… select suitable landing ground for use as a Base for aircraft. … O.C. Plymouth B[attalio]n. [Lt-Col. G E Matthews RM] will detail 2 detachments of 1 Company each to cover demolition parties provided by H.M. Ships, and also the Air Base Reconnaissance Party. These covering forces will land simultaneously at Seddul-Bahr and Kum Kale …55
This was the first time in history that such an airfield reconnaissance party landed under fire on hostile territory.
In the Directorate of Military Operations (DMO) at the War Office, Captain Wyndham Deedes, a regular who at one time had served in the Turkish Army and was now working in MO2 dealing with the Ottoman Empire, was called by Kitchener on 16 February to give his opinion on the prospects for success of a purely naval attack. Deedes echoed the conclusion of all earlier General Staff assessments that this was fundamentally unsound, at which Kitchener bawled him out. Deedes, who as we have seen was, with Doughty Wylie, trying to get agents into the Gallipoli Peninsula in March), later served at GHQ in Egypt and at Gallipoli, where Kitchener apologised on meeting him again.56 The point of this story is that the Intelligence Staff at the War Office did not merely consist of ‘dug-outs’; officers like Deedes knew the Turkish Army well, and as Deedes went out before Hamilton’s Staff, and soon joined it, he provided crucial intelligence continuity. In fact, it was hardly fair of Callwell to be self-disparaging in styling himself a ‘dug-out’, for he had been in harness up to 1913, and was very much au fait with Turkish affairs and the Dardanelles.
Four preliminary landings for demolitions and reconnaissance were made at the Sedd-el-Bahr camber, the last on 4 March. Matthews (who landed at Kum Kale on the 4th) and other officers of the landing parties gained invaluable information about the terrain and defences, which Hamilton, when he arrived, found invaluable if disturbing. This evidence demonstrated that the impression given to Hamilton and Braithwaite by Kitchener of the terrain south of Achi Baba was false; it was neither bare nor empty. It was in fact heavily fortified, and protected by barbed wire concealed in folds of the ground near the shore.57 Landings, at first unopposed, and subsequently with only light opposition, had previously been made on 26 and 27 February and guns were destroyed. But as a result of these landings more surprise was lost, the Turks began to dig trenches and erect wire entanglements, and the 29th Division lost 3,000 men landing here on 25 April.58
The French, who had their own intelligence organisation in the Levant, were also carrying out intelligence work and preparations. The French battleship Gaulois prepared a report on landing places, which she lent to Irresistible who passed it on to Ark Royal; the last named returned it on 12 March.59
Hamilton’s briefing – 12 March 1915
There is a great deal of uncertainty about the exact details of the initial briefing of the newly appointed commander and chief-of-staff of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. Hamilton had been aware of his impending appointment for some days,60 but Braithwaite, Director of Staff Duties at the War Office, was only informed of his own appointment on the afternoon of 11 March. At the briefing, Callwell took Kitchener and Hamilton through the Anglo-Greek plan for attacking the ‘Forts at the Dardanelles’ by landing troops ‘on the North-west coast of the Southern part of the Peninsula, opposite Kilid Bahr’.61 Callwell later told the Dardanelles Commission that he had never seen the Greek plan, although he had tried to obtain details through the military attaché (in Athens); though he claimed he was unsuccessful in this, he was clearly in possession of at least an outline. A story was current in 1915–16 that the War Office had a copy of the Greek plan, but omitted to show it to Hamilton before he left England.62 The evidence given by Kerr relating to this has already been cited; he knew a great deal about the plan, and had in fact drawn up the outline himself.
It is unknown whether Braithwaite sought out any information on the day he was informed of his appointment, but Hamilton made it clear that the following day, after their briefing by Kitchener and Callwell, Braithwaite at once investigated the resources of the Intelligence Branch. Hamilton claimed that here, Braithwaite found little in the pigeon holes ‘beyond the ordinary text books’ [i.e. the 1905 Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe, the crucial 1909 General Staff Report on the Defences of Constantinople, the 1913 Combined Operations handbook, handbooks on Western Turkey, perhaps the 1908 NID Turkey Coast defences Report, etc.], and that ‘The Dardanelles and Bosphorus might be in the moon for all the military information I have got to go upon. One text book and a book of travellers’ tales don’t take long to master’.63 Either his memory was faulty or, as we shall see, he was deliberately playing down the intelligence material received to suit his agenda.
Callwell had drawn up staff appreciations of the Dardanelles problem from 1906, including one in September 1914. He therefore knew exactly what handbooks and other material were relevant to Hamilton’s expedition. He later admitted that the 1906 report was considered so secret (in 1906 itself and for some years subsequently), because it contained very sensitive material relating to a possible attack upon Turkey, that it was improperly withheld, even in 1915 after hostilities with Turkey had commenced. To compound this omission, the Military Operations Directorate, confronted on 26 February 1915 with a request from Maxwell (GHQ Egypt), who had read Maucorps’ alarming report and asked for topographical information and copies of General Staff studies of the Dardanelles problem at a time when it seemed that Birdwood and the Navy were to conduct imminent operations, stalled by replying that it was inconvenient to send this material and referred Maxwell to more generally available material:
3290 Cipher M.O. 177. Feby. 26th. Your 639 E. Difficult to send you resume of General Staff studies of Gallipoli. Suggest your consulting Admiralty reports of Turkey Coast defences [NID 838 May 1908], Part II, of which all war ships have copy. Ten copies of Military Report 1905 Eastern Turkey in Europe being sent you to-day by [diplomatic] bag.64
This obstructive approach was less than helpful; either the War Office could not be bothered, or it considered that strategy and high-level assessments of operational feasibility were none of Maxwell’s business. No doubt there was also a reluctance to release the contents of classified documents. Maxwell probably already had the secret 1909 Report, which covered Gallipoli and the Dardanelles; a copy of this was held later, if not at the time, in the library of the Survey of Egypt.
Hamilton, describing the paucity of information given to him, commented that it was useless to plan operations ‘unless there is some sort of material, political, naval, military or geographical to work upon.’65 Again this was disingenuous.
Materials made available at the briefing
So what material was actually handed over at the time of the briefing? The Dardanelles Commission, having taken evidence from Hamilton, Braithwaite, Callwell, and many others, reported that Hamilton had taken:
1. ‘The official handbooks’ [i.e. the secret 1909 Report on the Defences of Constantinople and the 1913 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations. Aspinall stated that Hamilton also had with him the pre-war Admiralty report on the Dardanelles defences – this was NID 838, Turkey Coast Defences, May 1908];
2. The outline of a Greek General Staff plan for an attack on the Dardanelles [as gathered by Kerr, Cunliffe Owen and others, and expounded by Callwell to Kitchener and Hamilton on 12 March];
3. Kitchener’s statement that the Kilid Bahr Plateau had been entrenched and would be ‘sufficiently held’ by the Turks, and that south of Achi Baba the point of the Peninsula would be ‘so swept by the guns of the fleet that no enemy positions would be encountered in that quarter’, and
4. The one-inch map of the Peninsula of Gallipoli and Asiatic Shore of the Dardanelles 1/63,360 (GSGS 2285), reduced in 1908 from the 1:50,000 French 1854 map, and revised, in two sheets, 1 & 2, the secret editions of which were overprinted with the Turkish defences in red. The Commission noted, following Aspinall, that this map ‘afterwards proved inaccurate, and of little use’.66
Hamilton and Braithwaite
were given a copy of the secret May 1909 War Office Report on the Defences of Constantinople, Prepared for the General Staff (its accompanying Plates (maps, plans, panorama sketches and photographs) volume, which also contained topographical panorama photographs, was dated 1908, but printed in 1909),67 of which 100 copies were printed, and which contained a great deal of invaluable information on the topography and defences of the Gallipoli Peninsula and its possible landing places. Much of this information was similar to that printed in the Naval Intelligence Division handbook NID 838 Turkey Coast Defences of May 1908. Both reports were dealt with in Chapter 3, and extracts from them are given in Appendices II and III. Callwell made it clear, both in his evidence to the Dardanelles Commission and in his post-war books, that these ‘secret reports’ were either handed over to Hamilton and his staff before they left London, or sent out subsequently.68
Those who assume that Hamilton’s expedition was ill-equipped with topographical and tactical information should look closely at the 1909 Report and its accompanying Plates folder of maps, plans, panorama sketches and photographs; their importance cannot be over-emphasised. They represented a very detailed and thorough topographical and tactical survey of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the whole Dardanelles area, and the close defences of Constantinople itself, well supported with visual material. It gave a clear idea of the difficulty of the terrain, including information on roads and tracks, water supply, possible beaches for landings, etc. The only thing missing was air photos, hardly surprising as the aeroplane had only just appeared on the scene, and no opportunity had been forthcoming for taking photos from balloons or airships. It could be argued that efforts should have been made to supplement the Report with air photos between 1909 and 1914, but this ignores the facts that no British bases were within flying distance, no aircraft carriers existed, no naval airships were in theatre, seaplanes could not attain the required altitude, and British air photography was in a primitive state.
Enough of the 1909 Report is given in Appendix III to show that Hamilton and his Staff were not bereft of information. Naturally they did not base their plans purely on the information on landing places given in the Report, but also took into account the results of their own reconnaissances, intelligence reports, air reconnaissance and air photographs, etc., particularly as far as Turkish defences and dispositions were concerned. We know from Callwell that Hamilton and Braithwaite took a copy of this 1909 Report, together with the associated maps and plates, when they left London on 13 March 1915.
The 1909 Report on the Defences of Constantinople was more or less contemporaneous with another secret June 1909 War Office Report on Certain Landing Places in Turkey in Europe, Prepared for the General Staff,69 fifty copies of which were printed, which gave information on Rodosto, in the Sea of Marmara, as well as Dede Agach on the Aegean, Salonica and Valona. A Report on Eastern Turkey-in-Europe was also printed in the same year.
These pre-war reports focused on the infrastructure of existing Turkish coast defences, such as forts, gun batteries, mines, torpedoes, searchlights, telephone lines and cables, etc., and on man-made harbours and landing places, but they were written very much bearing in mind the possibility of opposed landings across natural beaches, and looked closely at the terrain problems that might be encountered in the beach areas and inland. The panorama sketches in particular were specifically marked with suitable landing places.
The 1913 Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, was ‘issued by command of the Army Council, and with the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. It is for the use of officers only. 2nd September, 1913’70 (see Appendix V). This revision of the earlier 1911 manual was a most valuable guide to the principles and execution of such operations, and included a chapter on ‘Reconnaissance’. It was studied by all the officers on Hamilton’s Staff, and also by officers of the formations under his command. Its principles were followed as far as possible.
As far as maps were concerned, Hamilton’s Staff first used the one-inch map of the Gallipoli Peninsula, the secret edition of which showed the Bulair Lines and other fixed defences at Sedd-el-Bahr and along the Straits.71 This was supplemented in-theatre by up-to-date intelligence reports and maps. A 1:250,000 sheet Gallipoli (GSGS 2097) had also been printed at the War Office in October 1908; various other 1:250,000 sheets of the area were also sent with the expedition (see Chapter 6).
Reviewing the information
It is clear that, in their evidence to the Commission, Hamilton and Braithwaite tried to shift at least part of the blame onto the paucity of information supplied by the War Office:
Sir Ian Hamilton, in the evidence which he gave before us, dwelt strongly on the total absence of information furnished to him by the War Office Staff. No preliminary scheme of operations had been drawn up. ‘The Army Council had disappeared.’ No arrangements had been made about water supply. There was ‘a great want of staff preparation’.72
Much of this may have been true, but not the part about information. We have seen that Braithwaite also garnered information in the War Office. His evidence to the Commission told disingenuously of his obtaining ‘such information as was available at the War Office, which was of a very meagre description’.73 There was in fact a great deal of information at the War Office, which continued to generate a flow of information to Hamilton and Braithwaite after they left England, and Maxwell and Birdwood in Egypt had also been gathering intelligence. It should also be borne in mind that there was collusion between Hamilton, Braithwaite and other witnesses.74
In fact, the contemporary accounts are all contradictory. Hamilton stated that he and his Staff had, apart from the rough notes which Braithwaite had made, ‘the text book on the Turkish Army, and two small guide books’, and did not find these very illuminating.75 He also claimed that ‘there is no information at all about springs or wells ashore’.76 According to Rhodes James, Braithwaite obtained from the Intelligence Branch at the War Office an out-of-date ‘textbook’ on the Turkish Army and two small ‘guidebooks’ on Western Turkey.77 The handbook on the Turkish Army was largely irrelevant, as the Intelligence Department in Cairo was working hard at updating it and compiling an accurate Turkish order-of-battle.
Aspinall (later Aspinall-Oglander, the campaign’s Official Historian), in a statement to the Dardanelles Commission, wrote, under the heading ‘Information available on leaving London’:
A serious difficulty experienced by Sir Ian Hamilton and his Staff on leaving London, and when making arrangements for the landing was, that we had received little information as to the strength, dispositions and armament of the enemy and as to the topography of the country. The only map issued to us proved to be inaccurate.78
In his evidence, he described the map as out-of-date rather than inaccurate:
I shall never forget the dismay and forebodings with which I learnt that apart from Lord Kitchener’s very brief instructions, a pre-war Admiralty report [NID 838, May 1908] on the Dardanelles defences and an out-of-date map, Sir Ian Hamilton had been given practically no information whatever.79
Like Hamilton’s own, this statement is disingenuous; Hamilton had a copy of the excellent 1909 War Office report (see below) on the Gallipoli Peninsula and its defences, the Admiralty report was being systematically updated from many sources, while the one-inch map, although based on an old survey, was the best available at the time. Maps are always out-of-date. What is important is how quickly and how accurately they are updated, or supplemented by the necessary additional information such as charts, visual reconnaissance and air photos. An experienced commander like Hamilton knew very well not to rely solely on the map, as he himself readily admitted. Nevertheless, as one of Hamilton’s staff officers from the start, and therefore in a position to know, Aspinall’s view must be taken seriously. He gave further examples of the inadequacy of the map in the Official History, and indeed in several respects it was inferior to the French original from which it was derived (see Chapter 6). Orlo Williams, Ha
milton’s cipher officer from the beginning, wrote in his diary of the whole staff having to study the 1913 Combined Operations handbook,80 but made no mention of any other reports or maps.
T E Lawrence, who was in a position to know about maps having briefly worked at GSGS and then as ‘Maps’ Officer at Maxwell’s GHQ providing liaison between Hamilton’s Staff and the Survey of Egypt, did not mention the one-inch map of Gallipoli when he wrote to Hogarth from Cairo on 20 April 1915, stating (complaining about the dearth of maps of Asiatic Turkey and Syria, and not making a comment on the maps of Gallipoli) that ‘The expedition came out with two copies of some ¼” [i.e. 1:250,000] maps of European-Turkey as their sole supply. I hope you get me some of Butler’s [leader of the American Archaeological Expedition) N. Syrian maps. Tell him the 1905 ones are ROTTEN.’81 This has often been misinterpreted, by those who have accepted uncritically the statements of Hamilton and others, to mean that no larger-scale maps of Gallipoli were available.
The truth comes out very emphatically in Callwell’s evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, and in his post-war books, The Dardanelles (1919) and Experiences of a Dug-Out (1920). Not only did he make it clear that Hamilton deliberately misled the Commission, but he emphasised that Hamilton and his Staff took copies of the secret reports on the Dardanelles defences and Gallipoli Peninsula when they set out from London in March. He stated that:
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