14 ‘Quality’ means (1) the differentia of the essence, e. g. man is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is four-footed; (35) and a circle is a figure of particular quality because it is without angles—which shows that the essential differentia is a quality. [1020b] —This, then, is one meaning of quality—the differentia of the essence, but (2) there is another sense in which it applies to the unmovable objects of mathematics, the sense in which the numbers have a certain quality, e. g. the composite numbers which are not in one dimension only, but of which the plane and the solid are copies (these are those which have two or three factors); and in general that which exists in the essence of numbers besides quantity is quality; for the essence of each is what it is once, (5) e. g. that of 6 is not what it is twice or thrice, but what it is once; for 6 is once 6.
(3) All the modifications of substances that move (e. g. heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and lightness, (10) and the others of the sort) in virtue of which, when they change, bodies are said to alter. (4) Quality in respect of virtue and vice and, in general, of evil and good.
Quality, then, seems to have practically two meanings, and one of these is the more proper. The primary quality is the differentia of the essence, (15) and of this the quality in numbers is a part; for it is a differentia of essences, but either not of things that move or not of them qua moving. Secondly, there are the modifications of things that move, qua moving, and the differentiae of movements. Virtue and vice fall among these modifications; for they indicate differentiae of the movement or activity, (20) according to which the things in motion act or are acted on well or badly; for that which can be moved or act in one way is good, and that which can do so in another—the contrary—way is vicious. Good and evil indicate quality especially in living things, (25) and among these especially in those which have purpose.
15 Things are ‘relative’ (1) as double to half, and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as that which can heat to that which can be heated, and that which can cut to that which can be cut, (30) and in general the active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception.
(I) Relative terms of the first kind are numerically related either indefinitely or definitely, to numbers themselves or to 1. e. g. the double is in a definite numerical relation to 1, and that which is ‘many times as great’ is in a numerical, (35) but not a definite, relation to 1, i. e. not in this or in that numerical relation to it; [1021a] the relation of that which is half as big again as something else to that something is a definite numerical relation to a number; that which is times something else is in an indefinite relation to that something, as that which is ‘many times as great’ is in an indefinite relation to 1; the relation of that which exceeds to that which is exceeded is numerically quite indefinite; for number is always commensurate, (5) and ‘number’ is not predicated of that which is not commensurate, but that which exceeds is, in relation to that which is exceeded, so much and something more; and this something is indefinite; for it can, indifferently, be either equal or not equal to that which is exceeded.—All these relations, then, are numerically expressed and are determinations of number, and so in another way are the equal and the like and the same. (10) For all refer to unity. Those things are the same whose substance is one; those are like whose quality is one; those are equal whose quantity is one; and 1 is the beginning and measure of number, so that all these relations imply number, though not in the same way.
(2) Things that are active or passive imply an active or a passive potency and the actualizations of the potencies; e. g. that which is capable of heating is related to that which is capable of being heated, because it can heat it, (15) and, again, that which heats is related to that which is heated and that which cuts to that which is cut, in the sense that they actually do these things. But numerical relations are not actualized except in the sense which has been elsewhere stated; actualizations in the sense of movement they have not. (20) Of relations which imply potency some further imply particular periods of time, e. g. that which has made is relative to that which has been made, and that which will make to that which will be made. For it is in this way that a father is called the father of his son; for the one has acted and the other has been acted on in a certain way. Further, (25) some relative terms imply privation of potency, i. e. ‘incapable’ and terms of this sort, e. g. ‘invisible’.
Relative terms which imply number or potency, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else, not because something else involves a reference to it; but (3) that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it. (30) For ‘that which is thinkable’ implies that the thought of it is possible, but the thought is not relative to ‘that of which it is the thought’; for we should then have said the same thing twice. Similarly sight is the sight of something, not ‘of that of which it is the sight’ (though of course it is true to say this); in fact it is relative to colour or to something else of the sort. [1021b] But according to the other way of speaking the same thing would be said twice—‘the sight is of that of which it is.’
Things that are by their own nature called relative are called so sometimes in these senses, sometimes if the classes that include them are of this sort; e. g. medicine is a relative term because its genus, (5) science, is thought to be a relative term. Further, there are the properties in virtue of which the things that have them are called relative, e. g. equality is relative because the equal is, and likeness because the like is. Other things are relative by accident; e. g. a man is relative because he happens to be double of something and double is a relative term; or the white is relative, (10) if the same thing happens to be double and white.
16 What is called ‘complete’ is (1) that outside which it is not possible to find any, even one, of its parts; e. g. the complete time of each thing is that outside which it is not possible to find any time which is a part proper to it. (15)—(2) That which in respect of excellence and goodness cannot be excelled in its kind; e. g. we have a complete doctor or a complete flute-player, when they lack nothing in respect of the form of their proper excellence. And thus, transferring the word to bad things, we speak of a complete scandal-monger and a complete thief; indeed we even call them good, (20) i. e. a good thief and a good scandalmonger. And excellence is a completion; for each thing is complete and every substance is complete, when in respect of the form of its proper excellence it lacks no part of its natural magnitude.—(3) The things which have attained their end, this being good, (25) are called complete; for things are complete in virtue of having attained their end. Therefore, since the end is something ultimate, we transfer the word to bad things and say a thing has been completely spoilt, and completely destroyed, when it in no wise falls short of destruction and badness, but is at its last point. This is why death, too, is by a figure of speech called the end, because both are last things. But the ultimate purpose is also an end. (30)—Things, then, that are called complete in virtue of their own nature are so called in all these senses, some because in respect of goodness they lack nothing and cannot be excelled and no part proper to them can be found outside them, others in general because they cannot be exceeded in their several classes and no part proper to them is outside them; the others presuppose these first two kinds, and are called complete because they either make or have something of the sort or are adapted to it or in some way or other involve a reference to the things that are called complete in the primary sense. [1022a]
17 ‘Limit’ means (1) the last point of each thing, i. e. the first point beyond which it is not possible to find any part, (5) and the first point within which every part is; (2) the form, whatever it may be, of a spat
ial magnitude or of a thing that has magnitude; (3) the end of each thing (and of this nature is that towards which the movement and the action are, not that from which they are—though sometimes it is both, that from which and that to which the movement is, i. e. the final cause); (4) the substance of each thing, and the essence of each; for this is the limit of knowledge; and if of knowledge, (10) of the object also. Evidently, therefore, ‘limit’ has as many senses as ‘beginning’, and yet more; for the beginning is a limit, but not every limit is a beginning.
18 ‘That in virtue of which’ has several meanings:—(1) the form or substance of each thing, e. g. that in virtue of which a man is good is the good itself, (15) (2) the proximate subject in which it is the nature of an attribute to be found, e. g. colour in a surface. ‘That in virtue of which’, then, in the primary sense is the form, and in a secondary sense the matter of each thing and the proximate substratum of each.—In general ‘that in virtue of which’ will be found in the same number of senses as ‘cause’; for we say indifferently (3) ‘in virtue of what has he come?’ or ‘for what end has he come?’; and (4) ‘in virtue of what has he inferred wrongly, (20) or inferred?’ or ‘what is the cause of the inference, or of the wrong inference?’—Further (5) kath’ho is used in reference to position, e. g. ‘at which he stands’ or ‘along which he walks’; for all such phrases indicate place and position.
Therefore ‘in virtue of itself’ must likewise have several meanings. The following belong to a thing in virtue of itself:—(1) the essence of each thing, (25) e. g. Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and what it was to be Callias; (2) whatever is present in the ‘what’, e. g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal. For ‘animal’ is present in his definition; Callias is a particular animal.—(3) Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of its parts; e. g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, (30) in which life directly resides, is a part of the man.—(4) That which has no cause other than itself; man has more than one cause—animal, two-footed—but yet man is man in virtue of himself.—(5) Whatever attributes belong to a thing alone, (35) and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue of itself considered apart by itself.
19 ‘Disposition’ means the arrangement of that which has parts, in respect either of place or of potency or of kind; for there must be a certain position, as even the word ‘disposition’ shows. [1022b]
20 ‘Having’ means (1) a kind of activity of the haver and of what he has—something like an action or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, between them there is a making; so too between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is a having. (5) This sort of having, then, evidently we cannot have; for the process will go on to infinity, if it is to be possible to have the having of what we have.—(2) ‘Having’ or ‘habit’ means a disposition according to which that which is disposed is either well or ill disposed, (10) and either in itself or with reference to something else; e. g. health is a ‘habit’; for it is such a disposition.—(3) We speak of a ‘habit’ if there is a portion of such a disposition; and so even the excellence of the parts is a ‘habit’ of the whole thing.
21 ‘Affection’ means (1) a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered, (15) e. g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, and all others of the kind.—(2) The actualization of these—the already accomplished alterations.—(3) Especially, (20) injurious alterations and movements, and, above all, painful injuries.—(4) Misfortunes and painful experiences when on a large scale are called affections.
22 We speak of ‘privation’ (1) if something has not one of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it; e. g. a plant is said to be ‘deprived’ of eyes.—(2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, (25) it has it not; e. g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses ‘deprived’ of sight; the latter in contrast with its genus,13 the former in contrast with his own normal nature.—(3) If, though it would naturally have the attribute, and when it would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not ‘blind’ at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally have it. (30) Similarly a thing is called blind if it has not sight in the medium in which, and in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with reference to the object with reference to which, and in the circumstances in which, it would naturally have it.—(4) The violent taking away of anything is called privation.
Indeed there are just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, (35) and invisible either because it has no colour at all or because it has a poor colour, and apodous either because it has no feet at all or because it has imperfect feet. [1023a] Again, a privative term may be used because the thing has little of the attribute (and this means having it in a sense imperfectly), e. g. ‘kernel-less’; or because it has it not easily or not well (e. g. we call a thing uncuttable not only if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or well); or because it has not the attribute at all; for it is not the one-eyed man but he who is sightless in both eyes that is called blind. (5) This is why not every man is ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘just’ or ‘unjust’, but there is also an intermediate state.
23 To ‘have’ or ‘hold’ means many things:—(1) to treat a thing according to one’s own nature or according to one’s own impulse; so that fever is said to have a man, and tyrants to have their cities, (10) and people to have the clothes they wear.—(2) That in which a thing is present as in something receptive of it is said to have the thing; e. g. the bronze has the form of the statue, and the body has the disease.—(3) As that which contains holds the things contained; for a thing is said to be held by that in which it is as in a container; e. g. we say that the vessel holds the liquid and the city holds men and the ship sailors; and so too that the whole holds the parts. (15)—(4) That which hinders a thing from moving or acting according to its own impulse is said to hold it, as pillars hold the incumbent weights, and as the poets make Atlas hold the heavens, implying that otherwise they would collapse on the earth, (20) as some of the natural philosophers also say. In this way also that which holds things together is said to hold the things it holds together, since they would otherwise separate, each according to its own impulse.
‘Being in something’ has similar and corresponding meanings to ‘holding’ or ‘having’. (25)
24 ‘To come from something’ means (1) to come from something as from matter, and this in two senses, either in respect of the highest genus or in respect of the lowest species; e. g. in a sense all things that can be melted come from water, but in a sense the statue comes from bronze.—(2) As from the first moving principle; e. g. (30) ‘what did the fight come from?’ From abusive language, because this was the origin of the fight—(3) From the compound of matter and shape, as the parts come from the whole, and the verse from the Iliad, and the stones from the house; [in every such case the whole is a compound of matter and shape,] for the shape is the end, and only that which attains an end is complete.—(4) As the form from its part, e. g. man from ‘two-footed’ and syllable from ‘letter’; for this is a different sense from that in which the statue comes from bronze; for the composite substance comes from the sensible matter, (35) but the form also comes from the matter of the form. [1023b]—Some things, then, are said to come from something else in these senses; but (5) others are so described if one of these senses is applicable to a part of that other thing; e. g. the child comes from its father and mother, and plants come from the earth, because they come from a part of those things.—(6) It means coming after a thing in time, (5) e. g. night comes from day and storm from fine weather, because the one comes after the other. Of these things some are so described because they admit of change into one anoth
er, as in the cases now mentioned; some merely because they are successive in time, e. g. the voyage took place ‘from’ the equinox, (10) because it took place after the equinox, and the festival of the Thargelia comes ‘from’ the Dionysia, because after the Dionysia.
25 ‘Part’ means (1) (a) that into which a quantum can in any way be divided; for that which is taken from a quantum qua quantum is always called a part of it, (15) e. g. two is called in a sense a part of three. It means (b), of the parts in the first sense, only those which measure the whole; this is why two, though in one sense it is, in another is not, called a part of three.—(2) The elements into which a kind might be divided apart from the quantity are also called parts of it; for which reason we say the species are parts of the genus.—(3) The elements into which a whole is divided, (20) or of which it consists—the ‘whole’ meaning either the form or that which has the form; e. g. of the bronze sphere or of the bronze cube both the bronze—i. e. the matter in which the form is—and the characteristic angle are parts.—(4) The elements in the definition which explains a thing are also parts of the whole; this is why the genus is called a part of the species, (25) though in another sense the species is part of the genus.
26 ‘A whole’ means (1) that from which is absent none of the parts of which it is said to be naturally a whole, and (2) that which so contains the things it contains that they form a unity; and this in two senses—either as being each severally one single thing, or as making up the unity between them. For (a) that which is true of a whole class and is said to hold good as a whole (which implies that it is a kind of whole) is true of a whole in the sense that it contains many things by being predicated of each, (30) and by all of them, e. g. man, horse, god, being severally one single thing, because all are living things. But (b) the continuous and limited is a whole, when it is a unity consisting of several parts, especially if they are present only potentially,14 but, failing this, even if they are present actually. Of these things themselves, those which are so by nature are wholes in a higher degree than those which are so by art, (35) as we said15 in the case of unity also, wholeness being in fact a sort of oneness.
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 107