by Blair, Tony
Once George declared he was in favour of going the UN route, the visit relaxed. Dick Cheney had been there for part of the time, and made it clear he was not for going down the UN route. He was unremittingly hard line.
Dick is the object of so much conspiracy theory that it’s virtually impossible to have a rational discussion about him. To those on the left, he is, of course, an uncomplicated figure of loathing. Even for the middle ground, they tend to reach for the garlic and crucifixes. You have to go pretty far right to find Dick’s natural constituency.
My take on him was different from that of most people. I thought he had one central insight which was at least worth taking seriously. He believed, in essence, that the US was genuinely at war; that the war was one with terrorists and rogue states that supported them; that it stemmed from a guiding ideology that was a direct threat to America; and that therefore the only way of defeating it was head-on, with maximum American strength, with the object of destroying the ideology and allowing democracy to flourish in its stead. He would have worked through the whole lot, Iraq, Syria, Iran, dealing with all their surrogates in the course of it – Hezbollah, Hamas, etc. In other words, he thought the world had to be made anew, and that after September 11, it had to be done by force and with urgency. So he was for hard, hard power. No ifs, no buts, no maybes. We’re coming after you, so change or be changed.
Of course, this attitude terrified and repelled people. But, as will be obvious from what I have written, I did not think it was as fantastical as conventional wisdom opined. It is one struggle. Our enemy has an ideology. It does threaten us. The ultimate answer is in the spread of democracy and freedom. It is even possible to conceive of this, in different language, as being a progressive position, certainly where removing someone like Saddam was concerned.
My problem with the way he put it and wanted to do it was that the manner of doing it was incomplete. Precisely because the war was based loosely around an ideology, the fight had to be waged and won at the level of ideas and in a way that would appeal not to us, but to those who had fallen or might fall prey to that ideology. In other words, it couldn’t be a hard-power strategy alone. It had to encompass more than military might. It had to engage the people out in the Middle East, in the Muslim world, and had to build alliances within that world. This wasn’t some namby-pamby peacenikery; it was a critical part of winning. That was why, for example, progress to a Palestinian state was of such huge importance. It wasn’t a sideshow; it was central to the main stage on which the struggle was being played out.
Therefore, also, when it came to human rights and prisoner issues, we had to be showing by our actions the strength of our alternative ideas and, however constraining it might be, the truth was that in the reality of modern communications, in an age of information that was transforming the arena of public debate, this was not a weak-minded concession, it was an absolute imperative.
So there was much to be said for his insight, but the methods and messaging assumed the world of the 1980s, not the early twenty-first century.
By the end of September, we had a clear commitment for a fresh UN resolution. This also greatly helped with the concerns of our Attorney General, Peter Goldsmith, about the legality of action without one.
My speech at party conference that year came together with surprising ease. Though I dealt with Iraq and foreign policy, I reserved most of it for a huge push on reform. We were now well into our health, education and crime plans and I felt, at long last, both more confident about the case for them and more comfortable with the ministers fronting them.
A staunch friend as always, Bill Clinton turned up to the conference to spread a bit of stardust and remind them I was progressive and knew well at least one American other than George. He even went out to a Blackpool McDonald’s for a burger and fries, much to the amusement, astonishment and bemusement of the sprinkling of late-night diners. He had an endless ability for rapport with ordinary people, liked it, got something from it, felt reinvigorated from it. I could do it but was always a little shamefaced, never sure whether I was intruding or foisting myself on strangers. He would just love it, ‘shooting the breeze’, as if having a McDonald’s in Blackpool was what he did every Tuesday night as a matter of course. Kevin Spacey was there too, a really fun guy, who turned up with Bill for Northern night and did a brilliant impersonation of him. Also performing was Paul Rodgers, the lead singer of Free and Bad Company, and so a set of completely bizarre pictures of all of us were taken, with the party activists in awe at the spectacle.
I always reckoned that even the ones who didn’t like me (quite a few) or didn’t agree with me (a large proportion) still admired the fact I counted, was a big player, was a world and not just a national leader. It’s not a reason for doing anything, by the way, but the British, whatever they say, prefer their prime ministers to stand tall internationally. Most foreign leaders wouldn’t have turned a head if they wandered down Guildford High Street. The US president, yes. Others, not really, maybe Sarkozy in later times, but probably not Chirac even at the time. However, Brits would want to know that in Toulouse people would recognise me. Our leaders should stand out, and if not cut a dash, at least make an impact. The problem is as time has gone on and the world has changed, and Britain’s relative size and weight have shifted, it becomes harder to do. Not less desirable; just harder.
Again I stress: it’s not the reason for acting in Afghanistan and Iraq or anything else, but our alliance with the US gave Britain a huge position. Those who thought our closeness to America was a problem in the rest of the world could not have been further from the mark. On the contrary, it gave us immediate purchase. There was no greater nonsense than that our alliance with the US lost us standing in the world. The opposite is the case. This was true even in the Middle East. It was true in spades in China and India. I remember once debating the pure politics of Iraq with Robin Cook. He said to me: It will be a disaster electorally; remember Wilson and Vietnam – he didn’t side with the US. I know, I replied, and just remind me of the result of the 1970 election again? I’m not, by the way, commenting on the decision; only the pure politics of it.
In October 2002, we had evidence of the continuing terrorist threat when a nightclub in Bali was bombed, leaving just over two hundred dead, including many tourists, mainly Australian. It was an ugly jolt to any complacency. It was followed by the Moscow theatre hostage attack in which over a hundred died. A little later in February 2003 we had our own scare when we were told of a potential attack on Heathrow. We had the usual emergency meeting. The options included shutting the airport, but I feared that the consequence would be devastating for British industry and the airlines. Instead, I decided to put up a big presence around the airport as a deterrent, including armoured vehicles and heavily armed patrols. It worked, but the press accused us of inventing the whole thing as a pretext for stepping up the ‘war on terror’.
The UN resolution was duly debated and passed in November 2002, and shortly after, the weapons inspectors, led by Hans Blix, were allowed back into Iraq. Hans was a curious fellow. He was smart and capable, and I liked him, but his problem was that he felt the weight of the politics of the inspection. This was quite natural, but in truth he just needed to do his job. If Saddam was in compliance, fine. If not, fine. That was his judgement. But it was ours as to the consequences. Instead, he first said Saddam wasn’t complying; but then, as he could see the result of such non-compliance, shifted more to the position that Saddam might comply. And it wasn’t clear whether the facts had changed, or his appreciation of the political implications. He kept saying, ‘I have to decide for war or peace’, and I kept saying, ‘You don’t. Just tell us your honest assessment.’ However, to be fair, he was in a pretty impossible position and, as I shall relate, was actually very helpful in a last-ditch attempt to resolve the issue peacefully.
By this time in late 2002, our military were well alongside the US. The options were still being canvassed. There were essentiall
y three ‘packages’ for our potential involvement. One was purely logistics support. The second was air and sea, with special forces. The third was for full-on ‘boots on the ground’, i.e. the participation of UK ground forces inside Iraq. Mike Boyce, who had grown in stature and confidence as time went on, was clear that the optimum from the British perspective was package three. He said he would have a real problem with the army if they were not fully involved, and such involvement alone gave us far greater influence in shaping US thinking. This was also my own instinct.
The new year turned and with it a sense we were in the final phase. The inspectors were in. The first Blix Report in mid-January was clear: Saddam was not complying. A further report would come in a month. The UN resolution passed in November had been silent on the need for a further resolution prior to any military action. There were legal debates as to whether it was necessary, and Peter Goldsmith was again anxious about it. The Russians had become negative, and it was perfectly possible a second resolution would be vetoed.
I was still thinking it might be possible to get a second resolution – George was adamant he didn’t need one. Jack Straw and others warned me that, without one, I might be unable to survive the expected House of Commons vote.
I was about as isolated as it is possible to be in politics. On the one hand, the US were chafing at the bit and essentially I agreed with their basic thrust: Saddam was a threat, he would never cooperate fully with the international community, and the world, not to say Iraq, would be better off with him out of power. My instinct was with them. Our alliance was with them. I had made a commitment after September 11 to be ‘shoulder to shoulder’. I was determined to fulfil it.
On the other hand, my isolation within Cabinet, let alone the PLP and large parts of media and public opinion, was colossal. And worrying, not because I might go down – in a sense, so what? – but because so much was at stake. War and peace. The struggle against terrorism. The future of our treasured alliance. The reputation of the country and its armed forces. Above all, people’s lives. Either way, people’s lives, since ‘peace’ would not be peace for those in Iraq under the boot of Saddam.
As I pondered in December 2002 and took a short winter break in January 2003, I tried to work out what was the right thing to do. I was past expediency, past political calculation, past personal introspection. I knew this could be the end politically. I just wanted to know: what is the right thing?
I could see by now, and following the first Blix Report, that barring something unanticipated, the likelihood was war. We could opt out, of that I was sure. Package one was designed with that in mind. George had regularly given me the chance to take it and stay out of the conflict, coming in only for the aftermath. We had many allies by then. Thirteen out of twenty-five EU countries were onside. The coalition would eventually number over thirty different nations. But many were taking the route of avoiding the initial fighting.
I remember that Christmas at Chequers. As ever, there was the massive tree in the Great Hall, the decorations, the festivity done with a ritual and solemnity that time had long made hallowed. My family came, as did Cherie’s. The house was busy, bustling and brimful of Christmas spirit. Leaving everyone to take pre-Christmas drinks, I went up to the Long Gallery, my place of quiet reflection, with its ancient books, some dating from the time of Caxton. I sat and thought. What did I truly believe? That Saddam was about to attack Britain or the US? No. That he was a bigger WMD threat than Iran or North Korea or Libya? Not really, though he was the only leader to have used them. That left alone now, with these inspections ending the same way as the last, he would threaten the stability of the region? Very possibly. That he would leach WMD material or provide help to terrorists? Yes, I could see him doing that. Was it better for his people to be rid of him? For sure. Could it be done without a long and bloody war? You can never be sure of that. Did I want more time? Yes, but to allow me to probe every other way of doing it, rather than because I believed the nature of his regime would ever change. Would a new Iraq help build a new Middle East? I thought that possible.
Did I think that if we drew back now, we would have to deal with him later? That I thought was clear: yes, there was no way this man, with his past, was going to be anything other than a source of instability. At some point, especially if strengthened now, he would be back to his old tricks.
So, in or out? In, I concluded. And if in, better in fully and not partly. I still thought it possible to avoid war. I still thought it possible that other alternatives, diplomatic or through a coup of some sort (there was much private Arab talk of such a thing), could be available to avert conflict. I was determined, at the least, to try to persuade the Americans to get more time. But I had said I would be with them, and if conflict could not be avoided, I would be in with the whole and not half a heart.
If you had told me then that we would not find WMD after we toppled Saddam, and that following his removal there would be six years of conflict as we grappled with the terrorism so cruelly inflicted upon the Iraqi people, would my decision have been different? I ask that question every day. So much bloodshed. So many lives so brutally affected or destroyed. Yes, a new Iraq is now emerging and at last there are signs of hope. But at what cost?
And then I think of leaving him there in power. I remember the stories some of the Iraqis have told me since of what life was really like under Saddam. The killings, the torture, most of all the fear. ‘You trusted no one except the closest family,’ I remember one man saying. ‘No one.’ In the worst days of 2006 when Basra seemed overrun with militia, I recall asking someone from there if it would not be better if it had never happened. ‘Are you serious?’ he said. ‘It will take time. Iraq was a broken country. For some, now it’s worse. It’s true. But no, you have no idea what it was like. And at least our future is in our hands.’
But back then, I could not foresee the future; I could only try to navigate my way through the present. In February 2003, a million people marched in London against the war. There had never been a larger demonstration, reminding me of my isolation and the responsibility of the decision I was about to take.
FOURTEEN
RESOLUTION
The weeks in the build-up to military action on 19 March were probably the most difficult in all the ten years of being prime minister. The inspectors were back in Iraq and producing reports, but they were inconclusive. The Blix Report of 27 January 2003 was the first formal report of the inspectors. In his oral briefing of the United Nations Security Council on 9 January, he had said that many outstanding issues were unresolved by the Iraqi declaration in December 2002; and that the information sought by the inspectors had not been forthcoming.
In the 27 January submission, the inspectors made it clear that, in terms of process at least, Iraq had somewhat opened up, but the November 2002 UN resolution had called for cooperation by Saddam to be ‘immediate, unconditional and active’. The submission is important since it provides essential context to understanding the decisions being taken by me and others. Blix said as follows:
Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.
He then went on to describe, in detail, what his current understanding was of the various programmes. This is worth reading since it gives an insight into the difficulty of trying to deal with a regime like that of Saddam.
Chemical weapons
The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.
Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequentl
y, it was said that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilisation and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.
There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.
I would now like to turn to the so-called ‘Air Force document’ that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq–Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to UNMOVIC.