Whether a term bears a number of specific meanings or one only, (10) may be considered by the following means. First, look and see if its contrary bears a number of meanings, whether the discrepancy between them be one of kind or one of names. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed even in the names; e. g. the contrary of ‘sharp’ in the case of a note is ‘flat’, while in the case of a solid edge it is ‘dull’. Clearly, then, the contrary of ‘sharp’ bears several meanings, (15) and if so, so also does ‘sharp’; for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. For ‘sharp’ will not be the same when contrary to ‘dull’ and to ‘flat’, though ‘sharp’ is the contrary of each. Again baru (‘flat’, ‘heavy’) in the case of a note has ‘sharp’ as its contrary, but in the case of a solid mass ‘light’, so that baru is used with a number of meanings, (20) inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. Likewise, also, ‘fine’ as applied to a picture has ‘ugly’ as its contrary, but, as applied to a house, ‘ramshackle’; so that ‘fine’ is an ambiguous term.
In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used, but a difference of kind between the meanings is at once obvious: e. g. in the case of ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’: for sound is called ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’, (25) just as ‘colour’ is too. As regards the names, then, there is no discrepancy, but the difference in kind between the meanings is at once obvious: for colour is not called ‘clear’ in a like sense to sound. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same in kind we have the same sensation, (30) whereas we do not judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of colour, but in the latter case we judge by sight, in the former by hearing. Likewise also with ‘sharp’ and ‘dull’ in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch, but in the former by taste. For here again there is no discrepancy in the names used, (35) in the case either of the original terms or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is ‘dull’.
Moreover, see if one sense of a term has a contrary, while another has absolutely none; e. g. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none, so that ‘pleasure’ is used in more than one sense. [106b] To ‘love’ also, used of the frame of mind, has to ‘hate’ as its contrary, while as used of the physical activity (kissing) it has none: clearly, therefore, to ‘love’ is an ambiguous term. Further, see in regard to their intermediates, if some meanings and their contraries have an intermediate, while others have none, or if both have one but not the same one, (5) as e. g. ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’ in the case of colours have ‘grey’ as an intermediate, whereas in the case of sound they have none, or, if they have, it is ‘harsh’, as some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate. ‘Clear’, then, is an ambiguous term, and likewise also ‘obscure’. See, moreover, if some of them have more than one intermediate, (10) while others have but one, as is the case with ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’, for in the case of colours there are numbers of intermediates, whereas in regard to sound there is but one, viz. ‘harsh’.
Again, in the case of the contradictory opposite, look and see if it bears more than one meaning. For if this bears more than one meaning, then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning; (15) e. g. ‘to fail to see’ is a phrase with more than one meaning, viz. (1) to fail to possess the power of sight, (2) to fail to put that power to active use. But if this has more than one meaning, it follows necessarily that ‘to see’ also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite to each sense of ‘to fail to see’; e. g. the opposite of ‘not to possess the power of sight’ is to possess it, while of ‘not to put the power of sight to active use’, the opposite is to put it to active use. (20)
Moreover, examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence of a certain state: for if the one term bears more than one meaning, then so will the remaining term: e. g. if ‘to have sense’ be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body, then ‘to be wanting in sense’ too will be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body. (25) That the opposition between the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of a certain state is clear, since animals naturally possess each kind of ‘sense’, both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body.
Moreover, examine the inflected forms. For if ‘justly’ has more than one meaning, then ‘just’, also, will be used with more than one meaning; for there will be a meaning of ‘just’ corresponding to each of the meanings of ‘justly’; e. g. if the word ‘justly’ be used of judging according to one’s own opinion, (30) and also of judging as one ought, then ‘just’ also will be used in like manner. In the same way also, if ‘healthy’ has more than one meaning, then ‘healthily’ also will be used with more than one meaning: (35) e. g. if ‘healthy’ describes both what produces health and what preserves health and what betokens health, then ‘healthily’ also will be used to mean ‘in such a way as to produce’ or ‘preserve’ or ‘betoken’ health. Likewise also in other cases, whenever the original term bears more than one meaning, the inflexion also that is formed from it will be used with more than one meaning, and vice versa. [107a]
Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term, and see if they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same, (5) then clearly the term is ambiguous: e. g. ‘good’ in the case of food means ‘productive of pleasure’, and in the case of medicine ‘productive of health’, whereas as applied to the soul it means to be of a certain quality, e. g. temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also, as applied to ‘man’. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, as (e. g.) the good that happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good. (10) Often it signifies what is of a certain quantity, e. g. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. So then the term ‘good’ is ambiguous. In the same way also ‘clear’, as applied to a body, signifies a colour, but in regard to a note it denotes what is ‘easy to hear’. ‘Sharp’, too, is in a closely similar case: for the same term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note is a swift note, (15) as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us, whereas a sharp (acute) angle is one that is less than a right angle, while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point).
Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term, and see if they are different without being subaltern, as (e. g.) ‘donkey’, which denotes both the animal and the engine. (20) For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared to be an animal of a certain kind, and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. If, however, the genera be subaltern, there is no necessity for the definitions to be different. Thus (e. g.) ‘animal’ is the genus of ‘raven’, and so is ‘bird’. Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird, we also say that it is a certain kind of animal, (25) so that both the genera are predicated of it. Likewise also whenever we call the raven a ‘flying biped animal’, we declare it to be a bird: in this way, then, as well, both the genera are predicated of raven, and also their definition. But in the case of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen, for whenever we call a thing an ‘engine’, (30) we do not call it an animal, nor vice versa.
Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before you are different without being subaltern, but also in the case of its contrary: for if its contrary bears several senses, (35) clearly the term before you does so as well.
It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use of the term in combination, e. g. of a ‘clear (lit. white) body’ and of a ‘clear note’. For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted, the same expression ought to remain over. This does not happen in the case of ambiguous terms, e. g. in the cases just mentioned. [107
b] For the former will be ‘a body possessing such and such a colour’, while the latter will be ‘a note easy to hear’. Abstract, then, ‘a body’ and ‘a note’, and the remainder in each case is not the same. It should, however, have been had the meaning of ‘clear’ in each case been synonymous. (5)
Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares, and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e. g.) any one describes what betokens and what produces health as ‘related commensurably to health’, we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term ‘commensurably’ in each case, (10) e. g. if in the latter case it means that ‘it is of the right amount to produce health’, whereas in the former it means that ‘it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails’.
Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared as ‘more or less’ or as ‘in like manner’, as is the case (e. g.) with a ‘clear’ (lit. white) sound and a ‘clear’ garment, and a ‘sharp’ flavour and a ‘sharp’ note. (15) For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp ‘in a like degree’, nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. ‘Clear’, then, and ‘sharp’ are ambiguous. For synonyms are always comparable; for they will always be used either in like manner, or else in a greater degree in one case.
Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the differentiae also are different in kind, (20) e. g. those of ‘animal’ and ‘knowledge’ (for the differentiae of these are different), look and see if the meanings comprised under the same term are differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern, as e. g. ‘sharp’ is of a ‘note’ and a ‘solid’. For being ‘sharp’ differentiates note from note, and likewise also one solid from another. ‘Sharp’, then, is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern. (25)
Again, see if the actual meanings included under the same term themselves have different differentiae, e. g. ‘colour’ in bodies and ‘colour’ in tunes: for the differentiae of ‘colour’ in bodies are ‘sightpiercing’ and ‘sight-compressing’, (30) whereas ‘colour’ in melodies has not the same differentiae. Colour, then, is an ambiguous term; for things that are the same have the same differentiae.
Moreover, since the species is never the differentia of anything, look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species and another a differentia, as (e. g.) ‘clear’ (lit. (35) white) as applied to a body is a species of colour, whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia; for one note is differentiated from another by being ‘clear’.
16 The presence, then, of a number of meanings in a term may be investigated by these and like means. [108a] The differences which things present to each other should be examined within the same genera, e. g. ‘Wherein does justice differ from courage, and wisdom from temperance?’—for all these belong to the same genus; and also from one genus to another, provided they be not very much too far apart, e. g. ‘Wherein does sensation differ from knowledge?’: for in the case of genera that are very far apart, (5) the differences are entirely obvious.
17 Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging to different genera, the formulae being ‘A : B = C : D’ (e. g. as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the object of sensation), and ‘As A is in B, so is C in D’ (e. g. as sight is in the eye, (10) so is reason in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea, so is windlessness in the air). Practice is more especially needed in regard to terms that are far apart; for in the case of the rest, we shall be more easily able to see in one glance the points of likeness. We should also look at things which belong to the same genus, (15) to see if any identical attribute belongs to them all, e. g. to a man and a horse and a dog; for in so far as they have any identical attribute, in so far they are alike.
18 It is useful to have examined the number of meanings of a term both for clearness’ sake (for a man is more likely to know what it is he asserts, if it has been made clear to him how many meanings it may have), (20) and also with a view to ensuring that our reasonings shall be in accordance with the actual facts and not addressed merely to the term used. For as long as it is not clear in how many senses a term is used, it is possible that the answerer and the questioner are not directing their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once it has been made clear how many meanings there are, and also upon which of them the former directs his mind when he makes his assertion, (25) the questioner would then look ridiculous if he failed to address his argument to this. It helps us also both to avoid being misled and to mislead by false reasoning: for if we know the number of meanings of a term, we shall certainly never be misled by false reasoning, but shall know if the questioner fails to address his argument to the same point; and when we ourselves put the questions we shall be able to mislead him, if our answerer happens not to know the number of meanings of our terms. (30) This, however, is not possible in all cases, but only when of the many senses some are true and others are false. This manner of argument, however, does not belong properly to dialectic; dialecticians should therefore by all means beware of this kind of verbal discussion, unless any one is absolutely unable to discuss the subject before him in any other way. (35)
The discovery of the differences of things helps us both in reasonings about sameness and difference, and also in recognizing what any particular thing is. [108b] That it helps us in reasoning about sameness and difference is clear: for when we have discovered a difference of any kind whatever between the objects before us, we shall already have shown that they are not the same: while it helps us in recognizing what a thing is, because we usually distinguish the expression that is proper to the essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae that are proper to it. (5)
The examination of likeness is useful with a view both to inductive arguments and to hypothetical reasonings, and also with a view to the rendering of definitions. It is useful for inductive arguments, (10) because it is by means of an induction of individuals in cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in evidence: for it is not easy to do this if we do not know the points of likeness. It is useful for hypothetical reasonings because it is a general opinion that among similars what is true of one is true also of the rest. If, then, with regard to any of them we are well supplied with matter for a discussion, we shall secure a preliminary admission that however it is in these cases, (15) so it is also in the case before us: then when we have shown the former we shall have shown, on the strength of the hypothesis, the matter before us as well: for we have first made the hypothesis that however it is in these cases, so it is also in the case before us, and have then proved the point as regards these cases. It is useful for the rendering of definitions because, if we are able to see in one glance what is the same in each individual case of it, (20) we shall be at no loss into what genus we ought to put the object before us when we define it: for of the common predicates that which is most definitely in the category of essence is likely to be the genus. Likewise, also, in the case of objects widely divergent, the examination of likeness is useful for purposes of definition, (25) e. g. the sameness of a calm at sea, and windlessness in the air (each being a form of rest), and of a point on a line and the unit in number—each being a starting point. If, then, we render as the genus what is common to all the cases, we shall get the credit of defining not inappropriately. Definition-mongers too nearly always render them in this way: for they declare the unit to be the starting-point of number, (30) and the point the starting-point of a line. It is clear, then, that they place them in that which is common to both as their genus.
The means, then, whereby reasonings are effected, are these: the commonplace rules, for the observance of which the aforesaid means are useful, are as follows.
[Books II–VIII omitted.]
* * *
1 a 9
2 101a 22.
3 a 7
4 102a 18.
5 102b 4.
6 ii. 7.
7 b1,a8.
8 100a 25.
DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS
Translated by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTORY (CHAPTERS 1–2)
CHAPTER
1. General distinction of genuine from merely apparent reasonings and refutations.
2. Four classes of arguments in dialogue form:—Didactic arguments, Dialectical arguments, Examination arguments, and Contentious arguments (the subject of the present book).
PERPETRATION OF FALLACIES (CHAPTERS 3–15)
3. Aims of contentious reasoning fivefold.
[Chapters 4–33 omitted.]
EPILOGUE
34. (1) Our programme and its performance (183a 27−b 15).
(2) History of dialectical theory compared with that of rhetoric (183b 15–end).
DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS
(On Sophistical Refutations)
1 [164a] Let us now discuss sophistic refutations, (20) i. e. what appear to be refutations but are really fallacies instead. We will begin in the natural order with the first.
That some reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident. This happens with arguments, as also elsewhere, (25) through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. [164b] For physically some people are in a vigorous condition, (20) while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice; and some people are beautiful thanks to their beauty, while others seem to be so, by dint of embellishing themselves. So it is, too, with inanimate things; for of these, too, some are really silver and others gold, while others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense; e. g. things made of litharge and tin seem to be of silver, while those made of yellow metal look golden. (25) In the same way both reasoning and refutation are sometimes genuine, sometimes not, though inexperience may make them appear so: for inexperienced people obtain only, as it were, a distant view of these things. [165a] For reasoning rests on certain statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of something other than what has been stated, through what has been stated: refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the given conclusion. Now some of them do not really achieve this, though they seem to do so for a number of reasons; and of these the most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names only. (5) It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things discussed: we use their names as symbols instead of them; and therefore we suppose that what follows in the names, follows in the things as well, just as people who calculate suppose in regard to their counters. (10) But the two cases (names and things) are not alike. For names are finite and so is the sum-total of formulae, while things are infinite in number. Inevitably, then, the same formulae, and a single name, have a number of meanings. Accordingly just as, in counting, those who are not clever in manipulating their counters are taken in by the experts, (15) in the same way in arguments too those who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both in their own discussions and when they listen to others. For this reason, then, and for others to be mentioned later, there exists both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real. Now for some people it is better worth while to seem to be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the semblance of wisdom without the reality, (20) and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom); for them, then, it is clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so. To reduce it to a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a thing, (25) himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and to be able to show up the man who makes them; and of these accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer, and the other upon the securing of one. Those, then, who would be sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: for it is worth their while: for a faculty of this kind will make a man seem to be wise, (30) and this is the purpose they happen to have in view.
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 30