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by Marc Ambinder


  Keller and Jill Abramson, then managing editor and now the executive editor of the paper, agreed that the U.S. government should get a week’s notice. This was decided as a measure to both protect the Times’s competitive edge (as other papers would certainly print the cables with or without the New York Times on point) and give U.S. officials the opportunity to help contextualize the material revealed. It would also allow officials to backstop the Times’s efforts to protect sources and highly sensitive intelligence programs and otherwise prevent the disclosure of information that might cause significant harm to the United States.

  On the Wednesday evening before Thanksgiving 2010, after denials and outrage from the Obama administration, government officials finally came to the table.

  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton designated William Burns, under secretary for political affairs, and P. J. Crowley, assistant secretary of state for public affairs, as team leaders of the ad hoc WikiLeaks response group. The State Department opened negotiations with an obviously overreaching request: that the Times redact all details of communication between American diplomats and foreign heads of state. Would they overlook, for example, the request by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia for the United States to “cut off the head of the snake,” referring, now famously, to Iran?11 Similarly, would the Times withhold cables involving the king of Bahrain, who pleaded with General David Petraeus to deal with Iran “by whatever means necessary”?12

  This opening bid was, of course, a nonstarter, and the Times never considered it. The State Department WikiLeaks response group argued that publishing these cables would rapidly destabilize regimes in such a way that would lead to riots, death, destruction, and carnage of the most abhorrent variety. (To a certain extent, the State Department was correct: regimes were destabilized, and several fell, as part of the Arab Spring.) Though representatives of the New York Times were fully aware that the cables would strain diplomatic relations, they determined that the government’s request relied more on fears of embarrassment than on any legitimate, overriding threats to national security.

  By the day of publication—November 28, 2010, under the banner “Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy”—the U.S. government was actively working with the Times as a full partner in all but name. State officials vetted the cables for sensitive content in consultation with several government agencies, and the Times agreed to a number of the redactions requested. In fact, in most cases the paper had already independently decided to redact them. One involved a highly classified counterterrorism unit designated CTU—an abbreviation fans of 24’s Jack Bauer might recognize. CTU had taken years to build, and was staffed by Yemeni, American, and British operatives, with the express purpose of intelligence sharing.13 Though the Obama administration has publicly acknowledged an active footprint of U.S. special operations forces in Yemen training locals for counterterrorism, neither CTU nor multinational intelligence sharing had previously been revealed. Such a revelation would have been distinctly unpopular at home, with the rising threat of Yemen to U.S. security, and abroad, for obvious reasons.

  A more interesting revelation of cooperation came not from a known front in the war, but from a hostile foreign power. On February 18, 2010, General Ali Mamlouk, the general intelligence director of Syria, attended a counterterrorism meeting “at the request of President Bashar al-Asad as a gesture following a positive meeting between [Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs] William Burns and the Syrian president the previous day.” According to Imad Mustapha, Syrian ambassador to the United States, who translated for Mamlouk during the meeting, “Mamlouk’s attendance at meetings with foreign delegations was extraordinary,” and did not occur “even with friendly countries like Britain and France.” This was a very personal gesture and a show of goodwill. The Syrian officials “were attentive during [Ambassador Daniel] Benjamin’s presentation on al-Qaeda, foreign fighters, and other common threats, and reacted positively to his warnings that these issues presented challenges to both the U.S. and Syria.” For his part, the Syrian spy chief extended the possibility of “security and intelligence cooperation” with the United States, so long as Syria was given point in regional actions, the bilateral relationship between the United States and Syria improved, and economic sanctions against Syria were alleviated. “In summary,” said Vice Foreign Minister Faisal al-Miqdad, who was also present at the meeting, “President Asad wants cooperation, we should take the lead on that cooperation, and don’t put us on your lists.”14

  By comparison, the WikiLeaks response group did not ask the Times to withhold publication of a cable where José “Pepe” Grinda Gonzalez, a Spanish National Court prosecutor, referred to Russia as a “mafia state,” or the multitude of cables reporting tensions between Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev.15 (One of the more salacious reports by Russian insiders explores three branches of thought on the matter: that Medvedev is coming into his own as president; that Medvedev is “Robin” to Putin’s “Batman”; that the two leaders coexist peacefully.)16 These types of reports were trivial to the response group. Western intelligence sharing with terrorist states—a vital national security priority—triggered a blinking red light and barricades.

  Interestingly, “Cablegate” has had but a limited effect on some areas of U.S. policy and has actually strengthened the president’s governing agenda in others. As if in mockery of Julian Assange’s loftiest ambitions, the release of State Department diplomatic cables has given ideological ammunition to those who believe that the entrenched state, methodically cloaked in secrecy, actually reflects the best interest of the polity.

  Assange’s Manichean view of the governing institutions of the United States arguably blinded him to the subtleties of foreign policy as revealed by the cable release. A clear-eyed reading of much of the classified material wrenched from the secrecy apparatus suggests a more accountable government than Assange—or anyone, really—ever imagined. Contrary to the initial alarmist reporting, the diplomatic cables make heroes out of American diplomats. For the most part, the puzzle pieces dumped by Assange (and patiently reassembled by outsiders) reveal an American government that indeed tries to do what it says it will do. And when the government is pressed to lie or obfuscate, it almost invariably does so to further a redeeming interest. The oppressive secrecy regime as perceived by Assange may be messy—yes—and abused—of course—but not altogether dysfunctional or objectively immoral.

  Veteran investigative journalist Bart Gellman has outlined how this works in practice. The government competes with journalists on one level and cooperates with them on another. That is to say, the state labors to keep as much sensitive information out of the public square as possible. Once classified information has been compromised, however, the state works with journalists to facilitate its responsible publication, with context and elaboration.

  Aside from threats of enforcing the Espionage Act—a rarely used sledgehammer in the government’s toolshed—there is no legal or formal basis for the government to ask a reporter not to reveal classified programs, or the particulars of said programs. Indeed, in such cases the government’s hands are often tied, as those requests would prove technically illegal. By asking for red pen authority over key classified details of a journalist’s reporting, the government implicitly confirms those details. Because it is unlawful to share, suggest, or substantiate classified information with persons lacking clearance and “need to know” authority, the state is largely impotent when faced with the primed printing press. Blunt intimidation, therefore, is invariably ineffective.

  None of the cable revelations, positive or negative, nullify the larger point: Julian Assange, and future Julian Assanges, are the direct result of the sprawling secrecy apparatus of the U.S government. Because so many matters of the state have been stamped Secret, the practice of illegally leaking to the press is not only considered acceptable, but oftentimes necessary for governance. Accordingly, lawmakers charged with crafting le
gislation to prevent future WikiLeaks scenarios are hamstrung by a situation they have created and a mechanism they have come to rely on. An overreaching law might prevent future Salt Pit–equivalent revelations, while anemic legislation would give tacit approval for similar illegal, unilateral, bulk declassifications. At the same time, politicians and the contemporary culture herald whistleblowing as an act of virtue. Well, Assange blew the whistle on King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who wanted the U.S. military to launch a preemptive decapitation strike on Iran.

  Ultimately, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates—no stranger to the importance of state secrecy, having served as both the leader of a military at war and as former director of central intelligence—pointedly questioned the alarmists in Washington:

  Let me just offer some perspective as somebody who’s been at this a long time. Every other government in the world knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has for a long time. And I dragged this up the other day when I was looking at some of these prospective releases. And this is a quote from John Adams: “How can a government go on, publishing all of their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not. To me, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel.”

  When we went to real congressional oversight of intelligence in the mid-70s, there was a broad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again if we were going to share it all with the Congress. Those fears all proved unfounded.

  Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think—I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is: governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets.

  Many governments—some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.17

  Gates won few friends at the State Department for his candid remarks. He contradicted statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who had earlier called the WikiLeaks exposé “an attack on America” and on the international community, adding, “There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations.”18 The Department of Justice was apoplectic at Gates, fearing that such an unvarnished assessment by such a respected, experienced, and senior administration official—a man who by virtue of his career in government may well know more secrets than anyone—would undermine any future prosecution of Julian Assange.

  The weeks and months following the WikiLeaks cable release have confirmed the statements of Secretary Gates. It was embarrassing. Some U.S. ambassadors found their telephone calls unreturned. Secretary Clinton, meanwhile, endured a public lashing in the press when cables emerged suggesting that the State Department had issued orders for diplomats to collect human intelligence. Never mind that such policies reach back to Thomas Jefferson, the first secretary of state, who instructed diplomats to gather “such political and commercial intelligence as you may think interesting to the United States.”19 Never mind that diplomats of the United States were not in fact conscripted into intelligence gathering. Rather, because the order was circulated to the entire State Department, Secretary Clinton’s name appeared as the originator of the cable. This was and is standard procedure.

  In 1990, Secretary of State James Baker found himself in similar tempest when reports surfaced that the American envoy to Iraq, April Glaspie, had tried to appease Saddam Hussein on the eve of the Iraqi dictator’s decision to invade Kuwait. In fact, Glaspie’s cable recounting events of the meeting noted that she had specifically warned the Iraqi leader against invading its neighbor. But higher-ups at the State Department didn’t get the cable, or misplaced it, and it took the U.S. government some time to correct the record. Baker obviously couldn’t know the situational specifics to defend Glaspie, and he wouldn’t play the news media’s game. “What you want me to do is say that those instructions were sent specifically by me on my specific orders,” he scoffed, noting that 312,000 cables go out in his name each year.20

  The cables related to Secretary Clinton’s nonexistent spy ring involved guidelines set by analysts at the CIA’s National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Requirements Tasking Center. The HUMINT Tasking Center is charged with determining what types of intelligence the U.S. government requires for ongoing activities and how best to obtain it. In 2004, the CIA determined that in order to provide value-added insight to policy makers enmeshed in complex negotiations about war and terrorism, it needed additional raw data on foreign dignitaries, the United Nations, and various countries. The decision to send out a tasking was itself derivative of a 2003 presidential national security directive issued by President George W. Bush. The data would be used by many consumers: State’s own intelligence branch; the National Security Agency, which has representatives in the center; the CIA; and the Defense Intelligence Agency, which compiles extensive intelligence and operations databases.

  In 2009, the CIA updated its intelligence requirements and reissued the directive, which went to all members of the intelligence community, joint intelligence centers of combatant commands, and even to selected cleared personnel representing the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce overseas, as the 8,500-word cable itself makes clear. Once State got the order, Michael Owen, the acting State Department intelligence chief, properly distributed the instructions with a gloss as to what his shop could use to provide the intelligence community with better information. Just as in the case of Secretary Baker, in all likelihood Secretary Clinton never saw the material, even though her name appeared as originator.

  The leaked cable does, however, raise questions. Does the intelligence community spy on the United Nations? Yes. Does it spy on friendly African leaders? Certainly. Does the government want to collect sensitive and personal information on friendly international politicians, like the head of the World Health Organization? Somewhat uncomfortably, it does. But the State Department does not have the capacity to tap phones and collect data; Foreign Service officers aren’t trained in tradecraft. They are not expected to gather intelligence for the sole purpose of feeding the CIA analytical beast.

  Instead, there is an assumption made by every person who comes into contact with an identified member of the U.S. Foreign Service overseas that a representative of the U.S. government is going to act at all times in the interest of the U.S. government. Accordingly, every Foreign Service officer gathers information to some degree. The CIA HUMINT Tasking Center directive helps focus their efforts. There is no new, malevolent Clinton-directed blurring of lines; the lines were already blurred by design. Foreign officials understand the unofficial role played by diplomats and oftentimes use it as a means to send back-channel messages to the State Department.

  Like every revelation by WikiLeaks made public so far, the furor subsided. The enticing narrative of a secret spy ring orchestrated by Hillary Clinton gave way to the more tedious reality of how paperwork is deployed in a bureaucracy. This is not to say, however, that nothing changed as a result of the scandal. On the contrary, it contributed to perhaps the most significant policy casualty of the WikiLeaks affair. Before the cable release, the CIA and the State Department were on the verge of finalizing an agreement designed to give thousands of intelligence analysts assigned to several agencies of State instant desk access to high-level diplomatic traffic. “That all went up in smoke,” said an official who was brokering the announcement.

  In the long run, this may prove to be a net positive for information security. The Secret Internet Protocol Router Netw
ork (SIPRNet) used by the Department of Defense is hardwired with no external points of entry so as to prevent illegal access by unauthorized personnel. During the first Bush administration, “authorized personnel” totaled five hundred users with security clearances. Today, several hundred thousand users have SIPRNet access. Many of them have only interim clearances—a mere signature on a nondisclosure agreement. With too many secrets come too many persons requiring access. That is how Bradley Manning, a troubled U.S. Army private at a forward operating base lacking even the slightest pretense of “need to know,” gained access to the entirety of the State Department’s secret files.

  War fighting is measurably improved by such cross-agency data sharing, but the program was implemented at the expense of basic precautions. USB ports were not disabled. Nor were the write capabilities of CD and DVD drives. In a sense, the administrators of SIPRNet invited the security breach.

  Post-WikiLeaks, interagency information sharing has been curtailed pending a reassessment of computer network security policies. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued a directive ordering all federal agencies that handle sensitive information to review their internal security practices. In addition, the OMB has ordered that agencies build assessment teams composed of specialists in security and counterintelligence to establish new procedures and standards for training, access, and oversight. In the meantime, WikiLeaks has put a halt to intelligence community-wide efforts at declassification—the opposite of the organization’s stated goal.

  Whether or not WikiLeaks succeeded in revealing nontrivial overclassification, however, remains an open question. Certainly diplomatic cables consisting of compiled news summaries from the public press and stamped “Secret” are too much, though a fair argument can be made that even then a particular selection of newspaper columns reflects the priorities of the United States. But such cables’ exposure does not equate with “significant” harm to national security. On other hand, those cables that would likely have imperiled the state were carefully redacted. The New York Times took the initiative and was soon assisted by the ad hoc State Department–Times partnership, and then followed by WikiLeaks itself. The organization did, in fact, redact the names of U.S. covert and clandestine operatives in the field.21

 

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