by Colin Downes
Reporting to the Air Ministry in the New Year I requested a posting to my old squadron, No. 65 (East India) Squadron at Duxford near Cambridge, for I understood it was to be the first squadron to be re-equipped with the RAF’s latest interceptor fighter, the Hawker Hunter. This was scheduled for the summer of 1954 but unfortunately for me it was not to be, and No. 43 Squadron, ‘The Fighting Cocks’, received the honour. In fact, No. 65 Squadron did not receive their Hunters until the arrival of the Mark 6 two years later in 1956, which was probably just as well in view of the many problems associated with the early marks of Hunters. Regrettably this was to be the last aircraft for this famous squadron before it disbanded to become a ground-to-air missile squadron, and thankfully I was not around then to witness this, or the ever diminishing fighter force in Fighter Command. Early in 1954 I arrived at Duxford to join No. 65 Squadron again and command ‘A’ Flight on my old war horse the Gloster Meteor Mk VIII. Duxford, a famous pre-war fighter base, was also occupied by No. 64 Squadron, an old squadron sparring partner from my Mustang days. Life followed very much the pattern of my time on No. 41 Squadron with me leading the squadron aerobatics team, only to be overshadowed by emerging Hunter aerobatics teams as squadrons became equipped with the Hunter Mk 1 and Hunter Mk 2. Apart from the disappointment of not being the first fighter wing to be equipped with the new interceptor, I was pleased with my posting to Duxford as it was a pleasant base conveniently situated for most of my interests, and because it enabled me to renew acquaintance with my old alma mater after a period of a dozen years. Much had happened to me in the intervening years but at Cambridge the apparent changes were more with ‘town’ than with ‘gown’. In 1954 RAF Duxford was commanded by the highly respected fighter pilot Group Captain Jamie Rankin, DSO, DFC, who had replaced ‘Sailor’ Malan after the Battle of Britain in commanding the Biggin Hill wing. There were many experienced and knowledgeable wartime fighter pilots in the RAF who assessed both men as the two best RAF wing leaders of the war. Wing Commander Tommy Burn, DFC, who flew Meteors despite the handicap of two prosthetic legs, commanded the wing. Another aspect that pleased me was that the CO of No. 64 Squadron was an old friend, Squadron Leader Harry Bennett, AFC, who led the RAF aerobatics team when flying Vampires. I was his best man at his wedding and sadly in 1955 he was killed in a flying accident. In the space of little more than a year I lost three of my closest friends in the RAF through accidents.
Not much of significance occurred during the year apart from my promotion to squadron leader when I took over command of the squadron for a short while. As one of the principal RAF fighter bases Duxford had many VIP visitors and the most memorable and unique for me occurred with the visit of Emperor Haile Selassie of Abyssinia. He flew into Duxford for a visit to Cambridge University with a large and impressive entourage and accompanied by the British Minister of Defence and the Chief of the Air Staff. I was selected to escort him for a tour of the Duxford wing and to my surprise, and to the obvious discomfort of his towering Nubian bodyguards, when we arrived at my squadron he asked to see my personal Meteor and insisted on getting into the aircraft. Haile Selassie had a very imposing list of titles and although splendidly attired in full formal uniform and decorations, this could not disguise the fact that in stature he was a small man. After inserting him into the aircraft cockpit with some difficulty in as dignified manner as possible he disappeared from view. I leaned in to brief him on the controls while his two large and imposing bodyguards dressed in their flowing white robes and carrying gleaming scimitars, poised precariously on either side of me. I had the distinct and disconcerting impression that the slightest move on my part being wrongly interpreted by them would result in me being shish kebab. The Emperor was very friendly and appeared genuinely to enjoy his visit to the squadrons. The only sour note for me during his visit occurred when a pompous representative of the Ministry of Defence informed me that should the Emperor present me with an inscribed solid gold Rolex watch (that was his custom when favourably impressed) I must regard it as treasure-trove and hand it over to the Treasury Office. I wondered afterwards what the comptroller did with this imposing array of imperial largesse. As it turned out this caution was unnecessary for Haile Selassie was either keeping the watches for his visit to the University or else he had run out of them by the time he arrived at Duxford. Although I have owned a solid steel Rolex, this was the nearest I ever came to own a solid gold Rolex watch.
The New Year of 1955 brought a shock when my tenacious flying instructor’s category popped-up again in the bowels of the Air Ministry and I found myself posted as the chief ground instructor to No. 4 Flying Training School at Middleton St. George in the north of England. I endeavoured to get this changed for the command of an F-86 squadron with 2nd ATAF in Germany without success. I spent the next year instructing and training ab initio fighter pilots while flying DH Chipmunks, Vampire Vs and the two-seat Vampire T-11, and in my spare time included some flying instruction at the local gliding club. During the year I did have one interesting break from a job I did not enjoy very much as my position presented an opportunity to attend a month’s course on supersonic aeronautics at Bristol University that was both interesting and enjoyable. Then fortunately for me, although not for others, fate took a hand in February 1956 when two flights of Hunters from the Day Fighter Leader Squadron at the Central Fighter Establishment (CFE) were caught out low on fuel when a sudden sea fog closed the airfield at West Raynham and the aircraft diverted to the nearest airfield at Marham 10 miles away. As the eight Hunters flew overhead Marham the sea fog rolled in and only the first pair landed on the runway. The other six ran out of fuel with four pilots ejecting from their aircraft. One pilot attempted a forced landing and crashed on the airfield with injuries. The remaining pilot attempted a crash landing outside the airfield boundary and was killed. The loss of six Hunters with one pilot killed made headline news with a call for a parliamentary inquiry into the disaster and, as is the case when politics are involved, there had to be culprits and heads had to roll. The result of which was that in March 1956 I found myself at West Raynham as the senior instructor of the Day Fighter Leader School and CO of the Hunter squadron.
The Central Fighter Establishment moved from Tangmere on the south coast of Sussex to West Raynham on the north coast of Norfolk at the end of the Second World War in 1945. CFE was responsible for evaluating the tactical and operational abilities of new fighter aircraft and for the training of the leaders of the fighter squadrons. As such it comprised several flying departments or squadrons under the control of the Air Ministry: the Air Fighting Development Squadron (AFDS), the All Weather Development Squadron (AWFDS), the Instrument Rating and Examination Squadron (IRS), and the Day Fighter Leader School (DFLS) incorporating the Day Fighter Leader Squadron and the All Weather Fighter Leader Squadron, which became the Fighter Combat Wing (FCW). These squadrons were commanded by wing commanders who reported to a Group Captain Operations, who in turn reported to the air commodore Commandant. When I arrived on the DFLS the squadron operated Hunter aircraft and the Fighter Combat Wing had not formed. During war exercises the squadron reverted to its war designation of No. 122 ‘Bombay’ Squadron of which I was the CO, and with its pick of the best of course graduates from the fighter squadrons on the staff, the squadron was the most experienced and elitist fighter squadron in the RAF. I was naturally very pleased and proud to be given this command although I was unhappy at the way it came about because the officer I replaced was an old friend. I knew No. 122 Squadron from my Mustang days and so things had turned out better than expected for me with my command of the Hunter squadron of all Hunter squadrons in the RAF. Many pundits scoffed that DFLS was a unit courting trouble and it was surprising such a disaster had not occurred before with the squadron operating to much lower limits than customary with the regular fighter squadrons. Unfortunately, the short duration of flight of the Hunter Mk 1 had been its undoing in that it did not allow for the vagaries of the weather along the north Norfolk coas
t, notorious for its sudden sea fogs sweeping in from The Wash and the North Sea. Such a moment of bad luck with no warning caught the Hunters too low on fuel for a diversion to where conditions were clear. The delay in the courses enabled me to get flying time on the Hunter and not for the first time was my conversion on type dictated by the study of the Pilot’s Notes while sitting in the aircraft, starting up and then taking-off. By the time the courses resumed I had accomplished sufficient flying time to be both conversant and proficient with the aircraft; my only one mishap occurring when an engine failure on take-off resulted in me parking the Hunter in the runway over-shoot area, fortunately with no airframe damage to the aircraft or injury to myself. Had the turbine failed a little later in the take-off it would have been a different story and provided another field day for the press.
The history of the Hunter development into a satisfactory fighter is an interesting story and my years spent flying the aircraft through a progression of Marks 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 provided some of the most satisfying flying of my RAF career, although initially fraught with frustration and disappointments. There is an old pilots’ adage that if an aircraft looks right it flies right. If this is a truism then the Hunter should have performed like a dream, but such was not the case and my anticipation proved far greater than the realization until many modifications occurred culminating in the Hunter Mk 6 that did indeed fly right. There are some aircraft that defy this supposition and in this respect the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom is a good example of an ugly aircraft proving to be very effective operationally. The F-4 Phantom proved to be one of the greatest multi-role combat aircraft ever designed.
The Hunter Mk 1 was arguably one of the best looking transonic jet fighters to enter service but was woefully deficient in some flying and operational characteristics. There were two main factors that affected the introduction of the Hunter into service. First, the advent of transonic fighters such as the Soviet Mig-15, the French Dassault Mystere and the US North American F-86 made the British Gloster Meteor obsolescent as an interceptor fighter, although it continued to provide a useful service in the ground attack and reconnaissance roles. Second, the national defence situation during the Korean War at the height of the Cold War, pushed for an early introduction of the Hunter into service and the initial order of only three prototypes was an incredible decision for a priority project. The result of this folly and pressure was that the Hunter entered RAF service in the summer of 1954 before the many shortcomings, difficulties and operational problems of the aircraft were sorted out in the development trials’ programme.
The RAF philosophy for its new jet interceptor fighter remained the same as it was for the Spitfire and the Meteor in that the close proximity of the bomber threat from the European mainland required an interceptor with a high rate of climb. This was a fundamental operational requirement for the interception of high altitude bombers carrying nuclear bombs before reaching the UK. During the 1950s and 1960s the nuclear air threat to the UK was from the high altitude and high speed Soviet subsonic jet bombers, such as the TU-16 ‘Badger’ protected by a defensive armament of 23 mm cannon in remote controlled turrets. The RAF counter to this threat was initially with the subsonic Meteor, to be replaced by the transonic Hunter day and Javelin all-weather fighters by the mid-1950s; with the supersonic Lightning all-weather fighter entering service in the early 1960s. The Hunter, Javelin and Lightning fighters were armed with 30 mm cannon until the Javelin became equipped with air-air guided weapons during the late 1950s, and the Lightning in the mid-1960s. During the era of the subsonic fighters the speed differential between the bombers and the interceptors was negligible, making accurate positioning for a successful interception essential in order to carry out a pursuit attack. In the Second World War the Luftwaffe was successful in head-on attacks to break up the packed formations of the USAF heavy bombers. However, with a single jet bomber the closing speed was such that the effective firing time available made the kill probability very low on a first-pass-only attack. Therefore, even with an accurate interception the prospect for the fighter invariably prescribed a lengthy pursuit attack that in the distance and time involved placed severe constraints on the fighter’s performance, by which time a Soviet jet bomber would be within the UK airspace. While closing on the Soviet bomber the fighter pilot had time to consider and assess some ballistics factors and Newton’s Laws of Motion in anticipating a reception from the bomber’s defensive armament. The physics involved were to some extent in favour of the fighter as the effective range and accuracy of the bomber’s return fire was resolved by the aircraft’s speed because this had to be subtracted from the muzzle velocity of the guns to establish the adverse effect on the speed, accuracy and range of the bullets or shells. Conversely, the fighter’s cannon fire was assisted by the speed of the fighter when added to the muzzle velocity of the cannon, thereby extending the effective range and accuracy of the cannon shells. The problem confronting a discretionary fighter pilot was to assess theoretically the effective range to open fire with some immunity from the bomber’s multiple cannon. This was obviously a fine line to draw in order to silence the bomber’s return fire before concentrating on the destruction of the aircraft. Fortunately for us such suppositions were academic in offering the encouragement that in addition to the greater firepower advantage of the fighter, there was an operational advantage while attacking a Soviet bomber. It was not until the advent of air – air guided weapons that this advantage over the bomber was complete, provided the interception profile was correct, in ensuring not only a higher interception probability but also a far greater kill probability.
In 1948 the Air Ministry issued two Operational Requirements (OR), OR.F-3 and OR.F-4. The Hawker Hunter was the chosen aircraft to meet the Day Fighter OR and the Gloster Javelin was selected for the All Weather Fighter OR. The Hawker Hunter Mk 1, the RAF’s first British transonic fighter, was a single seat, single engine swept wing aircraft powered by a Rolls Royce Avon 107 axial-flow compressor turbine engine of 7,500 lb.s.t. This gave the Hunter an impressive initial rate of climb of approximately 10,000 feet per minute, with 45,000 feet reached in 13 minutes. The 40 degree swept wing at the inboard wing root increased to 44 degrees along the leading edge to the wing tip, and this gave the Hunter Mk 1 a maximum speed of Mach 0.93 with a service ceiling of 49,000 feet. An internal fuel capacity of 334 (Imp.) gallons limited the aircraft’s duration of flight to around 30 minutes. Thus in order to achieve a high rate of climb over a short ground distance covered, the dilemma of all RAF interceptors of a short duration of flight continued until modified with additional external fuel tanks and increased engine power. The Hunter Mk 1 controlled by conventionally designed power-assisted ailerons and elevators resulted in poor handling characteristics at high altitude and high Mach numbers. Various modifications to the mainplane, tailplane and flying controls resulted before the pitch-up handling problems were cured. In parallel with the entry into service of the Hunter Mk 1 with the Rolls Royce Avon engine, the Hunter Mk 2 entered service with an Armstrong Siddeley Sapphire axial-flow compressor turbine engine giving 8,000 lb.s.t. The inclusion of the Sapphire engine as an alternative engine was an insurance in case of a shortage of Avon engines from Rolls Royce. The Sapphire engine with its greater power gave the Hunter Mk 2 a better rate of climb and an increase in maximum speed to Mach 0.94 with an increased service ceiling of 50,000 feet. The Rolls Royce Avon’s compressor design produced engine surges at high altitude at high angles of attack, with compressor stalling under slam throttle conditions that often resulted in an engine flame-out. Consequently, high altitude combat manoeuvring produced frequent practice of engine relighting in flight. The shortcoming of the Hunter Mk 1 operationally became apparent as the service trials progressed with the gun firing trials.
A study of the respective armament of the Hunter and the F-86 makes for an interesting comparison. In ordnance terms aircraft guns up to a calibre of 12.7 mm (0.5 in) are referred to as machine-guns and any calibre i
n excess of that is considered a cannon. The armament of the Hunter consisted of four 30 mm Aden cannon in a removable pack. The Aden cannon were a development of the revolver-fed design of the German Mauser MG-213 with electronically fired ammunition. The Hunter had a maximum load of 150 rounds per cannon with a rate of fire of 1,200 rounds per minute, giving a firing time of 8 seconds. The rounds were belt-fed to the five chamber revolver action by the recoil with a gas piston operation. This was a far more effective armament than that of the F-86 in meeting the anticipated threat of high flying and high speed Soviet bombers. The rates of fire of the 30 mm Aden cannon and the 12.7 mm Browning machine-gun was approximately the same. The Hunter carried 600 rounds for the four Aden cannon with a firing time of approximately 8 seconds, against the 1,600 rounds for the six Browning machine-guns carried by the F-86 with a firing time of approximately 13 seconds. This equates to around 80 of the 30 mm shells per second from the Hunter against 120 of the 12.7 mm bullets from the F-86. The average burst of fire with the sight steady on the target was around three seconds during a pursuit attack. In a head-on attack this would approximate to the maximum firing time available within firing range. During three seconds burst of fire the Hunter delivered 240 of the 30 mm shells against 360 of the 12.7 mm bullets from the F-86. However, the killing factor is not the density of fire but the weight of fire and here the Hunter held a big advantage, for although the 30 mm Aden cannon shell was more than twice the size of the 12.7 mm Browning machine-gun bullet, it was more than six times the weight. Consequently the Hunter would deliver more than four times the weight of fire of the armour piercing, incendiary and explosive 30 mm shells from its four cannon as against the same type of 12.7 mm ammunition from the six machine-guns of the F-86. Put in more practical terms, during three seconds burst of fire the Hunter could hit a target with close to 180 lb of lethal metal compared with a little less than 40lb from the F-86. Obviously, 30 mm cannon fire had far greater destructiveness than the lighter 12.7 mm fire, and a single 30 mm shell had a far greater probability for a kill than a single 12.7 mm bullet.