In his 1979 FBI interview, General Starbird made no mention of his earlier statement (attributed to him by Fialka and the Cockburns) that Ted Shackley of CIA told him of the HEU found near Dimona. However, former Air Force Colonel Robert A. Erickson, Chief of the Physical Security Branch in NRC’s Division of Safeguards, told the FBI that in about 1976 he saw a classified memorandum in General Starbird’s office that related to the NUMEC matter.666 He found it interesting and made a copy. Later, he read the story by John Fialka in The Washington Star dealing with NUMEC and found it to contain “much of the same information as the memorandum,” so he destroyed his copy.
On January 9, 1978 Erickson had provided a more detailed account of the classified memo he had read and copied in Starbird’s office. He said, “It was just a collection of ‘tidbits’ and it was very raw intelligence data. It did not say anything about people stealing material. Erickson later received a copy of this same document from Ralph G. Page and put it in his safe. The document bothered him because of its raw, unfinished nature and because it was about a person and was in the nature of character assassination. Because of this, he shortly thereafter destroyed the document . . . [before] he read an article by John Fialka in The Washington Star. What was in the article about the relationships was almost exactly what was contained in the document he destroyed. . . . [The document] came from Barry Rich [DOE staffer]. [Erickson] recalled that when Rich let him read the document he said something to the effect, ‘This thing is dynamite’ . . . the document helped [Erickson] know why the White House was concerned with the preparation of the report on safeguards—the fear of a possibility, rather than knowledge of a certainty, of diversion.”667 When the Conran task force interviewed Barry Rich in 1977, he made no mention of this “dynamite” document.
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Nearly all of FBI’s interviewees in 1979 were asked who paid the fine levied against NUMEC by AEC for the U-235 that was missing from the Astronuclear contract.41 One interviewee whose name was redacted said NUMEC borrowed money to pay the fine from either Pitt National Bank or Mellon Bank. As described above, the AEC interviews of NUMEC employees in 1966 disclosed that the penalty was underwritten by NUMEC’s line of credit with Mellon Bank, which is corroborated by the 1965 NUMEC report to shareholders. The FBI agents conducting the interviews in 1979 apparently had not read the file of FBI interviews conducted a decade earlier that contained this information. The FBI did not ask how the borrowed money was repaid. They should have known but may not have known that ARCO assumed all of NUMEC’s debts in its 1967 acquisition of NUMEC. No one mentioned the even larger quantities of U-235 that went missing from Apollo after 1966 and must have resulted in additional fines.
Gossick told his interviewing agent in 1979 that he had not been properly briefed before his Congressional testimony and should have testified that there was no conclusive evidence of a diversion at Apollo. It would have saved him a lot of grief if he had said this to Udall and Dingell, either publicly or privately.
Former NRC Chairman Rowden said that when he was AEC’s Assistant General Counsel for Administration and Litigation he gave legal advice to AEC employees who conducted the original investigation at Apollo in 1965 and 1966. He did not tell the agent that when he was Chairman of NRC and gave the Conran task force its assignment in 1977, he did not disclose his previous connection with the NUMEC matter. Rowden also did not tell the FBI agent or the Conran task force about the extended interactions among FBI, Shapiro, Seaborg and the Nixon administration that Seaborg later recounted in his 1993 memoir. Rowden probably knew these details because of his service in the AEC’s General Counsel’s Office, including the years when Seaborg was chairman. For example, Rowden did not say that Hoover thought Shapiro was not trustworthy and should have his clearance removed. Rowden did not tell the FBI in this interview about his interactions with the NSC in the run-up to the release of the inventory difference report in 1977.
In late 1977, Rowden told NRC investigators that he became AEC Solicitor in 1966 with responsibilities that took him away from the NUMEC affair.668
In April 1979, David Burnham opined on Rowden’s role in the 1965-1966 AEC investigation of NUMEC.669
After months of inaction, the five men who ran the commission decided on their course: AEC investigators would interview present and former NUMEC employees, commission auditors would examine NUMEC records regarding uranium shipments out of the United States, and the FBI would be asked to investigate the apparent theft (“unlicensed transfer”) of uranium. . . .
For reasons never satisfactorily explained, however, the bold plans were short-circuited. The theft of nuclear materials was clearly under the jurisdiction of the FBI. But after only one week’s consideration, Bureau officials told the AEC that the FBI would not investigate the matter.
The possibility that AEC might undermine what happened with its own investigation was likewise undermined when the commission’s general counsel, over the protests of his investigators, ordered them not to take any written statements. The [assistant general] counsel at that time, a thirty-eight-year-old career government lawyer named Marcus Rowden, a decade later was named chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by President Ford.
Was the AEC sabotaging the very investigation it had just ordered? We don’t know. We do know, however, that despite the lack of an immediate FBI investigation and a crippled effort by the AEC, the commission did not hesitate to assure Congress that they saw no cause for alarm.
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In early November 1979, Lee Gossick resigned from NRC. The press reported that the commission fired Gossick because of a failure to effectively run the NRC emergency management team during the accident at Three Mile Island in March 1979. Gossick said he resigned because of a chronic failure of the commission “to reach consensus of any kind on many matters.”670 This was an unfortunate end to an otherwise distinguished career. It could have been avoided if Gossick had just modified his congressional testimony on NUMEC, either before or after the fact.
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On November 27, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski denied a request from one of the NSC staff that John Deutch of DOE be given access to an August 1977 memorandum Brzezinski wrote to the president regarding NUMEC. The Top Secret memo was based on briefings Jessica Tuchman Mathews received from FBI, ERDA and CIA. The staffer said that Senator John Glenn had been “pressing John Deutch of DOE for his views on this matter.” The staffer said, “he [Deutch] and I believe it is important that he should know the contents of the memorandum in order to avoid stepping into unknown pitfalls in this sensitive matter.” Brzezinski checked “Disapprove” at the bottom of the memo and added a hand written note, “Brief him orally.”671
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The FBI continued its investigation after its November 1979 report. In an interview by the Bureau’s Chicago office on November 14, 1979, an unidentified source recounted Conran’s allegations. He felt that Conran “was basically correct” regarding a coverup of the NUMEC matter. The source also expressed annoyance with the high ranking retired generals who were “the major obstruction regarding disclosure of the diversion coverup.”672
On February 7, 1980, FBI’s Washington Field Office issued a report of the final two interviews requested by Justice, saying, “Since no further investigation remains, this matter is being closed at WFO.”673
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On March 7, 1980, the FBI Director alerted the Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and Washington field offices that three employees in NRC’s Regional Office in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania had come forward with new information on NUMEC. The information concerned the availability of shipping containers for the alleged diversion and the identity [redacted] of a person or persons that one of the sources “suspected may have been involved in the alleged diversion.”674 During a subsequent March 19 interview by the FBI, an NRC inspector of fuel facilities recalled an interview on March 5 with an individual in Apollo. That individual had called NRC on February 27 alleging health hazards
at the Apollo plant where he worked. The plant was then owned and operated by Babcock and Wilcox and was located near the alleger’s former place of residence. He said B&W dismissed him when he took time off work for illness, saying he “abandoned his job.” He said he had been in contact with authorities of Pennsylvania and someone advised him to contact NRC. The alleger’s union was currently undergoing a grievance proceeding with B&W to get his job back. The NRC inspector believed the alleger “wanted to wait until this grievance was settled before he considered contacting NRC because both the company and the union consider the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the enemy.”
Towards the end of the interview, the NRC inspector asked the alleger “if there were any security problems at the Babcock and Wilcox Plant [Apollo].” The alleger said “when he read an article in the newspaper concerning losses of nuclear material when Mr. Shapiro was there, he had to laugh.” When the NRC inspector asked why, the alleger related a story that he asked the inspector to keep off the record.
The alleger stated that in 1965 or 1966, soon after starting work for NUMEC, he and another individual who he was not able to identify were walking near the loading dock at the Apollo facility. “He observed some people, who he was unable to identify, loading cans into some equipment . . . the cans were of the approximate size and dimension that would contain high enriched uranium, that is, six inches high and three and a half to four inches in diameter. . . . He noticed that the shipping papers for the equipment indicated that the material was destined for Israel. He stated that there was a guard with a gun who ordered them to leave the area. As a result of this confrontation, he and his associate left the area.” The interviewee went on to identify several people still employed at Apollo who might know more about this occurrence.
That same day, the FBI interviewed James Devlin, chief of the Security and Investigations Section, Safeguards Branch of NRC Region 1 in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. Devlin said his office did not conduct any investigation regarding the statements of this alleger.675
[Devlin] did indicate, however, that in 1965-1966 the Atomic Energy Commission (the NRC’s predecessor) did not impose any safeguard requirements on organizations like NUMEC and NUMEC did not have a security force per se. According to Devlin, NUMEC’s only armed guard was an individual by the name of (redacted) who was also a Deputy Policeman for the local town, which he believed to be Leechburg Township, PA. According to Devlin, the only other security coverage at the NUMEC facility were unarmed, un-uniformed watchmen who patrolled after hours.
The foregoing interviews led FBI to interview an unnamed former B&W employee on March 21. That individual probably was the alleger identified by NRC, but his identity is unclear from the redacted records that FBI released. In any event, a confidential source told FBI (extraneous information has been deleted from this quotation),
In late March or early April 1965 (exact date unknown) while working [at Apollo] on a swing shift from 3:30 p.m. until 12:00 a.m., his ammoniator was shut down between approximately 9:00 and 10:00 p.m. in the evening. He stated that because of negative air pressure within the plant area, conditions were usually very warm so he walked out to the loading dock for a breath of air. The loading dock was located approximately 20 feet from his equipment through a single door. He advised that employees often went to the loading dock to get a breath of air and further said he thought he remembered an employees’ eating area on the dock.
He related that when he entered the loading dock area on this particular evening, he noticed a flatbed truck backed up to the loading dock with some strange equipment on it. He described the equipment as several steel cabinets with some kind of gauges on the front of them and other equipment, which looked like lathes. He opined the equipment may have come from the pelletizer area of which he was not familiar. He advised he then noticed the NUMEC owner, Dr. Zalman Shapiro, pacing around the loading dock while (redacted) (Shipping and Receiving Foreman) and (redacted) (NUMEC truck driver) were loading “stove pipes” into the steel cabinet type equipment that he observed on the truck. He recalled there were four or five of the steel cabinets on the flatbed truck. He stated that (redacted) and (redacted) never loaded trucks themselves, always employing other workers.
He stated that the “stove pipes” are cylindrical storage containers used to store canisters of high enriched materials in the vaults located at the Apollo nuclear facility. He stated that the “stove pipes” contained three or four canisters which were described as highly polished aluminum with standard printed square yellow labels, approximately three inches in diameter by six inches tall, that normally are used to store high enriched uranium products which he defined as 95 percent uranium.
He stated that he observed two workmen, whose names he could not recall, bringing the “stove pipes” from the High Enriched vault area located approximately 150 feet from the docks to the dock area where (redacted) and (redacted) opened the “stove pipes” and withdrew the canisters located in the “stove pipes.” He then said (redacted) checked the label on each canister for information and checked it off on a shipping order he had attached to a clipboard. He advised that the canisters were then replaced in the “stove pipe” and then the “stove pipe” itself was loaded into the cabinet type equipment after being wrapped with a brown paper type insulation. He advised that he observed one cabinet being loaded and that the “stove pipes” were placed one in each back corner of the cabinet and one in the front center of the cabinet directly behind the door. [The draft of this FBI document recorded that the source also advised that most shipping at Apollo was done during the day.]
He described the canisters found in the “stove pipes” as approximately three inches by six inches, bright polished aluminum canisters with yellow labels containing typewritten information and nuclear “fan” symbols in the upper corners of the label. He said he never observed typewritten information on the labels that he had previously seen on the dock.
He advised he was sure this was High Enriched uranium products due to the size and shape of the container and the labeling. He stated that the containers he used in the Low Enriched area were much larger than the canisters he observed and used a different label.
He stated he had never seen “stove pipes” used as shipping containers but whenever High Enriched uranium products were shipped, the canisters were unloaded from the “stove pipes” and loaded into cement lined steel drums. He further advised that the route the workmen transporting the “stove pipes” used took them away from the Low Enriched area and brought them onto the dock through a different door. The Low Enriched materials vaults were located approximately 50 feet from the dock area down an angled corridor. He said the normal route for High Enriched materials from the High Enriched vaults was down the same corridor where the Low Enriched vaults were located.
(Redacted), citing his natural curiosity, stated he observed (redacted) lay his clipboard down on the empty drum located on the dock, whereupon he proceeded to read the information contained on the shipping order. He said he noticed that the destination for the equipment on the truck was Israel, and that it was to be transported by ship. He recalled that the ship had a long foreign name, which he believed to be Greek, and its location at the time was in New York City.
He stated that after he had quickly read the information contained on the shipping order, (redacted) grabbed the clipboard away from him, telling him in words to the effect that the material contained in the shipping order was confidential and not for his eyes. He advised that shortly thereafter, an armed guard ordered him off the loading dock. He stated that he did not observe anybody call the armed guard nor did he see the guard on the dock, but that he believed the guard came from one of the hallways adjoining the dock. He stated that he was on the loading dock for approximately 15 minutes and that at no time did Dr. Shapiro (redacted) or (redacted) or anybody else ask him to leave.
He further advised that it was highly unusual to see Dr. Shapiro in the manufacturing section of the Apollo
nuclear facility; it was unusual to see Dr. Shapiro there at night; and very unusual to see Dr. Shapiro so nervous as to pace around. He described Dr. Shapiro as a very calm, cool and collected man who never got upset.
He advised he had not come forward before because he had a large family to support and the day following the incident, the plant Personnel Manager (name unrecalled) of NUMEC threatened to fire him if he “did not keep his mouth shut” concerning what he had seen on the loading dock the night before. He further advised he mentioned the threat he received from the Personnel Manager to his union steward, whereupon he claims he was visited by “some union goons” from Kittanning, Pa., and again told to keep his mouth shut.
He stated the prevailing attitude at the plant in 1965 by management, union and employees was that the Atomic Energy Commission was the enemy looking for a reason to shut the facility down with the resultant job losses. In addition he stated he did not know how or who to contact in authority who would take action.
A second version of this interview in the FBI files has somewhat different redactions and appears to be a Teletype draft of the document quoted above.676
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In March, word of the continuing investigation got back to Shapiro, and he had a Washington lawyer named Harold Ungar (an associate of Edward Bennett Williams) speak to the New York Times. Ungar said that his client’s position, “is very simple: he never diverted a single microgram of nuclear material to Israel or anyone else and does not believe that any one else did so at the plant.”677
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It appears that FBI was receiving new information from a new source about some suspicious shipping activities that occurred in early 1965, just before the Oak Ridge audit in April, which found that 93.8 kilograms of U-235 was unaccounted for. The new source was not entirely consistent in telling his story. For example, he told the NRC inspector that another employee accompanied him to the dock for a breath of air. That fellow employee is missing from his later interview with the FBI agent. The part about an armed guard telling employees to leave the loading dock on the night in question was not disclosed by earlier AEC or FBI investigations. Its relevance is that AEC did not require nor did NUMEC normally provide armed guards for shipments in the 1960s. Gerry Page, Deputy Director of NRC’s Division of Safeguards, confirmed that AEC regulations did not require armed guards at sites like Apollo until the 1970s.678
Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel Page 36