Chapter 2
1 “Statement for the Record of Dr. Thomas Fingar,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, June 25, 2008, www.dni.gov/testimonies/20080625_testimony.pdf (accessed on June 25, 2008); Kevin Whitelaw, “Climate Change Will Have Destabilizing Consequences, Intelligence Agencies Warn,” US News World Report, June 25, 2008. The report was called “The National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030.”
2 Laura Sullivan, “Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law,” All Things Considered (NPR Radio), October 28, 2010.
3 This report is widely available on the Web—for example, on the Global Business Network website at www.gbn.com/GBNDocumentDisplayServlet.srv?aid=26231&url=/UploadDocumentDisplayServlet.srv?id=28566.
4 On bombing and Paris negotiations, see Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States and the Modern Historical Experience (New York: New Press, 1985), 440–444; Stanley Karrnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1997).
5 Jeff Goodell, How to Cool the Planet: Geoengineering and the Audacious Quest to Fix Earth’s Climate (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010).
6 For a thorough discussion of the ocean’s thermaline circulation system, see the following: Tim Flannery, The Weather Makers: How Man Is Changing the Climate and What It Means for Life on Earth (New York: HarperCollins, 2006); Elizabeth Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature and Climate Change (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2006); Eugene Linden, The Winds of Change: Climate, Weather, and the Destruction of Civilizations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); Al Gore, Earth in the Balance (New York: Plume, 1993); Al Gore, An Inconvenient Truth (New York: Rodale Books, 2006); George Monbiot, Heat: How to Stop the Planet from Burning (New York: Doubleday, 2006).
7 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, “Report on Abrupt Climate Change and Its Implications for the United States National Security” (report prepared for the Pentagon Office of Net Assessment, Global Business Network, February 2003), 2.
8 CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2007), 44.
9 CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, 16.
10 CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, 60.
11 Kurt M. Campbell et al., The Age of Consequences: The Foreign-Policy National Security Implications of Global Climate Change (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for New American Security, 2007), 35.
12 Campbell et al., Age of Consequences, 9.
13 Campbell et al., Age of Consequences, 85–86.
14 Jonathan Pearlman and Ben Cubby, “Defense Warns of Climate Conflict,” Sydney Morning Herald, January 7, 2009; the Australian Defense Forces analysis, titled Climate Change: The Environment, Resources and Conflict, was completed in November 2007.
15 “Climate Change and International Security” (paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S113/08, March 14, 2008), 1–2. This report is available online at www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/reports/99387.pdf.
16 “Climate Change and International Security,” 3–5.
17 Thomas Barnett, “The Pentagon’s New Map,” Esquire, March 2003. It is tempting to give American foreign policy an intellectual coherence that it doesn’t necessarily have. Although general goals are agreed on, namely projecting American power for the sake of American business, policy circles are divided into different schools of thought, cliques, and networks that compete for the influence of opposing visions.
18 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
19 John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (New York: Longman, Green and Co., 1909), 685.
20 Larry Elliott and Mark Tran, “UN Report Warns of Threat to Human Progress from Climate Change,” Guardian, November 4, 2010.
Chapter 3
1 Interview with Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC, March 1999; Frank L. Jones, “Marine Corps Civil Affairs and the Three Block War,” Marine Corps Gazette 86, no. 3 (March 1, 2002). Derek Summerfield, “The Psychosocial Effects of Conflict in the Third World,” Development in Practice 1, no. 3 (autumn 1991): 159–173: 2.
2 CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation, 2007), 44. Emphasis added. That was Gen. Anthony Zini (Ret.) reflecting on the military implications of climate change, but Woolsey, Panetta, and the others all make similar statements.
3 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (FM 3–24.2). US Military Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2009), p. viii.
4 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Thomas Ricks, The Gamble: General David Patraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). For an excellent and critical history of counterinsurgency in Colombia see, Forrest Hylton, “Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success,” Brown Journal of World Affairs Vol. XVII, no. I (Fall/Winter 2010): 99115.
5 For the classic discussion of anomie, see Robert K. Merton, “Social Structure and Anomie,” American Sociological Review 3, no. 5 (October 1938): 672–682.
6 Jose Harris, “War and Social History: Britain and the Home Front During the Second World War,” Contemporary European History 1, no. 1 (March 1992): 17–35: 18.
7 Indeed, that is what unlucky “guests” of the Taliban, like Jerey van Dyke, describe. By his account, the Taliban give the impression that drone strikes build unity on the ground, even if they fray and wear upon the Taliban leadership networks. Jerey Van Dyke, Captive: My Time As a Prisoner of the Taliban (New York: Times Books, 2010).
8 Summerfield, “The Psychosocial Effects of Conflict,” 159–173: 2.
9 I am thinking here most specifically of political Islam. See Oliver Roy, The Failures of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), in which French scholar Roy argues that political Islam, once in power, necessarily tempers its radicalism, for there is no “Islamic” way to run a modern economy or state because Islam is not a social theory but a moral theory.
10 Robert J. Bunker, “Epochal Change: War over Social and Political Organization,” Parameters 27 (summer 1997): 15–25.
11 As often happens in colonial situations, there were both resistance and creative adaptation on the part of the colonized people. As explained in Theda Perdue and Michael Green’s excellent The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears, the Cherokees used the “civilizing” process, turning it to their own national ends. They adopted modern farming methods and tools, as well as created a Cherokee script, newspapers, a constitution, and a modern sovereign state. They engaged in long-distance trade and the cash economy, even buying and owning slaves, and brought in white indentured servants to work their lands. But they resisted efforts to privatize their land holdings and hung on to their language and customs and thereby, through partial acculturation, thwarted conquest. Interestingly, the Kikuyu of Kenya and the Chagga of Tanzania also both resisted and adapted to colonialism in a similar fashion to the Cherokee. On the Cherokee, see Theda Perdue and Michael Green, The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears (New York: Viking, 2007).
12 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (New York: Anchor, 1961). General George Crook quoted in John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
13 If this sounds a lot like Judeo-Christian eschatology, that is because there was significant influence from the Mormon Church and, strangely, the Shakers on the founding leaders of the Ghost Dance Cult, like the
Paiute prophet Wovoka. See Frank D. McCann Jr., “The Ghost Dance, Last Hope of Western Tribes, Unleashed the Final Tragedy,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History 16, no. 1 (winter 1966): 25–34. For a historiographical survey of the literature on the Lakota ghost dance, see Michael A. Sievers, “The Historiography of ‘The Bloody Field . . . That Kept the Secret of the Everlasting Word’: Wounded Knee,” South Dakota History 6, no. 1 (1975): 33–54; Raymond J. DeMallie, “The Lakota Ghost Dance: An Ethnohistorical Account,” The Pacific Historical Review 51, no. 4 (November 1982): 385–405.
14 Captain E. D. Swinton, D.S.O., R.E., The Defense of Duffer’s Drift (Washington, DC: US Infantry Association, 1916), 9.
15 Swinton, The Defense of Duffer’s Drift, 36.
16 Hans Schmidt, Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998).
17 For more on this, see Dunbar Ortiz, “Indigenous Rights and Regional Autonomy in Revolutionary Nicaragua,” Latin American Perspectives 14, no. 1 (winter 1987): 43–66; Jane Freeland, “Nationalist Revolution and Ethnic Rights: The Miskitu Indians of Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast,” Third World Quarterly 11, no. 4 (October 1989): 166–190. A famous innovator of small-war tactics and doctrine was Maj. Gen. Merritt A. Edson (USMC), who led, and later wrote about, a 1928 campaign to pacify Nicaragua’s Rio Coco.
18 On the last example, see the excellent article by Shane Bauer, “Iraq’s New Death Squad,” The Nation, June 22, 2009.
19 United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 2.
20 This is from a report from the Brady brigade commander dated October 1919, quoted in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995), 105.
21 Like the cavalry, the marines, emphasizing small mobile units, adopted local methods of transportation—on rivers, mountain trails, or country roads. Resupply was limited, and marines tended to live off the land—which is to say, the local population. Discussing marine suppression of rebellion in Haiti during America’s intermittent fourteen-year occupation there, Lester Langley gives this description of tactics: “Marine commanders in the guard had to adapt to rebel tactics. A patrol could travel twenty to thirty miles in a day, moving single file along trails flanked by dense growth, stopping usually at midafternoon to rest. Since pack mules ordinarily moved slower than men, animals were limited to the minimum necessary for carrying blanket, rolls, food, and ammunition. . . . Everything was sacrificed to speed on the trail, to having men in condition to fight. . . . What could not be scavenged was flown in by the air squadron.” Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898–1934 (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2002), 207. This was the age of gun boat diplomacy, and the manual refers explicitly to the imperial nature of such engagements: “Small wars, generally being the execution of the responsibilities of the President in protecting American interests, life and property abroad, are therefore conducted in a manner different from major warfare. In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over the military operations. The very inception of small wars, as a rule, is an official act of the Chief Executive who personally gives instructions without action of Congress.”
22 Louis Gannett, “In Haiti,” The Nation, September 28, 1927.
23 Schmidt, Maverick Marine, 2.
24 Ernesto Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1998), 19.
25 Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 10.
26 Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 10–11.
27 Danilo Valladares, “Youth Gangs—Reserve Army for Organized Crime,” Inter Press Service, September 21, 2010.
28 Dennis Rodgers, “Living in the Shadow of Death: Gangs, Violence and Social Order in Urban Nicaragua, 1996–2002,” Journal of Latin American Studies 38, no. 2 (2006): 267–292: 267.
29 Here is a random sampling of stories on the postwar violence: “Gunmen Slaughter 14 Football Players,” Independent (UK), November 1, 2010; Valladares, “Youth Gangs”; Nick Miroff and William Booth, “Violence Accompanies Mexican Drug Cartels As They Move South,” Washington Post, July 27, 2010. And here are academic articles analyzing the crisis: Sonja Wolf, “Subverting Democracy: Elite Rule and the Limits to Political Participation in Post-War El Salvador,” Journal of Latin American Studies 41, no. 3 (2009): 429–465; Rodgers, “Living in the Shadow of Death.”
30 Tim Rogers, “The Spiral of Violence in Central America,” Z Magazine, September 2000.
31 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (Berkeley, CA: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).
32 Mike Davis, “The Pentagon As Global Slumlord,” TomDispatch.com, April 19, 2004, www.alternet.org/story/18457.
33 See Greg Grandin’s excellent Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan, 2005), 87–88.
34 Peter Maas, “The Salvadorization of Iraq?” New York Times Magazine, May 1, 2005.
Chapter 4
1 On Africa, the IPCC writes, “Warming is very likely to be larger than the global annual mean warming throughout the continent and in all seasons, with drier subtropical regions warming more than the moister tropics. Annual rainfall is likely to decrease in much of Mediterranean Africa and the northern Sahara, with a greater likelihood of decreasing rainfall as the Mediterranean coast is approached. Rainfall in southern Africa is likely to decrease in much of the winter rainfall region and western margins. There is likely to be an increase in annual mean rainfall in East Africa. It is unclear how rainfall in the Sahel, the Guinean Coast and the southern Sahara will evolve.” Susan Solomon, Dahe Qin, Martin Manning, and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group I, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 850.
2 Mwangi Ndirangu, “The Vanishing Snow of Mount Kenya,” Daily Nation (Nairobi), December 17, 2009.
3 M. Boko et al. “Africa,” in Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ed. M. L. Parry et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 440.
4 John Vidal, “Climate Change Is Here, It Is a Reality,” Guardian, September 3, 2009.
5 The Kalenjin are made up of the Kipsigis, Nandi, Tugen, Keiyo, Marakwet, Pokot (in the past called the Suk), Sabaot, and Terik. Many of these tribes live in the Mount Elgon region, overlapping the Kenya-Uganda border. They were the political base of Daniel Arap Moi. Kalenjin political identity had first begun to take shape in the 1940s, among independent but culturally and linguistically similar tribes. Kalenjin translates roughly as “I tell you,” and it seems to have emerged among servicemen who were shipped off to fight for Britain in World War II. These men addressed each other as kale (which referred to one who had killed an enemy in battle). Wartime radio broadcasts hailed them with the plural kalenjok. After the war a Kalenjin political club formed at Alliance High School and at Makerere College. From the beginning the Kalenjin united to counterbalance the power of the Kikuyu, who had lost most of their land to the British, then led the Mau Mau rebellion and were soon to dominate postindependence political and economic life in Kenya. By 1948 there was a Kalenjin Union in Eldoret and a monthly magazine called Kalenjin in the 1950s. See Benjamin E. Kipkorir, The Marakwet of Kenya (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1982).
6 “Clashes in North Kenya over Cattle Raiding Kill 26,” Associated Press Worldstream, August 1, 2008.
7 On the population and geography of this culture, see Elliot Fratkin, “East African Pastoralism in Transition: Maasai, Boran, and Rendille Cases,” African Studies Review 44, no. 3 (December 2001): 1–25. Fratkin writes, “Pastoralists
occupy 70 percent of the total land of Kenya, 50 percent of Tanzania, and 40 percent of Uganda. But their populations are numerically small (fewer than 1.5 million of Kenya’s 30 million, Tanzania’s 35 million, and Uganda’s 23 million people), and they find themselves politically disempowered and economically marginalized in national polities that are dominated by people from agricultural communities. Pastoralist groups of East Africa include cattle-keeping Maasai (300,000 in southern Kenya and 150,000 in northern Tanzania), Samburu (75,000), Turkana (200,000), Boran and Orma (75,000), and Karimojong, Dodoth, Teso, and Jie peoples in Uganda (total about 200,000). Camel-keeping pastoralists occupy the drier regions of northeastern Kenya, southern Ethiopia, and Somalia and include Afro-Asiatic-speaking Gabra (25,000), Rendille (25,000), and pastoral Somali (about 1 million of Somalia’s 6.5 million people). In addition, many agricultural groups in East Africa raise large herds of cattle, including Kalenjin speakers (Nandi, Kipsigi, Pokot) in western Kenya and Bantu-speaking Ba Ankole in western Uganda and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi” (3–4).
8 Fratkin, “East African Pastoralism,” 8.
9 Eleanor J. Burke, Simon J. Brown, and Nikolaos Christidis, “Modeling the Recent Evolution of Global Drought and Projections for the Twenty-First Century with the Hadley Centre Climate Model,” Journal of Hydrometeorology 7, no. 5 (October 2006): 1113–1125.
10 Dr. David Kimenye, “Life on the Edge of Climate Change: The Plight of the Pastoralists in Northern Kenya,” Christian Aid, November 13, 2006, p. 2.
11 Mwaniki Wahome, “For Agriculture, Larger Budget Allocation Vital,” The Nation , June 12, 2008; see also the introduction of Victor A. Orindi, Anthony Nyong, and Mario Herrero, “Pastoral Livelihood Adaptation to Drought and Institutional Interventions in Kenya,” in Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World (occasional paper, Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Program, 2007/2008).
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