“It is not possible to believe that Ben Potter would confide his innermost secrets to a man such as this, a man who, as we have heard, is known to have stolen openly from the client trust accounts of his own firm. This theft,” I say, “is a given, hard evidence, which has been accepted as such by the state and which you must conclude, for the purposes of this trial, is now fact.”
I see a series of nodding heads in the jury-slow, timorous, but there.
“We have heard from the witness Jo Ann Campanelli about the violent argument between Tony Skarpellos and the victim shortly before the murder. We know that the victim sent a written ultimatum to Mr. Skarpellos ordering him to pay the money back to the trust account or to suffer the consequences, consequences which may well have included the loss of his license to practice law in this state. This,” I say, “was a compelling motive for murder.”
I punch hard at the Greek’s alibi, the money paid to Susan Hawley, the so-called loan without interest, or collateral. “We should all be so lucky as to borrow at the bank of Anthony Skarpellos,” I say. This draws a few smiles from behind the railing.
I wonder aloud at the state’s investigative myopia, why they have centered on my client to the exclusion of another obvious suspect, one steeped in motive and opportunity.
“Who had more to gain,” I say, “Talia Potter or Anthony Skarpellos? Who had more to lose?”
“Look at the facts,” I tell them. “We do not know whether Talia Potter knew of her husband’s presumed plans for divorce, an assertion for which we have only the word of Anthony Skarpellos, a witness who has much to gain by the conviction of Talia Potter. This is the state of the people’s evidence,” I say. “Far from compelling.
“On the other hand, there is no question that Anthony Skarpellos knew of the threat represented by Ben Potter, a threat communicated in writing, precise in its terms, certain in its consequences.”
I back away from them at the railing, until I am opposite the witness box.
“Tony Skarpellos sat there in that chair, ladies and gentlemen”-I point to the box-“and told you that he did not argue with Ben Potter before the murder. We now know that was a lie.” I remind them of Jo Ann’s testimony of hearing this violent argument.
“He sat there”-I point again as if this was the scene of the crime-“and denied that he had ever taken money from the trust account of his own firm. We now know that was a lie.”
I drop my voice a full octave. “He sat there, ladies and gentlemen, and denied that he murdered Ben Potter, and I submit that that was a lie as well.”
In silence, I hold their eyes for a full ten seconds on this point. It is something Ben had taught me for all of the pregnant places in argument. It seems an eternity. Most of the jurors break eye contact with me before I have finished.
“Ladies and gentlemen, you have an obligation when you get into that room, when you close the door for deliberations, to consider all of the evidence. If you, any one of you, hold a view of this evidence that says that my client is not guilty, and you should, you must hold firmly to that view. You must not be bullied, or cajoled into abandoning that position for reasons of convenience, to go along with the others, to be sociable,” I say. “This is no afternoon tea, no party, but a trial for the life of Talia Potter. In the course of a year, there are many jurors who sit where you sit now. Few will judge such weighty issues.
“There is, lurking in the subconscious, a dynamic in every case that I have ever tried,” I tell them, “a belief that unless the jury can come to a unanimous verdict, somehow it has failed as a body, it has wasted precious taxpayers’ money, wasted tremendous amounts of time, for the court, for its fellow jurors, and for the lawyers who have participated. This is not so.
“The law says, for good reason, that you may only convict or acquit, based upon a unanimous vote of the jury, all of you together,” I tell them. “This, however, does not mean that a jury that has not come to a unanimous vote has failed to produce a result. The result in such a case, ladies and gentlemen, is that some jurors, one or more jurors, are persuaded that the state has failed to produce sufficient evidence of guilt to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this defendant is guilty. Such a result, ladies and gentlemen, means that my client is entitled to the continued presumption of innocence to which every one of us in this room is entitled until and unless the state proves our guilt.”
I have made my last point to this jury. I glance at Talia briefly.
“Ladies and gentlemen, there sits an innocent woman.” I point with an outstretched arm at Talia, then drop it to my side as if I have offered one final salute.
“This is my last opportunity to address you,” I say, “so I will thank you for the generous time you have given us, for your patience, and most of all for your honesty, integrity, and wisdom, which I am certain you will bring to your deliberations.”
With this I am off on my heels, back to the counsel table and quickly into my seat.
Nelson sits for the briefest moment before rising, taking a few last-minute notes on a yellow pad. When he is finally before the jury he does not waste any time, trying to take this apart, the meat of my argument.
This time he goes for the critical issue first.
“Why,” he says, “would a man who has committed murder, and who has framed the victim’s wife for that crime-why would such a man lend eighty thousand dollars to defend the wife on the very charges for which he has framed her?”
He smiles at the jury as if he has given them the opening moves of a Chinese puzzle. “Why,” he says, “would any rational human being do this?”
I had asked myself the same question many times. The answer has always come back in the form of Gilbert Cheetam, and his utter lack of competence. One of the imponderables I cannot argue before this jury and expect them to understand. It was a masterstroke, I think; Cheetam for his lack of competence, and me for my conflict, my affairs with Talia. The Greek had assembled the perfect defense team. Skarpellos was more perceptive than I had ever imagined.
Nelson hits on this as a major theme, that it defies logic for Skarpellos to have financed the defense, if in fact he had murdered Ben.
He leaves the strand of Talia’s hair alone and instead shores up other elements of his case. He tells them that there is no reason to believe that the money paid to Susan Hawley was anything other than what Tony Skarpellos says it was, a loan. “You may question the source of that payment,” he says, “but its purpose is clear, a loan pure and simple.” He questions why, in our case, if we believed that Susan Hawley was a bought witness, we did not call her to the stand. He says that police, who questioned her extensively, never doubted her story that she was with Tony Skarpellos on the night of the murder.
Here Nelson is proving to be a better defense lawyer than I had expected. By the time he is done, he has leveled the playing field again, and the gargantuan butterflies which soared in my stomach at the start of this trial are back. What the jury will do with this case is, I fear, a crapshoot of immense proportions.
CHAPTER 40
We waited for the worst, a quick verdict, until that at least seemed unlikely. An hour of listening to Harry’s fingers thumping on the counsel table, and Talia and I could stand it no longer. So we left.
Talia doesn’t know what to do with herself so she follows us, Harry and me, back to my office. Tod has come along, for moral support. With the jury retired, there is no longer a purpose to the facade of distance I have imposed between the two of them.
Talia is like a sick and frightened child. To watch her one would think that nothing bad can happen so long as she remains in our presence. I have watched her enough over the past several days to sense that she is now plea-bargaining with the angels for her life. The moment of truth is drawing near, and nerves are raw, on edge. I myself have made resolutions to higher authority, for a better life, for an end to duplicity, if only we can dodge this train bearing down upon us.
Acosta took nearly two hours to char
ge the jury, using the list of instructions from our conference in chambers. These were read in a slow, methodical manner, framed in English that a grade-schooler could understand.
True to form, he did not embellish on these instructions or seek to explain or interpret them further. These little nuggets of the law have been crafted by legal scholars, most of them tested in the appellate courts, whittled and refined, until they can stand the test of time.
The jury took the little pile of forms from the clerk, the ones for their secret ballots on the verdict, with boxes marked “guilty” and “not guilty” printed on them. What takes place behind closed doors is now shrouded in secrecy, like the college of cardinals before signaling the world with its chimney of white smoke. No one beyond the twelve souls now locked in that room will know with accuracy what happens there.
Back in my office Harry finds the bottle in the bottom drawer of my desk, the good stuff, Seagram’s V.O. He holds it up, offering to clean glasses for us all. Tod and I swear off, but Talia says yes. At this point, she needs it. Harry is off, down the hall, looking for a little ice. One of the tenants has a small refrigerator in his office. To the drinkers on this floor, this machine has become a communal thing, like an oasis in the desert.
There’s a large canvas mailbag in the corner of my office. It has been there since the prelim, and since that time I have been dropping letters into its dark hole each day. These are from people who have been following this case in the news, in their morning papers and on the tube. It is always a mystery to me that people, presumably with busy lives, have time for this. I have shown the best of these letters to Talia-those wishing her well, confident of her innocence. I have saved some of the best for deep moments of depression. The death threats, some filled with obscenities, I have dropped in the dingy bag.
There are stacks of paper on my desk, four of them as thick as telephone books. Most have envelopes stapled to open letters, a sorting of the mail by Dee. These are correspondence, client letters, bills, motions for discovery in cases I have not thought about in weeks, all waiting for attention behind Talia’s trial. Harry has been putting out little fires on my desk, dealing with the urgent stuff since the trial began. I paw through the first stack, trying to clear the easy pieces away, items I can put Post-it stickers on, with notes to Dee for filing.
“What are my chances?” she says. Talia is looking at me across the desk, large oval eyes of emerald. Tod is in one of the client chairs. It is the first time she has asked this since the jury was empaneled.
I want to tell her that it will be all right, that she will walk away from this a free woman. But I know better than to try to predict what any jury will do. It would be easier to call the six numbers of this week’s Lotto mania.
I tell her this, but cloak it in a few rules of thumb, little psychic rafts of security she might cling to. “The longer they stay out the better for us,” I say. “A sign that perhaps one or more of the jurors is holding out.”
“A hung jury?” says Tod.
“Who knows.”
With this her expression sags.
“That’s the best we can hope for, after all of this, a hung jury?” She looks at the two of us. Her confidence in lawyers has just slipped several notches.
“It’s impossible to know,” I tell her.
She nods, like perhaps she accepts this. But I know better.
Harry is back with two glasses and some ice. He pours Talia a stiff drink, mixed with a little water. His own he takes straight.
In the first stack of papers is a letter from Peggie Conrad, the paralegal in Sharon Cooper’s case. There are a number of papers here, things for me to sign in order to finalize this probate that is still hanging fire. They are all paper-clipped together, a thick packet.
Harry does a one-cheeker on the corner of my desk while Talia sits on the sofa against the wall.
“My guess,” says Harry, “is five days.” He’s laying odds on how long the jury will be out. This, I think, is a little moral support for Talia. He’s telling her to calm down, to relax, or she won’t have to worry about the verdict: She will be a mental basket case before they announce it. Though right now, I wonder if she is not in better shape than Harry.
“Damn,” I say.
“What is it?” Harry’s looking at me, like I’ve just dropped a live grenade.
“Nothing,” I tell him. “Just something I forgot to tell Peggie Conrad about in Sharon’s case.”
In the chaos surrounding Eli Walker’s column, the disclosure of my affair with Talia, I’d forgotten to call off Peggie, to tell her that Coop had already taken care of the receipt for the toaster left for repair by Sharon at the hardware store. She has now spun her wheels and duplicated his efforts, for there in this stack of papers is a xeroxed copy of the receipt. This must be the store’s own copy, a lot of writing on the printed form, a heavy scrawl that is difficult to decipher.
The intercom on my phone rings, but I don’t move to get it. My eyes are struggling with the cryptic handwriting of some store clerk, making out only one word on this form. Instead Harry picks the phone up. He puts his glass down on the desk, his expression suddenly dark, worried.
“They’re back,” he says.
“What?”
“The jury, they’re back.”
“A verdict?” I ask.
“I don’t know; Dee took the message. All she said is the jury is back.”
Typical of Dee Magnuson, she has given us a collective coronary. With Dee it is seldom sins of commission that one must worry about, but those of omission. She failed, when the clerk called, to find out why the jury was back. There may be reasons other than a verdict.
When we arrive in the courtroom, the jury is already in the box. They are not talking, but listening-to testimony being reread by the court reporter. It takes me several seconds before my mind zeros in on the colloquy being read. It is Nelson’s expert on the strand of hair, Mordecai Johnson-my cross-examination. This is cause for concern, that the jury is focusing on the only piece of evidence linking Talia to the crime, as if they are searching the record for some hook upon which to hang a conviction. Or maybe they’re just looking one more time, to assure themselves that in fact there is no compelling evidence.
But more than the words being read, a dry monotone by the reporter, I am concerned by something else that I see, there beyond the jury railing. Centered in the second row sits Robert Rath, my alpha factor. He is not where he should be.
I look at the seat, far left, front row, the chair nearest the judge, which should be occupied by the foreman of this jury. It is held by one of the four women I had tried to remove from the panel. She looks at me, a fleeting glance, as I stare, my mouth half open. So much for the science of jury selection. I have miscalculated badly, and I wonder if perhaps I have made other mistakes. For the first time I begin to question seriously whether this jury will be buying the theory of Tony Skarpellos as killer.
The reporter finishes with her notes, and Acosta looks to the jury.
“Madam foreman, is there anything else?”
“One of the instructions,” she says. “The one dealing with the defendant’s silence during this trial. We would like it read again, and explained.”
Harry looks at me. For the first time he is grappling seriously with thoughts of a death penalty phase. He doesn’t have to talk for me to know this. It is written in his eyes.
Acosta handles this gingerly, leaving the jury in the box, while Nelson and Meeks, Harry and I join him in chambers. This is required procedure in this state, a conference out of the presence of the jury before the judge may read or explain any jury instruction once deliberations have started. The Coconut is worried; he sees mistrial written in this request. He is beginning to wonder whether my assertions of Nelson’s body language may not have been closer to the fact than he’d realized.
He is on the prosecutor like a cheap blanket. Nelson is adamant that he has done nothing wrong.
This is a sho
rt meeting. We all agree. Acosta will read the instruction word for word; he will explain nothing. He will respond to specific questions if the jurors have any, and then perhaps only after a further sidebar with counsel.
Back out with the jury, Acosta reads the instruction. But this does not resolve their problem. It seems there is a real dilemma. One of the jurors has made a serious mistake. He has commented on the defendant’s failure to take the stand.
Acosta looks at me, trouble in his eyes.
I have heard and seen enough. I am out of my chair. “Your Honor, the defense moves for a mistrial.”
Nelson is up objecting, saying that this error can be cured. “The fact that the jury has collectively brought this to the attention of the court indicates that they understand the spirit, the requirement, of this instruction,” he says. “Certainly any problem is capable of being cured by further instruction of this court. We have spent too much time and effort to have a mistrial at this late date.”
But I am insistent. “The law in this area is clear. It is prejudicial error, prima facie,” I say, “for the jury to comment upon or to consider the defendant’s assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege.”
Acosta’s in a quandary. The law is four-square on our side. There is not a principle in jurisprudence more firmly established. The appellate reports are filled with cases of convictions reversed for lesser cause than this.
Acosta calls us to a sidebar. He leans over the lip of the bench toward our faces, whispering so the jury cannot hear.
“A difficult problem.” He is all consolation now, trying to appease me. It’s a good argument, he says, my request for a mistrial. “But I think it is one best raised on appeal, if that becomes necessary.” He raises bushy eyebrows. “In good conscience, I cannot stop the trial at this stage. I must go forward. Put yourself in my place.”
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