Apart from the Anglo–Greek scheme, no preliminary plan for a Dardanelles operation had been prepared by the General Staff in London. The reason for this was simple, and unbelievable: it was only on 11 March that the General Staff were told that large-scale military operations were being considered, despite the fact that Wolfe Murray, the CIGS, had been present at all War Council meetings.83
The Navy’s progress and Achi Baba
Admiral de Robeck intended to land a demolition party on 3 March at Sedd-el-Bahr, but was prevented by bad weather. Landings took place the next day, but little success was achieved. Demolition, survey and beach parties were landed from Inflexible and Ocean under Lieut. Commander Giffard. A covering company of the Plymouth Battalion under Major Palmer of the Royal Marines was to move forward to a line from Morto Bay to the ‘fountain’ north of Tekke Burnu, which it would hold for three hours while the demolition and survey parties did their work. In fact seaplanes had located old trenches behind the Old Castle at Sedd-el-Bahr, from which Turkish fire prevented the covering force from advancing, so the operation was aborted.84 On 5 March the Navy planned to use a cairn on the summit of Haji Monorlo Dagh as an aiming point for Queen Elizabeth to lay her fire over the Peninsula at targets in the Narrows.85
On 8 March Captain Fitzmaurice of the Triumph, after observing the naval bombardment from Morto Bay, stated his view that ‘no real progress could be made without the assistance of land forces to supplement and make good the work done by the fleet’. He considered that Achi Baba, the commanding feature of the southern Peninsula, was essential as an artillery spotting station for the Navy. This judgement was based on his experience at Tsingtau, where naval bombardment had proved ineffective until an observing station was established on Prinz Heinrich Berg. In addition, he thought that guns might be taken ashore.86 Clearly the accumulation of these naval views, and particularly their emphasis on the importance of Achi Baba, later carried much weight with Sir Ian Hamilton. On the other hand, the Naval Official Historian commented that the ‘high authorities of both services’ ignored the lessons of Port Arthur and Tsingtau: ‘Owing to our imperfect machinery for bringing together the naval and military staffs for intimate study of combined problems, such failures in council were inevitable.’87 By 8 March, although it was clear that observation of naval gunfire and the location of concealed batteries was the key to the situation, Kitchener gave no suggestion in his instructions to Birdwood that troops should be used to remedy the situation.
The importance of Achi Baba as an artillery observation post was emphasised by many of the Army and Navy staff involved in planning the initial operations. Surgeon Rear-Admiral Jeans later repeated the discussions he had heard, possibly on board Euryalus, between Hamilton’s HQ and de Robeck about capturing Achi Baba in order to emplace heavy artillery behind it to bombard the defences of the Narrows:
Its summit commanded the whole system of gun positions on both sides of the Dardanelles at Kilid Bahr and Chanak, and once the 15-inch howitzer already at Mudros with its tractor and railway lines, could be mounted there and brought to bear on that system its destruction was anticipated in a few days.88
Witnesses to the Dardanelles Commission, including Lieut.-Col. Hore-Ruthven and Lieut-Col. T H B Forster, confirmed the existence of this massive howitzer at Mudros; apparently it was never unloaded from its ship.89
The high-trajectory 15-inch howitzer, a new design rather than merely a scaled-up version of the new 9.2-inch and 12-inch models, had been ordered by Churchill in 1914 for the Royal Marine Artillery, but the prototype (‘Granny’) went to France and took part in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March 1915. Twelve such howitzers were under construction in early 1915, and on proof firing a range of 11,000 yards was attained.90 On 14 May 1915, the landings at Gallipoli having been made but only slow progress achieved towards Achi Baba, Churchill minuted: ‘The fifth 15-inch howitzer, with fifty rounds of ammunition, should go to the Dardanelles with the least possible delay, being sent by special train across France and re-embarked at Marseilles….’
He also proposed to send 9.2-inch guns, to be mounted on land or on monitors as occasion demanded, and several monitors.91 So Churchill secretly sent a howitzer and ammunition out to Mudros. However, the distance from the summit of Achi Baba to Kilid Bahr was 13,000 yards (12km), so the range from heavy artillery positions behind Achi Baba was much greater than the maximum range of the 15-inch howitzer. It would therefore have been necessary to advance the howitzer to the forward slopes, unacceptable as it would expose it to enemy fire. Reports by British artillery commanders at Gallipoli do not mention this addition to their arsenal, for the simple reason that it was never landed on the Peninsula.
The destruction of the defending coast batteries would enable the fleet to push through the Straits and the Bulair Lines to be captured. Undoubtedly there was considerable naval and Army agreement on the importance of Achi Baba for such a purpose, but it was based on a misconception; the summit did not in fact give a direct view of the Narrows defences, which were defiladed by intervening high ground and the steep scarp edge of the Kilid Bahr Plateau. This suggests that key figures on the staff could not read the one-inch map, and did not understand the elementary concept of intervisibility; the map gave perfectly good information on this point.
Command passes from Birdwood to Hamilton
Birdwood had been led to understand by Kitchener that he would be given command of the expanded ‘Constantinople Expeditionary Force’. The addition of the Royal Naval Division, the 29th Division and d’Amade’s French contingent led Kitchener to appoint Sir Ian Hamilton, a General of more experience and greater reputation. Birdwood started planning landings, in cooperation with the Navy, at his Egyptian HQ. He had presumably been provided with an outline copy of what was known of the Greek plan by way of Admiral Kerr in Athens. Frederick Cunliffe Owen, who had gone from Constantinople to Egypt via Athens, was also familiar with the Greek plan, and probably imparted it to Clayton and Maxwell. Following Hamilton’s arrival at Mudros, and later in Egypt, he took over from Birdwood the planning material thus far accumulated, and also the Anzac Printing Section (including both hand-litho and letterpress capability) which Ernest Dowson, Director General of the Survey of Egypt, had formed in early March for Birdwood when he first heard of impending operations at the Dardanelles. From this point on, the tragedy unfolds with relentless inevitability.
Notes
1. Lt-Col. F Cunliffe Owen to The Secretary, Army Council, 27-9-1927, in Imperial War Museum Department of Documents.
2. Anon. (1876), The Dardanelles for England: the true solution of the Eastern Question, 28pp., 8vo., War Office Library Catalogue, 1912, Part III.
3. Reports and Memoranda relative to Defence of Constantinople and other positions in Turkey … (1877), pp. 135–46, in TNA(PRO) WO 33/29.
4. The Dardanelles Commission, in The World War I Collection (Uncovered Editions), London: The Stationery Office, 2001, p. 32.
5. Ardagh, The Eastern Question in 1896, Ardagh Papers, October 1896, pp. 32–4, TNA(PRO) 30/40/14/1.
6. Hopkirk, Peter, On Secret Service East of Constantinople, London: John Murray, 1994, p. 13.
7. Aspinall-Oglander, Brig.-Gen. C F, History of the Great War, Military Operations, Gallipoli, Vol. I, London: Heinemann, 1929, p. 5.
8. Ibid, pp. 5–8.
9. Quoted in Rohde, Lt G H, Die Operationen an den Dardanellen im Balkankrieg, 1912/13, Früher Ordonnanz-Offizier im Stabe des Oberkommandos auf Gallipoli, Mit 9 Abbildungen auf 8 Tafeln and 3 Kartenbeleigen. 8vo. vi + 136pp, Berlin: R Eisenschmidt (BL Shelfmark: 9136.dd.21), p. 97.
10. Rhodes James, Robert, Gallipoli, London: Pimlico, 1999, pp. 3–4.
11. Stenzel, Kapn A, Der kürzeste Weg nach Konstantinopel. Ein Beispiel für das Zusammenwirken von Flotte and Heer, 1894, 73pp. Map. 8vo.
12. The Dardanelles Commission, op. cit., p. 90.
13. Military Policy in a War with Turkey, memo by Captain Grant Duff, 11 July 1906. TNA(PRO
) WO 106/42, Envelope C3, 21a.
14. War with Turkey. The Forcing of the Dardanelles. 10 August 1906. Secret. Capt. Ottley’s submission. Papers and various drafts. TNA(PRO) ADM 1/8884.
15. Minutes of 92nd meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence, 26 July 1906. TNA(PRO) CAB 38/12/46.
16. TNA(PRO) ADM 1/8884 op. cit. Very Secret. The Forcing of the Dardanelles (The Naval Aspects of the Question). Capt. C L Ottley, Director of Naval Intelligence. E44942. 12.-8/06. Pk. E&S. A. 12pp., final (third) and earlier drafts.
17. Ottley (1906), op. cit., final draft, p. 11.
18. Ibid, first and second drafts.
19. Minutes of 93rd meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence, 13 November 1906. TNA(PRO) CAB 38/12/55.
20. The Possibility of a Joint Naval and Military Attack upon the Dardanelles. Secret. 92B. Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. 2 Whitehall Gardens. December 20, 1906. I Memorandum by the General Staff. N.G.L. December 19, 1906. [4pp.] II Note by the Director of Naval Intelligence [1p.]. February 1907. Printed at the Foreign Office by J W Harrison, 14/2/1907. Foolscap. Cover + 5pp. TNA(PRO) CAB 17/184.
21. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 41.
22. The Dardanelles Commission, op. cit., p. 32.
23. Haldane to Knollys, 10 December 1906, Royal Archives: RA W27/51.
24. 96th meeting of the CID. TNA(PRO) CAB 2/2/1.
25. Gooch, J, The Plans of War. The General Staff and British Military Strategy c1900– 1916, London: Routledge, 1974, p. 262.
26. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 29.
27. Ibid, p. 11.
28. Morgenthau, Henry, Secrets of the Bosphorus, London: Hutchinson, 1918, p. 30.
29. Graves, Philip, Briton and Turk, London: Hutchinson, 1941, pp. 179, 184–7.
30. Heller, Joseph, British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, London: Cass, 1983, pp. 116–23.
31. Ibid, p. 131.
32. Kerr to Inglefield (CID, Historical Section), 27 March 1922, in TNA(PRO) ADM 137/4178, 1915–22, Greece, papers relating to economic and strategic position in Balkans and Dardanelles campaign – letters from Admiral Mark Kerr.
33. Cunninghame’s evidence to Dardanelles Commission, TNA(PRO) CAB 19/33.
34. Thomson, Sir Basil, The Allied Secret Service in Greece, London: Hutchinson, 1931, pp. 50–1.
35. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 14.
36. Gaselee (Foreign Office) to Daniel (CID, Historical Section), 17 April 1925, in TNA(PRO) ADM 137/4178, op. cit.
37. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., pp. 40–1.
38. Ibid, p. 41.
39. Ibid, p. 29.
40. Grey to British Minister, Athens, 4 September 1914, in TNA(PRO) ADM 137/4178, op. cit. Gaselee states: ‘see Greek White Book (original and supplement) in our [Foreign Office] Printed Library, Quarto 1854. The document of which I have just spoken is the only one of its contents which bears directly on this particular crisis.’
41. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 42 & fn.
42. Kerr to Inglefield (CID, Historical Section), 27 March 1922, in TNA(PRO) ADM 137/4178, op. cit.
43. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 42.
44. Ibid, p. 43.
45. Ibid, p. 44.
46. Ibid, pp. 52–3.
47. Ibid, pp. 55–6.
48. Ibid, p. 57.
49. The Dardanelles Commission, op. cit., p. 95.
50. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 44.
51. Ibid, p. 67 & fn.
52. Birdwood to Ellison, 13 April 1924, TNA(PRO) WO 161/84.
53. Rhodes James, op. cit., pp. 40–1.
54. GHQ MEF War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4263.
55. Lady Hamilton’s Diary, Hamilton Papers, Liddell Hart Archive, King’s College London.
56. Fitzherbert, M, The Man who was Greenmantle. A Biography of Aubrey Herbert, London: OUP, 1985, pp. 149–50.
57. Corbett, Sir Julian S, History of the Great War, Naval Operations, Vol. II, London: Longmans Green, 1921, pp. 147, 173.
58. Storrs, R, Orientations, Definitive Edn, London: Nicholson & Watson, 1945, p. 198.
59. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit. pp. 74–5.
60. Birdwood to Ellison, 13 April 1924, TNA(PRO) WO 161/84.
61. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 69fn.
62. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 417fn.
63. Corbett, op. cit., p. 174fn.
64. ANZAC Corps General Staff (Special Mission) War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4280.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid. War Diary of Major N P Hancock DAA & QMG ANZAC, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4280.
67. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., pp. 73–4.
68. Kitchener to Birdwood via Maxwell, in ibid, p. 74.
69. Ibid, pp. 73–4.
70. Corbett, op. cit., p. 174.
71. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 76.
72. Wemyss, Admiral, The Navy in the Dardanelles Campaign, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1924, p. 27.
73. Birdwood to Kitchener, rec’d Cairo 4.3.15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574, Dardanelles Operations – Copies of Telegrams 1915 (GOC-in-C, Egypt).
74. Corbett, op. cit., p. 176.
75. Birdwood to Kitchener via Maxwell, TNA(PRO) CAB 63/17 p. 81.
76. Maxwell to Fitzgerald, in Kitchener Papers, TNA(PRO) 30/57/61.
77. Kitchener to Maxwell for Birdwood, rec’d 5.3.15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574, Dardanelles Operations – Copies of Telegrams 1915 (GOC-in-C, Egypt).
78. Maxwell to Fitzgerald, in Kitchener Papers, TNA(PRO) 30/57/61.
79. Aspinall-Oglander, op. cit., p. 69fn.
80. Corbett, op, cit., p. 176.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid, p. 174.
83. Ibid, p. 175.
84. Jeans, Surgeon Rear-Admiral T T, Reminiscences of a Naval Surgeon, London: Sampson, Low & Marston, 1927, p. 248.
85. Minutes of Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, pp. 741, 753–4, TNA(PRO) CAB 19/33.
86. Edmonds, Brig.-Gen. Sir James, Military Operations, France and Flanders, Vol. I, London: Macmillan, 1927, p. 83.
87. Minute by First Lord of the Admiralty [Churchill], 14 May 1915 to Secretary, I.S.L. [First Sea Lord], C.O.S. [Chief of Staff], in TNA(PRO) CAB 19/28.
CHAPTER 3
Pre-War Geographical Intelligence
Intelligence … must be timely, accurate, relevant and verifiable. It must answer a question and it must engender proactive, actionable decision making even if that decision is not to act.1
While we are clearly in a position to assess whether available ‘open source’ intelligence was in fact collected and used in the run-up to the Gallipoli operations, we will never, given the nature of this particular animal, know very much about the clandestine intelligence-gathering prior to those operations. Published histories of intelligence services are rather obviously full of lacunae, and histories (and biographies) of military and naval operations and their participants likewise omit crucial aspects of this vital preliminary function. There is a sense in which we will never know the true history of any event, given that crucial elements of the equation remain locked away in secret files, or have long-since been shredded or gone to the grave with the actors concerned. Nevertheless, certain pieces of information survive in the archives or in the literature, and we can state with confidence that various intelligence agencies were supplying strategic, topographical, operational and tactical intelligence; in fact a great deal was available in various forms and in various departments. Whether it was properly used is a different matter. The mounting of the Gallipoli landing operations was a classic example of intelligence being available in various forms but not being correctly collated, analysed, evaluated, distributed or used operationally. There was no ‘Theatre Intelligence Section’ before the Gallipoli landings as there was before D-Day.
Military and naval studies of the Dardanelles to 1906
Regarded as the geographical key to ‘the Eastern Question’, the Dardanelles area had long been considered of strategic importance by the British, and many studies of various kinds had been made of
its defences, terrain and possible landing places. These studies were carried out over several centuries prior to the inception of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915.
In their early development, the British Army and Navy each developed their own Intelligence departments which drew on a variety of sources. The Lords of the Admiralty were keenly interested, and the National Archives contain papers relating to the Admiralty’s ‘Secret Branch’, including documents from the 1796–1826 period: ‘internal memoranda, correspondence, intelligence reports and papers or operational or political questions of particular delicacy, or special interest to the First Lord and the members of the Admiralty Board. They include Duckworth’s passage of the Dardanelles’2 in 1807.
In 1799, following the French seizure of Egypt, a British military mission (including three Royal Engineer officers) under Brig.-Gen. Koehler RA, was sent to Constantinople to advise and assist the Sultan.3 Major M Hope, Commanding Royal Artillery, and Major Charles Holloway, Commanding Royal Engineers, were ordered to ‘visit and examine’ the castles, defences, batteries, magazines, etc., at the Dardanelles, and submit a report. This they did, concluding that the defences were totally inadequate, would not prevent an enemy fleet from forcing a passage to Constantinople, and should be augmented, re-sited where necessary and re-armed. Hope raised a significant point when he noted that ‘it is not to be supposed that these Castles will at any time be attacked by sea and land together’; he gave no reason for this supposition.4
Grasping Gallipoli Page 9