It is wrong, however, to suppose, as some assert, that coming-to-be and passing-away in the unqualified and complete sense are distinctively defined by ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’, while the change that takes place in what is continuous is ‘alteration’. On the contrary, (20) this is where the whole error lies. For unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away are not effected by ‘association’ and ‘dissociation’. They take place when a thing changes, from this to that, as a whole. But the philosophers we are criticizing suppose that all such change16 is ‘alteration’: whereas in fact there is a difference. For in that which underlies the change there is a factor corresponding to the definition17 and there is a material factor. (25) When, then, the change is in these constitutive factors, there will be coming-to-be or passing-away: but when it is in the thing’s qualities, i. e. a change of the thing per accidens, there will be ‘alteration’.
‘Dissociation’ and ‘association’ affect the thing’s susceptibility to passing-away. For if water has first been ‘dissociated’ into smallish drops, air comes-to-be out of it more quickly: while, if drops of water have first been ‘associated’, air comes-to-be more slowly. (30) Our doctrine will become clearer in the sequel.18 Meantime, so much may be taken as established—viz. that coming-to-be cannot be ‘association’, at least not the kind of ‘association’ some philosophers assert it to be.
3 Now that we have established the preceding distinctions, we must first19 consider whether there is anything which comes-to-be and passes-away in the unqualified sense: or whether nothing comes-to-be in this strict sense, but everything always comes-to-be something and out of something—I mean, (35) e. g., comes-to-be-heal thy out of being-ill and ill out of being-healthy, comes-to-be-small out of being-big and big out of being-small, and so on in every other instance. [317b] For if there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, ‘something’ must—without qualification—‘come-to-be out of not-being’, so that it would be true to say that ‘not-being is an attribute of some things’. For qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified not-being (e. g. out of not-white or not-beautiful), (5) but unqualified coming-to-be is a process out of unqualified not-being.
Now ‘unqualified’ means either (i) the primary predication within each Category, or (ii) the universal, i. e. the all-comprehensive, predication. Hence, if ‘unqualified not-being’ means the negation of ‘being’ in the sense of the primary term of the Category in question, we shall have, in ‘unqualified coming-to-be’, a coming-to-be of a substance out of not-substance. But that which is not a substance or a ‘this’ clearly cannot possess predicates drawn from any of the other Categories either—e. g. we cannot attribute to it any quality, (10) quantity, or position. Otherwise, properties would admit of existence in separation from substances. If, on the other hand, ‘unqualified not-being’ means ‘what is not in any sense at all’, it will be a universal negation of all forms of being, so that what comes-to-be will have to come-to-be out of nothing.
Although we have dealt with these problems at greater length in another work,20 where we have set forth the difficulties and established the distinguishing definitions, the following concise restatement of our results must here be offered:—
In one sense things come-to-be out of that which has no ‘being’ without qualification: yet in another sense they come-to-be always out of ‘what is’. (15) For coming-to-be necessarily implies the pre-existence of something which potentially ‘is’, but actually ‘is not’; and this something is spoken of both as ‘being’ and as ‘not-being’.
These distinctions may be taken as established: but even then it is extraordinarily difficult to see how there can be ‘unqualified coming-to-be’ (whether we suppose it to occur out of what potentially ‘is’, or in some other way), and we must recall this problem for further examination. (20) For the question might be raised whether substance (i. e. the ‘this’) comes-to-be at all. Is it not rather the ‘such’, the ‘so-great’, or the ‘somewhere’, which comes-to-be? And the same question might be raised about ‘passing-away’ also. For if a substantial thing comes-to-be, it is clear that there will ‘be’ (not actually, but potentially) a substance, out of which its coming-to-be will proceed and into which the thing that is passing-away will necessarily change. Then will any predicate belonging to the remaining Categories attach actually to this presupposed substance? In other words, (25) will that which is only potentially a ‘this’ (which only potentially is), while without the qualification ‘potentially’ it is not a ‘this’ (i. e. is not), possess, e. g., any determinate size or quality or position? For (i) if it possesses none of these determinations actually, but all of them only potentially, the result is first that a being, which is not a determinate being, is capable of separate existence; and in addition that coming-to-be proceeds out of nothing pre-existing—a thesis which, more than any other, preoccupied and alarmed the earliest philosophers. (30) On the other hand (ii) if, although it is not a ‘this somewhat’ or a substance, it is to possess some of the remaining determinations quoted above, then (as we said)21 properties will be separable from substances.
We must therefore concentrate all our powers on the discussion of these difficulties and on the solution of a further question—viz. (35) What is the cause of the perpetuity of coming-to-be? Why is there always unqualified,22 as well as partial,23 coming-to-be?
‘Cause’ in this connexion has two senses. [318a] It means (i) the source from which, as we say, the process ‘originates’, and (ii) the matter. It is the material cause that we have here to state. For, as to the other cause, we have already explained (in our treatise on Motion24) that it involves (a) something immovable through all time and (b) something always being moved. (5) And the accurate treatment of the first of these—of the immovable ‘originative source’—belongs to the province of the other, or ‘prior’, philosophy: while as regards ‘that which sets everything else in motion by being itself continuously moved’, we shall have to explain later25 which amongst the so-called ‘specific’ causes exhibits this character. But at present we are to state the material cause—the cause classed under the head of matter—to which it is due that passing-away and coming-to-be never fail to occur in Nature. (10) For perhaps, if we succeed in clearing up this question, it will simultaneously become clear what account we ought to give of that which perplexed us just now, i. e. of unqualified passing-away and coming-to-be.
Our new question too—viz. ‘what is the cause of the unbroken continuity of coming-to-be?’—is sufficiently perplexing, (15) if in fact what passes-away vanishes into ‘what is not’ and ‘what is not’ is nothing (since ‘what is not’ is neither a thing, nor possessed of a quality or quantity, nor in any place). If, then, some one of the things ‘which are’ is constantly disappearing, why has not the whole of ‘what is’ been used up long ago and vanished away—assuming of course that the material of all the several comings-to-be was finite? For, presumably, the unfailing continuity of coming-to-be cannot be attributed to the infinity of the material. (20) That is impossible, for nothing is actually infinite. A thing is infinite only potentially, i. e. the dividing of it can continue indefinitely: so that we should have to suppose there is only one kind of coming-to-be in the world—viz. one which never fails, because it is such that what comes-to-be is on each successive occasion smaller than before. But in fact this is not what we see occurring.
Why, then, is this form of change necessarily ceaseless? Is it because the passing-away of this is a coming-to-be of something else, (25) and the coming-to-be of this a passing-away of something else?
The cause implied in this solution26 must no doubt be considered adequate to account for coming-to-be and passing-away in their general character as they occur in all existing things alike. Yet, if the same process is a coming-to-be of this but a passing-away of that, (30) and a passing-away of this but a coming-to-be of that, why are some things said to come-to-be and pass-away without qualification, but others only with a qualification
?
This distinction must be investigated once more, for it demands some explanation.
(i) Now we often divide terms into those which signify a ‘this somewhat’ and those which do not. [318b] And
We have thus stated one characteristic manner in which unqualified will be distinguished from qualified coming-to-be and passing-away; but they are also distinguished according to the special nature of the material of the changing thing. (15) For a material, whose constitutive differences signify more a ‘this somewhat’, is itself more ‘substantial’ or ‘real’: while a material, whose constitutive differences signify privation, is ‘not real’. (Suppose, e. g., that ‘the hot’ is a positive predication, i. e. a ‘form’, whereas ‘cold’ is a privation, and that Earth and Fire differ from one another by these constitutive differences.)
The opinion, however, which most people are inclined to prefer, is that the distinction31 depends upon the difference between ‘the perceptible’ and ‘the imperceptible’. (20) Thus, when there is a change into perceptible material, people say there is ‘coming-to-be’; but when there is a change into invisible material, they call it ‘passing-away’. For they distinguish ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ by their perceiving and not-perceiving, just as what is knowable ‘is’ and what is unknowable ‘is not’—perception on their view having the force of knowledge. Hence, (25) just as they deem themselves to live and to ‘be’ in virtue of their perceiving or their capacity to perceive, so too they deem the things to ‘be’ qua perceived or perceptible—and in this they are in a sense on the track of the truth, though what they actually say is not true.
Thus unqualified coming-to-be and passing-away turn out to be different according to common opinion from what they are in truth.32 For Wind and Air are in truth more real—more a ‘this somewhat’ or a ‘form’—than Earth. But they are less real to perception—which explains why things are commonly said to ‘pass-away’ without qualification when they change into Wind and Air, (30) and to ‘come-to-be’33 when they change into what is tangible, i. e. into Earth.
We have now explained why there is ‘unqualified coming-to-be’ (though it is a passing-away-of-something) and ‘unqualified passing-away’ (though it is a coming-to-be-of-something). For this distinction (35) of appellation depends upon a difference in the material out of which, and into which, the changes are effected. It depends either upon whether the material is or is not ‘substantial’, or upon whether it is more or less ‘substantial’, or upon whether it is more or less perceptible, (ii) But why are some things said to ‘come-to-be’ without qualification, and others only to ‘come-to-be-so-and-so’, in cases different from the one we have been considering where two things come-to-be reciprocally out of one another? For at present we have explained no more than this:—why, when two things change reciprocally into one another, (5) we do not attribute coming-to-be and passing-away uniformly to them both, although every coming-to-be is a passing-away of something else and every passing-away some other thing’s coming-to-be. [319a] But the question subsequently formulated involves a different problem—viz. why, although the learning thing is said to ‘come-to-be-learned’ but not to ‘come-to-be’ without qualification, (10) yet the growing thing is said to ‘come-to-be’.
The distinction here turns upon the difference of the Categories. For some things signify a this somewhat, others a such, and others a so-much. Those things, then, which do not signify substance, are not said to ‘come-to-be’ without qualification, but only to ‘come-to-be-so-and-so’. Nevertheless, in all changing things alike, we speak of ‘coming-to-be’34 when the thing comes-to-be something in one35 of the two Columns—e. g. in Substance, (15) if it comes-to-be Fire but not if it comes-to-be Earth; and in Quality, if it comes-to-be learned but not when it comes-to-be ignorant.
We have explained why some things come-to-be without qualification, but not others—both in general, and also when the changing things are substances and nothing else; and we have stated that the substratum is the material cause of the continuous occurrence of coming-to-be, because it is such as to change from contrary to contrary and because, (20) in substances, the coming-to-be of one thing is always a passing-away of another, and the passing-away of one thing is always another’s coming-to-be. But there is no need even to discuss the other question we raised—viz. why coming-to-be continues though things are constantly being destroyed.36 For just as people speak of ‘a passing-away’ without qualification when a thing has passed into what is imperceptible and what in that sense ‘is not’, so also they speak of ‘a coming-to-be out of a not-being’ when a thing emerges from an imperceptible. (25) Whether, therefore, the substratum is or is not something, what comes-to-be emerges out of a ‘not-being’:37 so that a thing ‘comes-to-be out of a not-being’ just as much as it ‘passes-away into what is not’. Hence it is reasonable enough that coming-to-be should never fail. For coming-to-be is a passing-away of ‘what is not’ and passing-away is a coming-to-be of ‘what is not’.38
But what about that which ‘is’ not except with a qualification? Is it one of the two contrary poles of the change—e. g. is Earth (i. e. the heavy) a ‘not-being’, (30) but Fire (i. e. the light) a ‘being’? Or, on the contrary, does ‘what is’ include Earth as well as Fire, whereas ‘what is not’ is matter—the matter of Earth and Fire alike? And again, is the matter of each different? Or is it the same, since otherwise they would not come-to-be reciprocally out of one another, i. e. contraries out of contraries? [319b] For these things—Fire, Earth, Water, Air—are characterized by ‘the contraries.’39
Perhaps the solution is that their matter is in one sense the same, but in another sense different. For that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underlying them, is the same: but its actual being is not the same.
4 So much, then, on these topics. Next we must state what the difference is between coming-to-be and ‘alteration’—for we maintain that these changes are distinct from one another. (5)
Since, then, we must distinguish (a) the substratum, and (b) the property whose nature it is to be predicated of the substratum; and since change of each of these occurs; there is ‘alteration’ when the substratum is perceptible and persists, (10) but changes in its own properties, the properties in question being opposed to one another either as contraries or as intermediates. The body, e. g., although persisting as the same body, is now healthy and now ill; and the bronze is now spherical and at another time angular, and yet remains the same bronze. (15) But when not
hing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum, and the thing changes as a whole (when e. g. the seed as a whole is converted into blood, or water into air, or air as a whole into water), such an occurrence is no longer ‘alteration’. It is a coming-to-be of one substance and a passing-away of the other—especially if the change proceeds from an imperceptible something to something perceptible (either to touch or to all the senses), (20) as when water comes-to-be out of, or passes-away into, air: for air is pretty well imperceptible. If, however, in such cases, any property (being one of a pair of contraries) persists, in the thing that has come-to-be, the same as it was in the thing which has passed-away—if, e. g., when water comes-to-be out of air, both are transparent or cold40—the second thing, into which the first changes, must not be a property of this persistent identical something. Otherwise the change will be ‘alteration’.
Suppose, e. g., that the musical man passed-away and an unmusical man came-to-be, (25) and that the man persists as something identical. Now, if ‘musicalness and unmusicalness’ had not been a property essentially inhering in man, these changes would have been a coming-to-be of unmusicalness and a passing-away of musicalness: but in fact ‘musicalness and unmusicalness’ are a property of the persistent identity, viz. man. (Hence, as regards man, these changes are ‘modifications’; though, as regards musical man and unmusical man, (30) they are a passing-away and a coming-to-be.) Consequently such changes are ‘alteration’.
When the change from contrary to contrary is in quantity, it is ‘growth and diminution’; when it is in place, it is ‘motion’; when it is in property, i. e. in quality, it is ‘alteration’: but when nothing persists, of which the resultant is a property (or an ‘accident’ in any sense of the term), it is ‘coming-to-be’, and the converse change is ‘passing-away’. [320a]
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