No. 3 Squadron overflew the Peninsula whenever weather permitted. Samson stated that he was told about the proposed landings on about 11–12 April, and his Squadron immediately made every effort to secure good photos and make sketches of all possible beaches, including any defences located. Prior to the landings they provided clear reports on all beaches, and Samson gave Hamilton his own map on which was plotted all reconnaissance results and photo intelligence.74 The only failure was at Sedd-el-Bahr, where well-sited and concealed trenches were not located from the air. Samson noted that they could have obtained better results with the improved cameras used later in the war.75 Butler’s folding camera was still in use on 23 May; the French squadron, from which a camera was borrowed, did not arrive until May, and the first photos taken with it seem to have been taken about 28 May.76
Thus RNAS mapping activity in the air was at first confined to making sketches and filling in traces (the Survey of Egypt printed squared 1:40,000 skeleton traces to overlay on the maps, so that visual reconnaissance information could be added), but reconnaissance photographs were taken as soon as possible. As well as spotting for the ships’ guns, Samson’s machines had to perform reconnaissance work for the Fleet, attempt to locate mines, and also undertake further reconnaissance to assist the army in making plans for landings.
Major Hogg, reporting on No. 3 Squadron’s work before the landings, stated that at first 80 horse-power Henri Farman machines were used, but these were so underpowered that it was often impossible to fly more than eight to ten miles up the Peninsula from Cape Helles. Later 100 horse-power Maurice Farmans arrived, and reconnaissance sorties were then flown up to the line across the Peninsula from Nibrunesi Point to Maidos, which included the Anzac sector, and also along the Asiatic Shore as far as Chanak at the Narrows. When this initial reconnaissance was completed, a complete map was sent to Hamilton’s Staff at Lemnos. Hogg also made one reconnaissance as far as Bulair, about sixty miles from Tenedos, in a Maurice Farman with a 120 horse-power engine, and spotted for the Navy in a wireless-fitted machine.77
On 11 April, following the arrival of Hogg and Jenkins, No. 3 Squadron made the first attempt to locate the Turkish trenches and field gun positions in the Helles and Anzac areas. Samson considered the results to be fairly good, and forwarded a tracing to Hamilton’s GHQ. A ‘Sketch map 1/40,000 Square 177 Showing defences of Achi Baba correcting former reconnaissances on 13/4/15’ was soon issued, and this was probably drawn from air photos.78 On the same day, General Hunter-Weston (GOC 29th Division) and his GSO2 sailed in the cruiser Dartmouth to Tenedos where, at the aerodrome, they conferred with Samson, studied the air reconnaissance results, and arranged for a copy to be sent to 29th Divisional HQ the next day.79 Successive editions of an outline 1:40,000 intelligence map of the Turkish field defences in the Helles and Anzac sectors, based on RNAS air photos and visual reconnaissance, were reproduced by the MEF Printing Section and distributed to the troops before the landings; these were dated 14, 18 and 20 April (see Chapter 6). Assaulting formations and units were thus provided with ‘defence’ supplements to their operations maps. Air photos were probably only supplied to Hamilton’s HQ Staff, not to lower formations or units, before the landings though they were studied at Tenedos by formation commanders.
Thoroughly alerted by naval bombardments and minesweeping attempts, the Turks worked feverishly on their defences throughout the months before the landings. The Anzac Corps Staff reached Mudros on 12 April, and found that they were to land in the Gaba Tepe area. The next day, Hamilton signalled to de Robeck:
Will you please have two of the available aeroplanes placed at the disposal of the GOC the ANZAC, Lt Gen. Sir W. Birdwood whose HQ are on board HMT the Minnewaska, and one at the disposal of the GOC 29th Div, Major General Hunter Weston HMT the Andanian for the forthcoming operations.80
An air reconnaissance from Tenedos was made on 14 April by an Anzac staff officer, Major Villiers Stuart,81 and on the same day the first sketch map showing the results of aerial reconnaissance was lithographed and distributed, only days after air photography began. On 15 April Hamilton spent almost two hours at Tenedos with Samson and Keyes (de Robeck’s Chief of Staff) ‘trying to digest the honey brought back by our busy aeroplane bees from their various flights over Gallipoli.’82
Photography of the beaches
It was naturally suggested that air photos should be used for reconnaissance of the beaches and their exits. From the time when the first air photos were taken of the land defences, few days were left to form a good picture of the terrain and the Turkish defences before the landings. This was clearly a very difficult task with only one camera. On 16 April Hamilton asked de Robeck ‘for further information as to length, breadth of Cape Helles beaches and preparations for defence from seaward of ravine in Sq. 184, S, T, X, Y. [Sari Tepe area, north of Krithia, running inland from coast]. Suggested photographs of beaches might be obtained from aeroplanes.’83 Samson was critical of the joint naval and military policy as regards the use of his aircraft, believing that had they been permitted to concentrate solely on close reconnaissance of the landing beaches, they would have produced much more complete results.84 In this he does not seem to have thought the lack of cameras a constraint though clearly, besides shortages of plates or film, paper and chemicals, having only one camera and one experienced photographer at this stage was a serious limitation.
The landings and after
Samson considered, in the light of his constant flights over the Peninsula, that the landings would be impossible.85 He was mistaken. The landings, though difficult, were possible. What was impossible, given the total loss of surprise, was the break-out from the beach-heads. His pessimism was shared by Hamilton’s intelligence staff, and by most of the generals, who had also seen the air photos, maps and intelligence reports. On the 25th Samson’s aircraft photographed the landings in progress, and on that and the following few days, the aircraft photographed important inland positions, spotted for the Navy and reconnoitred the whole Peninsula as far as Bulair, and also the Asiatic coast,86 watching particularly for Turkish troop movements towards the bridgeheads. On the 26th and 27th Samson noted that ‘we could see the Turks digging in all across the Peninsula. Trenches used to spring up like magic.’87
Although the pre-landing attempt at airfield reconnaissance at Helles had failed when the landing parties encountered strong opposition, after the main landings a suitable, if rough, landing place was soon identified next to Hill 138 (Hunter-Weston Hill), about half-a-mile from W Beach (Lancashire Landing), and used daily, but was under continuous shellfire and, from 29 June, was only used for special purposes and as an emergency landing ground. Samson noted that it was always shelled when in use, and four planes were destroyed there by 2 May; another was lost there later.88
Following the April landings, further air photos were taken which were used by the GHQ Printing Section during the land operations for making the important ‘trench diagrams’, showing the Turkish trenches, battery positions, etc., which served much the same purpose as trench maps on the Western Front. Through most of 1915, however, the trench diagrams were not sufficiently accurate to be used for the direction of artillery fire, and the 1:20,000 map (taken from captured Turkish 1:25,000 maps) was used for this.
On 2 May Samson wrote that the Army had found Butler’s ‘wonderful photographs’ of the enemy positions extremely valuable.89 As a result, a new sketch map of Turkish defences was printed and issued the following day.90 Air photos were at first only supplied to GHQ, but in May or June, lower formations such as the 29th Division received such photos of, for example, the Gully Ravine area. The RNAS did not, at this stage, have the capacity to make large numbers of prints from each photographic plate. The photographic unit which arrived with the French squadrons may have helped the British with printing.
Hogg reported on 11 May that since the landings they had been flying reconnaissance sorties and spotting for ships and land batteries, under the orders of de Ro
beck (Navy) and Hunter-Weston (29th Division), and that Knatchbull Hugessen had been appointed to assist in spotting for the army’s batteries in the Helles sector. He made it clear that No. 3 Squadron was working for 29th Division in the Helles sector, while ‘the Ark Royal with seaplanes is working with the Australian force on the West Coast near Nibrunesi Point and is entirely distinct from No. 3’. When VIII Corps was formed (under Hunter-Weston) on 24 May, covering the Helles sector, No. 3 Squadron worked for this new formation.
Hogg also remarked on air photography and on the inadequacy of the 1:40,000 map:
Photography. – The maps of Turkey [i.e. the Gallipoli Peninsula] are very indifferent, many natural features are not marked, and roads and paths inaccurately shown. This has been corrected to some extent by sketches from aeroplanes. The country however presents very few landmarks such as prominent farmhouses, woods etc. and it is extremely difficult from Observation Posts on the ground to spot works that have been plotted on the map by aeroplane. Observation. The observer has to plot in the position of patches of gorse, a green field or any such indication which may help the location of a trench from the ground.
We have only one camera, private property, a Naval Pilot [Butler] has been taking photos with this. The first experiments were not satisfactory, but latterly excellent results have been obtained, and are of the greatest value. The photos, in addition to their value to the General Staff, correct the map and enable the observer to place the enemy’s positions and trenches with greater accuracy.
Developing and printing are done here by the owner of the Camera.91
He thus makes it clear that no other camera was yet in use by 11 May. By 28 May, however, Butler was using the French camera, fixed to his machine in a vertical position, which enabled him to obtain sharper and more vertical photos. These good-quality images were used to plot the first of the ‘trench diagrams’, that of the Krithia sector dated 1 June. Photographs taken over the Peninsula from May, with this camera, and later reproduced in Dowson’s ‘Secret Report’ (see Appendix VI), show the ‘fiducial marks’ at the middle of each side typical of survey cameras; these would have enabled the principal point of each photograph to be identified, and radial triangulation to be undertaken had the British understood the nature of this photogrammetric technique.
Before the attack of 4 June, No. 3 Squadron flew reconnaissance and artillery spotting sorties, and Butler took photos of the complex network of Turkish trenches south of Krithia. From these, large-format and large-scale trench diagrams (1:6,000) were lithographed by the GHQ Printing Section, the first being dated 1 June, and delivered by air to Advanced GHQ at Helles. The Squadron’s pilots used these ‘photographic maps’ to direct artillery fire.92
On 10 June Hogg reported some organisational changes; formerly the Squadron had been working directly under 29th Division, but since then the new VIII Corps had been formed so they were now working under the orders of the Corps CRA (Commander, Royal Artillery) for reconnaissance and spotting purposes, a rather anomalous position for the observers as they were now ‘practically absorbed into No. 3 Aeroplane Squadron, the O.C. of which [Samson], though directly under the orders of the Admiral [de Robeck], meets the requirements of the CRA as far as possible’. He emphasised that the Turkish anti-aircraft guns were getting more accurate, were scoring ‘a good many hits’, and that as a result sorties were having to be flown at 7,000 feet or over, rather than the earlier 4,000 feet. As the seaplanes were no longer working in this sector, they also had to fly submarine-spotting sorties. Describing one German submarine, he noted that near the surface there was ‘no disturbance of the water visible, but her hull showed up greyish green, and an under-water bow wave, as she dived, showed up the direction which she was going in – Then she disappeared.’
Hogg also remarked on the utility of powerful binoculars for artillery observation work: ‘The 12 Mag[nification] Binoculars … are excellent; the smaller field [of view] is a disadvantage for general work, but for examining gun emplacements particularly, the high power is of immense value.’ As far as camouflage and concealment were concerned, he noted:
Our gunners conceal their guns much better than the Turks. The latter in nearly every case cover their emplacements with quantities of brushwood, making hard distinct outlines which attract attention. One or two judiciously placed branches and a cover painted to harmonise with the surroundings are probably more efficacious.93
In his next report, on 25 June, Hogg gave details of the development of their photographic work:
Photography. – This is all done by one pilot, Lieutenant Butler RNAS in a Henry [sic – Henri Farman]. The French have lent him a camera, which he fixes alongside his seat outside the nacelle. Plates are brought back here for development; he has the assistance of an amateur: there is no regular photographic establishment, as the French have. Results have been very satisfactory. He pieces the photos together to form a map, which is sent to [Hunter-Weston’s VIII] Army Corps HQ. Trench reconnaissance is now done in this way exclusively. Its value is so great that a regularly equipped photographic section attached to each squadron or other unit appears to be indicated.
This is the first reference to photo-mosaics being made; this implied that photography was being done in a relatively systematic way, overlapping verticals being taken from a constant altitude, which also enabled ‘trench diagrams’ to be traced off. However, in the absence of control points on the ground, these were far from accurate in a planimetric sense, and also carried no height data. On 25 June he wrote that an Henri Farman machine was being used exclusively for photography, but that ‘they are of very little use for our work here’. He had earlier noted that with these underpowered 80 HP Henri Farmans it was impossible to get more than eight to ten miles up the Peninsula to plot Turkish trenches and gun positions. On 25 June he also reported that a second French squadron had just arrived, and he had heard of a third on the way.94
After Butler was wounded at the end of June, his photographic work was taken over by Flight Lieutenant Thomson. The borrowed French camera, which produced excellent clear prints, was damaged in an aeroplane accident before 30 July; this was most unfortunate given the impending diversionary operations at Helles on 6 August in connection with the Suvla landings and Anzac attacks. On 30 July Major-General Douglas, commanding 42nd Division and now commanding VIII Corps in the Helles Sector, since the departure of Hunter-Weston in mid-July, was reduced to asking the French for the loan of existing photos of ‘certain areas’ not covered by British photos.95
The French Air Service
The first French aeroplane squadron to join the RNAS at Tenedos was Captain Cesari’s squadron, l’Escadrille 98T, which arrived at the Dardanelles early in May. The first French air photographs were taken about mid-May, Lieutenant Saint André specialising in this work, which provided sufficient data for the reproduction of rudimentary, but approximately accurate trench diagrams of the French and Turkish trenches. The French squadrons at Gallipoli, gradually building up from one to at least three, not only took their own photos for mapping by the French Topographical Service, but in May lent a good air camera, focal length 30cm (12 inches) to the British. From 4 August, and probably earlier, series of air photos were being taken specifically for mapping.96
Seaplane work during and after 25 April
The duties of Ark Royal’s seaplanes, apart from spotting for naval gunfire, included the reconnaissance of all roads leading to the Turkish front positions as far north as Taifur Keui (thirty miles from the tip of the Peninsula), and as far east as Maidos, watching for troop movements and reinforcements. They also included the location of enemy battleships in the Dardanelles, and reconnaissance of permanent fortifications and field gun positions. Little success was obtained with the latter, ‘partly owing to the nature of the country which is much broken and covered with thick low scrub in which the guns are carefully concealed, and partly owing to the fact that the enemy refrained from firing their field guns to any great extent wh
en an aeroplane was in a position to observe’.97 After the landings, Ark Royal’s seaplanes concentrated on supporting the Anzac sector.
Towards the end of May, Ark Royal’s seaplanes continued with spotting, photography and reconnaissance. The seaplane carrier Ben-my-Chree joined Ark Royal on 12 June,98 and was the base for the Short 184 seaplane used by Flight Commander C Edmonds to torpedo a Turkish ship on 12 August, the first occasion a ship had been torpedoed from the air. He struck again on 17 August. Such headline-making strikes were of little significance when set against the routine but crucial work of reconnaissance and photography.
Air spotting for naval bombardment was developed during the campaign using aerial photography as a base. After vertical and panoramic photos had been taken of the targets on which seaplane spotting observation was required, the observer using these photos with a transparent scale showing the actual distances on the ground could immediately locate the target. First flying over the ship to set the scale to the line of fire, he placed it over his vertical photograph in its correct orientation and could then plot the fall of each shell on the photograph and read off the range and deflection errors.99
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