by Roy Adkins
The next few weeks were in reality a phoney war, with Spanish ships firing at, and occasionally chasing, vessels that tried to evade the blockade, while on land both sides worked hard on their fortifications. In sieges, the besieging forces tended to win in the end, and so the key considerations were: how long would it take? and how much would it cost (both financially and in manpower)? The Spaniards were confident that by maintaining the blockade and building up considerable forces for an attack, it was inevitable that the Rock would be theirs. Gibraltar’s more limited options were focused on withstanding the siege and wearing down the Spanish forces to such a degree that they might give up or be forced eventually to move to another more pressing theatre of war. All through July and August 1779, guns were shifted about and new ones mounted, the fortifications were reinforced and improved, new batteries constructed, a communication line dug from the Moorish castle to the Prince’s Lines, the rock face cut back at the north end to prevent an infantry attack and stores moved to safety. All this activity was summarised by Drinkwater:
The engineers were busily employed in putting the works at Willis’s [batteries high up on the north front] in the best repair, and in erecting new batteries on the heights of the North front. A considerable extent of ground above the Town was cleared and levelled, to encamp the different regiments in case the enemy should fire upon the Town. Parties were likewise detached to collect shrubs, &c. from the face of the hill, for fascines; and the artillery were daily engaged in completing the expence magazines with powder, ranging the different ordnance, and preparing everything for immediate use in their department.43
A rapid way of shoring up and repairing fortifications in siege warfare was with sandbags and with wooden barrels and gabions (cylindrical wicker baskets) filled with sand, soil, stones or rocks. Also used were fascines, which were long bundles of brushwood tightly bound with pliable wood or rope.44 Brushwood began to be cut for the never-ending task of making fascines, and early on General Orders were displayed to prohibit the wasteful cutting of materials: ‘To preserve firing [fuel] for our ovens in case of necessity, strict orders were given to prevent soldiers or others cutting down the Palmeto bushes, brushwood or grass on any part of the Garrison without leave from the Governor.’ Boats were even taken round the back of the Rock so that brushwood could be cut in that inaccessible location. Another order affected the inhabitants in particular – much of the Rock was declared out of bounds: ‘No person without a permit, except belonging to the Navy or Army, in their uniform, to be suffered to go upon the Hill above the New Road.’45
While the engineers were responsible for constructing defensive works and batteries in which guns were placed, it was the role of the Royal Artillery to fire the guns, but they had too few men, and so about 180 men were ordered to be taken from the regiments and attached to the artillery. Paterson noticed that two inhabitants also stepped forward to join: ‘Mr. A. Webber & Mr. J. Grumly have joined the R. Artillery with the Governor’s approbation to serve as Volunteers during the investiture of this place by the Enemy. Are to be attested and receive each Mattrosses cloathing.’ In the 1777 census, both men were listed as Protestants. John Grumley was now twenty years old and Arthur Webber was a thirty-seven-year-old merchant, and they were both joining the Royal Artillery as matrosses, who were assistants to the gunners. Many inhabitants were already employed in the King’s service, though it was rare for any of them to join the armed forces. Grumley would later become a second lieutenant, but was killed in action before the end of the siege.46
Because insufficient men were highly skilled in the use of the musket, another order was given to recruit marksmen:
A Corps of Marksmen to consist of a lieutenant, one British serjeant and corporal, one Hanoverian serjeant and corporal, and one private man from each battalion company of the line to be formed immediately, care to be taken that the men fixed upon for this service are expert at firing at a mark. Lieutenant Burleigh of the 39th Regiment is appointed to command this Corps. The non-commissioned officers and one half the private men to attend the drill twice a day and fire ball at a mark. From the time they begin to be employed upon actual service they will receive an addition to their pay equal to what has been ordered for the men attached to the Royal Artillery.47
All the soldiers were armed with a smooth-bore musket of the ‘Brown Bess’ type that had been standard issue for decades. It was fired by a flintlock, a mechanism powered by a strong spring, which was ‘cocked’ by drawing back a lever with a flint attached. When the trigger was pulled, the spring brought this lever down on to a steel striking plate. Sparks flew into a small pan of gunpowder, and the resulting flame travelled through a touch-hole and set off the gunpowder charge inside the barrel.
By the time of the siege, prepared cartridges containing gunpowder and a round lead bullet (usually called a ‘ball’) were issued. To load the musket with a cartridge, the soldier first pulled back the cock to the first notch, ‘half-cock’, allowing the cover (‘frizzen’) of the pan to be raised. This cover was attached to the steel striking plate. The soldier then bit the end off the cartridge and held the ball in his mouth, while he tipped a little gunpowder into the pan of the flintlock. Once he had replaced the cover on the pan to stop the gunpowder spilling out, he tipped the rest down the barrel, spat in the ball and rammed the paper casing of the cartridge on top to hold it in place. The musket was now ready to fire. Muskets were most effective and accurate at ranges of less than 100 yards; beyond this distance they became increasingly inaccurate. The main advantage of the musket was that well-trained soldiers could load and fire one every twelve seconds, giving a rate of fire of five shots per minute. For close combat, muskets also had detachable bayonets.
The Spaniards were also busy, and an ominous development occurred when a camp started to form some 3 to 4 miles away on the common of San Roque, with streets of white canvas bell tents. After only two days, Mrs Green wrote: ‘the Enemy increasing their encampment and making great preparation ... unloading stores, pitching more tents, &c, &c, and thus ended the month of July. Various were the opinions, though it seemed most probable that the Enemy’s intentions were to make every possible and effectual trial to establish a stronger blockade.’ She had to admit that Barcelo was an extremely good naval officer, as his squadron was managing to stop virtually every vessel heading their way.48
In her diary, Mrs Green jotted down her own observations and also fragments of information shared with her. She was sure they could ‘be depended upon, as they are from our own Corps [Engineers], and mostly from the Gentleman that is in the Colonel’s family, who would hardly bring a false account’. She meant thirty-year-old Lieutenant Charles Holloway, an engineer, who had arrived in Gibraltar in 1777. Colonel Green had appointed him as his aide-de-camp, and so Holloway was one of his close circle, or military ‘family’. Several officers, she said, also kept journals: ‘The Engineers all do, for the Chief Engineer’s inspections, and he keeps a very separate one, which I believe is not intended to be shown to anyone in this Garrison.’ Until now, nobody knew what Spain had in mind, apart from the blockade, but Mrs Green concluded that ‘it is not to be doubted but the intention of the Spaniards is to attack this Garrison’.49
From high up on the Rock, it was possible for the officers to look across to Spain with the aid of portable telescopes or spy glasses and spot much of what was going on. Gibraltar towered above everything, so that the Spanish positions were laid out below them like a map. The Spaniards were at a huge disadvantage, looking upwards at the Rock and unable to gain a clear picture of the fortress. Even their highest positions at San Roque and the adjacent hill known as the Queen of Spain’s Chair (or Sierra Carbonera) were too low and too distant to yield much helpful information, even with the assistance of telescopes. In Britain, John Dollond had developed a telescope that included an achromatic lens which produced a clearer image, and his firm had a virtual monopoly on telescopes used by naval officers on b
oard ship and by army officers on land. It amused Mrs Green to see the young officers competing with each other for information:
It now became quite fashionable to get all the news each one could collect; and by way of gaining all that, everybody was using spy glasses from morning to night. All those that affected great cleverness were ever ready with a pencil and paper, and it was really laughable enough to see with what a jealous eye each aid de camp looked at the other, fearing he should be the first to communicate his ideas of what he supposed the Enemy was about! Various therefore was the reports, and could not always agree.50
Officers from the navy, artillery and engineers were frequently accomplished artists and draughtsmen, which were valuable skills in reconnaissance and espionage, and so pencil and paper were not just for jotting down ideas, but for sketching details. One of those officers was Captain Paterson: ‘Took a sketch of the enemy camp consisting of 2 battalions of foot, 2 regiments of horse and about 400 artillery. Discovered from the top of the Rock about 26 heavy guns mounted on travelling carriages drawn up in two lines behind Fort Negro.’51
More and more Spanish troops and cavalry came into their camp, and by the first week in August, Holloway thought there were 4500 men all told. Prodigious quantities of equipment were also being landed from boats and ships, including guns, gun carriages, mortars, shot, shells, tents, bedding, vast quantities of brushwood for fascines, wool, straw, planks and timber piles. The guns along the entire stretch of the Lines were dismantled and then gradually remounted, with considerable structural work done to improve the fortifications, particularly in the forts at each end. Much of the work took place at night, out of view, and Drinkwater said that ‘at night we generally observed a number of lights, and frequently heard a noise like that of men employed on some laborious duty; this might be that of dragging cannon’.52 Each day the scene changed for those officers watching intently. ‘Saw from the top of the Rock 18 guns laying dismounted in Fort Barbara,’ wrote Paterson in mid-August, ‘likewise tracks of carriages into Fort St. Philips, and 4 guns supposed to be brought from their camp last night and the night before. Behind Fort Negro the enemy appear to have 6 brass mortars, 26 battering cannon, a great quantity of shot, shells, ammunition boxes etc.’53 More than forty ox teams were hauling materials to the forts, along with numerous waggons.
By the end of August, five large laboratory tents had been erected for the preparation of ammunition, and the garrison realised that a huge mortar battery was being constructed next to Fort St Philip.54 Everyone feared that the bombardment of the Rock was about to begin. They were completely unaware that Spain’s attention was in fact focused far more on invading Britain at that moment.
CHAPTER THREE
INVASION
France had joined America as an ally in the war against Britain in 1778, still feeling humiliated by the loss of territories after the Seven Years’ War. With this opportunity to avenge their defeat and adjust the balance of power within Europe, the old plans for an invasion of Britain were revised. Although the last war had drained the resources of both countries, in France there had been a determined effort to improve the armed forces, especially the navy. This was not the case in Britain, and by the time the two countries were at war once more, many ships in the Royal Navy were facing repair or replacement. Even so, the French navy was not strong enough to send ships to help the Americans, defend French overseas territories and provide protection for an invasion of Britain. What France also needed was the Spanish navy.1
Both France and Spain agreed on the idea of an invasion of Britain, yet it took months to settle the details. France thought that Britain’s strength lay in its control of the English Channel, the anchorage at Spithead and the nearby naval base at Portsmouth, and so wanted to seize those key places. Spain, perhaps more realistically, believed that any invasion of southern England would force Britain to relinquish Gibraltar in return for a withdrawal of the invading forces. In the final version of the invasion plan, it was decided that the French and Spanish fleets would meet up no later than mid-May 1779 off the port of Corunna in north-west Spain. Together, they would head for the English Channel, and, with the protection of this combined fleet, a French invasion force would cross the Channel from France and capture the Isle of Wight, Gosport and Portsmouth. Various alternative targets, such as Plymouth and the Channel Islands, were also chosen in case of unforeseen events.
Without a common language or signalling system, there was plenty of scope for confusion, while a string of last-minute changes added to the problems of the two navies working together. From the outset, delays occurred because the Spaniards insisted on a formal statement of their grievances with Britain and a declaration of war, which they would only undertake after the French fleet had left the port of Brest in north-west France and was heading for the rendezvous. Under this additional pressure, the French commander Admiral d’Orvilliers set sail in early June, already a month late, with insufficient food, water and medicine, no lemons to combat scurvy and unsuitable recruits as sailors and soldiers. A week later, the rendezvous was reached, and a vessel went into Corunna to inform the Spanish fleet.
The British government was well aware of events in France and Spain, including the preparations of the invasion fleet, because it assembled intelligence from a variety of sources, such as captains of naval and merchant ships, smugglers, friends of Britain in neutral countries, British residents still living in France and, of course, spies. Most nations had their own intelligence network, and those of Britain and France were particularly active. In every major port, spies were observing the movements of shipping, and in Britain there was a constant watch for potential spies and saboteurs. The General Post Office had a specific department dedicated to the interception and copying of dispatches and correspondence to and from foreign countries, which often operated similar systems themselves. To combat this, letters were sent in code, and the Post Office had a cipher department that decoded letters for government and official bodies before passing them on, as well as attempting to decipher foreign letters written in code. Another source of information was the network of consuls and ambassadors in neutral countries, which had included Spain until the official declaration of war.2
Detailed intelligence about the preparations of the Franco-Spanish fleet had already found its way to Britain. When part of the Spanish fleet was being fitted out in the port of Cadiz, the British consul there, Josiah Hardy, was well placed to pass on reports. On 25 May he wrote in code to Lord Grantham, who was the British ambassador at Madrid: ‘Orders came yesterday to get the whole fleet now here completely equipt for sea on the first of next month, the ships are to come down into the bay in order to be ready for sailing. They are to be formed into three divisions, one of which is to sail immediately under the command of Vice Admiral [Don Antonio] Ulloa and will be eight ships of the line & two frigates.’3 The actual coded passage began ‘kwnbwr. mlyb. dbrxbwnld. ak. &bx. azb. ezkso. gsbbx.’, representing the words ‘Orders came yesterday to get the whole fleet’. This is a substitution code, where k = o, w = r, d = n, e = b, r = s, and so on, but such codes are relatively simple and easy to break. Hardy’s letters are unusual in this respect, because most letters were written in a numerical code, constructed from a table where each word was represented by a specific group of numbers. Surviving letters to and from Eliott on Gibraltar used a stronger, numerical code, not a simple substitution code like Hardy’s.
As a result of all the intelligence flowing back to London, preparations were being made for a defence against invasion. The biggest problem was a shortage of men for both the army and navy. They were all – technically – volunteers, but countless rank-and-file volunteers (‘privates’) were lured into the army by dubious recruiting methods, while the navy frequently resorted to forcible recruitment by press-gangs. The army units assigned to the defence of Britain were greatly under strength, but were bolstered by the militia and fencibles. The militia was the army reserve, ra
ised locally by ballot and, despite any training, largely inexperienced. Coxheath Camp near Maidstone in Kent became the biggest camp for training completely raw militia conscripts from all over the country, forming a strategically placed reserve against invasion. The fencibles were similar forces, but their service was strictly limited in duration and confined to a particular area. Taken together, the army, militia and fencibles appeared to be a strong defensive force, but the quality of these troops varied enormously, and many were barely fit for any military service.4
Units of fencibles were being hastily recruited and trained all over Britain, and John Macdonald, an unmarried teacher of about twenty-six years of age, was one of many who joined a regiment in Scotland, enlisting in the North Fencibles during the summer of 1778. A few months later at Inverness, he was persuaded to join the second battalion of the 73rd Highland Regiment by its colonel, George Mackenzie, who had heard him play the Highland bagpipes. The 73rd was originally raised for the war in America, mostly from the remote Scottish Highlands of Ross-shire and Cromarty, but the first battalion would be sent to Africa and India and this second battalion to Gibraltar. Being too late to travel on board the transports, Macdonald made his own way to Portsmouth, the first time he had ever left the Highlands, and in June 1779 he sailed with the rest of the troops to the naval base of Plymouth.5