by H. W. Brands
25
HIGGINS AND THE other frontline reporters disdained the “headquarters correspondents” who followed the generals around. But MacArthur insisted on his entourage, whose members were suitably impressed. “Today, as on eleven previous landings he personally led during World War II, General MacArthur had no qualms about exposing himself to enemy fire,” one related. “Wearing his familiar sweat-stained, braided campaign cap and crisp sun-tans, he watched the first phase of the joint sea and land operation open at dawn. Seated in the lookout chair aboard the flagship of Rear Adm. James H. Doyle, commander of the assault force, General MacArthur watched the beaches tremble under the bombardment of United States and British warships. Then, three and one-half hours after Marine units seized little Wolmi Island, in Inchon Harbor, General MacArthur and his staff boarded a launch. They cruised within rifle range of the North Koreans off a second beach on the edge of Inchon. Shells thundered over the launch as Allied warcraft bombarded the beach. There was no return fire.”
During the weeks of preparation for the Inchon operation, even casual observers in Japan had realized something was afoot. The official name of the operation was Chromite, but reporters referred to it as Operation Common Knowledge. The North Koreans doubtless concluded that an attack was coming. Yet MacArthur contrived to keep them guessing where it would occur. His ships and planes misleadingly pounded Kunsan, which seemed the likelier target anyway.
And so when his real attack occurred at Inchon, the surprise was effectively complete. The North Koreans had failed to mine most of the Inchon harbor, apparently discounting the possibility of attack, as MacArthur assumed they would. His naval arm justified his confidence in its ability to handle the tides, and after his ship-mounted guns and Japan-based warplanes softened the shore defenses, his marines secured a beachhead and then the city with but modest casualties.
They were followed shortly by army units that complemented the marines to form X Corps, which drove swiftly inland toward Seoul and Kimpo airfield, the most important air facility in Korea. Kimpo fell first; Seoul held out for ten days. But by the month’s end the North Korean garrison there had been killed, captured or dispersed.
Meanwhile Johnnie Walker’s Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter and pressed hard to the north. The North Koreans, with X Corps cutting off their line of retreat, broke and ran. The enemy was trapped, MacArthur told reporters, and would soon be deprived of supplies. “If that can be accomplished, these forces will sooner or later disintegrate and cease to be a coordinated fighting enemy.” Long experience decreed the outcome. “The history of war proves that nine times out of ten an army has been destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off. That’s what we are trying to do.”
Events unfolded as MacArthur predicted. The pincers of X Corps and the Eighth Army closed upon the North Koreans, who surrendered by the tens of thousands. Johnnie Walker proclaimed victory. “As far as we are concerned, the war is over,” he said on September 25. “The enemy’s army has disintegrated into ineffective pockets which have no real offensive power.”
MacArthur agreed. “While mopping-up fighting is still in progress in this area,” he declared on September 27, “all effective escape routes are closed and the fate of the North Korean forces caught in this pocket is sealed.”
—
HE PREPARED TO reinstall Syngman Rhee in Seoul. The ceremony, he judged, suited the Oriental mind, which placed great store in such gestures. “But at this juncture I received an astonishing message from Washington,” he recalled. “In an order, undoubtedly instigated by the State Department, and reflecting its antagonism toward President Rhee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff admonished me that any plan for the restoration of his government ‘must have the approval of higher authority.’ ”
In fact the chiefs were simply taking care not to cross the line from military affairs into politics, but MacArthur responded as vehemently as he had to their eleventh-hour questioning of the Inchon attack. “Your message is not understood,” he wrote. “I have no plan whatsoever except scrupulously to implement the directives I have received. These directives envision support of the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council of 25 and 27 June, calling upon member governments to furnish ‘such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attacks and to restore international peace and security in the area.’ ” The existing government of South Korea was the only government recognized by the United States and the United Nations. It had never ceased to function but had simply been driven from its lawful capital by communist bandits. Now that the bandits had been defeated, it was returning to the capital. “This of course involves no reestablishment of government, nor indeed any change in government, but merely a restoration of the existing government to its constitutional seat.”
Without awaiting a reply, MacArthur proceeded with his plan. He brought Walker and X Corps commander Ned Almond to Seoul to receive the Distinguished Service Cross. He addressed Rhee and other officials of the Korean government, and implicitly the world at large. “By the grace of merciful Providence,” he said, “our forces fighting under the standard of that greatest hope and inspiration of mankind, the United Nations, have liberated this ancient capital city of Korea. It has been freed from the despotism of Communist rule and its citizens once more have the opportunity for that immutable concept of life which holds invincibly to the primacy of individual liberty and personal dignity.”
Flouting his order from Washington, MacArthur continued, “In behalf of the United Nations, I am happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the seat of your Government, that from it you may the better fulfill your constitutional responsibility.”
He thereupon sought a higher endorsement than any that could come from Washington. “In humble and devout manifestation of gratitude to the Almighty God for bringing this decisive victory to our arms, I ask that all present rise and join me in reciting the Lord’s Prayer.” His audience did as he bade. “Our Father, which art in heaven,” they said as one. They proceeded to the end: “For Thine is the kingdom and the power and the glory forever. Amen.”
MacArthur closed in his own words. “Mr. President,” he said, again addressing Rhee, “my officers and I will now resume our military duties and leave you and your government to the discharge of civil responsibility.”
He later recalled Rhee’s response. “ ‘We admire you,’ he said with tears flowing down his cheeks. ‘We love you as the savior of our race.’ ” MacArthur added, “And when the ceremony was over the people of Seoul lined the streets and clapped and waved their little paper flags.”
—
“INCHON PROVED TO be the luckiest military operation in history,” Omar Bradley remarked. The surprise of the North Koreans was “astonishing,” he said; the whole affair was a “military miracle.” And it cemented MacArthur’s ascendancy over the joint chiefs and all the other critics, Bradley admitted. “The swiftness and magnitude of the victory were mind-boggling. We had been on the point of despair, bracing for a ‘Dunkirk’ at Pusan and/or a disaster at Inchon. A mere two weeks later the North Korean Army had been routed and all South Korea had been regained. MacArthur was deservedly canonized as a ‘military genius.’ Inchon was his boldest and most dazzling victory. In hindsight, the JCS seemed like a bunch of Nervous Nellies to have doubted.”
The administration had no choice but to offer congratulations. George Marshall cabled MacArthur, “Accept my personal tribute to the courageous campaign you directed in Korea and the daring and perfect strategical operation which virtually terminated the struggle.”
To which MacArthur replied, “Thanks, George, for your fine message. It brings back vividly the memories of past wars and the complete coordination and perfect unity of cooperation which has always existed in our mutual relationship and martial endeavors.”
Truman was happy to join the cheering, despite his previous misgivings about MacArthur, for the war seemed all but over. MacArthur’s Eighth Army a
nd X Corps were closing in on the North Korean army. More than a hundred thousand of the enemy had been captured already; seizing the rest appeared a matter of time. The United Nations, with America’s strong assistance and MacArthur’s inspired leadership, had fulfilled its mission of restoring peace and order to Korea and destroying the army that had broken the peace and subverted order. MacArthur had been insolent, even insubordinate, but he had come through magnificently in the end. He might retire now or very shortly. Truman could afford to be generous.
So the president was. “I know that I speak for the entire American people when I send you my warmest congratulations on the victory which has been achieved under your leadership in Korea,” he cabled MacArthur. “Few operations in military history can match either the delaying action where you traded space for time in which to build up your forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has now resulted in the liberation of Seoul.” Truman asked MacArthur to convey congratulations to the officers and men of the services under his command. “My thanks and the thanks of the people of all the free nations go out to your gallant forces—soldiers, sailors, marines and air men from the United States and the other countries fighting for freedom under the United Nations banner. I salute you all, and say to all of you from all of us at home, ‘Well and nobly done.’ ”
26
YET THE WAR wasn’t quite over. Some loose ends remained. “Mr. President, have you decided what our troops will do when they reach the 38th parallel in Korea?” a reporter inquired at Truman’s first news conference after the Inchon landing.
“No, I have not,” Truman answered. The decision, he explained, was not his to make. “That is a matter for the United Nations to decide. That is a United Nations force, and we are one of the many who are interested in that situation. It will be worked out by the United Nations and I will abide by the decision that the United Nations makes.”
But the United Nations offered no clear guidance. The decision-making process there had been complicated by the return of the Soviet delegate, and the sudden reversal of fortunes on the battlefield outpaced the ability of the members of the anti–North Korean coalition to decide what their war aims were.
MacArthur’s troops got closer to the North Korean border. Again Truman faced questions. “Mr. President,” a reporter asked at the next news conference, “has this government given General MacArthur specific authority to cross the 38th parallel?”
Truman still dodged. “That is a matter I can’t answer publicly now.” The president paused. “I will give you the answer at the proper time. We haven’t reached the 38th parallel yet.”
“I wonder if I could ask you this question,” the reporter persisted. “Do you consider that he has implied authority to cross—”
Truman interrupted the question. “General MacArthur is under direct orders of the president and the chief of staff, and he will follow those orders,” he said.
“Do those orders imply, sir, the crossing of the 38th parallel?”
“I can’t answer the question.”
The reporters moved briefly to other subjects before returning. “Mr. President, you said a week or so ago that the matter of crossing the 38th parallel was a United Nations decision?”
“That is correct.”
“And you said today that General MacArthur is under your direct orders?”
“That is correct, but the United Nations will have to act on it first. I appointed General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander, at the request of the United Nations. They have certainly requested—will make a request of me, if they want further orders issued to General MacArthur.”
“Mr. President, there was an interpretation at the State Department today that the original United Nations resolution gave General MacArthur the right to go over the 38th parallel if he deemed it necessary. Do you—”
“The original United Nations resolution was very broad,” Truman said.
“In connection with the Korean situation, sir, American authorities in the United Nations have given out a six-point program for a settlement of the Korean situation. Have you seen it and would you care to comment on it?”
“You mean the broadcast asking them to surrender?”
“No sir. What I was thinking of was a plan for the settlement of the Korean situation based on our point of view.”
“It hasn’t been taken up with me.”
Truman suddenly realized he had said too much. There had been no broadcast asking for surrender. The president fumbled as he tried to step back. “The broadcast of General MacArthur—I think made today—was taken up with me, inviting them to surrender. I think he is making that broadcast today. You will have to consider that off the record, however, until General MacArthur makes the broadcast.”
Reporters agreed, yet kept asking. “Mr. President, is that a demand for unconditional surrender?”
“You will have to wait for General MacArthur’s broadcast, and then I will comment on that and answer your question.”
“Could you tell us when you expect him to make it?”
Truman turned to his press secretary. “I think some time today, isn’t it, Charlie?”
“I think it is today,” Charlie Ross replied.
“I think it is today,” Truman repeated. “I think he is going to make it today, and then you can get the release of it from the State Department.”
—
IN FACT IT wasn’t until two days later that MacArthur issued his surrender demand. Truman couldn’t decide if the general was trying to make him look bad or if there was a more innocent explanation. MacArthur didn’t enlighten him.
“The early and total defeat and complete destruction of your armed forces and war-making potential is now inevitable,” MacArthur declared, when he finally issued his statement. He was addressing the commander of North Korean forces, in words that were translated into Korean and disseminated by radio from Seoul and Tokyo and in leaflets dropped from airplanes over North Korea. “In order that the decisions of the United Nations may be carried out with a minimum of further loss of life and destruction of property, I, as the United Nations Commander in Chief, call upon you and the forces under your command, in whatever part of Korea situated, forthwith to lay down your arms and cease hostilities under such military supervisions as I may direct.” MacArthur also demanded the immediate release of all UN prisoners of war. “I shall anticipate your early decision upon this opportunity to avoid the further useless shedding of blood and destruction of property.”
—
HAD THE NORTH Koreans accepted MacArthur’s surrender demand, the question of the 38th parallel would have been rendered militarily moot; when they rejected it, the issue became acute. The crux of the matter was that the UN resolutions authorizing the war were vague as to how far the UN commander’s authority ran, while MacArthur’s military needs were specific. He wanted to exploit the disorder among the North Koreans and destroy their army, even if this required crossing into North Korea. His planes had been penetrating North Korean airspace for months; he saw no reason his troops shouldn’t enter North Korea on the ground. By doing so, they could shorten the war and save many lives. But the politics of crossing were murky. MacArthur might end up occupying North Korea, which was more than Washington had bargained for when the fighting began, and definitely more than most of the countries that backed the UN mission had expected. An incursion into North Korea, moreover, might provoke a response from the Soviet Union or China and thereby risk widening the war.
In the glow of Inchon, the Truman administration decided to take a risk. The president approved instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur that were based on NSC 81 and strove to balance opportunity against risk. “Your military objective is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces,” the chiefs declared on September 27. “In attaining this objective you are authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th Parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of
such operation there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.” In other words, MacArthur could cross the 38th parallel as long as his only foe was the North Koreans.
Yet he must do everything he could to make sure the North Koreans remained his only foe. “Under no circumstances,” the order continued, “will your forces cross the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian border. Furthermore, support of your operations north or south of the 38th parallel will not include air or naval action against Manchuria or against USSR territory.”
—
MACARTHUR MADE NO objection. He responded to the joint chiefs with an outline of his military plans. If the North Koreans rejected his surrender demand, the Eighth Army would cross the 38th parallel and drive to Pyongyang. X Corps would make an amphibious landing at Wonsan, on the east coast one hundred miles north of the 38th parallel, with the goal of effecting a juncture with the Eighth Army and cutting North Korea in two. Operations in the northern part of North Korea would be reserved to ROK forces. MacArthur added, “There is no indication at present of entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces.”
The chiefs approved MacArthur’s plan. George Marshall attached a personal note. “We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel,” the defense secretary told MacArthur.
All the same, Marshall suggested that MacArthur not make a public announcement on the subject. He should simply act. In this Marshall was relating the administration’s reading of the politics of the United Nations. “Evident desire is not to be confronted with necessity of a vote on passage of 38th parallel,” Marshall said of the international body. “Rather to find you have found it militarily necessary to do so.”