Sheets of the 1:80,000 General Staff map of France of this period were constructed in a similar way to the Gallipoli 1854 survey, though controlled by a good primary triangulation; the secondary and tertiary triangulations, however, left much to be desired. The Gallipoli map was not intended to act as a large-scale artillery map; there was no such concept at the time, the nearest equivalent being a fortress survey. It was a good rapid topographical survey of its period and, as with all such maps, had to be supplemented by reconnaissance before an operation and eventually supplanted by a larger-scale product if an assault involving modern weapons was envisaged.
This French map was reproduced in England in 1876 by the Ordnance Survey, at the time of tension before the war between Turkey and Russia (1877), a scale in miles being added. It was incorporated in 1877, along with many other plans and reconnaissance maps of the Gallipoli Peninsula, into the ‘Strictly Confidential’ War Office Reports and Memoranda relative to Defence of Constantinople and other positions in Turkey.35 In 1880 the Intelligence Branch overprinted this 1876 background in red, showing a fleet anchorage off Suvla Bay, a main landing place south of Nibrunesi Point, a line of advance southward to the Kilid Bahr Plateau, Turkish defences at Chanak and on the Kilid Bahr Plateau, and diversionary landings on the east coast and south of Gaba Tepe. This accompanied a Memorandum on the Passage of the Dardanelles by Major Ardagh.36
Early British surveys and maps
British medium-scale mapping of the Dardanelles area began with Tom Spratt’s impressive surveys, both land and hydrographic, from the late 1830s. These were augmented by the French 1854 map of the Peninsula, and by further British surveys of the Bulair and Gaba Tepe–Kilid Bahr areas made in 1877–8 before and during the Russo-Turkish War, when Britain supported the Sultan. In 1877 the War Office ordered Lt-Colonel Home and Captain Fraser, both of the Royal Engineers, to Constantinople to study the military situation, conduct surveys (assisted by various other sapper officers), and report back. The result was a ‘Strictly Confidential’ volume printed at the War Office in 1877: Reports and Memoranda relative to Defence of Constantinople and other positions in Turkey. Also on Routes in Roumelia, which contained a large number of specially surveyed maps and plans, including many of the Gallipoli Peninsula.37 These have already been described in Chapter 3. Maunsell revised the survey of the Bulair defences in 1905.
In the heightened tension of the period following the Akaba Crisis (1906), the British one-inch map The Peninsula of Gallipoli (GSGS 2285, in two sheets) was prepared in 1908 from the French 1854 map, when General Spencer Ewart was DMO (1906–10). Colonel Charles Close, Chief of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (MO4) from 1905 to 1911, was directly responsible for its preparation. Detail and graticule were in black, contours and spot-heights in brown, water in blue, scrub and forested areas shown by green tree symbols, and sea in blue-green. Magnetic variation was given for 1907, and the contour interval was stated in the margin as 100-feet. In addition, brief ‘going’ notes (Steep sandy bluffs, Thick brushwood, Low scrub or occasional dense brushwood, etc.) were added to the map face in black. A secret edition showed fixed defences (forts, batteries, etc.) in red. On the Asiatic Shore, only rough form-lines were used, as the French surveyors had not covered this area. No War Office specification survives but, although it may have been drawn and reproduced in a hurry in order to incorporate it into the 1909 Report on the Defences of Constantinople, its relatively large scale suggests that it was intended for possible operational use related to the contemporary War Office and Navy studies of forcing the Dardanelles.
The Dardanelles Commission, influenced by Aspinall and others, noted that the map (or rather the 1:40,000 map taken directly from it in 1915) ‘afterwards proved inaccurate, and of little use’.38 Was this true? Why did GSGS not supply more or better maps? Quite simply, there was little better material in Allied hands, apart from the French 1:50,000 survey from which it was derived, except for limited areas such as the Bulair Lines and the vicinity of the coast defence forts and batteries. There were, however, the large-scale reconnaissance sketch maps of the Suvla–Gabe Tepe–Maidos area made by Grover in 1877.
Callwell felt no need to apologise for the one-inch and 1:40,000 maps, stating correctly that ‘in the absence of regular surveys, the maps supplied to the Expeditionary Force were necessarily untrustworthy in respect of the ground not actually visible from the sea’.39 He was referring to the fact that the original French work was more in the nature of a reconnaissance survey, and to the need for visual reconnaissance to correct the map, and was very well aware that systematic air survey with the necessary large coverage was simply not an option at the time. Unfortunately no sheets of the Turkish 1:25,000 map came into Allied hands until after the landings of 25 April, so the one-inch and 1:40,000 maps were the only ones available. They were supported by a 1:250,000 sheet (Gallipoli, of the Turkey in Europe GSGS 2097 series: Map of the Balkan States, sheets published from 1908 onwards40), and various even smaller-scale sheets. There were no large-scale maps apart from Grover’s sketch maps, and plans of the immediate areas of the forts made in 1877-80. There were also various Admiralty Charts (see Chapter 8).
The quarter-inch map
The British so-called quarter-inch to a mile sheet (entitled Gallipoli) of the Gallipoli Peninsula, first printed at the War Office under Charles Close in October 1908 (later copies were corrected to July 1915), was in fact one of a series (GSGS 2097) of 1:250,000 sheets covering Turkey, so it was not at the true quarter-inch scale (1:253,440) at all. Detail and spot-heights were black, hill-shading brown, and water blue. This small scale was in 1914 considered to be the ‘strategical’ rather than ‘tactical’ scale, and was only of any use in operations when nothing to a larger scale was available. As it took in a lot of ground on one sheet, it gave a general picture of the theatre but very little detail, and was useless for artillery work. The 29th Division and others leaving the UK in March 1915 were supplied with 1:250,000 sheets of Turkey, as well as the one-inch map of Gallipoli. Copies were sent to Cairo, and in 1915 the Survey of Egypt made a poor reproduction of the Gallipoli sheet to provide stocks for the Anzacs. These were stamped ‘¼-inch’ on the reverse.
Maps of the Bulair area and Lines
The 1877 map at four inches to the mile (1:15,840), which covered the whole neck of the Peninsula, was TSGS 2052 Survey of Defensive Position near Bulair shewing the lines constructed by the Anglo-French Army in 1855. Sketched December 1876 by Lieut. Cockburn RE and Lieut. Chermside RE. Corrected June 1905. Confidential. It was reprinted for the 1915 operation (as GSGS 2052) and overprinted with the Army’s squaring system in red; each square had 500-yard sides.41 This map, appended to the 1909 Report on the Defences of Constantinople, was closely form-lined, with spot-heights. Maunsell, military attaché in Constantinople, who corrected it in 1905, had drawn two panoramic sketches in March 1904 which were added to the foot of the map. Had more time been available, this map could have been redrawn at the War Office or the Survey of Egypt with contour lines (with height values) more appropriate for modern field artillery use. On the Western Front, a five-metre contour interval was considered appropriate for large-scale (1:10,000 and 1:20,000) trench and artillery maps.
Perhaps because insufficient numbers of Sheet 3 of the 1:40,000 map were printed, the Royal Naval Division, assigned to the diversionary attack at Bulair on 25 April, continued to use the one-inch map (GSGS 2285) showing the Bulair Lines, which carried the army squaring, and possibly had the four-inch map as well. In the event the Division only made a brief feint at Bulair on 25 April and, apart from Freyberg’s one-man diversionary operation, did not land. Thus the shortage of 1:40,000 sheets with naval squaring was not critical.
Accuracy of British maps
Why were the one-inch and 1:40,000 maps considered ‘inaccurate and of little use’? In the 1908 British redrawing and reduction from 1:50,000 to one-inch (1:63,360) scale, the contour (form-line) interval had unaccountably been reduced fr
om ten metres (about 32.5 feet) to 100 feet (about 31 metres), and this had the visual effect of suppressing the impression of relief and eliminating many important under-features. It appears that this wide interval was the result of a policy decision for all one-inch topographical maps at this time, based on the Ordnance Survey policy for the map of the United Kingdom.
However, it was clearly stated in Close and Cox’s Textbook of Topographical Surveying (1913)42 that ‘the weight of [international] authority is in favour of a contour interval of about 50 feet [about 15 metres] for a 1-inch scale [map]… These considerations have led to the decision to adopt the same rule for military sketching, both on its own merits and because sketches will necessarily be used in conjunction with government maps.’ Indeed the new and widely admired 1:50,000 map of France of the period incorporated an interval of ten metres (thirty-two feet), while in the USA it was twenty feet. The 1908 one-inch map of Gallipoli did not therefore meet this 1913 specification, although it did conform to earlier Ordnance Survey practice. As a counsel of perfection, it would have been advantageous to have used hill-shading, hachures or rock-drawing to emphasise inland cliffs and gullies; this could have been done only to a limited extent without air survey or a close ground survey. All-in-all, it might have been better to reproduce directly the old 1:50,000 contours.
The 1913 Textbook stated that the uses of maps in war were:43
1. For strategical purposes;
2. For finding the way;
3. To give the Commander of a force topographical information concerning roads, villages, woods, hills, streams, bridges, ferries, railways, water supplies, &c.;
4. To enable a general outpost, offensive or defensive position to be taken up;
5. And generally to convey information which cannot be given at the moment by the eye alone.
It is clear that, as a general rule, large scales are not required.
This last statement was dramatically disproved within a year or two, when the opening operations of the First World War on the Western Front and elsewhere demonstrated that as soon as operations bogged down in trench or position warfare, an accurate, large-scale contoured and gridded map was absolutely essential for artillery and other tactical purposes in modern war. This remained the case throughout the 20th century and into the 21st. A map with five-metre or ten-metre contours was found absolutely essential for artillery work; the Second World War and subsequent operations up to the present day have confirmed this. Modern weapons imposed their own requirements; the map became part of an integrated weapons system, part of a ‘revolution in military affairs’. The best example of this phenomenon in the pre-war period was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, which was closely observed on the spot by Sir Ian Hamilton, who also wrote a book about it.44 He did not, however, appear to have learned the lessons himself.
In general, though, the one-inch map of Gallipoli, and its 1:40,000 derivative, fulfilled the 1913 Textbook conditions. However, the problem of the wide contour interval was exacerbated by the lack of any specific interval information, although the values were printed by the contour lines. That said, careful study of the map’s contours and spot-heights, particularly in conjunction with visual reconnaissance, air photos and topographical descriptions available in the handbooks, should have given sufficient information to troops landing and moving inland. The form-lines showing relief on the 1854 map were not the result of an accurate contour survey, but were nevertheless carefully sketched in. Although not technically accurate, they gave a very good idea of the steep sides and depth of features such as Gully Ravine and the broken country around Sari Bair.
It was unfortunate that the 1915 Gallipoli operations occurred at a crux in the development of artillery survey and air survey (not to mention battlefield communications), and it is worth remarking that the same problems were experienced on the Western Front. It might just be argued that an air survey should have been made in the pre-war or early-war period; this question is examined in Chapter 7. Had the Gallipoli operations taken place two years later, by which time air survey techniques had considerably developed – as evidenced by good maps being produced from air photos on the Western Front (where, however, a relatively good topographical base existed), and in Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia – it might have been a different story. Even on the Gallipoli Peninsula, later in 1915, maps were being produced based on an Allied triangulation with additional control points obtained from air photos. Such maps, however, take a long time to prepare. Lack of time (and surprise) was the problem with the initial landings at Gallipoli.
The topography of the Peninsula remained relatively unchanged over the period 1854-1914, though coastal erosion continually modified the coastline and other forms of erosion also occurred. The coastline shown on the 1854 map differed significantly from that on the 1908 and the 1915 maps, and the reasons for this need to be identified.
A further problem was the suppression of detail when the 1854 map was redrawn and reduced in 1908; control points such as churches, mosques and windmills shown on the 1854 map were omitted. Suppression of contours and detail is not unusual when reducing a map, but its need can certainly be questioned when the reduction is by such a small percentage (about twenty percent in linear terms). The problem was compounded by the later enlargement from 1:63,360 to 1:40,000 at the Survey of Egypt – i.e. to a scale larger than that of the original 1:50,000 map. Such an enlargement should, if anything, be accompanied by an increase in detail and closer contours, but this did not necessarily happen in 1908 – some detail was omitted but new detail, notably the 1906 submarine cable to Imbros and telegraph lines, was added. Some detail on the Asian side, around Kum Kale, was taken from the Admiralty chart. In addition, the secret edition carried a red overprint of the Turkish fixed defences. Clearly an attempt had been made to include detail of military significance, but the problem was that the terrain itself was of great military significance and needed to be represented as accurately as possible. In 1915 the Survey of Egypt presumably did not have access to the 1854 map, or its later reprints; Dowson, in Cairo, may not have known of these maps. The 1908 map gave no clues as to its forebears in any marginal inscription. The French force did, however, carry copies of the 1854 map, but these were not apparently studied by Hamilton or his Staff.
Given that the Peninsula had not been accessible to the overt operations of British or French surveyors in the decades since the Crimean War, apart from a brief interlude in 1876–80 (and perhaps later in the case of the French), the one-inch map, despite the stated deficiencies, was simply the best available, and was not a bad reconnaissance map for rapid unopposed or lightly opposed landings and exploitation operations. Like most maps of most theatres in those days it was not suitable for position warfare, but it had never been intended for trench warfare or prolonged operations.
The evaluation given by the Official History of the ‘War in the Air’ was incorrect in places, and only partly justified:
If the observer in the air were studying the peninsula from the only maps which the Allied forces possessed in the early days of the campaign, he would soon be aware that, although the main features might be correctly shown, the multitudinous folds in the ground, and the rivers too, were given at best approximately, and often incorrectly. Some important features were omitted altogether. For example, the vast Gully Ravine, fifty to a hundred yards wide and extending some three miles, with precipitous banks a hundred feet high, was not even indicated. And this ravine was to prove one of the vital tactical features in the campaign. The complete unreliability of the maps was, for long, a serious handicap to the airmen who were called upon to reconnoitre and to report the effect of the [Naval] fire.45
It was untrue to state that Gully Ravine was not indicated; although the wide contour interval understated the rugged nature of the country, the feature was clearly shown by a watercourse and two close contour lines on either side, indicating a very steep drop of over 100 feet. It was also shown clearly on Chart X93 of the Helles
area, which the commanders studied. Close study of the map, combined with an awareness of the contour interval (it was printed on the one-inch map but not the 1:40,000; on the latter, contour values in feet were printed by the contour lines, which gave the necessary information about contour interval) should have given sufficient information, particularly when supplemented by aerial reconnaissance and photographs.
Many 1:40,000 sheets were augmented, corrected and personalised by the addition of further defence details or layer-colouring to emphasise the relief before the landings – for example those used by Hamilton and his Staff. The formation and unit headquarters also modified their printed maps with manuscript additions, and there are many examples of such in The National Archives46 in London and the Australian War Memorial collections. One of the latter, used by Monash, was layer-tinted and annotated with Turkish defences dated 18 and 20 April, and another used by Blamey was layer-tinted.47 Yet another was used by Captain A M Ross, Staff Captain of 3rd Australian Brigade, to plan that Brigade’s landing at Anzac on 25 April. In this way some of the perceived inadequacies of the printed maps were overcome.
Grasping Gallipoli Page 25