by H. W. Brands
The situation with the Russians was a bit different, MacArthur said. “They have an air force in Siberia and a fairly good one, with excellent pilots equipped with some jets and B-25 and B-29 type planes. They can put 1,000 planes in the air with some 200 to 300 more from the Fifth and Seventh Soviet fleets.” Yet he wasn’t worried. “They are probably no match for our air force.” Soviet ground troops were not a concern. “The Russians have no ground troops available for North Korea. They would have difficulty in putting troops into the field. It would take six weeks to get a division across, and six weeks brings the winter.”
A combination of Chinese ground troops and Soviet air support was not impossible, but neither was it particularly worrisome. “Russian air is deployed in a semi-circle through Mukden and Harbin, but the coordination between the Russian air and the Chinese ground would be so flimsy that I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us.” Air support of ground troops was complicated. “Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own air and ground forces are not as good as the marines, but they are effective.” The communists couldn’t measure up. “Between untrained air and ground forces an air umbrella is impossible without a lot of joint training. I believe it just wouldn’t work with Chinese Communist ground and Russian air.”
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THE DISCUSSION TURNED to the Japanese peace treaty then being negotiated and whether the Soviet Union and China, as co-belligerents in the war against Japan, could be excluded from negotiations. Truman solicited MacArthur’s opinion. The general suggested inviting the communists to a peace conference. “If they don’t come in, go ahead,” he said. “After the treaty is drawn up, submit to them a draft of the treaty and if they don’t sign, go ahead with the treaty. The Japanese deserve a treaty.”
Dean Rusk of the State Department said he and his diplomatic colleagues hoped to wrap up a peace treaty with Japan before the Eighth Army was withdrawn from Korea. “But your operations in Korea are going faster than the diplomats can go in getting a treaty,” he told MacArthur.
“I hope to get the Eighth Army back by Christmas,” MacArthur repeated.
Truman raised the question of a Pacific security alliance, comparable to the North Atlantic alliance. He asked for MacArthur’s view.
“A Pacific pact would be tremendous, but due to the lack of homogeneity of the Pacific nations, it would be very difficult to put into effect,” MacArthur said. “They have no military forces.” He suggested instead a statement like the Truman Doctrine, promising American protection to countries battling communism. “All they want is the assurance of security from the United States. The President should follow up this conference with a ringing pronouncement. I believe that at this time, after the military successes and the President’s trip, it would have more success than a Pacific pact.”
Truman and MacArthur spoke of the Philippines, which seemed on the right track, and French Indochina, which did not. MacArthur expressed puzzlement at the inability of France to stem the communist insurgency in northern Vietnam. “The French have 150,000 of their best troops there with an officer of the highest reputation in command. Their forces are twice what we had in the perimeter”—around Pusan—“and they are opposed by half of what the North Koreans had. I cannot understand why they do not clean it up.”
“I cannot understand it either,” Truman said.
Truman dealt summarily with another country. “General MacArthur and I have talked fully about Formosa,” he told the group. “There is no need to cover that subject again. The General and I are in complete agreement.”
Dean Rusk mentioned a plan floated by India to put Indian and Pakistani forces on the North Korean border with China and the Soviet Union. They would act as a buffer between American forces and the Chinese and Soviets. Rusk asked MacArthur’s opinion.
“It would be indefensible from a military point of view,” MacArthur said. “I am going to put South Korean troops up there. They will be the buffer. The other troops will be pulled back south of a line from 20 miles north of Pyongyang to Hamhung. I want to take all non-Korean troops out of Korea as soon as possible. They ought to move out soon after the elections. The ROK troops can handle the situation.” The last thing Korea needed was more foreign troops; what it needed instead was firm American support for the government of Syngman Rhee. MacArthur asserted that the United Nations was overstepping politically on the subject of the Korean government. “I have been shaking in my boots ever since I saw the UN resolution which would treat them on exactly the same basis as the North Koreans,” he said. “We have supported this government and suffered 27,000 casualties in doing so. They are a government duly elected under United Nations auspices and should not be let down.”
Truman agreed. “This cannot be done and should not be done,” he said. “We must insist on supporting this government.”
Rusk pointed out that propaganda against Rhee at the United Nations, by allies of China and the Soviet Union, was causing some coalition countries to waver in their commitment to Korea.
“Propaganda can go to hell,” Truman said. “We are supporting the Rhee government.”
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TRUMAN HAD BEEN mentally checking items off his written agenda for the meeting. He saw they had reached the end. “No one who was not here would believe we have covered so much ground as we have been actually able to cover,” he told the group. He checked his watch, which read 9:10. A luncheon had been scheduled for noon. He suggested regathering at that hour. “In the meantime a communiqué can be prepared and talks among the members of the staff can be carried on. Then I want to award a couple of medals to a couple of people and we can all leave after luncheon.”
MacArthur demurred. “If it’s all right, I am anxious to get back as soon as possible and would like to leave before luncheon, if that is convenient,” he told the president.
Truman didn’t bat an eye. “I believe this covers the main topics,” he said. “Secretary Pace, did you have anything else to take up?”
“Yes, sir,” Pace said, “but I can take them up separately with General MacArthur. And I imagine General Bradley has some also.”
Truman nodded. “The communiqué should be submitted as soon as it is ready,” he said. “And General MacArthur can return immediately. This has been a most satisfactory conference.”
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HE DIDN’T BELIEVE it. He had to bite his tongue to keep from saying what he did believe: that after he, the president of the United States, had flown seven thousand miles, it was incredibly arrogant of MacArthur to insist on leaving before lunch. A conference with the commander-in-chief didn’t end until the commander-in-chief said it ended.
Truman kept his temper in check. He chatted with MacArthur while the staff was producing the communiqué. MacArthur asked if Truman intended to run for president in 1952. Truman’s antennae quivered; he responded by inquiring whether MacArthur had any political plans. “None whatsoever,” MacArthur replied. “If you have any general running against you, his name will be Eisenhower, not MacArthur.”
Truman laughed. His personal experience of the demands of the presidency had tempered his previous enthusiasm for Eisenhower. He told MacArthur he respected Eisenhower as a general. “But he doesn’t know the first thing about politics. Why, if Eisenhower should become president, his administration would make Grant’s look like a model of perfection.”
Truman smiled for the photographers at the Wake Island airfield as he awarded MacArthur a fourth oak leaf cluster for his Distinguished Service Medal. He shook hands with MacArthur before boarding the Independence, having decided that if MacArthur wouldn’t stay for lunch, neither would he, and that the president must depart before the general.
The communiqué—in fact a statement issued in Truman’s name, but one that MacArthur read and approved—cast the best possible light on the brevity of the meeting. “The very complete unanimity of views which prevailed enabled us to finish our discussions rapidly, in or
der to meet General MacArthur’s desire to return at the earliest possible moment,” the president’s statement said. “It was apparent that the excellent coordination which has existed between Washington and the field, to which General MacArthur paid tribute, greatly facilitated the discussion.” As to the substance of the talks, the president spoke in positive generalities. “Primarily we talked about the problems in Korea which are General MacArthur’s most pressing responsibilities. I asked him for information on the military aspects. I got from him a clear picture of the heroism and high capacity of the United Nations forces under his command. We also discussed the steps necessary to bring peace and security to the area as rapidly as possible in accordance with the intent of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and in order to get our armed forces out of Korea as soon as their United Nations mission is completed.”
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TRUMAN WAS STILL putting the best face on things when he reached San Francisco en route home. “I have just returned from Wake Island, where I had a very satisfactory conference with General Douglas MacArthur,” he said. Truman’s critics were shouting what MacArthur had muttered under his breath: that the Wake Island meeting was a political show for a beleaguered president. Truman answered the critics obliquely. “I understand that there has been speculation about why I made this trip,” he said. “There is really no mystery about it. I went because I wanted to see and talk to General MacArthur. The best way to see him and talk to him is to meet him somewhere and talk to him.” As to why he had traveled such a long distance and MacArthur a much shorter one: “I went out to Wake Island to see General MacArthur because I did not want to take him far away from Korea, where he is conducting very important operations with great success. Events are moving swiftly over there now, and I did not feel that he should be away from his post too long.” Truman reiterated that he and MacArthur agreed on all the important issues. “There is complete unity in the aims and conduct of our foreign policy.” He relayed MacArthur’s message that the war was nearly over. “General MacArthur told me about the fighting in Korea. He described the magnificent achievements of all the United Nations forces serving under his command. Along with the soldiers of the Republic of Korea these forces have now turned back the tide of aggression.” America and the world could take comfort, as he himself did. “I am confident that these forces will soon restore peace to the whole of Korea.”
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ALMOST NO ONE in the United States bought the White House explanation of the Wake Island conference. Republicans continued to claim that it was politically motivated and were tickled that MacArthur had cut it short. Some said so outright; others were a bit more subtle. Former Minnesota governor and past and presumptively future Republican presidential candidate Harold Stassen said he applauded the president for traveling to Wake Island. “I am glad he went,” Stassen said. “I am glad the conference took place.” It was about time the president met the general, Stassen said, and he hoped Truman had learned something from the experience. “Any impartial observer must agree that General MacArthur is the best informed American with regard to the entire Asiatic situation.” It was a tragedy of American policy and of Asian affairs that Truman had not heeded MacArthur’s counsel at critical moments in the recent past. “If President Truman had asked and accepted General MacArthur’s advice five years ago, China would not today be under Communist leadership,” Stassen said. “If the president had asked and accepted General MacArthur’s advice two years ago, the United States would not today be reading casualty lists of the youth of our nation killed and wounded in Korea. If the president had asked and accepted General MacArthur’s advice one year ago the United Nations would not now be concerned about what to do next in Formosa.” Perhaps a change was coming; perhaps Truman had seen the light. He could demonstrate this by deferring to MacArthur on Asian affairs. “If the President will now appoint him Supreme Commander of American military interests in all of the Asiatic-Pacific area, we will acclaim the president for that action.” Stassen hoped the president would do this right thing. But if he didn’t, if the president by failing to hand control of America’s Asian policy to MacArthur proved that the whole Wake Island affair was a political show, then he would rightly incur the wrath of the American people. “The nation will say to its president: For shame!”
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TRUMAN STILL FELT the sting of MacArthur’s disrespect when he faced reporters two days after his return to Washington. “Mr. President,” one asked, “are you now in complete agreement with General MacArthur on Formosa?”
Truman typically liked news conferences and the banter with reporters. But he was in a foul mood this day. His back stiffened and his mouth grew tight as he lit into the questioner. “Let me tell you something that will be good for your soul,” he said. “It’s a pity that you columnists and reporters that represent a certain press service can’t understand the ideas of two intellectually honest men when they meet.” Truman didn’t identify the press service, and the reporters present couldn’t figure out which one he was talking about, not least because the reporter who asked the question was from the friendly St. Louis Post-Dispatch. But Truman evidently had prepared his answer, and he had more to say. “General MacArthur is the commander in chief of the Far East. He is a member of the government of the United States. He is loyal to that government. He is loyal to the president. He is loyal to the president in his foreign policy, which I hope a lot of your papers were—wish a lot of your papers were. There is no disagreement between General MacArthur and myself. It was a most successful conference. Formosa was settled a month ago, or five weeks, I think it was. And there was nothing about Formosa to be settled with General MacArthur. I went out there to get General MacArthur’s viewpoint on Japan and the Japanese treaty, to find out if he had any suggestions to make to the treaty which we had drawn and sent around for discussion. I went out there to find out about the rehabilitation of Korea, and I found out about it. And we have made a decision on what we are going to do about it. We talked about all the rest of the Asiatic continent and the Far East, and when General MacArthur went to leave, he said that it was one of the most successful conferences he had ever attended. And I said the same thing. There’s your answer.”
“Thank you, Mr. President.”
“You understand now, don’t you?”
“Yes, sir.” Several reporters laughed at their colleague’s chastening.
Truman joined the laughter, but he wasn’t happy. When another reporter, several questions later, said, “Mr. President, I hate to bring up Formosa again,” Truman cut him off. “Formosa is answered, and I have nothing to say further on it,” he said.
“No more comment?”
“No more comment whatever. I answered you on that.”
But the reporters weren’t done. “Mr. President, did any question of General MacArthur’s resignation arise?”
“No,” Truman said. “He did not want to come back before the job is finished, he said. I imagine he meant the Japanese peace treaty, when he said that.”
“Do you know how long that might be?”
“No.”
Truman’s demeanor at this press conference made as much news as his remarks. “Rarely has the President appeared as furious as he was today,” the White House reporter for the New York Times observed. “He was aroused so much that the words seemed to trip over each other.” A correspondent for the Washington Post described Truman as “very angry,” with “eyes blazing.” The Post reporter suggested that Truman realized he had lost the battle over the meaning of Wake Island. “The president’s touchiness on the subject of Formosa was presumably heightened yesterday by a spate of newspaper speculation to the effect that he had won MacArthur to his way of thinking, or that it had been the other way around, in regard to the controversial island, the Nationalist Chinese government’s last refuge. The implication, naturally offensive to Mr. Truman, was either that he was in a position of having to persuade a subordinate around to his viewpoint, o
r that a subordinate had persuaded him.”
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WITH AN EFFORT, Truman calmed himself, trusting that the imminent end of the war would put his MacArthur troubles behind him. American and ROK forces swept north according to MacArthur’s plan, with the political significance of the 38th parallel lost in the excitement of military success. MacArthur’s offensive carried the endorsement of the UN General Assembly, to which the U.S. mission in New York had appealed following the return of the Soviet delegate to UN deliberations. Resolutions of the General Assembly lacked the weight of Security Council resolutions, but the Soviet veto in the Security Council left the assembly as America’s only alternative venue. On October 7 the General Assembly endorsed the goal of “the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea.”
MacArthur’s Eighth Army took a big step toward this end when it captured Pyongyang on October 19. The fact of the capture was important to Syngman Rhee, who accompanied MacArthur to Pyongyang and prepared to incorporate it and the rest of North Korea into the republic he headed. The symbolism was important to MacArthur and everyone else opposed to communism, for it marked the first time a communist capital had been liberated since the start of the Cold War.
The liberation of the rest of North Korea appeared likely to require but days more. MacArthur told reporters, after a visit to a zone where army paratroopers were being dropped, “I didn’t see any opposition. It looks like it was a complete surprise. It looks like we closed the trap. Closing that trap should be the end of all organized resistance. The war is very definitely coming to an end.” On the same day, MacArthur, speaking as UN commander, declared, “The enemy is thoroughly shattered.”