by Ian Hughes
Although interpreted in a negative light, there is some validation for Constantius’ policy. Firstly, and possibly of foremost importance, the Goths were transformed from enemies into friends. This allowed Constantius to withdraw troops facing the Goths to fight in other theatres. As a result, he was not compelled to begin either a new recruiting drive or to allocate funds to pay for troops to garrison areas facing the Goths. This saving in part negated the extra cost of allowing the Goths to settle in Aquitaine. Secondly, the great majority of the taxes collected were used to pay for the army. In theory, the Goths were now part of the army, and as such were simply receiving their pay as usual. The loss of revenue needed to pay the army was in effect being used to pay the ‘army’. Thirdly, there were huge problems with tax collecting, with many landowners being members of the aristocracy, who were immune from some aspects of taxation. Although the number of individual aristocrats who owned land in Aquitaine may have been small, the settlement in effect transferred them from being immune from tax to being tax payers. Finally, as will be seen in Chapter 6, the consequences of the civil wars fought by Theodosius I against western usurpers and the continuous warfare following the ‘rebellion’ of Alaric and the crossing of the Rhine in 406 were huge. Analysis has revealed that between the accession of Theodosius in the East and the compilation of the Notitia Dignitatum (dating to c.420) in the West, about half of the Western field army had been lost.62 Constantius needed to end the wars against the Goths as otherwise the army could easily enter a process of rapid collapse. Furthermore, by bringing the Goths within the structure of the army, he would help to alleviate the problems of manpower shortage and, hopefully, be given time in which to recruit and rebuild.
Finally, the settlement would give respite to the war-weary provinces of Gaul and allow them the time they needed to recover, although the concept that the settlement allowed ‘normal life to resume its course, though under new masters’ may be a little too optimistic.63 Following the treaty of 418/419 a degree of stability again appeared in the West, despite the tremendous losses previously suffered.64 Further, the sparse written record demonstrates that in many cases the local ‘Roman’ aristocracy benefited from the change, since their new masters settled in Toulouse and so gave them readier access to influence and power than was available under the Italo-centric empire.65 There can also be little doubt that for some the settlement was simply a change of masters, with Gothic landowners taking the place of imperial tax collectors. Yet for many – and especially those on the borders, where both small-scale and large-scale warfare continued – the settlement was a further blow to their dwindling prosperity.
As a consequence, despite the fact that the settlement should probably still be seen as detrimental to the affairs of the empire, at the time the benefits may have been seen as outweighing the shortcomings. In fact, the adoption of the policy of creating foederati out of the invaders may have been the main reason why the West survived the invasions and civil wars of the early-fifth century.66 It is largely with the benefit of hindsight, and the knowledge of what ramifications the policy would have in the long term, that the negative aspects of Constantius’ decision can be seen as outweighing the positives.
SPAIN
The attack by the Goths had seriously weakened the Siling Vandals and the Alans. As a result, they decided to leave their territories and place themselves under the command of Gunderic, the king of the Asding Vandals.67 At an unknown point in time the king of the now-combined Vandals and Alans took the title ‘King of the Vandals and the Alans’, a title later attested to Gelimer due to a silver missorum with the legend Gailamir Rex Vandalorum et Alanorum. As Gelimer ruled from 530 to 534, this illustrates that the Alans kept a separate identity within the Vandal kingdom.68 Yet these are not the only peoples who joined forces under Gunderic. According to Possidius, ‘There were Vandals and Alans, mixed with one of the Gothic peoples, and individuals of various nations’.69 Without realizing it, the Roman plan to weaken the Vandals and Alans instead resulted in their coalescing to form a new Vandal ‘supergroup’ that could rival that of the Goths themselves.70
Gunderic’s new ‘alliance’ was far more powerful than the army he had previously commanded. In 419 he led his troops against the Sueves and besieged them ‘in Nerbasis montibus’ (the Erbasian Mountains).71 It is possible that Gunderic was attempting to force the Sueves to join with his forces, so making him undisputedly the strongest military leader in Spain.72 Unfortunately for him, a Roman relief force under Astyrius, comes Hispaniarum, broke the siege and foiled Gunderic’s ambition.73 Shortly after this, as a reward for his services both before and after this campaign, Astyrius was made patricius. This was not the end of the matter, as the Vandals retreated south, and Maurocellus, the Spanish vicarius, only escaped from Bracara after the loss of some of his men.74 The new Vandal army was at war with Rome and remained a major threat to the security of Spain. They were now set on finding new territories, since the conflict at Bracara is the first sign of them expanding their influence towards the south of Spain.
THE HUNS
Aetius was probably not fully aware of the complex military and political manoeuvring being carried on during this period of extreme confusion, since for most – if not all – of the time he was a hostage with the Huns.75
It is extremely difficult to draw a clear picture of the nature of the Huns at this time. The sources are very vague and where information is given it is often used to provide an overarching view of Hunnic rule that is contradicted by other sources.76 For example, due to events later in Aetius’ career, it is often assumed that the king of the Huns at this time was Rua. Unfortunately, this association is far from secure, as Rua is not attested as king of the Huns until 424.77 It is more likely that Aetius was sent to the Hun king Uldin, who at around this time dominated the Danube frontier. Uldin had invaded Thrace in 405 and had helped in the defeat of Radagaisus in 406.78 In 408 Uldin had invaded Thrace again. Unfortunately for him, on this occasion the Romans had used ‘promises and bribes’ to cause many of his followers to abandon him.79 It is almost certain that it was Uldin who secured Aetius as a hostage following this ‘defeat’. An exchange of hostages after negotiations would on one side allow Uldin to save face and on the other help to guarantee that he would not attack the empire again. This was especially important during the years from 408, when Italy was under extreme pressure from the Goths (under Alaric and later Athaulf) and from the usurper Constantine III in Gaul.
Yet it is clear that although Uldin was pre-eminent in the region of the Danube, he was not a supremely powerful sole leader of the Huns: there are many examples of Hunnic forces taking service with the Romans, and to a large degree they appear to have followed the ‘traditional’ barbarian practice of following strong leaders until they felt that these were no longer serving their own best interests, after which they defected and served somebody else.80
GOTHIC AND HUNNIC INFLUENCES ON AETIUS
There is very little evidence for the nature and appearance of Aetius except for what can be deduced from the sources. However, Gregory of Tours, quoting Renatus Frigidus, actually describes Aetius:
Aetius was of medium height, manly in his habits and well-proportioned. He had no bodily infirmity and was spare in physique. His intelligence was keen, he was full of energy, a superb horseman, a fine shot with an arrow and tireless with the lance (contu inpiger). He was extremely able as a soldier and he was skilled in the arts of peace. There was no avarice in him and even less cupidity. He was magnanimous in his behaviour and never swayed in his judgement by the advice of unworthy counsellors. He bore adversity with great patience, was ready for any exacting enterprise, he scorned danger and was able to endure hunger, thirst and loss of sleep.
Greg. Tur. 2.8
It is almost certain that his skill as a horseman and at archery was picked up whilst with the Huns. Yet what is more notable is that during his time amongst the Goths and Huns, Aetius missed the major confrontations between Stilich
o and his enemies. He also missed the campaigns fought by Constantius against both usurpers and Goths in Gaul. It is interesting to note that Stilicho and Constantius III displayed a preference for the strategy of manoeuvre and blockade to that of direct military confrontation. In this they followed the habits of the later imperial army, recognizing that a defeat would drastically reduce the manpower available to the army. By contrast Aetius, being exposed for a long period to the slightly more aggressive Goths and the far more aggressive Huns, may have learned far more adventurous strategies and tactics from his barbarian mentors.
Furthermore, by being removed from the court and army at an early age, Aetius was less susceptible to the traditional Roman ethos of relying largely on the Roman army for defence. His time amongst the barbarians may have taught him that, far from being inferior to the Romans, these people were at least the equivalent of their ‘cultural superiors’ within the empire. Far more importantly for his near future, his time amongst the Huns allowed him to build personal relationships and alliances that would help him in the years to come.
Yet in the long term, and possibly of equal importance to his absorption of the ‘barbarian’ willingness to fight, Aetius’ time amongst the Goths and Huns would result in him being able to speak at least a little Gothic and Hunnic.81 When it came to later negotiations with Huns and Goths, both on the diplomatic side as well as with negotiations with foederati, Aetius would not have need of an interpreter. It is likely that such linguistic skills would have impressed opposition ambassadors and spokesmen.
AETIUS RETURNS HOME
There is absolutely no indication in the sources as to the date when Aetius was released from his time as a hostage to the Huns. Analyzing the sparse evidence, several possibilities emerge. For a very early date, it is possible that upon the death of Uldin Aetius returned to the empire. However, this would not allow Aetius time to build long-lasting, stable relationships amongst the Huns. It is far more likely that he remained a hostage after Uldin’s death.
The difficulty here lies in the fragmentary nature of the history of the Huns. It is known that Uldin invaded Thrace in 408 and was forced to retire. It is also known that in 412 the king of the Huns was Charaton.82 Unfortunately, we do not know whether Charaton was the successor to Uldin or a king of a completely different group of Huns in a different location.
Assuming that Charaton was the successor to Uldin, the latter must have died at some point between 409 and 412. It would follow that at this point Aetius remained as a hostage to secure the treaty first agreed with Uldin. In this way Aetius became known to the next generation of Huns, who were probably of around his own age. Included amongst these were Rua, Octar and Mundiuch, the brothers who were to lay the foundation of a genuine Hunnic empire under the control of one individual, Attila, son of Mundiuch.83 Although conjecture, it is likely that Aetius remained with the Huns for a long time, at least until the death of Charaton, which dates most likely to the end of the 410s or possibly as late as the early 420s.
The extended stay would allow several years for him to forge strong personal relationships with the boys who would become the next generation of rulers. It is possible that Aetius was returned following the death of Charaton. After all, his contemporaries and friends Rua and Octar were now beginning their ‘joint’ rule. His presence was not needed, since the brothers had no intention of invading the west or of placing the court in Ravenna under pressure. Their greatest priority in the following years was to unite the Huns under their own leadership. After that, they would aim at Constantinople for glory. Details are few and unclear and there can be no certainty about the political circumstances surrounding the rise of Rua and Octar. However, from the limited evidence available it is possible that Rua took control of the Hunnic tribes facing the western empire whilst Octar took control of those facing the east.84 Yet although it is possible that the death of Charaton was the reason for Aetius’ return, there is one further major event that could have signalled the end of Aetius’ time as a hostage to the Huns. This concerned the Emperor Honorius.
CONSTANTIUS III AND HONORIUS
On 1 January 417, prior to the settlement of the Goths in Aquitania in 418, the magister militum Constantius had married Galla Placidia, half-sister of Honorius.85 They had two children, a daughter named Justa Grata Honoria – usually known simply as Honoria – and a son, Valentinian, who was born on 2 July 419.86
Constantius’ rise now reached towards its apogee. In imitation of Stilicho, after his marriage Constantius received the title parens principum (first parent, parental guardian) in 420, and then on 8 February 421 he was appointed co-emperor with Honorius whilst Placidia was declared Augusta and their son Valentinian was declared nobilissimus (most noble).87 Although no doubt an honour, Constantius soon regretted the elevation, since after he became emperor his movements were heavily circumscribed and he no longer had the freedom he had enjoyed as magister militum.88 It is possible that this assertion was to affect the generals who came after him, since the vast majority of them had no wish to place themselves upon the throne, possibly due to the knowledge that once emperor they would be heavily tied down by bureaucratic red tape, so unable to lead the army in person and so risk losing the army’s support.
Yet even aside from Constantius’ own dismay, his elevation to emperor did not meet with universal approval: his elevation – along with those of Placidia and Valentinian – was not recognized by Theodosius II in the East.89 Allegedly, Constantius was so angered by this refusal to recognize his rule that he began preparations for war with the East.90 Unfortunately for him, but possibly fortunately for the empire, these came to nothing as he died on 2 September following a short illness after reigning for only six months. Following his death, relations between his widow Galla Placidia – who had been declared Augusta by Honorius and Constantius in 421 – and her half-brother the Emperor Honorius quickly deteriorated and she fled to Constantinople.91
Honorius himself was not to enjoy the pleasures of sole rule again for very long. On 15 August 423 he followed in his father’s footsteps and died of oedema (dropsy).92 The West now needed a new emperor. Of more importance to Aetius, the death of the emperor signalled the end of the treaty that Honorius had signed with the Huns. Although he may have returned to Ravenna prior to this (see above), it is almost certain that with the end of the treaty all of the hostages that had been exchanged with the Huns now returned home. Aetius headed for Ravenna.
GAUDENTIUS
The reunion of Aetius and Gaudentius was doubtless joyful. Aetius had spent several years with the Huns and, although his position as a hostage gave him a protected position and meant that he was unlikely to be harmed, there were still many other dangers that could have taken his life.
Whilst Aetius had been in the east, Gaudentius had remained in the west. Unfortunately, there is no mention of him in any of the sources. Everything about his life is completely unknown. Yet it is almost certain that he continued to serve both Constantius III and his successors as magister militum in a military capacity. Honorius had died without leaving any heirs. Gaudentius, and to a lesser degree Aetius, would now be in a position to influence events.
* It is recommended that this chapter be read in conjunction with the Chronology to aid understanding.
Chapter 3
Aetius Takes the Stage
CASTINUS, BONIFACE AND AETIUS
When Aetius returned to the court in Ravenna he found that politically the atmosphere was highly charged and the court divided into at least two camps. Earlier, in either 420 or 421, Honorius had appointed an individual by the name of Castinus to be the comes domesticorum (‘Count of the Household’).1 In this position Castinus had led a campaign against the Franks.2 Probably at the beginning of 422, after the death of Constantius III, Honorius had elevated Castinus to be a dux, before shortly afterwards making him magister utriusque militiae (‘Master of all the Troops’).
The elevation of Castinus was to have political consequences. Placi
dia, a very forceful woman, appears to have aimed at becoming the power behind Honorius. Brought up in the household of Stilicho and Serena, in all likelihood she aimed to emulate their political and military domination of Honorius as parens principum. On the other hand, women were usually subordinate to men in Roman society, and so any attempt by her to gain control of the court will have been resented by those men who would have expected to be in her place. She quickly came into opposition with Castinus, who as the magister militum saw himself as the natural heir to Stilicho and Constantius III.3 The scene was set for a bitter rivalry. Although the advantage may have been with Castinus, since he controlled the army, Placidia was known to be ruthless: in 408, when Rome was being besieged by the Goths under Alaric, she had allegedly approved the Senate’s decision to kill Serena, the adopted half-sister who had raised her. Sentiment was not a strong part of Placidia’s personality.
In 422 Castinus was ordered to lead a campaign against the Vandals in Spain, being given a mixed force of Romans and Visigothic foederati (allies) from the new settlement in Aquitania.4 In an unexpected turn of events, another Roman general was ordered to accompany him. Boniface had risen to fame as early as 413, when the Goths under Athaulf had attacked Marseilles during the conflict between Athaulf and Constantius III. During the attack Boniface had managed to wound Athaulf himself, a feat for which he was ‘fêted by the citizens’.5 Following this moment of fame Boniface successfully commanded troops in Africa in 417 and entered into correspondence with (Saint) Augustine, in the course of which Augustine allayed his Christian fears that fighting wars and killing was against God’s will and would ensure ‘eternal damnation’.6