by H. W. Brands
“He did nothing of the kind.”
“Mr. President, a few months ago this government declined the offer of Chinese Nationalist troops. Has that been up for reconsideration, in view—”
“The offer of Nationalist Chinese troops was refused for the reason that we hoped not to be involved in a world war. That situation still continues.”
“Mr. President, will the United Nations troops be allowed to bomb across the Manchurian border?”
“I can’t answer that question this morning,” Truman said.
“Mr. President, will attacks in Manchuria depend on action in the United Nations?”
“Yes, entirely.”
“In other words, if the United Nations resolution should authorize General MacArthur to go further than he has, he will—”
“We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation, just as we always have,” Truman said.
“Will that include the atomic bomb?”
The president hadn’t seen this coming, though he quickly realized he should have. He didn’t have an answer ready. He could have declined to comment, but he had never liked that dodge. It made him appear indecisive. And indecisive was not how he wished to appear now.
“That includes every weapon that we have,” he said.
This answer got the reporters’ attention. One immediately followed up. “Mr. President, you said, ‘Every weapon that we have.’ Does that mean that there is active consideration of the use of the atomic bomb?”
Truman realized he was in trouble. He had wanted to calm the situation, and he found himself inflaming it. But he saw no way back, and so he pressed forward. “There has always been active consideration of its use,” he said. Yet he immediately qualified his statement. “I don’t want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women, and children who have nothing whatever to do with this military aggression. That happens when it is used.”
After an unrelated question, the reporters returned to the issue they all knew would headline their stories. “Did we understand you clearly that the use of the atomic bomb is under active consideration?”
Truman thought he saw a way out. “Always has been. It is one of our weapons.”
“Does that mean, Mr. President, use against military objectives, or civilian—”
He tried to close the discussion. “It’s a matter that the military people will have to decide. I’m not a military authority that passes on those things.”
These were still the days when reporters required permission to quote the president from news conferences. “Mr. President, perhaps it would be better if we are allowed to quote your remarks on that directly?”
“I don’t think that is necessary,” Truman said.
“Mr. President, you said this depends on United Nations action. Does that mean that we wouldn’t use the atomic bomb except on a United Nations authorization?”
“No, it doesn’t mean that at all. The action against Communist China depends on the action of the United Nations. The military commander in the field will have charge of the use of the weapons, as he always has.”
Truman saw he was simply getting in deeper. He certainly hadn’t given MacArthur authority to use atomic weapons, and he didn’t intend to. He sought shallower water. “We have exerted every effort possible to prevent a third world war,” he said. “Every maneuver that has been made since June 25th has had in mind not to create a situation which would cause another terrible war. We are still trying to prevent that war from happening, and I hope we may be able to prevent it.”
He changed the subject by accusing his critics of sowing misunderstanding. “All these attacks and speculations and lies that have been told on the members of this government have not helped that situation one little bit. There’s a big one on the front page of the paper this morning, about Acheson having interfered with the command in the Far East. There isn’t one word of truth in that, and never has been. Acheson has attended strictly to his business as secretary of state, and he has done a good job. I am getting tired of all this foolishness and I’m going to bust loose on you one of these days.”
He spoke the last line with what might have been a twinkle in his eye. Several reporters laughed, perhaps to ease the tension. The interview ended moments later.
Truman knew he had bungled horribly. He had sought to allay fears that the Korean conflict would become a world war, but the story that led the day’s news was his threat to use atomic weapons against China. His suggestion that the choice of weapons was up to the theater commander—MacArthur—merely made things worse.
The White House quickly released an explanatory statement. “The President wants to make it certain that there is no misinterpretation of his answers to questions at his press conference today about the use of the atom bomb,” the White House statement said. “Naturally, there has been consideration of this subject since the outbreak of the hostilities in Korea, just as there is consideration of the use of all military weapons whenever our forces are in combat. Consideration of the use of any weapon is always implicit in the very possession of that weapon. However, it should be emphasized, that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon. In brief, the replies to the questions at today’s press conference do not represent any change in this situation.”
35
TRUMAN’S STATEMENT THAT the bomb was in play in Korea outdistanced the White House clarification, and it triggered a furor across America and around the world. Nearly everyone had thought the war almost over; hadn’t General MacArthur promised as much? But suddenly the planet was on the brink of World War III, which might pick up where World War II had left off, with the use of the most terrible weapons ever invented. Americans shuddered; the governments of America’s allies strove to distance themselves from Washington. Clement Attlee of Britain hastily arranged a trip to America; René Pleven of France counseled him on what to tell Truman to avert the cataclysm.
Within Washington, Congress stirred into action. The legislature had never liked having its war-making authority usurped by Truman on the Korean question, but the majority Democrats had declined to challenge a president of their own party and the minority Republicans couldn’t muster the votes to force the issue. Anyway, after Inchon, with victory on UN terms imminent, the president’s characterization of the conflict as a police action didn’t seem outlandish. The Chinese offensive changed the political calculations for both parties. Democrats worried about being dragged into a larger war; Republicans sought to blame the president for the abrupt reversal of fortunes.
Truman addressed the lawmakers’ concerns and complaints in a December 1 meeting with the leaders of the two parties. Omar Bradley provided a briefing on the situation in Korea, where American and UN forces continued to reel before the Chinese onslaught. At the close of Bradley’s remarks the president inquired if the lawmakers had questions. Tom Connally asked why MacArthur’s force was split into two wings, one in the east and the other in the west. Bradley pointed to the map he had brought and explained that a range of mountains separated the two wings. Communications and transport across the mountains were very difficult. Moreover, MacArthur had been trying to fulfill the UN directive to pacify and occupy as much of Korea as possible, toward the goal of holding all-country elections.
Alexander Wiley asked about the adequacy of MacArthur’s intelligence. Bradley had been expecting the question, which was the one nearly all of America and much of the world was asking. He didn’t wish to assign blame but couldn’t dodge the obvious. “Undoubtedly General MacArthur was unaware of the size of the concentration of enemy forces,” Bradley said, “or he would not have undertaken exactly the kind of operations that he did and he would have been better prepared to meet the attack.”
Democratic congress
man John McCormack asked how MacArthur had been caught so off guard. Wasn’t it well known that there were large numbers of Chinese troops in Manchuria?
“Yes,” Bradley replied.
“Isn’t there a command intelligence at MacArthur’s headquarters?” McCormack asked.
“Yes, there is field intelligence in Korea,” Bradley replied. He said he assumed the congressman wanted to know why MacArthur wasn’t aware of all the Chinese in Korea until they attacked. “The point is that the Chinese come across the Yalu River at night in small numbers, and they march down through Korea in short columns, also at night. It is very difficult to pick up these columns by air reconnaissance, and since they move in such small groups it is difficult even for our intelligence on the ground to make an accurate estimate of communist strength.”
Kenneth Wherry asked if MacArthur could hold a line in Korea.
Bradley said he didn’t know.
This produced a sobered pause. Truman let the message sink in before turning to Walter Bedell Smith to make the administration’s larger point about Korea. The CIA director set up a new map, this one centered on Europe and the Soviet Union. He said that what was happening in Korea was closely connected to what was happening in Europe. The Soviet-controlled areas of Europe had been very quiet during the last ten days. “This in itself is a disquieting fact.” But the Soviet army had been busy. “The Russians appear to have completed very large scale maneuvers in which some 500,000 men took part. Their maneuvers were concentrated on airborne troops and river crossings.”
John McCormack asked Smith why the Soviets were training so many men for airlift.
“Undoubtedly the Soviets are training their airborne troops for European operations,” Smith said.
McCormack asked whether, if World War III began, a bridgehead on the European continent would be important to the United States.
“An American bridgehead would certainly be important,” Smith said.
Truman took over. Once again the president cast the Korean issue in global context. The administration, he said, had been working hard to build up American defenses. He had sent one supplemental budget request to Congress in September and was about to send another. The current request, for $17 billion, had been in preparation for months, he said. But it had been increased in the last few days because of the escalation of the fighting in Korea. “I hope you can consider this carefully, and act fast,” he told the lawmakers. “I have been anxious for you to get all the facts about the situation with which we are faced. That is why I have had General Smith and General Bradley here to talk with you today. I want you to know the facts on which these estimates are based.”
He said he and the members of his administration had been working “day and night” to keep the conflict in Korea from spreading. Congress could help by providing the funding he was requesting. The better America was armed, the less likely it would be attacked. Truman repeated that time was of the essence, in light of the recent events. The administration had accelerated its rearming timetable. “We are trying to get ready by mid-’52 what we wanted for mid-’53,” he said.
As the session ended, the president urged all present to keep to themselves what they had heard there. “Don’t tell anybody, not even your wives,” he said. “What you heard here today is something even I don’t hear unless I push these people into telling me.”
36
JAMES RESTON WAS not at the meeting between Truman and the congressional leaders, yet the New York Times reporter evidently heard from one or more of those who had been. Washington had never been good with secrets, but the dismaying reversal in Korea, following months of tension between Truman and MacArthur, caused tongues to wag all over the capital. “Outwardly there is a new unity in Washington in the face of the crisis, but behind the scenes the atmosphere here is one of gravity and considerable bitterness,” Reston wrote. “There is no doubt that confidence in Gen. Douglas MacArthur, even on Capitol Hill, has been badly shaken as a result of the events of the last few days. Similarly, there is no doubt that United States leadership in the Western world has been damaged by President Truman’s acceptance of the bold MacArthur offensive and the President’s rejection of the more cautious British strategy.” Reston, whose sources clearly included administration officials, continued, “Ever since the Inchon landing, which was praised world-wide as one of the most adroit military operations in modern history, various suggestions have been made to the State Department and, through it and the President to General MacArthur, of the necessity for caution in approaching the Manchurian and Soviet frontiers.” The British, preoccupied with the safety of Hong Kong, had argued most strongly for staying away from China’s borders. But MacArthur repeatedly resisted restraint. “In each case,” Reston wrote, again following his administration sources, “General MacArthur took the view that these suggestions were jeopardizing the victories he had won. Moreover, he indicated that he could not be responsible for the security of his troops—a phrase he used on several occasions—if any such policy of cautious waiting were adopted.” Truman had let himself be persuaded by MacArthur, overriding his own judgment that caution was necessary.
Reston’s sources explained why this was so. “First, General MacArthur was on the ground. It was assumed that his intelligence had been right about the numbers of Chinese that opposed him before the United Nations attack. It was also assumed that he had been right in his estimate that the Chinese Communists were not preparing for a counteroffensive.” Events, of course, had proved these assumptions wrong. Reston added a political factor to the error equation. “From the time of the Inchon landing to the opening of last week’s ‘end-the-war’ offensive, General MacArthur was riding high. He was supported strongly on Capitol Hill and in the country, and any open break with him certainly could not have done President Truman any good in the election.”
The Chinese offensive had changed things dramatically. MacArthur wasn’t riding so high, and the administration appeared less reluctant to challenge him. Reston expected the tension to grow. Meanwhile the Korean conflict was further from resolution than ever. “Nobody available here today seemed to see any honorable policy between the unacceptable extremes of appeasement and an Asiatic war.”
—
MACARTHUR READ RESTON and other critics and grew angrier and angrier. It was bad enough, he believed, to have his hands tied by the lack of nerve of the diplomats and politicians. But to be blamed for the consequences of that hand tying was intolerable. He invited an interview with the weekly U.S. News & World Report and delivered his riposte. The interview took place in writing; the editors of the magazine cabled their questions to the general, who cabled his reply. The editors admired MacArthur, so much so that their questions seemed as though they had been written by him, which some might well have been.
“Were there any warnings from the U.N. or otherwise about the dangers of a winter offensive?” the editors asked.
“There were no warnings,” MacArthur answered predictably. “Nor were any warnings necessary,” he continued, more surprisingly. MacArthur elaborated, unveiling the argument that would become his defense against the charges of recklessness: namely, that his offensive had produced a positive outcome. “A winter offensive is as hard on the enemy as upon friendly forces,” he said. “To have assumed defensive positions awaiting spring would not have avoided the rigors of the winter climate, for to hold these positions would require constant fighting during the winter months and it would have given the enemy an opportunity to mass his forces for a demolishing attack—with every assurance that he would jump off just as soon as a satisfactory military balance had been achieved.” In other words, MacArthur had surprised the Chinese and spoiled their plans, rather than vice versa.
“Was there adequate knowledge of Chinese strength?” the editors asked.
MacArthur’s answer implied that such knowledge was impossible, given the constraints placed upon him. “When the line of battle moved northward following the Inchon landing,
the area of possible detection and interdiction of enemy movements contracted until there was left but a night’s march from the border sanctuary for Chinese Communist forces to the area of hostilities. This provided means for Chinese Communist authorities to move troops forward under cover of darkness and rugged terrain with little possibility of detection.” He added significantly, “Air reconnaissance across the border is prohibited.”
The editors asked if major operations like the recent offensive were planned in consultation with Washington and the UN or by the theater commander alone.
“Major operations are all reported and approved prior to being launched,” MacArthur said.
“Did you expect the winter offensive to be lengthy or a pushover?” the editors asked.
MacArthur granted that he had hoped the offensive would be decisive. But he reiterated that the way things had turned out was all to the good. “Had we failed to assault and uncover enemy strength and intentions, the opportunity secretly to build up from available resources of all China would inevitably encompass our destruction.”
“Was this estimate based on the belief that Chinese strength was not more than 60,000?” the editors asked, citing a figure that had been widely reported.
MacArthur responded, in effect, that the number was immaterial. “The tactical course taken was the only one which the situation permitted.”
“Would you describe the present situation as ‘critical and serious, but not hopeless’?”
MacArthur acknowledged the gravity of the situation. But it was not hopeless, he said, “unless one completely discounts the combined resources of the free nations engaged in the Korean conflict.”
“Are the Chinese supply lines vulnerable to air attack?”
MacArthur returned to the handicaps under which he operated. “Within Manchuria the Chinese supply lines are protected from our air attack.” And it was only in Manchuria where they might be reasonably interdicted. “South of the border for many miles along the river line, they can enter trails leading up through rugged terrain. Under the worst conditions, troops and supplies could be moved forward under cover of night with little possibility of air detection, an essential to air interdiction.”