Ask the Sphinx
Although the Arabs accused the United States of airlifting supplies to Israel, President Johnson had imposed an arms embargo on the region. (France, Israel’s other main arms supplier, also embargoed arms to Israel.) By contrast, the Soviets were supplying massive amounts of arms to the Arabs. Simultaneously, the armies of Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq were contributing troops and arms to the Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian fronts.
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Jerusalem Reunited
Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had sent a message on June 5 to King Hussein saying that Israel would not attack Jordan unless he initiated hostilities. When Jordanian radar picked up a cluster of planes flying from Egypt to Israel, and the Egyptians convinced Hussein the planes were theirs, he ordered the shelling of West Jerusalem. It turned out that the planes were Israel’s and were returning from destroying the Egyptian air force on the ground.
It took only three days for Israeli forces to defeat the Jordanian legion. On the morning of June 7, the order was given to recapture the Old City. Israeli paratroopers stormed the city and secured it. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan arrived with Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin to formally mark the Jews’ return to their historic capital and their holiest site. At the Western Wall, the IDF’s chaplain, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, blew a shofar (a ceremonial ram’s horn) to celebrate the event.
A Second Exodus
After Jordan launched its attack on June 5, approximately 325,000 Palestinians living in the West Bank fled to other parts of Jordan, primarily to avoid being caught in the cross fire of a war.
A Palestinian refugee who was an administrator in a UNRWA camp in Jericho said Arab politicians had spread rumors in the camp. “They said all the young people would be killed. People heard on the radio that this is not the end, only the beginning, so they think maybe it will be a long war and they want to be in Jordan.”
Some Palestinians who left preferred to live in an Arab state rather than under Israeli military rule. Members of various PLO factions fled to avoid capture by the Israelis. Nils-Göran Gussing, the person appointed by the UN secretary-general to investigate the situation, found that many Arabs also feared they would no longer be able to receive money from family members working abroad.
Israeli forces ordered a handful of Palestinians to move for “strategic and security reasons.” In some cases, they were allowed to return in a few days; in others, Israel offered to help them resettle elsewhere. The net result, however, was that a new refugee population had been created and the old refugee problem was made worse.
* * *
Ask the Sphinx
More than 9,000 Palestinian families were reunited in 1967. Ultimately, more than 60,000 Palestinians were allowed to return.
* * *
The World Is Stunned
After just six days of fighting, Israeli forces broke through the enemy lines and were in a position to march on Cairo, Damascus, and Amman. By this time, the principal objectives of capturing the Sinai and the Golan Heights had been accomplished, and Israeli political leaders had no desire to fight in the Arab capitals. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had become increasingly alarmed by the Israeli advances and was threatening to intervene. At this point, U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk advised the Israelis “in the strongest possible terms” to accept a cease-fire. On June 10, Israel did just that.
But Israel’s victory came at a very high cost to both sides. In storming the Golan Heights, Israel suffered 115 dead. Altogether, Israel lost 776 dead, and 2,586 were wounded. The death toll on the Arab side was 15,000 Egyptians, 2,500 Syrians, and 800 Jordanians.
By the end of the Six-Day War, Israel had captured enough territory to more than triple the size of the area it controlled—from 8,000 to 26,000 square miles. The victory enabled Israel to unify Jerusalem. Israeli forces had also captured the Sinai, Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and West Bank. Israel now ruled more than three quarters of a million Palestinians—most of whom were hostile to the government.
The Least You Need to Know
President Kennedy sold the first major weapons system to Israel, and the United States slowly became the country’s principal supplier.
The Arab League created the PLO as a tool to conduct a terrorist war against Israel.
Syria’s persistent shelling of Israeli farms in the north, combined with Nasser’s threatening language and behavior, convinced Israel it must strike both Syria and Egypt preemptively.
King Hussein joined the fight against Israel, losing the West Bank and Jerusalem in the process.
In just six days of fighting, the Egyptians, Syrians, and Jordanians were humiliated by Israel, and more Palestinians became refugees.
Chapter 15
No War, No Peace
In This Chapter
The three no’s
The meaning of 242
The War of Attrition
Terror on land and in the air
Foreign public opinion had been favorable to the Israeli cause; however, Israel had been left to fight the Six-Day War alone. In view of its isolation, especially after the United States reneged on its assurances to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, the Israeli public became more aware of the dangers of the Arab world. And it became more suspicious of its friends’ commitments to the state of Israel. As a result, Israel was determined to use the military victory to establish secure boundaries.
The Palestinians also learned a great deal from their defeat. They reached the conclusion that they could no longer rely on their Arab brothers to win their homes back for them. The Palestinian leadership began to take a more active role in Middle Eastern affairs in an attempt to determine its own fate.
The Arabs Say No, No, No
As in 1956, Israel had expected the military victory to convince the Arab states that the country could not be driven out of Palestine and to induce the Arabs to sit down and negotiate a peace settlement. Israel even expressed its willingness to give up most of the territory it had won in exchange for a guarantee of peace. The Arab leaders gave their answer in the form of the “Khartoum Declaration,” a statement they issued at the end of their meeting held in Khartoum in August 1967: “…no peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel….”
Cease-fire lines after the Six-Day War.
Resolution 242
Part of the Arab strategy was to once again use the United Nations to try to gain diplomatically what they could not achieve militarily. When the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, meant to provide guidelines for a peace settlement, the Arab states chose to interpret the new initiative in a way that placed all the responsibility for concessions on the Israelis and none on themselves (as they had done before with Resolution 194, regarding the refugees; see Chapter 12).
* * *
Ask the Sphinx
A Gallup poll after the 1967 Six-Day War showed that the American public’s sympathy for Israel had reached a record high (56 percent), whereas support for the Arabs was virtually nonexistent (4 percent).
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The ultimate goal of 242, as expressed in paragraph 3, is the achievement of a “peaceful and accepted settlement.”
The most controversial clause in Resolution 242 is the call for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” This is linked to the second, unambiguous clause calling for “termination of all claims or states of belligerency” and the recognition that “every State in the area” has the “right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”
The resolution did not make Israeli withdrawal a prerequisite for Arab action. Moreover, it did not specify how much territory Israel was required to give up. The Security Council deliberately did not say that Israel must withdraw from “all the” territories occupied after the Six-Day War. The Soviet delegate wanted the inclusion of those words and said that their exclusion meant “th
at part of these territories can remain in Israeli hands.” The Arab states also pushed for the word all to be included, but this was rejected. The Arabs nevertheless asserted that they would read the resolution as if it included the word all.
The literal interpretation was repeatedly declared to be the correct one by those involved in drafting the resolution. On October 29, 1969, for example, the British foreign secretary told the House of Commons the withdrawal envisaged by the resolution would not be from “all the territories.” When asked to explain the British position later, Lord Caradon, the British ambassador who had drafted the resolution, said, “It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of June 4, 1967, because those positions were undesirable and artificial.”
The resolution clearly called on the Arab states to make peace with Israel. The principal condition of this peace was that Israel withdraw from “territories occupied” in 1967, which means that Israel must withdraw from some, but not necessarily all, of the territories still occupied. The Arab states also objected to the call for “secure and recognized boundaries” because they feared that this implied negotiations with Israel.
Goldberg explained that this phrase, “secure and recognized boundaries,” was specifically included because the parties were expected to make “territorial adjustments in their peace settlement encompassing less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, inasmuch as Israel’s prior frontiers had proved to be notably insecure.”
Although ignored by most analysts, Resolution 242 does have other provisions. One requirement is that freedom of navigation be guaranteed. It is important to note that this clause was included because a principal cause of the 1967 war was Egypt’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran.
Israel’s Obligations to the Palestinians
The Palestinians are not mentioned anywhere in Resolution 242. They are only alluded to in the second clause of the second article of 242, which calls for “a just settlement of the refugee problem.” Nowhere does it require that Palestinians be given any political rights or territory. In fact, the use of the generic term refugee was a deliberate acknowledgment that there were two refugee problems—one Arab and the other Jewish. Recall that hundreds of thousands of Jews fled persecution in Arab countries and never received any compensation.
In a statement to the UN General Assembly on October 15, 1968, the PLO, rejecting Resolution 242, said, “The implementation of said resolution will lead to the loss of every hope for the establishment of peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East region.”
By contrast, Israel accepted the resolution and reaffirmed its willingness to reach a peace agreement with all its neighbors.
The conflicting interpretations of Resolution 242 combined with the August 1967 Khartoum declaration assured continued tension in the area.
The Geography of Peace
Americans, who live in a country that stretches from sea to shining sea, sometimes find it difficult to appreciate the geography of the Arab-Israeli conflict. If a hostile neighbor seized control of the strategic ridges in the mountains of Judea and Samaria, its army could split Israel in two. From there, it is only about 15 miles to the Mediterranean.
At its narrowest point, the width of Israel prior to the 1967 Six-Day War was only 9 miles! The distance from Israel’s border to Tel Aviv was 11 miles; to Beersheba, 10; to Haifa, 21; and to Jerusalem, 1 foot. After the capture of the Sinai, Israel had a 100-mile buffer zone between it and its most powerful enemy, Egypt. An aircraft taking off from Amman, Jordan, could be over Jerusalem in about two minutes.
As for the Golan Heights, this area overlooks Israel’s richest agricultural area. From the western Golan, it is only about 60 miles to Haifa and Acre, Israel’s industrial heartland.
Israel’s leaders fully expected to negotiate a peace agreement with their neighbors that would involve some territorial compromise. Therefore, instead of annexing the West Bank, Israel created a military administration. The Israeli authorities tried to minimize the impact on the population by restoring normal life and preventing any incidents that might encourage the Arabs to leave their homes. In 1972, elections were held in the West Bank. Women and nonlandowners, unable to participate under Jordanian rule, were now permitted to vote.
* * *
Sage Sayings
From a strictly military point of view, Israel would require the retention of some captured Arab territory in order to provide militarily defensible borders.
—Memo from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the secretary of defense, June 29, 1967
* * *
Except for the requirement that school texts in the territories be purged of anti-Israel and anti-Semitic language, the authorities tried not to interfere with the inhabitants. They did provide economic assistance. For example, some Palestinians in the Gaza Strip were moved from camps to new homes. This stimulated protests from Egypt, which had done nothing for the refugees when it controlled the area, but preferred to see the Palestinians languish so that Israel could beblamed for their condition.
The Palestinians also were given freedom of movement. They were allowed to travel to and from Jordan. East Jerusalem Arabs were given the option of retaining Jordanian citizenship or acquiring Israeli citizenship. They were recognized as residents of united Jerusalem and given the right to vote and run for the city council.
* * *
Mysteries of the Desert
In 1968, just before leaving office, President Johnson agreed to a longstanding request by Israel for Phantom jets. From this point on, however, the United States became the principal arms supplier to Israel and adopted a policy of maintaining Israel’s qualitative military advantage over its neighbors.
* * *
Also, Islamic holy places were left in the care of a Muslim council. Despite the Temple Mount’s significance in Jewish history, Jews were barred from conducting prayers there because of Islamic sensitivities and concerns that radical Jews might attempt to destroy the mosques in an effort to rebuild the Jewish Temple.
New President, New Peace Plan
It did not take long after Richard Nixon took office for his administration to look for the opportunity to bring the parties together for peace talks. Unfortunately, the Arabs refused to have any direct contact with the Israelis, who, in turn, believed face-to-face negotiations were a prerequisite for an agreement.
U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers began to shop his own ideas around the region and to the Soviets. He reaffirmed U.S. support for Resolution 242, but clearly leaned on the Israelis to make territorial concessions, hoping to force them to return to the pre-1967 borders and to accept many Palestinian refugees.
Despite this seemingly pro-Arab position, both Nasser and his Soviet sponsors objected to the Rogers Plan. Israel was naturally furious, but was having little success undermining the plan and none whatsoever in convincing the United States to pressure the Arabs.
Ultimately, a combination of factors led President Nixon to shelve the Rogers Plan. First, he was distracted by other pressing issues, notably Vietnam and antiwar protests. Second, both the Arabs and the Israelis had rejected the plan. Third, his increasingly influential national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, doubted the merits of the plan and was more concerned with the growing Soviet presence in the Middle East.
Rather than moving closer to peace, Arabs and Israelis were rapidly escalating their conflict.
The War of Attrition
Hostilities in the Six-Day War had barely ended when Nasser resumed fighting. Even though his forces had been routed, he was unwilling to leave Israel alone. He had learned that the Israeli army could not be attacked head on, but he was convinced that because most of Israel’s army consisted of reserves, it could not withstand a lengthy war. He believed Israel would be unable to endure the economic burden, and the constant casualties would undermine Israeli morale. Politically, starting a new war also maintained his standing as the leader of the fight against Zioni
sm.
As early as July 1, 1967, Egypt began shelling Israeli positions near the Suez Canal. On October 21, 1967, Egypt sank the Israeli destroyer Eilat, killing 47. Less than a year later, Egyptian artillery began to shell Israeli positions along the Suez Canal.
* * *
Ask the Sphinx
When Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol died suddenly in early 1969, 71-year-old Golda Meir assumed the post of premier, becoming the world’s second female prime minister (after Sirimavo Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka).
* * *
The fighting gradually escalated into what became known as the War of Attrition, and lasted nearly two years, until 1970. During this time, the IDF engaged in a number of daring raids, including one in which paratroops captured a Soviet-made radar station and transferred it intact to Israel.
The Arms Race Is On
In response to the Israeli success in penetrating deep into Egypt during the Six-Day War, the Soviets supplied Nasser with anti-aircraft missiles, which were deployed close to the Suez Canal. In addition to arms, the Soviets began to send air and ground troops to back up the Egyptian forces. The danger of a Soviet-Israeli confrontation subsequently grew, especially after Israeli pilots shot down four Russian-piloted MiGs in July 1970.
The United States became alarmed by the Soviet Union’s close cooperation with Egypt, as well as the threats it was issuing against Israel. Nixon and Kissinger viewed the situation as a challenge to American interests and made an all-out effort to convince both sides to accept a cease-fire. This was accomplished, and the shooting stopped on August 7. During the War of Attrition, Israel lost 15 combat aircraft—most shot down by anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Between June 15, 1967, and August 8, 1970, the Israeli death toll was 1,424 soldiers and more than 100 civilians. Another 2,000 soldiers and 700 civilians were wounded.
The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict Page 26