by H. W. Brands
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“I NOW BEGAN to formulate long-range plans for destroying the Chinese forces in Korea,” MacArthur wrote later, again slighting Ridgway. “My decisive objective would be their supply lines. By constant, but ubiquitous ground thrusts at widely scattered points with limited objectives, I would regain the Seoul lines for a base of future operations. I would then clear the enemy rear all across the top of North Korea by massive air attacks. If I were still not permitted to attack the massed enemy reinforcements across the Yalu, or to destroy its bridges, I would sever Korea from Manchuria by laying a field of radioactive wastes—the by-products of atomic manufacture—across all the major lines of enemy supply. The destruction in North Korea had left it bereft of supplies. Everything the Chinese used in the way of food or munitions had to come across the border. The Reds had only ten days’ supply of food in their North Korean dumps to feed nearly a million troops, and their ammunition was equally limited. Then, reinforced by Chinese Nationalist troops, if I were permitted to use them, and with American reinforcement on the way, I would make simultaneous amphibious and airborne landings at the upper end of both coasts of North Korea, and close a gigantic trap. The Chinese would soon starve or surrender. Without food and ammunition, they would become helpless. It would be something like Inchon, but on a much larger scale.”
If MacArthur actually did formulate such plans at the time, he had fairly lost touch with reality in Washington. He had been told again and again that there would be no summons of the Chinese Nationalists. He had been repeatedly ordered not to bomb across the Yalu. And as for sowing radioactive material in North Korea or China, his thinking was delusional.
Unless, of course, something changed in Washington. A general could always hope—and, where necessary, help.
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ON FEBRUARY 12, 1951, Joseph Martin celebrated Abraham Lincoln’s birthday by speaking to the Kings County Republican Committee of Brooklyn. The Republican leader of the House of Representatives hailed the patron saint of his party for Lincoln’s service to freedom in the face of great danger and trial. “Today, after ninety years of political service, the Republican party is still the only party of freedom in these United States,” Martin continued. “It is still the only party which steadfastly has refused to accept the alien doctrines of socialism and communism.” The Democrats, starting at the top, formed a sorry contrast, putting politics above policy, and party above country. “It is the great tragedy of our day that in a period of crisis we have an administration in Washington which is so bankrupt in leadership that its first measurement of every undertaking is whether it will help perpetuate those in power. Votes have become the yardstick of their policies.”
The problem was especially acute in foreign policy, Martin said. The administration had acquiesced in Russian control of half of Europe. Although the Republican Eightieth Congress had voted support for Chiang Kai-shek in China, the Truman White House had blocked its delivery. Meanwhile the Russians had built a nuclear arsenal, with American help. “Because we had fuzzy-minded, pinko officials in our security setup, the Soviet Union was able to steal the secrets of the atomic and the hydrogen bombs.” The Korean war was simply the most recent exhibit of communist malignity and Democratic incompetence. The war had caught the administration by unforgivable surprise and had exacted a fearful cost. The administration’s war-fighting strategy was criminally perverse. American troops were fighting greater numbers of Chinese Communist troops, but the administration refused to employ an army of Chinese Nationalists eager to confront the Communists. Truman had gone so far as to order the American Seventh Fleet to prevent any move by Chiang against the Chinese mainland. What could be more counterproductive than that?
The heart of the problem, Martin said, was the administration’s obsession with Europe. “Everyone knows that we must have an effective aid program for Europe,” he conceded. “Everyone knows that we must not, if we can possibly prevent it, allow the resources and productive capacity of the free European nations to fall into Communist control.” But Truman and his minions had carried things entirely too far. “I protest with every resource at my command the formulation of any over-all strategy which virtually ignores the focal point of our trouble today—Asia.”
Martin cited several distinguished soldiers and statesmen who had protested the short shrift given Asia. None was more distinguished than Douglas MacArthur. “How many people recall that General MacArthur declared that our failure to help the Republic of China may be ‘the single greatest blunder in the history of the United States’?” he asked rhetorically. Yet the blunder persisted. “If we really want to take the pressure off our forces in Korea, and if we want to diminish the threat of a Soviet sweep across Europe, why, may I ask, do we not employ the 800,000 anti-Communist Chinese troops on Formosa?” General MacArthur had frequently advocated such action, and Martin was happy to add his voice to that of the general. “What could be sounder logic, both strategically and militarily, than to allow the anti-Communist forces of the generalissimo on Formosa to participate in the war against the Chinese Reds? Why not let them open a second front in Asia?…If it is right for American boys to fight Chinese Reds in Korea, what can be wrong with American help to the anti-Communist Chinese fighting the Reds on their own soil? What are we in Korea for, to win or to lose?”
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MARTIN’S SPEECH WAS unremarkable in itself. Republicans had long used Lincoln’s birthday as an occasion to applaud themselves and castigate their opponents; Democrats did much the same at their annual celebrations of Jefferson and Jackson. Martin’s insults against Truman said nothing Joseph McCarthy and other Republicans hadn’t been saying for months and years about the president. To be sure, Martin as House leader held a higher post than McCarthy and most of the other Truman baiters, but still his remarks could easily have gone unnoticed.
And so they did until they received the endorsement of Douglas MacArthur. Martin might have been hoping to draw MacArthur into the 1952 presidential campaign; he might have been trying to cause mischief for the Democrats. He doubtless believed what he said about a change in America’s Asia policy being necessary. In any case, having cited MacArthur in his remarks, he made sure the general received a copy of the speech. “In the current discussions on foreign policy and overall strategy,” Martin wrote to MacArthur in early March, “many of us have been distressed that although the European aspects have been heavily emphasized, we have been without the views of yourself as Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern Command.” Martin reiterated that American security and the peace of the world required that America not weaken its position in Asia. “Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N.Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea.” Martin solicited MacArthur’s response. “I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise.”
MacArthur later said he had no choice but to answer. “I have always felt duty-bound to reply frankly to every Congressional inquiry into matters connected with my official responsibility,” he wrote. “This has been a prescribed practice since the very beginning of our nation, and is now the law. Only in this way, and by personal appearance, can the country’s law-makers cope intelligently with national problems.” Yet his response went considerably further than any duty demanded.
“Dear Congressman Martin,” he wrote on March 20. “I am most grateful for your note of the eighth forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old time punch.” Addressing the congressman’s question, MacArthur continued, “My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China’s entry into the war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally th
ese views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counter force as we have never failed to do in the past.” MacArthur endorsed Martin’s call for employing Chinese Nationalist troops. “Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition”—the American tradition of meeting force with maximum counterforce. The general lamented the wrongheadedness of the president’s policy toward communism. “It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom.” The war for the world had begun, despite what the president might think. And America must prevail. “There is no substitute for victory.”
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IF MACARTHUR REALIZED that his letter to Martin was a ticking time bomb, he gave no sign. “I attached little importance to the exchange of letters, which on my part was intended to be merely a polite response couched in such general terms as to convey only a normal patriotic desire for victory,” he wrote afterward.
In the moment, he placed much greater significance on an exchange with the joint chiefs and the White House. The State Department had been discussing with America’s allies possible terms of a ceasefire offer to the Chinese and the North Koreans. Sufficient progress had been made that the joint chiefs felt obliged to inform and consult MacArthur. “State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggressors, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea,” the chiefs cabled MacArthur on March 20. “Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort towards settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th parallel.” In other words, MacArthur should sit still for the present. Yet the administration didn’t want to leave his troops vulnerable. “State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for UN forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired.”
MacArthur responded at once, rejecting the State proposal and, in effect, any ceasefire. “Recommend that no further military restrictions be imposed upon the United Nations Command in Korea,” he cabled. “The inhibitions which already exist should not be increased. The military disadvantages arising from restrictions upon the scope of our Air and Naval operations coupled with the disparity between the size of our command and the enemy ground potential renders it completely impracticable to attempt to clear North Korea or make any appreciable effort to that end.”
Omar Bradley read the response and shook his head. “I do not know what went on in MacArthur’s mind at this time,” the joint chiefs chairman recalled. MacArthur understood perfectly well that the clearing of North Korea had long since been ruled out. The president wanted an end to the fighting, not an escalation of it. But MacArthur couldn’t resist reminding the chiefs—on the record—of the “military disadvantages” under which he was compelled to labor.
Bradley considered two explanations for MacArthur’s intransigence. The first was personal. “He had been made a fool of by the Chinese communist armies; now, as all the world had seen, Ridgway’s brilliant leadership had bailed him out,” Bradley wrote. MacArthur’s constant agitation for greater authority to attack the Chinese signaled his hope to regain the limelight. The chiefs’ new message shattered that hope. “There would be no all-out war with China directed from Tokyo. Perhaps this realization snapped his brilliant but brittle mind. What lay ahead now was merely a diplomatic search for the status quo and unrestricted praise for his subordinate, Ridgway.”
The other explanation was political. “Perhaps at this time MacArthur decided that he would come home and run for the presidency in 1952,” Bradley wrote. “He still had considerable popularity and substantial support among right-wing politicians on the Hill and in some state houses. Perhaps he believed that a sharp break with Truman, whose popularity was slipping badly, would redound to his credit and build such a massive groundswell of support that he could knock Republican front runner Bob Taft aside.” Bradley was still scratching his head years later. “I don’t know; I can only speculate. However, it is noteworthy that the events that were to transpire would fit this scenario.”
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POSSIBLY FEELING ECLIPSED by his subordinate, definitely convinced he would be a better president than his commander-in-chief, MacArthur set off a new explosion that rattled Washington and several other capitals. On the eve of Truman’s announcement of ceasefire terms, the general issued his own call for a cessation of hostilities. “We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces,” he declared on March 24. The tide of battle had indisputably turned. “The enemy’s human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces become seasoned in this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain and battle.”
MacArthur’s statement acquired a taunting tone. “Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war. He lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns.” In former days, the massive numbers of the Chinese might have offset their technical deficiency. But no longer; the American advantage was too great. “The resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss.”
If the enemy was not blind to all reality, he must give up his aggression. If he failed to do so, much worse might befall him. “A decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.” MacArthur called for an end to hostilities. “There should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China’s seat in the United Nations.” The decision was up to the Chinese. “I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the Commander-in-Chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception, might be accomplished without further bloodshed.”
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MACARTHUR’S “PRONUNCIAMENTO”—Dean Acheson’s word for it—triggered fresh outrage in Washington. For the general to threaten full war against China, at the moment when the president was trying to coax the Chinese to the peace table, egregiously exceeded his authority, impugned the integrity of the president, and once more threatened to shatter the unity of the American alliance system and the UN coalition.
The deputy secretary of defense, Robert Lovett, visited Acheson at eleven o’clock that night bearing a copy of MacArthur’s words. “Bob, usually imperturbable and given to ironic humor under pressure, was angrier than I had ever seen him,” Acheson recalled. “The General, he said, must be removed and removed at once.” Acheson shared Lovett’s anger as soon as he read MacArthur’s statement. “It can be described only as defiance of the Chiefs of Staff, sabotage of an operation of which he had been inf
ormed, and insubordination of the grossest sort to his Commander in Chief.”
Acheson discussed the matter with Lovett and some of Acheson’s State Department lieutenants until well after midnight, then resumed the discussion the next morning at the office. Lovett consulted with the joint chiefs at the Pentagon. He called Acheson to summarize their views. They had divided the MacArthur problem into three parts, according to the notes of the call. “The first related to the embarrassment with the 13 countries occasioned by MacArthur’s statement at the time this Government was negotiating with the 13 countries to agree on a proposed statement by President Truman.” Beyond the embarrassment, MacArthur’s statement nullified weeks of work with all those UN allies and made a future agreement harder. The second problem was the complication it threw in the path of future proposals. “It brought up the question again of how many negotiators there are; i.e., whether the State Department, the United Nations or MacArthur was the negotiator.” In the Chinese system, no general would spout off unauthorized; the Chinese would assume MacArthur spoke with authority, perhaps as part of some double game by the Americans. The third problem touched the matter of military discipline. The joint chiefs proposed to deal with this one first, because it was most clearly in their ambit. “They were considering it in the light of the directive of December 5”—transmitted on December 6—“which had been sent to MacArthur, among others. That directive specifically requires the Commander in the field to clear any statements, speeches, or anything else relating to political matters with Washington.”