Alexander would have been travelling through this most difficult terrain without his siege train; this was partly because of the difficulty of traversing these mountain passes, partly because Alexander had an overwhelming need for rapidity of movement and partly because he simply had not needed it for some years, as already noted. Alexander was now faced with a potentially extremely difficult siege without any siege engines, and with a lack of trees in the region, which seriously limited the ability of his engineers to construct more. The Sogdian Rock also could not be subjected to a simple frontal assault as the mountain upon which it stood was inaccessible to any significant number of troops; the path that led to it was narrow and not suitable for a frontal assault. Curtius tells us that Alexander seriously considered abandoning the siege before it even began as he apparently saw no obvious way of successfully carrying the Rock. It was only his longing (pothos) that again overcame him, as it did at numerous occasions during his career. Even with this ephemeral pothos, Alexander was still faced with the all-too-practical problem of how to assault the fortress. Alexander began by trying to avoid having to assault the citadel and attempted diplomacy. He sent Cophes, the son of Artabazus, to urge the natives to abandon the Rock and to surrender to Alexander. If they were to do this they were offered the opportunity to return to their homelands unmolested. Their response was simply to laugh in the face of Alexander’s representative. Arimazes, the commander of the Rock, was so confident in his position that, along with a number of far more insulting barbs, he asked Cophes if the Macedonians had brought flying troops with them, for this was the only way they could reach the fortress. Alexander was so enraged by this lack of respect that any thoughts of abandoning the siege were now gone. Arimazes’ words were ill advised as this barb appears to have given Alexander perhaps the kernel of an idea that he was to put into action the following night.
Alexander ordered his senior commanders to each have 300 men brought before him; these were to be only the fittest and most agile of the entire army. When these men had been gathered together, Alexander addressed the miniature assembly telling the troops that he wanted volunteers to climb the mountain upon which stood the fortress, a climb that was difficult enough, but was to be conducted under cover of night and in the extreme cold suggested by the snow on the mountain and its approaches. The prize for volunteers was a king’s ransom: the first to the top was to receive ten talents, the second nine talents, etc. We do not know what those who did not finish in the top ten were to receive – perhaps nothing at all. Arrian tells us ‘the men were keen enough already, but this proclamation was an added spur’.189 In all, 300 men volunteered, Curtius telling us they were particularly tough herdsmen from the Macedonian uplands, men who also had distinguished themselves as mountaineers in earlier sieges – sieges that apparently did not warrant great description by any source but probably ones conducted earlier in the Bactrian and Sogdian campaigns.
Alexander had developed a cunning and daring ruse by which he hoped to capture the Rock, a ruse that would rely for its success on stealth and perfect timing. Probably late afternoon of the night that the climb was due to commence, Alexander gathered together the 300 brave, yet slightly foolhardy, warriors warriors and explained to them what he required of them and how he planned to carry the siege. Alexander told the men:190
You will find a way up if you use your skill in searching for tracks that lead to the top. Nature has set nothing so high that it cannot be surmounted by courage. It is by using methods of which others have despaired that we have Asia in our power. Get to the top. When you have reached it, give me a signal with pieces of white cloth and I shall advance troops to divert the enemy’s attention from you to us.
They were evidently not put off by the high degree of personal danger involved in the climb, and apparently greatly inspired by Alexander’s words. The mountaineers faced an extremely difficult climb made all the more troublesome by the fact that it would have to be conducted at night to avoid any chance of the defenders realizing what was happening if the ruse that Alexander had planned was to be successful. The mountaineers equipped themselves with:191
Small iron tent-pegs, which they proposed to drive into the snow, where it was frozen hard, or into any bit of bare earth they might come across, and they had attached to the pegs strong flaxen lines.
Improvised pitons and rope are hardly ideal preparations for a difficult night time ascent of a mountain, but with only this equipment, they waited for nightfall and then began to climb. Arian tells us that the steepest and most precipitous face was chosen because this was the least likely to be guarded, although Curtius tells us the opposite, that they climbed the least difficult face. Either way, they were not likely to have been spotted at night even if there were regular patrols at the summit of the mountain.
The ascent began at second watch after Alexander had personally ridden around the mountain to determine the most advantageous place to climb. Along with their climbing equipment the mountaineers took only two days’ rations and their swords and spears, probably strapped to their backs to allow both hands to be kept free. The climb started well:192
They started out on foot, but then they reached the sheer parts. Here some pulled themselves up by grasping protruding rocks with their hands; others climbed by means of ropes with sliding knots which they threw ahead of themselves; others again used the pins, wedging them between rocks to serve as steps on which they could get a footing from time to time.
Quickly the climb became far more difficult, however; the mountain became ever steeper and the rock face increasingly sheer. The rate of climb slowed significantly and it surely must have taken place over two nights; a 6,000m climb at night with no breathing apparatus stretches credulity too far to be believable. Curtius goes on to tell us that:193
It was truly pitiful to see men who had been deceived by an unsure footing plunge headlong, and such a calamity overtaking another served to warn the rest that the same fate would soon be theirs.
After a difficult night spent on the mountain, the remaining mountaineers would have hidden in any cave or crevasse that they could to avoid detection by the defenders, and the exposure of the ruse. The tired and cold men would have taken what rest they could during the long day, awaiting nightfall once more so that they could complete their climb. When night did finally arrive they crawled out of their hiding places and began to climb once more. They reached the summit before dawn the following day and waited for the sun to rise as Alexander had instructed.
At dawn they signalled Alexander that they had arrived safely and were in position above the defenders. Alexander saw the signal and moved the army to the narrow path leading to the fortress, as previously arranged, and sent a herald to speak to the defenders. Once the army was in position, the defenders presumably also having moved to the gate to see what was going on, the mountaineers began to shout and wave their weapons around in the early morning light. The herald declared that Alexander had indeed found flying men, and that nobody and nothing could stand in his way; surrender was their only hope. The morale of the defenders, and the arrogance of Arimazes, disintegrated almost instantly: the Rock surrendered to Alexander without further loss of life.194
In order to complete their surrender, and probably on the orders of Alexander, Arimazes came to Alexander’s camp in person, along with some of his relatives and the leading citizens within the fortress. Alexander was apparently still furious at the arrogance displayed to him and his herald by Arimazes upon his initial offer of a peaceful solution, and he now had his opportunity to exact revenge. Alexander first ordered those who had come into his camp to be whipped and then crucified at the foot of the Rock that was their home. The remainder of the citizens and defenders were given as gifts to the peoples of the newly-founded cities in the region, and the citadel was given to Artabazus, along with the territory that it commanded.
Both Arrian and Curtius confirm that thirty-two men died during the arduous climb. An attrition rate of only te
n per cent seems rather low for such a difficult and dangerous task.195 At the outset of the siege we can assume that Alexander would have gladly sacrificed thirty-two men (and the fifty-five talents it would have cost him as reward to the first ten mountaineers) to capture such a fortress. The loss of life would have been far worse if an actual assault was forced upon the Macedonians.
In the capture of this mountain-top fortress, Alexander once again showed himself capable of analyzing a seemingly impossible situation and formulating a winning strategy. We also see an example of Alexander taking a calculated risk, that the defenders would surrender at the sight of his flying men, rather than attack the mountaineers whom they surely outnumbered by at least twenty to one, and he was again proved correct; Alexander was nothing if not lucky throughout his career.
Rock of Chorienes/Rock of Sisimithres
After a lengthy delay, which consisted of only minor campaigning in Maracanda, and culminated in the murder of Black Cleitus, autumn was suddenly upon the Macedonians. Before the year’s end, however, one final campaign awaited Alexander. From Maracanda, Alexander marched south to eliminate a group of Bactrian rebels who were based in the city of Xenippa, the exact location of which still remains unknown. No details are known about the campaign, other than its successful nature. We can probably draw the conclusion, however, that the campaign was a relatively minor affair as it is largely ignored by all of the sources. Alexander then moved to what would become his winter quarters in Nautaca, probably located between Maracanda and the Oxus River.196 Nautaca was the last refuge of the rebels commanded by Sisimithres (although Arrian calls him Chorienes, probably a corruption of Sisimithres). These Alexander forced into submission too as the last military action of 328.
For his final stand, Sisimithres was firmly ensconced in yet another seemingly impregnable citadel. The fortress was, like the Sogdian Rock, located on the peak of a large hill, or perhaps a small mountain. The hill was partially surrounded by a deep ravine and was thus inaccessible to a direct assault. The ravine was also wide enough that Alexander’s siege engines simply could not directly engage the walls; they could not get close enough. This fortress was, again, well stocked with food and water sufficient to support the defenders during a lengthy siege.
The ravine, combined with its torrent of water from the plateau above, meant that the fortress was naturally well defended. This was coupled with the circuit of well-built stone walls to present Alexander with another difficult siege. Arrian has the ravine encircle the Rock, but this cannot be so as the torrent of water in it was essentially a river and therefore surely must have led somewhere beyond the fortress, the fortress surrounded on three sides by the river is more likely. Arrian’s description appears to be something of a stock description, or else he is confusing two sources who gave slightly different descriptions; we must remember that the sources we have are extremely unlikely to have personally viewed this region of the empire.197
As usual, Alexander did not allow a natural barrier, however seemingly formidable, to stand against him. Alexander’s tactics are often brilliantly subtle with numerous sub-strategies that feed off the primary; occasionally, however, his methods were brutally direct. During this siege, Alexander used the precedent first set at Tyre; he set about building a causeway across the chasm. The causeway was a marvellous feat of engineering that is almost always underappreciated by modern historians. It consisted of a series of interlocking stakes that were cantilevered over the narrowest point of the gorge.198 The descent to the bottom of the deep gorge to lay the wooden foundations and to drive the huge wooden stakes into position must have been an extremely hazardous task about which we hear little. Whilst in the gorge, Alexander’s engineers also had to take care to firmly secure the base of the causeway against being swept away by the fast-flowing waters within the gorge. As during the later siege of Aornus the following year, Alexander supervised the work personally, and split his men into two shifts, day and night. Progress was slower than it was to be at Aornus, where the men constructed a stade-long stretch in a single day; access was more limited on this occasion.
The siege shows many similarities with the earlier siege of Tyre, similarities that perhaps have been deliberately exaggerated for effect. We are, as at Tyre, presented with the picture of the defenders treating the construction of the causeway as something of a joke, perhaps not believing that such a construction was even possible. This is exactly the reaction of the Tyrians until they saw the causeway getting ever closer to their island. As the causeway was developing, probably being built from the bottom of the gorge upwards, rather than from one side to the other, the defenders began to try to disrupt the construction teams by firing arrows upon them. This proved to be ineffective partially because of the distances involved, and partly because Alexander had learned the lessons of earlier siege operations and had deployed portable and moveable abates to protect the construction crews.
The work was difficult and therefore proceeded slowly; perversely this probably worked to Alexander’s advantage, however. As the causeway grew at a slow but dreadfully-inevitable rate, Sisimithres had plenty of time to become increasingly worried for his position and his fortress. Sisimithres had become aware, probably through previous attempts at diplomacy that Oxyartes was with Alexander’s host. Oxyartes was a neighbour and fellow tribesman of Sisimithres, now allied with Alexander. He was evidently a man trusted by the defenders. Sisimithres requested, via a herald, that Oxyartes be allowed to approach and enter the citadel so that they may converse regarding the current situation. Alexander allowed the parlay, hoping that Oxyartes could persuade the defenders of the wisdom of surrender, and the inevitability of death or slavery if they did not. In order to put continued pressure upon the defenders, especially during the talks:199
Siege towers were brought forward and a barrage of missiles flashed from the siege engines.
This attempt at a diplomatic solution evidently came rather late in proceedings; if the siege towers were able to get close enough to the walls to launch a volley then they must have been on the causeway, which must, therefore, have been partially complete. The top of the causeway would probably have been a wicker flooring that would support the earth and wood that would form the walkway across the ravine.
Oxyartes evidently tried to persuade Sisimithres that Alexander was an honourable man, citing himself as evidence that capitulation to the conqueror meant survival and prosperity. Sisimithres had evidently heard stories of Alexander’s previous successful operations against seemingly-impregnable fortresses, and was becoming increasingly concerned for the safety of his position, and so he decided to trust the word of Oxyartes. He sent Oxyartes back to the Macedonian camp with an offer of his surrender; this Alexander accepted and returned him to his throne with a hint that his kingdom would expand if he proved his loyalty. Alexander’s price was a surprisingly Macedonian one: Sisimithres’ two sons were to accompany Alexander on his future conquests, essentially acting as hostages against their father’s good behaviour; this is something that was a regular tradition in Macedonian history.
During this brief but, from an engineering perspective, extremely interesting siege, Alexander showed himself capable of learning difficult lessons from earlier sieges, specifically Tyre. At Tyre, Alexander only adopted defensive measures after suffering losses to ship-borne missile weapons. Hides were placed at the leading edge of the bridge to protect the builders and engineers from projectile weapons fired by the defenders.200 The defenders did not have the same will to resist as did the Tyrians, and at this display of siegecraft they surrendered before a final assault could be started against the defences proper. The Rock’s vast stores of provisions were enough to winter the Macedonian army; yet again Alexander avoided any serious logistical issues.
Upon the successful completion of the siege, winter was soon to be upon the Macedonians. Alexander made for Nautaca where he would winter the troops and await the new campaigning season of 327. The difficulties that Alexande
r had faced in Bactria and Sogdiana meant that he could not simply leave the region without the reasonable expectation that rebellion would occur once again as soon as he was too far away to respond quickly, and he could not allow the northeast frontier to delay his advance into India. With hindsight, this is a similar difficulty to that encountered in northern Greece, and his response was similar. During the Battles of Issus and Gaugamela, Alexander had been greatly impressed by the quality of the troops that the region had supplied to Darius (particularly the cavalry), and indeed in those he had faced in the recent rebellion. Alexander had a constant need for fresh, high-quality troops, and he also came to realize that reinforcements were drying up from Macedonia. With these factors in mind Alexander began a recruiting program that winter that he hoped would eliminate these long-term recruitment problems. This now-famous training program saw Alexander recruit (or more likely conscript) 30,000 Persian youths into the army. These were to be trained and equipped in the Macedonian-style, and educated in Macedonian tactics, essentially making them replacements for the pezhetairoi.201 The policy did not stop with infantry, however; significant numbers of native cavalry were also enlisted. Alexander would have been especially impressed by these during the two earlier set-piece battles, and his need for quality cavalry was always greatest as these were the strike force of the whole army.
This recruitment drive had a twofold effect. Firstly, it strengthened the Macedonian field army considerably in anticipation of the coming Indian campaign; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it removed significant numbers of potentially rebellious troops from Sogdiana and Bactria. This is exactly what Alexander had done in the Balkans in 335 when he conscripted thousands of Thracians, Odrysians, Triballians etc. It was also the general policy of the Roman Empire to station auxiliary troops as far as possible from their homelands.
The Sieges of Alexander the Great Page 17