera-on command on the Mylar tape. As the launch vehicle became more powerful, the satellite’s controllers were able to achieve more precise orbital periods as well, and the Agena B upper stage included small motors that allowed them to place the satellite in a more precise orbit. Finally, ground-based satellite tracking improved. All of these improvements dramatically increased the productivity of the missions. If controllers knew there were clouds over the target and knew that the satellite was going to pass over that area, they simply ordered the spacecraft to ignore the scheduled command to turn on the cameras. This was the usual practice, but if the target had a high priority, they took the photos anyway and hoped for the best. By the end of the CORONA program, cloud cover had been reduced to around 27 percent. Dino Brugioni, interview by Dwayne A. Day, November 6, 1996, and Charlie Murphy, interview by Dwayne A. Day, December 5, 1996.
47. A popular story is that word apparently came down from Washington that all information about the flight was to be suppressed. Those in possession of the capsule took this to mean that the vehicle should be destroyed and so they altered the bucket with sledgehammers and then dropped the battered capsule in San Francisco Bay. A different, apparently phony bucket was later presented to the U.S. Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, where even today it is still labeled “Discoverer XIV.” According to several of those involved in the program, the story is simply not true and the capsule in the Air Force museum is indeed that from the successful film mission. Some components of the buckets, such as the radio beacons, were eventually re-used, but the buckets were cut up and dumped in the ocean, according to several sources.
48. CORONA, ed. Ruffner, 41–42.
49. Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. (Deleted), Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), August 9, 1960, contained in CORONA, ed. Ruffner, 43.
50. The “Mushroom Factory” earned its nickname from those who worked there for two reasons: it was always damp in the Pentagon basement where their offices were located, and there was never any shortage of “fertilizer” from the upper levels of the bureaucracy. Charlie Murphy, interview by Dwayne A. Day, March 7, 1996.
51. CORONA, ed. Ruffner, 97.
52. James Q. Reber, Chairman, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, “List of Highest Priority Targets: USSR,” August 18, 1960, contained in CORONA, ed. Ruffner, 49–58.
53. Col. James E. Mahon, Memorandum for COMOR, “Urgent Requirements for CORONA and ARGON,” August 18, 1960, contained in CORONA, ed. Ruffner, 45–46. ARGON was sponsored by the Army Mapping Service and its camera was manufactured by Fairchild. ARGON carried so much film that during its operation the procedure was to simply turn the camera on and leave it on for the entire flight.
54. McDonald, “CORONA,” 694.
55. Bill King, interview by Dwayne A. Day, March 28, 1996.
56. McDonald, “CORONA,” 719, 694. In actuality, the problem was the difficulty of attaining the predicted orbit. The new camera could be adjusted to match the actual orbit.
57. Col. C. L. Battle, USAF, and J. W. Plummer, “The Discoverer Program,” Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 2175–61, [n.d.], 6.
58. The Agena already included ullage rockets to start its main engine just after separation from the Thor during launch.
59. Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 16.
60. Walter Levison, comments at “Piercing the Curtain,” May 1995. Information on the design of the camera comes from Frank Madden, in a letter to Dwayne Day, November 1996.
61. Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 19.
62. McDonald, “CORONA,” 694–95, 718, and Greer, “CORONA,” 28.
63. Two other CORONA missions also did not carry cameras. One was the STARAD radiation detection mission launched in October 1962 and the other was an R&D mission launched in September 1965 which failed to reach orbit.
64. Stereo viewing is
not the only way to obtain height data. It is also possible to measure an object’s shadow and determine its height using simple mathematics. Data could also be obtained using the known distance to the target as well as other ephemera, like the sun angle. But these alternative methods relied upon an assumption that the ground around the target was perfectly flat. Even slight changes in the ground slope could produce dramatically inaccurate measurements. Stereo-imagery was far superior. See Dino Brugioni’s comments in chapter 11 for further comments on this.
65. Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 34. MURAL also allowed the elimination of the momentum wheel, which saved weight.
66. Greer, “CORONA,” 29–30.
67. There is some question about whether this failure carried the last C‴ camera or the first MURAL. According to several sources, this mission, number 9030, carried a single C‴ camera. See, for instance, “Satellite Photographic Reconnaissance Flight Summary,” CORONA Briefing Book. But Jonathan McDowell, who keeps extensive lists of world satellite launches (and who provided the launch listing in this book), located a launch photograph of this mission which shows a vehicle with a much larger payload than that carried for C‴ missions, but was the same size as that used for the MURAL missions. The tail number of the Thor rocket matches the correct mission, leaving open only two possibilities: Mission 9030 actually carried a MURAL camera instead of a C‴, or it carried a single C‴ camera in a larger payload fairing. Because this mission was a failure, however, it did not change the numbers of either KH-3 or KH-4 satellites actually placed in orbit.
68. The secrecy was also extended to all other U.S. military space launches, including those of very innocuous and well-publicized programs like the Transit navigation satellites. This secrecy proved to be troublesome and expensive for many of the nonreconnaissance programs.
69. Greer, “CORONA,” 31. Attaining the optimum atitude was a major concern for satellite controllers and engineers alike for the early satellites. Low orbits increased resolution but decreased the amount of territory covered. High orbits did the opposite. Photo-interpreters generally preferred higher resolution, but in the early days they were happy just to be seeing previously uncovered areas. Charlie Murphy, the Air Force officer detailed to the CIA who was in charge of operations at AP, usually chose to go for a higher altitude for the early satellites. The Lockheed engineers appreciated this because it was difficult to determine the altitude of the satellites to begin with and higher altitudes decreased drag on the satellite and decreased the chances that it would come down in the wrong place.
70. The information on the Index camera, along with the story about the whale oil, comes from Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 45–46.
71. Ibid., 53.
72. Exactly who was responsible for the fix is a matter of some dispute. Albert Wheelon, then deputy director of science and technology at the CIA, remembers asking Sydney Drell of Stanford to form a group to evaluate this phenomenon. The Drell group, according to Wheelon, then went on to address other technical issues concerning CORONA. Frank Madden of Itek says that the problem was solved by the Itek environmental test lab people and that Dr. Edward Purcell, a member of the Drell group, visited the lab to check on their work. Madden wrote, “After his examination, he asked if our solution seemed to be working and we said it appeared to be. His rejoinder was that we had best stick with it. He noted that we basically had a Van de Graaff generator, and that he had never been able to understand them. We all gave him great credit for accepting an experimental solution as valid, even if it was not able to be substantiated theoretically”: Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 16. Bob Leeper remembers the Drell group as a Blue Ribbon Committee formed to analyze the overall CORONA system from a product quality standpoint, not specifically to address the electrostatic discharge problem. Leeper, letter to Day.
73. Frank Madden, interview by Dwayne A. Day, November 17, 1995.
74. These precautions included starting the film one or two frames earlier during each photo pass. Ibid.
75. Brugioni interview.
76. Carl Berger, The Air Force in Space, Fiscal Year 1961 (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1966), 34–38.
77. Dudley C. Sharp, Secretary of the Air Force, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, USAF, September 13, 1960, Thomas D. White Papers, Box 36, “4–5 Missiles/Space/Nuclear,” Library of Congress (hereinafter cited as LC).
78. “SAMOS Special Satellite Reconnaissance System,” USAF, n.d., Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952–61, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, “Intelligence Matters (14) [March-May 1960],” Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Also, “CORONA Program Profile.”
79. Brig. Gen. John M. Breit, USAF, Deputy Inspector General for Security, to AFCCS, “Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information (The SAMOS Reconnaissance Satellite),” October 23, 1960, Thomas D. White Papers, Box 36, “4–5 Missiles/Space/Nuclear,” LC. SAMOS E-4 was a mapping camera canceled when the decision was made to pursue ARGON. SAMOS E-3 was apparently a 36-inch camera canceled early on as well. Buzard, letter to Day.
80. Although the electronic intelligence aspects of the U.S. military space program remain classified, there have been a number of declassified documents concerning this SAMOS mission. See, for instance, Hugh S. Cumming Jr. to Mr. Farley, “SAMOS,” July 22, 1960, General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Subject Files, 1957–63, Box 6, “12 Satellite and Missile Programs,” RG 59, NARA. See also Lt. General Roscoe C. Wilson, Deputy Chief of Staff, Development, USAF, to Air Research and Development Command, “Exploitation of Initial SAMOS Data,” June 1, 1960, Thomas D. White Papers, Box 34, LC.
81. Lt. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, Air Research and Development Command, to Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF, September 13, 1959, Thomas D. White Papers, Box 26, LC.
82. Lt. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, Air Research and Development Command, to Gen. Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff, USAF, August 1, 1959, Thomas D. White Papers, Box 26, LC.
83. Gen. Curtis LeMay, Deputy Chief of Staff, USAF, to Lt. Gen. Bernard Schriever, Air Research and Development Command, September 9, 1959. Thomas D. White Papers, Box 26, LC.
84. Buzard interview.
85. Lee Bowen, The Threshold of Space: The Air Force in the National Space Program, 1945–1959 (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, September 1960), 30–32, 33.
86. King interview.
87. Harold F. “Bud” Wienberg, interview by R. Cargill Hall, March 16, 1995.
88. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” 24.
89. Leeper interview.
90. Greer, “CORONA,” 31. The “SAMOS Special Satellite Reconnaissance System” report identifies the E-5 as having a 66-inch focal length, which is identical with the KH-6 LANYARD.
91. McDonald, “CORONA,” 716; Greer, “CORONA,” 31.
92. The KH-4A was sometimes referred to as the KH-4J in reference to its J-1 camera.
93. Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 36–38.
94. Greer, “CORONA,” 32.
95. Madden, “CORONA Camera System,” 34.
96. McDonald, “CORONA,” 695. CORONA missions were usually launched around noon to mid-afternoon. This allowed them to photograph the Soviet Union on their descending passes. In mid-summer, so much of the Soviet Union was in sunlight for most of the time that the satellite could photograph targets both on its descending (north-south) and ascending (south-north) passes. The ascending passes were usually at a higher altitude, since the satellite’s orbit was at its highest over the South Pole and thus the satellite was traveling south to north while also decreasing in altitude. While this lowered the resolution for these ascending passes, decent imagery was useful no matter what and controllers took this opportunity whenever they had it.
97. Greer, “CORONA,” 32–33.
98. Burks
interview.
99. “Declassified Imaging Satellite Systems,” CIA Fact Sheet.
100. Organization Chart, Office of Special Activities—Deputy Director (Research), attached to Col. Stanley W. Beerli, USAF, Assistant Director for Special Activities, Office of Special Activities, OSA HQS Notice No. 1–15, June 29, 1962, RG 263, NARA.
101. Buzard interview. The CIA also had a security officer at AP. The details of this time period are still somewhat in dispute.
102. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” 24.
103. For information on the TFX effort, see Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). For information on the Gemini controversy, see Barton C. Hacker and James M. Grimwood, On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), 118–22.
104. Whether McNamara did this is unclear. However, it is consistent with other actions by the secretary of defense at the time. According to one account of NASA’s history during this same time period, McNamara proposed that DoD take over all manned spaceflight in earth orbit, leaving NASA to conduct missions beyond earth orbit. See Arnold S. Levine, Managing NASA in the Apollo Era (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), 230.
105. Albert “Bud” Wheelon, interview by Dwayne A. Day, June 22, 1996.
106. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” 26.
107. Albert Wheelon, comments at “Piercing the Curtain,” May 23, 1995.
108. Wheelon states: “The debate between CIA and DoD then shifted to whether CIA ought to pursue new reconnaissance systems. Assistant Secretary of Defense Gene Fubini and Brockway MacMillan argued against each system that CIA was developing. The debate continued until Al Flax became director of the NRO in 1965. He saw CIA and the Air Force as valuable and complementary assets. This was fortunate for the country because the three systems then being developed at CIA would eventually become vital components of the National Reconnaissance Program.” Albert D. Wheelon, “Lifting the Veil on CORONA,” Space Policy (November 1995): 253.