During the days that followed they tried again, but never managed to dislodge the skirmishers in spite of hard fighting, during which Sainte-Hélène was mortally wounded. Finally, on the night of October 22, the discipline of the increasingly demoralized and sick New Englanders onshore collapsed when a rumor spread that a huge French attack was imminent; they rushed for their longboats in disorder, and left five brass guns and a color on the beach. Phips and his fleet departed the next day.
The losses are difficult to estimate, but were light for the defenders – perhaps nine dead and eight wounded, plus 44 patients admitted to hospital (for all causes) during the week-long siege. Total Anglo-American losses were much higher: perhaps 600 dead in combat, from sickness, or lost in ships that disappeared during storms on the return voyage. There were great celebrations in Canada, and Louis XIV even had a gold victory coin minted, while near-bankrupt Massachusetts had to print paper money to cover the cost of the failed expedition. Such could be the far-reaching consequences of skillful skirmishing.
Besides brilliantly leading Quebec city’s defense, Count Frontenac had already fulfilled his role as a real Onontio to the First Nations. He had seen to it that they enjoyed generous terms at the great summer fur-trade fair in Montreal. In July 1690, he was there particularly to greet the Ottawa (Potawatomi) chiefs from the Great Lakes and, at a great assembly, reviewed some 1,200 warriors. He told them that he had long hoped the Iroquois would recognize his affection for them, but that it was not possible to wait any longer. He now hoped all Onontio’s allies would “march with us against the Iroquois.”
Not all New England and New York colonists neglected relations with the First Nations. Around the turn of the century the most active among the Mohawks was Pieter Schuyler (1657–1724), first mayor of Albany and colonel of the city’s militia, who led a large mixed raid that hit the village of Laprairie de Magdeleine near Montreal in August 1691. The raiders were intercepted during their retreat and took significant losses before they got back to Albany; this was the last sizeable Anglo-American raid into New France for decades to come. In this print after a portrait of c.1710 Schuyler wears a red coat and waistcoat, and buff gauntlet gloves. (Private collection; author’s photo)
Resisting enemy raids: “the battle of Laprairie,” 1691
Small-scale raids continued in 1691, the most remarkable being another strike on Laprairie, led this time by Col Pieter Schuyler of the Albany Militia (elder brother of Capt Johannes Schuyler). The Iroquois were increasingly disappointed by their white allies leaving them to do nearly all the wilderness fighting, so it was important for morale that Schuyler’s New York volunteers join them in this summer raid. His force was some 300 strong, half New Yorkers and half Iroquois, mainly Mohawks. Although they were spotted near Chambly, Schuyler’s party nevertheless succeeded in surprising a strong detachment of Canadian militiamen camping in a little stockade fort near the St Lawrence River on August 11. In what was remembered as “the battle of Laprairie” Schuyler had two or three killed and about 30 wounded, while French casualties were perhaps double that.
Alerted by the sound of gunfire, regular and militia companies would soon converge on Laprairie. Although it was probably unknown to Col Schuyler, at that time the fur-trade fair was taking place in Montreal, so many allied Ottawa warriors were present besides its garrison. In any event, Schuyler decided to make a rapid retreat to the Richelieu River, where his canoes were hidden, but then ran into an ambush set by Capt Philippe de Vallerennes coming up from Fort Chambly with 180 men.
Speculative reconstruction of a fortified Canadian village, late 17th–early 18th century. As Iroquois raids became more frequent, particularly around Montreal on the southern shore of the St Lawrence, stockades were increasingly built around villages. The main buildings were usually a seigneur’s house, a church, and a stone-built mill that could also serve as a stronghold. (Print after Edmond J. Massicotte; private collection, author’s photo)
Although Schuyler’s force was the stronger, de Vallerennes’ men were well positioned behind logs. After a two-hour fight, fearing that other pursuers from Montreal would soon arrive, Schuyler’s party “abandoned the battlefield, their baggage and their colors” and made their escape. They were “pursued for three days through swampy country with fallen trees, full of ravines, and none would have escaped if ours [Vallerennes’ party] had been stronger,” according to La Potherie (II: 141). The French and their allies found the bodies of 83 New Yorkers and 17 Iroquois and suspected that many more were wounded, while reporting only five or six of their own wounded. Back in Albany, Pieter Schuyler and the survivors claimed to have slain over 300 of the enemy including 13 officers (according to Colden, and an obviously incredible figure), for a loss of 43 dead and 25 wounded. Whatever the true numbers, their thinned ranks clearly showed how risky raids deep into Canada had become, due to the speed of the local response. Capt de Vallerennes had pressed Schuyler hard enough to keep him on the run, inflicting casualties and denying him the respite to choose suitable terrain to lay an ambush.
“The Indian Fort at ye Flats.” This plan of an Iroquois “castle” in the early 1690s incorporates some European features, such as a blockhouse (but without artillery) in the southeast corner, and houses for use of Anglo-American soldiers inside the eastern stockade. Such a fortified village might hold up to some 60 families, in longhouses; the central one, numbered 5, has had the roof cut away in this drawing to show separate hearths within. (Print after A Description of the Province and City of New York… of 1695, 1862 edn; author’s photo)
Madeleine de Verchères’ fight, 1692
One famous incident during small-scale Iroquois raids into Canada was the fight put up by 14-year-old Madeleine de Verchères, which became iconic in Canadian popular history. She was the daughter of François Jarret de Verchères, a former officer of the Carignan-Salières Regiment who had been granted a seigneurie east of Montreal, where he had built a bastioned stockade fort. Sometimes a few soldiers were detached to such “private” forts, but on October 22, 1692 only one soldier was present when an Iroquois war party appeared, and seized about 20 people who were working in the fields.
By her own account, Madeleine was about “400 steps” from the fort. As she ran for it a pursuing Iroquois grabbed at her scarf, but she untied it and slipped free; reaching the fort, she shut its only gate while shouting a call-to-arms. Ignoring several terror-stricken women, she put on the soldier’s hat, trying to make it seem as though there were men inside, and then fired a cannon. According to La Potherie, this “struck [the Iroquois] with terror, upset all their calculations and at the same time signaled all the forts on the north and south shores of the river from Saint-Ours as far as Montreal to be on their guard. With each fort passing the word on to the next after the first signal from Verchères … a hundred men were sent to bring it help, who arrived shortly after the Iroquois had disappeared into the woods.” The relief detachment caught up with the Iroquois and freed nearly all their prisoners.
When Frontenac’s July 1696 expedition against the Onondagas had to disembark at portages, the 74-year-old commander “was borne in his canoe by 50 warriors singing and uttering yells of joy.” Later on in the march he followed behind the artillery, “borne on a chair, between the two lines” of the central group, “to place himself when he thought proper at the head” of the troops (C11A, 14). His presence ensured high morale, and his tactical eye was unaffected by age. (Courtesy Library and Archives Canada, C6450)
The story was much embellished in Canadian school history books at the end of the 19th century, but the bare facts do show that there was a fairly good organization in place to provide protection. After a cannon-shot set off a chain of alarm signals the raiders could not remain much longer, since relief detachments were numerous and swift in pursuit. Another detail – that Madeleine also fired muskets during the defense, assisted by two younger brothers – confirms that she was familiar with firearms. There are other accounts of Canadian
women shooting muskets, for instance at a Maypole during celebrations, as well as when going out hunting, or firing at skulking Iroquois; clearly, Madeleine was far from unique in this ability.
Neutralizing the Iroquois: the Mohawks, 1693
Such raids were not ignored by Governor Frontenac and his officers. After their disastrous failure at Quebec City, the Anglo-American colonists were unlikely to stage another invasion. Frontenac therefore judged this to be an opportune time to neutralize the Iroquois by attacking them in their own territories. They would be challenged and their “castles” destroyed by major expeditions, not only to discourage their raiding but also to degrade their ability to feed themselves.4
A new factor was that since about the 1660s some Iroquois had been converted to Christianity by French Jesuit missionaries, and were moving to mission villages mostly situated near Montreal. These “Praying Indians of Montreal” were still warriors, however, and would join Canadians in war parties. Again, whatever London had chosen to proclaim, other Iroquois certainly did not think of themselves as British subjects – a warrior was subject to no man – and their attachment to the Anglo-Americans was usually provisional.
Of the five nations then forming the Iroquois confederacy (Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas and Senecas), the Mohawks – called Aigniers by the French – were the most persistent opponents, because their territory north of Albany was relatively close to Montreal. On January 25, 1693 a 600-strong expedition (100 regular troops, 300 Canadian volunteers and 200 allied warriors) led by lieutenants D’Aillebout de Mantet, Courtemanche, and La Noue left Montreal. Colden writes that “They were well supplied, with all sorts of ammunition, provisions, snowshoes, and such conveniences for carriage as were practicable upon the snow, and through such great forests as they had to pass. The French in Canada have a kind of light sledges made with skins [toboggans], [which] are drawn by large dogs on the frozen snow.”
By February 16 the party was spotted in the vicinity of Schenectady and a warning was at once relayed to Albany. The militia was mustered and a troop of cavalry immediately set out to reinforce Schenectady, “but no care was taken to give the Mohawks notice.” The raiders surprised two small castles by night, the first when only five men were present with the women and children, and both were taken “without any opposition … being [near to the] English, [they were] not fortified.”
Sketch map showing raids by Pierre de Troyes to James Bay (1686 – “Monsoni” indicates Moose Factory), and raids (1694–96) by Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville to the coasts of Maine, Newfoundland (“Terre Neuve”) and Ft Nelson on Hudson’s Bay. D’Iberville with about 50 other Canadians later sailed south to the Caribbean; his last raids were on St Kitt’s and Nevis in 1706. (From Histoire du Canada, 1912; author’s photo)
The next castle was larger and, as they approached it after dark, the raiders heard war-cries and thought that they had been spotted, but then perceived that a war-dance was being performed by about 40 warriors who were themselves preparing to go raiding. The attackers burst in, and during a savage fight suffered about 30 casualties; while the number of Mohawk warriors killed was unknown, “no doubt it was very considerable,” since the party took 300 prisoners including 100 warriors. The longhouses and other structures were all razed and the grain reserves that were found were destroyed. Meanwhile, many Mohawk warriors were at nearby Schenectady when news came of the fall of their castles, and they were “exceedingly enraged” that no New York militiamen went out to assist. At length, Col Pieter Schuyler came out in late March with 200 men, “partly regular troops” later joined by nearly 300 warriors, some “very ill armed,” but on hearing that the 600 raiders were withdrawing, he chose prudence.
The Onondaga and Oneida, 1696
Small parties of First Nations allies of the French and British continued to harass their respective enemies with less intensity over the next few years, but in 1696 Frontenac decided to attack the Onondaga nation in strength. Situated inland to the southeast of Lake Ontario, they had raided French traders to seize their furs, and had spurned Frontenac’s diplomatic approaches. (Years earlier he had sent a French officer, the Chevalier Pierre d’Aux, on a peace mission to the Onondagas, who had seized him, made him run the gauntlet, and eventually turned him over to the Anglo-Americans, who had kept him prisoner for two and a half years. The outraged Frontenac had not forgotten this episode.)
Impression of D’Iberville leading Canadian militia volunteers in the capture of the forts at St John’s, Newfoundland, in November 1696. (Print after Edmond J. Massicotte, 1907; private collection, author’s photo)
Sketch map of Acadia in the 17th–18th century. The French settlements centered on Port-Royal were established from 1605. Across the Bay of Fundy to the west was “Pentacoet,” the base from which Baron de Saint-Castin and the Abenakis launched raids on New England. From 1713 Acadia became the British colony of Nova Scotia, but the borderlands were still held by the French and their allied Indigenous nations; from a main base at Beaubassin many raiding parties still threatened Anglo-American positions in the 1740s and 1750s. (From Histoire du Canada, 1912; author’s photo)
In early July 1696 more than 2,200 men left Montreal: about 800 regulars of the Compagnies franches and 800-plus Canadian volunteers, all divided into eight battalions, as well as some 500 allied warriors, with two light brass cannon and some light mortars. The force was led by the aged Frontenac in person, although operations were delegated to Callières, Vaudreuil and Ramezay. After a stopover at Fort Frontenac, the force crossed Lake Ontario, landed on July 29, and marched inland. The troops were divided into three groups and not deployed in columns, but rather over a wide front, each battalion being two ranks deep, while allied warriors with some Canadians fanned out as scouts and skirmishers.
Remarkably, no ambushes were encountered during the advance – indeed, no fighting took place at all. Obviously awed by the size of the expeditionary force, the Onondagas evacuated their towns before Frontenac’s troops arrived on August 4 and 5. Once he had destroyed both the towns and the crops, he ordered Vaudreuil to take one battalion and some warriors to raze the nearby town and fields of the Oneida nation. There, too, they met no resistance as they destroyed the houses, canoes, standing crops and buried grain reserves – this time, the Onondagas and Oneidas would really starve when winter came. Frontenac withdrew on August 9 and was back in Montreal on the 20th, highly satisfied with all his contingents. When some chiefs at length appeared and complained that their people would have nothing to eat, they were told that Onontio was happy to give land to his Iroquois children if they came to live, as others had already, in Canada, where they could feed and lodge themselves safely. Although there had been no fighting, this major summer expedition into Iroquois territory seriously weakened the confederacy. Frontenac, who enjoyed good intelligence, reported to the king on October 25 that the Onondagas and Oneidas “were presently reduced by the lack of food, that would make more perish” than could have been destroyed “by saber and musket.” Frontenac had received information that the Mohawks too were suffering from shortages, not only of food but also of arms and ammunition, because “the English” (New Yorkers) had refused to help them (C11A, 14).
Even more important for New France, its friends and foes alike now knew that it could sustain a substantial force in the wilderness in either winter or summer, and therefore could realistically expect victory in almost all raids. The Anglo-American colonies were hemmed in due to their failure to develop appropriate tactics in response, while hostile First Nations, even as far away as the Great Plains, were never quite out of reach of Onontio’s soldiers and warriors.
Combined land and sea raids: Pemaquid, 1696
Even before the 1696 expedition, officials both in France and in Canada had considered seaborne attacks on coastal objectives. After the Chevalier d’Aux had finally returned from captivity in 1692, he reported that the New York city area could muster at least 1,100 men besides a company of British regulars, whi
le Boston and its environs had no fewer than 5,000 (C11A, 125). This intelligence deterred landings against such major cities as impractical, but small-scale combined operations on weaker and more isolated targets were suggested.
Print of an artist’s impression of Governor Louis-Hector de Callières presiding over “the Great Peace of Montreal” with the First Nations in July 1701. The culmination of tireless diplomacy by his predecessor Count Frontenac, this ensured basically peaceful relations for the next 50 years. (From Viator’s Histoire du Canada, 1915; author’s photo)
Acadia was the small French colony that had been founded around Port-Royal in today’s Nova Scotia in the early 17th century, followed by other minor settlements in present-day New Brunswick and northern Maine, which were repeatedly attacked by privateers from New England. The French settlers had befriended the Abenaki First Nation, while the Massachusetts settlers in Maine regarded them as being close to devil-sent creatures to whom no quarter should be granted. Unsurprisingly, by about 1675 the Abenaki warriors had become the most redoubtable defenders of the Acadian borderlands. Twenty years later they were led by the extraordinary Jean-Vincent d’Abadie, Baron de Saint-Castin (1652–1707). This French nobleman and ex-officer had been adopted by the Abenakis, marrying one of their “princesses” and becoming a chief. Combining both European and Indigenous concepts of warfare, he had turned the Abenakis into the most formidable force northeast of Massachusetts. He had Fort Pentagoet as a base for trade, arms, and supplies, and a few other white adventurers and missionaries often accompanied him on Abenaki raids.
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