Chapter 10
Quixotic Quest (1970)
Undeterred by Hoover’s relentless surveillance and relieved of NUMEC’s debt by its sale to ARCO, in October 1970 Shapiro left NUMEC and joined Kawecki Berylco Industries. KBI was formed by the October 1968 merger of two smaller companies, Kawecki Chemical Company that produced fluoride salts near Boyertown, Pennsylvania and The Beryllium Corporation located in Reading, Pennsylvania. Among other specialty metals, KBI processed beryllium, an important metal used in atom bombs, either as a reflector to increase explosive yield without increasing weight and size or, in more rudimentary weapons, as a neutron source at the center of an implosion. After he accepted the new position, Shapiro requested an elevated AEC security clearance, called a Sigma clearance, in addition to his Q clearance, so that he could do nuclear-weapons-related work for his new employer. KBI had contracts related to nuclear weapons with an AEC office in New Mexico.408
On October 14, the AEC commissioners met in executive session to discuss Shapiro’s request for a higher clearance. After the meeting, Seaborg recorded in his daily diary, “This is a very difficult situation and we will have Security staff discuss it with him with a view of possibly having a Security Board review, a method of procedure which I inherently deplore. We will also check with the White House to get their views.”409
On October 29, John F. Doherty, the acting head of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice, wrote to the FBI Director to transmit a “Security Statement” prepared by the AEC with respect to Zalman Shapiro.410 Doherty noted,
Subject is now employed by Kawecki Berylco Industries, Inc., which has available all current and advanced [nuclear] weapons concepts and techniques related to beryllium weapons components. The proposed Security Statement charges that subject has “knowingly established an association with individuals reliably reported as suspected of espionage” and that subject has “engaged in conduct which tends to show that subject may be subject to influence or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of national security.”
The transmittal letter attached an eight-page Security Statement that included a list of numbered points that supported these overarching concerns. The items were drafted as admissions that AEC intended Shapiro to sign. The transmittal letter asked the Bureau to, “Advise whether any individuals are currently available to testify at an AEC Personnel Security Board hearing to any of the information set forth in the lettered paragraphs of the proposed Security Statement.” When it first released this document in the mid 1980s, FBI completely redacted the proposed eight-page Security Statement and the paragraph in the cover letter setting forth the overarching charges against Shapiro. When released again in 2009, pursuant to another FOIA request, most of the redactions had been eliminated except for six lines elaborating on the affairs of David L. Lowenthal, two lines related to the purported request by the Israeli intelligence operatives in 1968 for information about electricity generators powered by Pu-238 and three lines related to ISORAD.
Consistent with the idea of a Personnel Security Board hearing, William Riley and Sid Kingsley, a lawyer from AEC’s office of general counsel, met with Shapiro on October 30 to advise him that his security clearance was under reconsideration because of the increased access to classified information that he would have at Kawecki Berylco. They informed him that the commission might use its administrative review procedures to resolve his application for clearance, i.e., his case might involve a public hearing. Shapiro left the impression with Riley that he would fight his case in such a hearing and said he had informed Kawecki Berylco of his past clearance problems. Shapiro said his problems “all stem from the Joint Committee . . . [where some] staff members . . . still believe that he had shipped special nuclear material to Israel.” Riley advised that he had told the commission of Shapiro’s claim that he had not passed classified information to unauthorized people, but that he also told the commission, “Dr. Shapiro had been less than candid in clarifying the derogatory implications, particularly the airport incident.” Shapiro “mentioned that Atlantic-Richfield [ARCO] had given ISORAD, the NUMEC-based company in Israel, to the Israeli company . . . because of Atlantic-Richfield’s relations with the Arabs in oil rights. He also indicated that he still plans to live in Israel.”411
On November 3, Seaborg called Attorney General John Mitchell to discuss Shapiro’s clearance request and to update Mitchell on the latest developments in the case. Seaborg said the commission had drafted a letter to Shapiro saying that a hearing would be held. The commission was prepared to send the letter, “provided Justice would be willing to release the information contained in the FBI reports; without the FBI information, a meaningful hearing could not be developed . . . alternatively, we could grant him clearance, but keep close surveillance of his activities involving the weapons aspects.”412 Mitchell said he would look into the matter. About this time, Seaborg also proposed to grant the clearance if Shapiro would swear an oath he had not passed sensitive information to any unauthorized person in the past and would not do so in the future.19
The following month, Riley told the commissioners at a luncheon meeting in their private dining room in Germantown that Mitchell and the White House “perhaps involving Henry Kissinger and even the President” had decided that the clearance should be denied without offering a hearing. Seaborg recorded in his diary, “This causes some consternation among the Commissioners because this will be the first instance in which such an action has been taken in the history of the Atomic Energy Commission.”413 In the meantime, the AEC continued Shapiro’s Q clearance while it decided what to do about the Sigma clearance.
At this point, Seaborg and his fellow commissioners faced a dilemma. Under AEC’s rules, they could not deny Shapiro’s clearance application without a hearing unless they found grounds to deny a hearing, which was unthinkable at the time because of the public reaction to the Oppenheimer affair. If they held a hearing, they could not consider the warrantless FBI surveillance information or the strong opposition in the White House and the Justice Department to granting of the clearance.
On December 11, Shapiro called Riley to ask if the commission had reached a conclusion in his case since the two of them had spoken about the matter on November 27. Shapiro said he had hired a lawyer but would not begin legal action against the AEC unless and until the commissioners denied his request for the Sigma clearance. He said he was prepared to advise the commission in writing that he had no intention to immigrate to Israel at this time. He advised Riley that he had asked Avraham Hermoni to speak on his behalf before any hearing that might be held on his clearance request. In addition, Shapiro said that his Israeli contacts had received information from a foreign government that a former AEC commissioner had suggested that he, Shapiro, was involved in diversion of materials to the Israelis. Riley told Shapiro he would be in touch in the near future.414
On January 21, 1971, Seaborg, Riley and AEC General Counsel Joseph F. Hennessey met with Attorney General Mitchell and Assistant Attorney General Robert Mardian in Mitchell’s office. Seaborg described his views on the case, i.e., the charges against Shapiro “were essentially without substance. . . . I strongly opposed denying a clearance without going through the hearing process . . . it had never been done before by any other government agency.” Mitchell said the charges against Shapiro “were serious enough so that the man should not have access to sensitive weapons information and he thought the case should be settled by the courts.” Seaborg’s rejoinder was that there would be sensational publicity associated with a hearing because Edward Bennett Williams was defending Shapiro and they intended to “put up a public fight in order to vindicate the man’s honor.” The meeting ended with Mitchell’s suggestion that Seaborg discuss the matter further with Secretary of State Rogers and National Security Advisor Kissinger.415
Shapiro’s new attorney, Edward Bennett Williams, was a well-known and successful Washington trial attorney who owned several prof
essional sports teams. He represented such high profile clients as Frank Costello, Hugh Hefner, Jimmy Hoffa, Joseph McCarthy and Frank Sinatra. Williams later represented Richard Helms when he was charged with lying to Congress. DCI Helms was an occasional guest in Williams’ box seats at the Washington Redskins’ home games.416 Evan Thomas, his biographer, observed, “Williams would defend anyone, he liked to say, as long as the client gave him total control of the case and paid up front. He would represent Mafia dons and pornographers for enormous fees. He would also represent priests, judges, and attractive women in distress for little or nothing.”417
On January 25, Seaborg, Riley and Hennessey met with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his assistant David Young in the White House. Seaborg reviewed the background of the Shapiro case, said the charges of diverting material were false and said he had briefed Attorney General Mitchell and Secretary of State Rogers. Seaborg told Kissinger that “scientists all over the country would be up in arms” if AEC denied Shapiro’s clearance request without holding a public hearing. Kissinger and Seaborg agreed to meet with Rogers and Mitchell to further address the clearance question in the near future. Seaborg had lunch in the White House dining room that same day with the president’s science advisor, Edward E. David. He told David that AEC commissioners and staff were “unanimous in opposing the proposed procedure.” David was sympathetic to Seaborg’s point of view and offered to talk to Mitchell about the matter, if necessary.418
The commissioners grew so desperate to find a way out of the clearance dilemma that on January 28, they directed AEC General Manager Robert Hollingsworth to find Shapiro another job.419 It is clear now that Seaborg and his fellow commissioners went to extremes to protect Shapiro’s interests. Shapiro had made choices about his friends, his affiliations and his job; his actions were called into question because of those choices; the government could not let him do a certain kind of work because of those questions; so, the government opted to find him another job. Even in America, where the relationship between politics and science often goes awry, one could not hope to get such a deal without friends in high places.
In February, David told the Justice Department that Shapiro “probably already has all the information necessary to make a simple nuclear weapon and thus it would be a mistake to drive him out of this country as a result of unfair treatment in the clearance process.”420 David was probably right. To incentivize AEC to find favorably on his clearance application, Shapiro said he did not intend to immigrate to Israel at this time. However, if his application was denied, Shapiro could always change his mind. Surely, notoriety would be attached to Shapiro’s immigration to Israel if his clearance were denied.
On February 18, Seaborg and Howard Brown had lunch with Helms in his private dining room on the seventh floor of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Seaborg described the impasse that had developed between AEC and Mardian of the Justice Department over Shapiro’s clearance request and emphasized his view that Shapiro “did not divert enriched uranium in the episode of a few years ago.” Helms told them he had no information about Shapiro that had not already been given to them. On a related subject, Seaborg urged Helms to “not become too concerned about cases of alleged leaking” of information about laser-induced controlled nuclear fusion to Israel.421
A week later, Seaborg and Justice agreed to tell Shapiro’s attorney that Justice was opposed to granting a Sigma clearance to Shapiro. On further reflection, AEC demurred by cancelling a scheduled meeting with Shapiro’s attorney without telling him of the Justice Department’s involvement in the case.422
On March 5, AEC Commissioners James Ramey and Clarence Larson met with the chairman, president and vice-president of KBI “to discuss possible solutions to the clearance problem that has been plaguing us.” The commissioners failed to convince KBI to change Shapiro’s job assignment; however they agreed to continue to extend his Q clearance while they continued to address his request for a Sigma clearance.423
While AEC and Justice deadlocked over Shapiro’s clearance request, AEC staff continued to hound him. On March 11, Riley informed Hoover that Shapiro, while working at KBI since July 20, 1970, had twice requested classified information for which he was not cleared. Riley told Hoover, “The AEC has not authorized KBI to grant Dr. Shapiro access to AEC classified information.”424 Hoover wrote back to Riley on March 16 to acknowledge that Shapiro, “without benefit of AEC clearance had been making inquiries regarding a classified AEC project.”20 The FBI retained Shapiro on its Security Index because of this infraction.425
The commissioners then reverted to the option of finding Shapiro another job. Unwilling to meet with him directly, they asked Frank Cotter, Westinghouse vice president and head of its Washington office, to meet with Shapiro to seek a way out of the dilemma. Instead, Cotter asked John Simpson, president of Westinghouse Power Systems, to offer Shapiro a job, which Simpson did on or about April 1. The job was senior technical advisor at a salary of $60,000 a year. Cotter also had a discussion with Shapiro where, according to Seaborg, Shapiro may first have learned of the full scope of difficulties he faced in upgrading his security clearance. Shapiro accepted Simpson’s offer soon after the Cotter discussion, and two weeks later withdrew his application for the Sigma clearance.426 On June 1, Shapiro wrote to AEC Commissioner Ramey to say he was pleased with his new job and to express his gratitude for Ramey’s “convincing me that in this case it was better to switch than fight.”427
On October 10, 1971, Edward Bennett Williams told Seaborg of his satisfaction with the manner in which Seaborg handled the case. Seaborg said there was more to the case than Williams knew and he would reveal more details someday. Seaborg also noted, “Williams told me that Bill Kilmer is a much better team leader for the Redskins than Sonny Jurgenson even though he is not as good a passer.”428
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On May 2, 1972, seven years after reaching FBI’s mandatory retirement age, J. Edgar Hoover died of heart failure, thus ending an unparalleled 48-year term in the same Federal office. His body lay in state in the Capitol where he was accorded full military honors. Hoover served eight presidents, and his tenure as director included gangster wars, prohibition, the great depression, World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War and the Vietnam War. He worked with eight DCIs.
On June 17, five men broke into Democratic National Committee Headquarters in the Watergate complex in downtown Washington, DC. Local police arrested them. The FBI later found that the five burglars were working for President Nixon’s staff and that former OSS and CIA operative E. Howard Hunt helped plan the break-in.
Congressional and media investigations of the break-in revealed a range of abuses, including campaign fraud, political espionage and sabotage, other illegal break-ins, improper tax audits, illegal wiretapping and a secret slush fund to help pay for it all. After two years of mounting evidence against the president and his staff, investigators uncovered a secret tape recording system in Nixon’s offices. The tapes provided evidence that six days after the break-in, Nixon and his staff conspired to cover it up. With the secret recording system cranking away, Nixon ordered his assistant H. R. Haldeman to tell CIA to tell FBI to back off its investigation. Haldeman did as he was told, but Helms refused to comply.429
Less than a year later, there was a changing of the guard at CIA. Helms had earned the president’s animosity by refusing to be part of the Watergate coverup. In early 1973, Nixon staffer John Dean again suggested that CIA intervene in FBI’s investigation to take the heat off Nixon. Helms again refused to go along with the shenanigans. Nixon fired him on February 2, 1973, less than two months short of his sixtieth birthday and CIA’s mandatory retirement age. Haldeman told Helms after the fact that Nixon forgot his promise that Helms could stay on until retirement.430
That same day, Nixon nominated Helms to be ambassador to Iran. During Helms’ confirmation hearings in 1973, Senator Stuart Symington (D-MO) questioned him on CIA’s role in the attempted subversion of Salvador
Allende’s government in Chile. The operations in Chile were still secret, and Helms chose to lie rather than ask for an executive session of the committee. He denied that CIA had aided Allende’s opposition. Subsequent investigations by Congress proved the lie. In 1977, Helms pled nolo contendere on the advice of his friend and attorney Edward Bennett Williams and his confidant Clark Clifford. The Federal judge sentenced Helms to two years in jail and a $2,000 fine. The sentence was suspended and friends from CIA paid the fine.
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Dr. James Schlesinger was Helms’ successor as DCI. Schlesinger was a Harvard-educated economist and a classmate of Henry Kissinger. He served as Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget from 1969 to 1971 and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1973. While at the budget bureau, Schlesinger led a three-month study for the Nixon administration that recommended the DCI assume a stronger leadership role in the intelligence community. Schlesinger surmised that the clandestine service was at the heart of CIA’s problem, consequently, “I’m going to bust it up,” he told the London chief of station.431
Schlesinger served as DCI for five months. Besides demonstrating a stronger leadership role for the DCI, he reorganized and reduced staff by getting rid of dead wood and moving slots from clandestine operations to coordination of the intelligence community. He had taken a similar tack at AEC to shake up and improve its regulatory program. In retrospect, his time at CIA was not long enough for him to accomplish anything important and was short enough to avoid getting into serious trouble. In July 1973, at the age of 44, he moved on to become Secretary of Defense during Nixon’s last year as president.
Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel Page 21