Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following:—The common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, (35) and their magistracy of the 104 to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit—this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, (40) nor that an ordinary one, but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed by seniority—this is far better. [1273a] Such officers have great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon.
Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. (5) But of the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them, (10) and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistracies of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, (15) that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)—these are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates,84 (20) and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy. The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well—he has not the leisure. If, then, (25) election of magistrates for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them—their kings and generals—with an eye both to merit and to wealth. (30)
But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way; and to this his attention should be first directed. Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, (35) yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honourable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, (40) where virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly established. [1273b] Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best. (5) And even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for them when in office.85
It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favourite practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one man.86 The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. (10) Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I said,87 this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all. (15)
The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. (20) Accident favours them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods. (25)
Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.
12 Of those who have treated of governments, some have never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed their lives in a private station; about most of them, what was worth telling has been already told.88 (30) Others have been lawgivers, either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have administered; and of these some have only made laws, others have framed constitutions; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did both. Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken.89 (35) As to Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized the different elements of the state. According to their view, the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, (40) the elected magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical. [1274a] The truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, but that he formed the courts of law out of all the citizens, thus creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is sometimes blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts, (5) which are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic element. When the law courts grew powerful, to please the people who were now playing the tyrant the old constitution was changed into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed the power of the Areopagus; Pericles also instituted the payment of the juries, (10) and thus every demagogue in turn increased the power of the democracy until it became what we now see. All this is true; it seems, however, to be the result of circumstances, and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, having been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian War,90 began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues, whom the better class opposed. Solon, (15) himself, appears to have given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary;91 for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and enmity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from the notables and the men of wealth, that is to say, (20) from the pentacosio-medimni, or from the class called zeugitae, or from a third class of so-called knights or cavalry. The fourth class were labourers who had no share in any magistracy.
Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy and Sicily. (25) Some people attempt to make out that Onomacritus was the first person who had any special skill in legislation, and that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. (30) But their account is quite inconsistent with chronology.
There was also Philolaus, the Corinthian, who gave laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family of th
e Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor, who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired to Thebes, where the two friends together ended their days. (35) The inhabitants still point out their tombs, which are in full view of one another, but one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other not. Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus, Diocles out of horror at his misfortunes, (40) so that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb; Philolaus that it might. [1274b] This is the reason why they settled at Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them laws about the procreation of children, which they call the ‘Laws of Adoption’. These laws were peculiar to him, and were intended to preserve the number of the lots.
In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing remarkable, (5) except the suits against false witnesses. He is the first who instituted denunciation for perjury. His laws are more exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern legislators.
(Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of property; of Plato, the community of women, children, and property, the common meals of women, (10) and the law about drinking, that the sober shall be masters of the feast;92 also the training of soldiers to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands, so that one should be as useful as the other.)93
Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution which already existed, (15) and there is no peculiarity in them which is worth mentioning, except the greatness and severity of the punishments.
Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author of a constitution; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that, if a drunken man do something wrong, (20) he shall be more heavily punished than if he were sober;94 he looked not to the excuse which might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expediency, for drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence.
Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians of Thrace. (25) Some of them relate to homicide, and to heiresses; but there is nothing remarkable in them.
And here let us conclude our inquiry into the various constitutions which either actually exist, or have been devised by theorists.
* * *
1 Rep. iv. 423 E, V. 457 C, 462 B.
2 N. Eth. v. 1132b 32.
3 Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 345–6.
4 Cp. i. 1259b 4, iii. 1288a 12.
5 Cp. Pl. Rep. i. 353.
6 Pl. Rep. v. 462 C.
7 Cp. Rep. v. 463 E.
8 Rep. iii. 403 A-C.
9 Cp. vii. 1330a 28.
10 Cp. N. Eth. viii. 1155a 22.
11 Cp. C. 2.
12 Symp. 191 A, 192 C.
13 Cp. C. 3.
14 Rep. iii. 415 B.
15 a25–40.
16 Cp. Rep. ii. 374.
17 Cp. Rep. iv. 424 a
18 Cp. N. Eth. ix. 8.
19 Cp. N. Eth. iv. 1119b 22.
20 Rep. v. 464, 465.
21 Cp. C. 2.
22 Cp. 1261a 18.
23 Cp. Rep. iv. 422 E.
24 Rep. v. 464, 465.
25 Rep. iv. 425 D.
26 Rep. v. 464 C.
27 Cp. 1269a 36.
28 Cp. Rep. v. 451 D.
29 Cp. Rep. iii. 415 A.
30 Rep. iv. 419, 420.
31 Cp. vii. 1329a 23.
32 Rep. ii. 373 E.
33 Rep. iii. 412 B.
34 Rep. v. 451 E.
35 Laws, vi. 780 E.
36 Laws, v. 737 E.
37 Rep. iv. 423 A.
38 Cp. vii. 1325b 38.
39 Perhaps Laws, iv. 704–709, and v. 747 D.
40 Cp. 1267a 19.
41 Cp. vii. 1327a 41.
42 Cp. vii. C. 2. and 3.
43 Laws, v. 737 D.
44 Cp. vii. 1326b 30.
45 But see Laws, v. 740 B-741 A.
46 Cp. vii. 1326b 26–32, 1330a 9–18, 1335b 19–26; but the promise is hardly fulfilled.
47 Laws, v. 734 E, 735 A.
48 Laws, v. 744 E.
49 Laws, v. 745 C, but Cp. infra, vii. 1330a 9–18.
50 Cp. iv. 1293b 16, 1294b 18–34.
51 iii. 693 D, 701 E, iv. 710, vi. 756 E.
52 Laws, vi. 756, 763 E, 765.
53 Laws, vi. 764 A; and Pol. iv. 1294a 37, 1298b 16.
54 Laws, vi. 763 D E.
55 Laws, vi. 756 B-E.
56 iv. 7–9, 12. 1296b 34–38, 1297a 7–13.
57 Laws, vi. 753 D.
58 v. 744 E.
59 1265b 21
60 Cp. 1265a 38-b 16.
61 Cp. 1263b 22.
62 Il. ix. 319.
63 Cp. 1265a 20.
64 Cp. l. 1.
65 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 677 B; Polit. 274 C; Tim. 22 D.
66 Cp. Plato, Polit. 295 A.
67 1268b 34 sqq.
68 These questions are not actually discussed in the Politics.
69 Cp. 1271b 41.
70 Cp. i. 1260b 18.
71 1269b 12, 23.
72 i. e. to the person who ‘inherits’ the heiress.
73 At the time of the Theban invasion.
74 iii. 14–17.
75 Cp. 1272a 13–21.
76 Laws, i. 625 E, 630.
77 Cp. vii. 1334a 6.
78 1271a 35.
79 Cp. vii. 1330a 5.
80 The question is nowhere discussed by Aristotle.
81 Cp. supra, 1270b 25.
82 1270b 35–1271a 18.
83 a41 sq.
84 Cp. iii. 1275b 8–12.
85 Cp. 1269a 34.
86 Cp. Plato, Rep. ii. 374 A.
87 1261b 1.
88 cc. 1–8.
89 c. 9.
90 Cp. v. 1304a 20, viii. 1341a 29.
91 Cp. iii. 1281b 32.
92 Cp. Laws, i. 640 D, ii. 671 D-672 A.
93 Cp. Laws, vii. 794 D.
94 Cp. N. Eth. 1113b 31.
BOOK III
1 He who would inquire into the essence and attributes of various kinds of governments must first of all determine ‘What is a state?’ At present this is a disputed question. Some say that the state has done a certain act; others, (35) no, not the state,1 but the oligarchy or the tyrant. And the legislator or statesman is concerned entirely with the state; a constitution or government being an arrangement of the inhabitants of a state. But a state is composite, (40) like any other whole made up of many parts;—these are the citizens, who compose it. [1275a] It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking, Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term? For here again there may be a difference of opinion. He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. (5) Leaving out of consideration those who have been made citizens, or who have obtained the name of citizen in any other accidental manner, we may say, first, that a citizen is not a citizen because he lives in a certain place, for resident aliens and slaves share in the place; nor is he a citizen who has no legal right except that of suing and being sued; for this right may be enjoyed under the provisions of a treaty. (10) Nay, resident aliens in many places do not possess even such rights completely, for they are obliged to have a patron, so that they do but imperfectly participate in citizenship, and we call them citizens only in a qualified sense, as we might apply the term to children who are too young to be on the register, (15) or to old men who have been relieved from state duties. Of these we do not say quite simply that they are citizens, but add in the one case that they are not of age, and in the other, that they are past the age, (20) or something of that sort; the precise expression is immaterial, for our meaning is clear. Similar difficulties to those which I have mentioned may be raised and answered about deprived citizens and about exiles. But the citizen whom we are seeking to define is a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such exception can be taken, and his special characteristic is that he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices. Now of offices some are discontinuous, and the same persons are not
allowed to hold them twice, or can only hold them after a fixed interval; others have no limit of time—for example, (25) the office of dicast or ecclesiast.2 It may, indeed, be argued that these are not magistrates at all, and that their functions give them no share in the government. But surely it is ridiculous to say that those who have the supreme power do not govern. Let us not dwell further upon this, which is a purely verbal question; what we want is a common term including both dicast and ecclesiast. (30) Let us, for the sake of distinction, call it ‘indefinite office’, and we will assume that those who share in such office are citizens. This is the most comprehensive definition of a citizen, and best suits all those who are generally so called.
But we must not forget that things of which the underlying principles differ in kind, (35) one of them being first, another second, another third, have, when regarded in this relation, nothing, or hardly anything, worth mentioning in common. Now we see that governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. [1275b] (What we mean by perversion will be hereafter explained.3) The citizen then of necessity differs under each form of government; and our definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other states. (5) For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits are distributed by sections among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon, for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they distribute among themselves, (10) while the elders are judges of homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates. A similar principle prevails at Carthage;4 there certain magistrates decide all causes. We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as to include these states. In them it is the holder of a definite, not of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, (15) and to some or all such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating or judging about some things or about all things. The conception of the citizen now begins to clear up.
The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) Page 163