The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict

by Mitchell G. Bard, Ph. D.

  Approximately 370 allied troops died in the Gulf War—a remarkably small number given the size of the force involved and the ferocity of the campaign. This figure includes 148 Americans killed in action, nearly one third of whom were killed in “friendly fire” incidents—that is, accidentally by their own troops. No one is sure of the casualty toll for the Iraqis, but the estimates are in the range of 35,000 or fewer.

  Meanwhile, when U.S. soldiers returned home, thousands began to develop a variety of ailments that ranged from relatively minor things such as insomnia to more serious health problems such as blurred vision, abdominal pain, and aching joints. These symptoms were referred to as Gulf War Syndrome.

  Over the past several years, a number of studies have been conducted to determine the cause. Speculation has centered on the possibility that troops were exposed to chemical or biological weapons, or were adversely affected by the smoke from the burning oil wells. But no conclusive evidence has been found to explain Gulf War Syndrome.

  * * *

  Ask the Sphinx

  George Bush emerged from the war as one of the most popular presidents in history, registering an approval rating of more than 90 percent in public opinion polls. Saddam Hussein remained one of the least-popular figures in the world. Yet less than two years later, Bush would be unemployed, and Saddam would still be president!

  * * *

  From Desert Storm to Desert Fox

  One of the coalition’s hopes was that the Iraqi people would be so angered by the death and destruction Saddam had brought upon them that they would rebel and overthrow him. Shiite Muslims in the south did rebel, as did the Kurds, but they were crushed by Saddam’s Republican Guard troops, which were supposed to have been destroyed in the Gulf War.

  The Kurds then launched a rebellion in the north, which Saddam also brutally suppressed. After this, however, the United Nations established a “no-fly” zone patrolled by allied warplanes to prevent Iraqi planes from operating in northern Iraq. In December 1992, U.S. fighters shot down an Iraqi jet in the zone.

  In 1993, the United States was twice provoked into attacks on Iraq. The first occurred when Saddam moved missiles into southern Iraq and refused to remove them. The United States responded by attacking the missile sites and also a nuclear facility in Baghdad. A few months later, a plot to assassinate former President Bush was disclosed, and President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack against Saddam’s intelligence headquarters in Baghdad.

  * * *

  Sage Sayings

  Desert Storm was the perfect war with the perfect enemy. The enemy leader was universally despised and his troops offered very little resistance. We had the perfect coalition, the perfect infrastructure, and the perfect battlefield. We should be careful about the lessons we draw from the war.

  —House Armed Services Committee

  * * *

  In 1996, Iraqi forces captured a Kurdish stronghold in northern Iraq. The United States responded by attacking military targets in Iraq and extending the no-fly zone. Afterward, a number of incidents occurred in which Iraq fired on allied jets patrolling the zone and U.S. warplanes responded by attacking Iraqi targets.

  * * *

  Tut Tut!

  Asia and the Middle East were getting more and more dangerous in 1998 as nonconventional weapons proliferated. India and Pakistan conducted nuclear weapons tests. Iran test-fired a missile that would allow it to target Israel with nuclear weapons for the first time. Russia also continued to assist Iran with its nuclear weapons program. Syria acquired more long-range missiles and developed a greater capability to manufacture biological and chemical weapons.

  * * *

  Clinton Fails to Outfox Saddam

  Following the Gulf War, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) conducted inspections in an effort to locate Saddam Hussein’s stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons and any remnants of his nuclear program. The commission had only limited success because of obstacles placed in its way by the Iraqis.

  Iraq accused the inspectors of being spies and expelled those who were Americans in November 1997. Then the rest of the team was withdrawn. After renewed military threats from the coalition, Saddam agreed to allow the inspectors to return, but refused to give them access to palaces and official residences, which was precisely where many of Iraq’s weapons were believed to be hidden.

  Intelligence officials believed Saddam retained a significant stockpile of nonconventional weapons and was secretly pursuing a resumption of the nuclear program; but because UNSCOM was repeatedly denied access to suspected sites, little evidence was collected and few of his weapons were destroyed.

  When the Iraqis continued to interfere with UNSCOM, President Clinton ordered Operation Desert Fox, an air campaign conducted jointly with the British, aimed at destroying Iraqi missiles, military facilities, and Saddam’s elite troops.

  Desert Fox accomplished very little. Early on, Pentagon reports indicated that the bombing raids didn’t destroy the targets they were aiming for. The UNSCOM team that was withdrawn before the operation never returned. And the Iraqi leader looked like he had won another victory in the sense that he remained in power and soon began to rebuild his capability to threaten his neighbors and U.S. interests.

  The Least You Need to Know

  President Bush spent five months building up U.S. forces in the Gulf and assembling a coalition of three dozen nations to liberate Kuwait. His real agenda, however, was to protect the West’s oil supplies.

  Bush persuaded the Israelis to let coalition forces fight their battle, even as Scud missiles rained down on Israeli heads.

  Most of the Arab world joined the fight against Iraq, with the notable exceptions of Libya and the Palestinians.

  The war ended with Saddam still in power and much of his army intact, prolonging the international confrontation with Iraq.

  Chapter 21

  Bush Turns the Screws

  In This Chapter

  Everyone in one room—finally

  Jewish immigrants are guaranteed

  Secret talks in Oslo break the impasse

  Arafat and Rabin shake hands

  The 1991 Gulf War made American policymakers realize how important it was for Israel to focus on a peace process with the Arab states, while efforts were being made to solve the specific problem of the Palestinians. This two-track approach was at the heart of the four-point initiative proposed by the Israeli government in May 1989. Unfortunately, that proposal got bogged down in negotiations relating only to the matter of elections for Palestinians.

  One of the ongoing difficulties in reaching some agreement with the Palestinians was finding people who were willing to negotiate with Israel. For Israel, the PLO was never a viable partner.

  Perhaps the more serious impact of the Gulf War on the peace process was the demoralizing effect the Palestinians’ support for Iraq caused in Israel. Even the leaders of the peace movement, who advocated talking to the PLO, expressed their disgust after Yasser Arafat’s embrace of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War.

  Baker’s Confab

  U.S. policymakers recognized that agreement on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations wasn’t likely until the Arab states took steps toward peace with Israel. It was toward this end that Secretary of State James Baker shuttled to the Middle East in April, May, and July 1991. The Bush administration’s objective was to convince Israel and her neighbors to attend a regional peace conference.

  In late July, Baker finally won agreement from Syria and Jordan to attend such a conference, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, with the participation of a European representative. Israeli prime minister Shamir reluctantly agreed to attend.

  For Israel, accepting an invitation by the Soviets and Europeans was a major concession because both were strong supporters of the Arab states and opponents of Shamir’s policies. Israel went along with the idea only after reaching agreement with the United States that the peace process would be implemented in
two tracks: parallel negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, as well as negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. While Israel agreed to an initial regional meeting under the auspices of the two superpowers, Shamir insisted that this meeting be followed by direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states.

  * * *

  Mysteries of the Desert

  After the PLO leadership withdrew from Lebanon in 1982, most, including Yasser Arafat, moved to Tunis, Tunisia. Although far from Palestine, Arafat still exerted control over Palestinian political affairs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip because his allies still imposed his will on the inhabitants there.

  * * *

  Regarding the Palestinians, Shamir wanted to make clear the negotiations would be aimed at reaching an interim arrangement of “self-government” modeled after the Camp David Accords and not the establishment of a Palestinian state. He refused to conduct any dialogue with the PLO and specified that the

  Palestinian delegation be composed of residents of the territories without representatives of the Palestinians living elsewhere.

  Shamir had labored to keep the PLO out of the negotiations, but he ultimately bowed to the reality that the Palestinians in the territories were not strong enough to make decisions and that they were forced to take directions from Tunis.

  The Historic Madrid Conference

  The United States and the Soviet Union issued joint invitations to all the parties to attend a conference in Madrid October 30 through November 1, 1991. At the opening session, Prime Minister Shamir gave what even his bitterest rivals in Israel acknowledged was a conciliatory speech. He directly appealed to the Arab states to “speak in the language of reconciliation, coexistence, and peace with Israel.”

  Shamir endorsed the approach to the peace process enunciated by President Bush, who said in his opening address that the United States’s objective was full peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors, and that only direct negotiations could lead to peace.

  Palestinian Hard-Line Demands

  By contrast, Arab spokesmen used the opening session to repeat maximalist demands. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa delivered a belligerent speech demanding that Israel implement UN Resolution 242 as Syria interpreted it, which “means that every inch of…the Golan, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip must be returned in their entirety.” Sharaa omitted any mention of peace or reconciliation with Israel and ruled out any adjustment of borders to meet Israel’s security needs.

  Palestinian representative Haider Abdel-Shafi’s opening remarks differed only in tone from those of Sharaa. On the positive side, Abdel-Shafi endorsed the concept of transitional arrangements in the territories and urged Palestinian radicals to respect the wishes of the Palestinian “majority” in the territories, who wished to live “side by side” with Israel.

  But Abdel-Shafi’s speech was also loaded with hard-line Arab demands. In a major departure from the invitation to the conference agreed to by the delegates, he said that the time frame for Palestinian transitional self-government must be “condensed” to less than five years.

  Contrary to the U.S. position, Abdel-Shafi also demanded that this interim phase lead automatically to Palestinian “sovereignty.” Abdel-Shafi also glorified the violent intifada, calling it “our drive towards nation-building and social transformation.” (See Chapter 18 for more on the violence of the intifada.)

  Evoking Violence and the PLO

  Abdel-Shafi went well beyond the Arab demand that Israel retreat to its precarious pre-1967 borders. He said Israel should comply with UN Resolution 181 of 1947, which would remove Galilee, the Negev, and other vital areas from the Jewish State.

  Apparently forgetting that many of his brethren supported Hitler, Jordanian Foreign Minister Kamel Abu Jaber said that “innocent” Arabs had been forced to pay the price for the Holocaust. Jaber also demanded that “Arab sovereignty” be “restored in Arab Jerusalem” and that the refugee problem “be solved in accordance with relevant resolutions.” Jaber said that the fulfillment of Arab demands “is a question of the credibility of the United Nations resolutions.”

  The Madrid conference ended without any agreements, but all the parties expressed an interest in continuing the talks.

  Jews Tear Through the Iron Curtain

  The experience associated with the Madrid conference and its aftermath led to the widespread perception that the Bush administration had shifted its policy in a pro-Arab direction. One source of this view was the administration’s attitude toward helping Israel absorb its refugees.

  For decades, Israel and the United States had fought for the freedom of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union began to dissolve, the gates were finally opened, and the trickle of immigrants to Israel became a flood, skyrocketing from fewer than 13,000 people in 1989 to more than 185,000 in 1990. Israel then asked for financial help. The United States responded in 1990 by approving $400 million in loan guarantees to help Israel house its newcomers. When it became clear the flood of refugees was even greater than anticipated, and tens of thousands continued to arrive every month, Israel realized that it needed more help and asked the United States for an additional $10 billion in loan guarantees.

  * * *

  Tut Tut!

  Guarantees are not grants. The United States simply co-signs loans for Israel, which give bankers confidence to lend Israel money at more favorable terms. These loan guarantees have no effect on U.S. domestic programs or guarantees. Moreover, they have no impact on U.S. taxpayers unless Israel were to default on its loans, something it has never done. In addition, much of the money Israel borrows is spent in the United States to purchase American goods.

  * * *

  Backing Support by Backing Loans

  President Bush knew that the guarantees could be used indirectly to fund settlements and feared the request would upset the Arabs just before the planned peace talks. He held a press conference in which he called for a delay in considering the guarantees until the following year. In his remarks, he used intemperate language that inflamed passions and provoked concern in the Jewish community that anti-Semitism would be aroused.

  * * *

  Ask the Sphinx

  In his September 1, 1991, press conference, George Bush suggested that Americans had risked their lives in Iraq “to defend Israelis” and complained he was “one lonely guy” confronting about “a thousand lobbyists” descending on Capitol Hill like the plague. Privately, he threatened to go on television and make a national address if the Israeli lobby did not back off its campaign to win guarantees from Congress.

  * * *

  The Arabs were also bitterly opposed to the guarantees and the immigration of Jews to Israel. They realized that the infusion of new potential soldiers, workers, and parents would greatly strengthen Israel’s military, economy, and society. Rather than explicitly saying this, however, they usually asserted that Israel was going to settle all the newcomers in the territories and thereby impede the peace process. The truth was that Israel did not force anyone to live in the territories, and very few Jews from either the Soviet Union or Ethiopia wanted to live in the West Bank.

  And more Ethiopians soon needed places to live.

  Operation Solomon

  Initially, Israeli officials believed most of the Jews of Ethiopia had been rescued in Operations Moses and Joshua. They learned later, however, that thousands remained behind.

  In early 1991, Eritrean and Tigrean rebels began a concerted attack on the Marxist government of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. When it became clear that his troops could not quell the rebellion, Mengistu fled. Israel watched with growing alarm as war and chaos engulfed Ethiopia and endangered the Jews caught in the cross fire. Shamir decided it was time once again for Israel to take dramatic action.

  The Israelis decided to mount another covert airlift. Thirty-four jumbo jets and Hercules C-130s were specially prepared—their seats were removed—to make room for as man
y people as possible. Shamir then authorized the Israeli airline, El Al, to fly on the Jewish Sabbath. On Friday, May 24, 1991, and continuing nonstop for 36 hours, the planes made round trips between Israel and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Operation Solomon rescued 14,324 Ethiopian Jews—twice the number evacuated in the winter of 1984–85 during Operations Moses and Joshua, in a fraction of the time. Yet again, Israel had pulled off a bold, successful mission to bring Jews back to their homeland.

  Rabin the Phoenix

  The Arabs didn’t share Israel’s joy at the influx of still more Jews. Little progress was made in the peace process, with the Palestinians claiming that Shamir’s settlement policy was creating problems on the ground that made territorial compromise impossible. The Bush administration agreed and held up providing loan guarantees to Israel, trying to blackmail Shamir into changing his policy. He did not.

  * * *

  Mysteries of the Desert

  Rabin agreed to go along with Bush’s insistence that the amount the United States determined that Israel had spent in the territories be deducted from the amount of the guarantees. Both Shamir and the Israeli lobby had fought this as a bad precedent of linking political issues to humanitarian assistance. Rabin saw the concession as an opportunity to win favor with Bush, and he also didn’t expect it to be costly because he planned to spend far less on the territories than his predecessor. In the end, Israel received nearly $9.3 billion of the $10 billion it requested from 1993 to 1997.