by Colin Downes
The initial strategic bombing attacks on Japan inflicted little damage to the home islands apart from the attacks on the major cities. The series of fire bomb raids on Tokyo inflicted more casualties than the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined. By June 1945 the six major industrial cities of Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kobe, Kawasaki and Yokohama were devastated with over 250,000 people killed. It is true that elements of the Japanese cabinet wanted to negotiate peace terms but the Potsdam Proclamation broadcast to Japan in July demanded unconditional surrender, and the militarists retained a veto over cabinet decisions. The Allied demand of unconditional surrender strengthened Japanese determination to fight to the end. President Truman commented that he hoped there was a possibility of preventing a similar Okinawa situation from one end of Japan to the other. It was this consideration that decided him to authorize the use of ‘a new weapon of unusually destructive force’ during August 1945 to end the war. President Truman knew that possession of a nuclear attack capability guaranteed that the Allies could not lose the war and further, could now end it quickly. However, it was necessary to demonstrate this in order to save Allied lives. He had an additional incentive to end the war quickly by August as the Soviets announced plans to invade Manchuria, Korea and Japan early in August and threatened to over-run the northern island of Hokkaido: he was alarmed at the prospect of Soviet penetration in Asia. An atomic bomb dropped over Hiroshima on 6 August, followed by another over Nagasaki on 9 August added another 3 per cent to the existing devastation of the Japanese cities. The Japanese war cabinet faced with Armageddon recommended to the Emperor that he accept the terms of surrender, and the war ended the following day. As one of those waiting to play a part in the final assault on Japan I had no qualms about the Americans bringing an early conclusion to the war with the use of the atomic bomb. Those who condemn the use of the atomic bomb to end five years of war against a cruel, remorseless and fanatical enemy in order to save the needless slaughter of American and Allied lives, do so without consideration of Cicero’s O Tempora! O Mores! I think it safe to conclude that had the Germans or the Japanese possessed nuclear weapons, they would not have hesitated in using them against military and civilian targets. If Truman had decided against the use of the two atomic bombs against civilian targets in order to preserve US casualties, the war would have continued into 1946. The US strategic bomber offensive, with the use of conventional bombs, would have intensified with even greater devastation of Japanese cities and loss of life. The objection to the use of the atomic bomb was the horrific and immense number of indiscriminate casualties to the civilian population. Continued and increasingly massive B-29 bomber raids against the Japanese home islands would have reduced all the major cities to rubble. In addition to this massive US strike capability, the US had available large numbers of an improved version of the German V-1 flying bomb: the Republic JB-2 ‘Loon’. Also, by 1946 the US had developed the German V-2 rocket into the A-4 missile. In addition to these new weapons of destruction were chemical and biological weapons available to both sides that posed the question whether the Japanese would in desperation resort to their use. A final consideration for an immediate end to the war by the use of atomic weapons was the declared intention of the Japanese to summarily execute all Allied POWs held by the Japanese in the event of an Allied invasion of Japan.
The use of the atomic bomb not only saved the Allied forces from experiencing extensive casualties in an invasion of Japan, but also countless Japanese civilian lives making the casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki fade into insignificance in comparison. The moral question is: did the end justify the means? The alternative suggests that it did, for had the atomic bomb not been used against Japan the war would have continued for two or more years with estimated Japanese casualties exceeding five million. The Soviets would have occupied the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido and probably tried to extend their occupation further. Without the US nuclear deterrent, the enormous land, sea and air forces of the Soviet Union would have overwhelmed the western European countries, turning them into satellites of the USSR. President Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb on Japan to end the war quickly, horrific though the consequences were, was his least abhorrent option, not only for the Allies but also for the Japanese.
After VJ Day in August, Tiger Force disbanded and we moved to Fairwood Common in South Wales for an armament practice camp before joining Nos. 19 and 64 Squadrons, first at Hethel and then Horsham St Faith near Norwich, to await the arrival of the Hornets. At this time Fighter Command practised for the victory fly-past over London and Buckingham Palace led by Group Captain Douglas Bader, the famous legless ‘ace’. After Bader returned to the RAF from being a POW he received promotion to Group Captain and was made responsible for leading the victory fly-past. I never served under him but frequently saw him sitting on the bar of the mess holding court. He had many admirers and like many strong personalities he was open to criticism. Certainly Bader was a controversial figure as a result of his ‘Big Wing’ theories on how to fight the Battle of Britain. AVM Leigh-Mallory, the AOC 12 Group, gave Bader, then a mere squadron leader, full command of the five squadrons comprising the Duxford wing. Bader’s theory was that the Luftwaffe should be attacked in wing strength and that he alone should control this large and unwieldy formation of aircraft in the air against the massed German bombers and fighters, without control from the sector commander. Pilots who flew in the Duxford wing said that taking-off and forming up this number of aircraft at combat altitude could take thirty minutes or more, half the endurance time of the fighters. I knew one pilot, who flew as wingman to Bader, who commented on his lack of consideration for those following him. I knew another who was a POW in the same prison camp with Bader who, despite the loss of his legs, insisted on his inclusion in all the escape plans despite the rules of the escape committee that only those actually planning an escape knew the plans. Fortunately, Bader’s involvement was vetoed by the senior British officer in the camp. There were many who criticized his insularity and intolerance, but he was undoubtedly a war hero and one could not but admire his personal courage and intense determination. Both during the war and after, his example and inspiration gave encouragement to the disabled and for his services to the disabled, both military and civilian, he received a well-deserved knighthood by the Queen. While practising for the fly-past the erroneousness and egotism involved in the ‘Big Wing’ concept became readily apparent as the distance covered and time involved in forming up the squadrons and wings before flying up the Thames to London made Bader’s ‘Big Wing’ theory ridiculous. The airborne control of several squadrons during an air battle becomes too inflexible and with the first ‘Tally-Ho’ call from Bader leading the charge, the whole Duxford wing became a confused free for all. Wing Commander Paddy Barthropp, DFC, AFC, who flew in the Battle of Britain and was a personal friend of Bader, commented that the Duxford ‘Big Wing’ concept as defined by Douglas Bader, was a complete mystery to him and many others because to assemble three or, in Bader’s case, five squadrons in the air into a controllable wing directed against the Luftwaffe bombers and fighters took far too long with the Luftwaffe bases some 20 miles or so across the Channel. The ‘Big Wing’ controversy continued after the war, but the outcome was the Duxford Wing attacked the German bombers after they had dropped their bombs on their targets.
I viewed the Battle of Britain from the ground as a school boy, so any views I have come from knowing many of those who took part in the battle and who knew the major personalities concerned. With the usual 20/20 hindsight one can blame ACM Sir Hugh Dowding, CinC Fighter Command, for allowing the ‘Big Wing’ controversy to blow-up to such an extent that the personal rivalry between the Group commanders seriously jeopardized the cooperation between 11 and 12 Groups in intercepting the Luftwaffe attacks on south-east England during a critical stage of the battle. It would appear that Dowding had the power, if not to sack Leigh-Mallory, at least to place the Duxford base within the 11
Group area or transfer some of the Duxford wing squadrons to 11 Group. This Group, commanded by AVM Park, was the vital Group for the defence of London and the south-east, and Park, the chief architect of Dowding’s plan for the Battle of Britain, was Fighter Command’s most able air commander. It is the opinion of many that such a move would have resulted in a more effective use of the Duxford squadrons. Following the victory over the Luftwaffe, while a grateful nation celebrated, the Air Ministry retired Dowding and relegated Park to Training Command. Air Marshal Keith Park’s value as an air commander was later recognized when he became AOC Malta and responsible for its successful defence in 1942. He went on to become CinC RAF Middle East and then commanded the Allied Air Forces in the Burma Campaign against the Japanese. Air Marshal Sholto Douglas, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, who had chaired the infamous ‘Big Wing’ debate, succeeded Dowding as CinC Fighter Command and Leigh-Mallory took over command of 11 Group. This was a typical example of politics in high command and when the Air Ministry under the command of Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff, published an official history of the Battle of Britain, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding’s name as CinC Fighter Command did not appear. This is comparable to the Admiralty publishing an official history of the Battle of Trafalgar and not mentioning Nelson; or the War Office writing of the Battle of Waterloo and omitting mention of Wellington; or indeed, a history of Britain during the Second World War without mentioning Churchill. Prime Minister Winston Churchill in his speech on the outcome of the Battle of Britain, a battle of greater significance in Britain’s survival than either Trafalgar or Waterloo, said, ‘Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.’ He was surprised and shocked at the Air Council’s treatment of the man who, in the opinion of most people, was largely responsible for saving Britain in 1940. Churchill in a minute to the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, rebuked him for being associated with such maliciousness, although it should also be noted that Churchill did nothing to intercede on Dowding’s behalf. ACM Dowding was the mastermind for the air defence of Britain, and the leader and inspiration of the ‘Few’. The omission of Lord Dowding from the official history was indeed shameful. In war a successful commander-in-chief is often judged by the attrition advantage over the enemy. As the victors, official RAF aircraft losses during 1940 amounted to half those experienced by the Luftwaffe. ACM Sir Hugh Dowding can be assessed not only a successful but also an effective commander-in-chief.
The same cannot be said of Sholto Douglas as CinC Fighter Command during 1941 and 1942 when he and Leigh-Mallory, then AOC No. 11 Group, initiated a policy of mass offensive fighter sweeps called Rhubarbs over Northern France. The intent was to draw the Luftwaffe fighters up into combat, and when this failed to achieve the objective the fighter wings escorted formations of bombers, renamed Circuses, to induce the Luftwaffe to fight. This resulted in a World War One type of an air battle of attrition in favour of the Luftwaffe. The rationale for an aggressive fighter policy over occupied Europe regardless of casualties was an attempt to maintain a moral ascendancy over the Luftwaffe following its defeat in the Battle of Britain. This aggressive policy found favour with the Air Council and also with Churchill who sought to demonstrate Britain’s determination to take the war against the Germans into Europe. Churchill wished to appease Soviet pressure for a second front and impress on them Britain’s intention to invade Fortress Europe. This was ultimately demonstrated by the fiasco and failure of the Dieppe Raid in 1942. The RAF’s offensive sweeps in 1941 and into 1942 turned the victory and the attrition advantage over the Luftwaffe in 1940 into an extensive and expensive defeat, with heavy aircraft losses and the aircrews either killed or taken prisoners of war. In a defensive air battle, as in the Battle of Britain, there is always a possibility to recover the aircrew shot down to continue to fight. The fighters and the bombers involved in these sweeps would have been better and more successfully employed in other areas of operations. The offensive fighter sweeps over Western Europe proved costly to the RAF, and were only superficially effective as a slight deterrent to the Germans in reinforcing their Eastern Front.
When Leigh-Mallory became CinC Fighter Command after Douglas he conducted a war game to vindicate the ‘Big Wing’ theory. The exercise was a fiasco and showed vital fighter airfields to be bombed before the ‘Big Wings’ were even airborne. As an interesting footnote to the ‘Big Wing’ controversy, on 15 September 1940, the day the Duxford wing claimed its highest total of German aircraft destroyed, post-war studies indicated they were more than the total losses of all German aircraft flying against the UK on that day. Indicative of this is the fact that from 8 August to 11 September 1940 during the height of the Battle of Britain, the RAF claimed 1,631 German aircraft destroyed with 584 probably destroyed, and of this total of 2,215 aircraft only 316 enemy aircraft wrecks were counted. When confronted with these figures Bader suggested the discrepancy could be found in the English Channel. The total official British figures for claims of Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed by the RAF and AA Command during the accepted period of the Battle of Britain were 2,698. Post-war official German quartermaster figures admitted losses due to all causes during this period as 1,733. Leigh-Mallory’s shortcoming as a commander-in-chief was further exposed when as CinC Allied Expeditionary Air Forces following the Normandy landings in 1944 his assessment for the support of ground forces and his poor appreciation of bomber operations upset the respective Allied bomber chiefs and army commanders to the detriment of the land battle. ACM Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory died in an air crash in 1944 en route to taking up his appointment as Air CinC Southeast Asia, and his replacement was his old nemesis, Sir Keith Park.
Group Captain Douglas Bader, DSO, DFC, was without doubt the most famous RAF fighter pilot of the Second World War, despite the loss of both legs in a flying accident before the war. This was in part due to an admiration for his example of willpower and sheer determination in persuading the Air Ministry to let him fly fighter aircraft again when war broke out in 1939. To me, Bader demonstrated an insatiable desire to emulate the Italian Air Marshal Balbo, after whom large formations of aircraft were named, in controlling airy navies grappling in the central blue, and as such was an ideal choice to lead the Victory fly-past over London. The fly-past appeared very impressive when viewed from the ground but in the air it was hard, sweaty and tedious work as the many squadrons and wings passed overhead in close formation. Bader may have had his critics but he was respected by fellow countrymen and foes alike. This was exemplified when the Luftwaffe permitted an RAF aircraft to drop a new pair of artificial legs onto an airfield in France after Bader was shot down in 1941. Although Bader was the best known of the disabled RAF pilots during the war, he was not alone as several other pilots used the Bader precedent in persuading the Air Ministry to let them continue to fly disabled.
I knew four other pilots in Fighter Command who flew fighters without the use of one or two legs and they continued to fly jet fighter aircraft after the war, thereby avoiding the very significant problem of controlling propeller torque. Hughie Edwards and Tommy Burn each flew with one leg, and Roy Morant and Colin Hodgkinson each lost the lower part of both legs. All these pilots shared similar characteristics in being strong personalities with great determination in developing powerful upper body strength as a compensation for their disability. They were also consummate exponents in the art of gamesmanship to even the odds against them. Bader was a keen golfer and played a good game despite his two artificial legs, and overawed those playing with him by insisting on walking the course and rejecting any form of assistance. Edwards and Burn were both keen squash players and would demoralize those playing against them with a very aggressive approach to the game. Their specialty was to go crashing to the floor while attempting, for a disabled player, an impossible return of the ball. This had a daunting effect on any opponent showing sympathy for or a deference to their disability. Morant became the CO of a Vampire jet fighter
squadron and led the squadron formation aerobatics team. Hodgkinson had an interesting escape following a forced landing in a Spitfire when the engine crushed his two artificial legs below the amputations, trapping him in the cockpit of the burning aircraft. He was able to undo his harness and crawl out of the wreckage unhurt to fly again.