Unionism is as complex as nationalism, and its history has also been interpreted in a number of ways. Alvin Jackson has argued, however, that, like nationalism, the more complex that unionist history is shown to be, the more simplified the political unionist rhetoric becomes in contemporary Northern Ireland. What this means is that contemporary militant and extreme notions of nationalism and unionism must rely on simple explanations of history, and so the potential for greater understanding between the two communities through the reading of professional history is lost. Like nationalism, interpretations of unionism first appeared mainly in the form of biographies of great unionist leaders, and books written by participants in the Home Rule crisis of the early twentieth century.
A good example of an ideologically unionist, but nevertheless well-researched, history of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century battles over the political state of Ireland was Ronald McNeill’s Ulster’s Stand for the Union (1922). McNeill was a unionist, but claimed to have written a professional history of the period. This is true in the sense that he used recognizable historical sources, but his political stance skewed the interpretations towards the unionist cause. McNeill, however, was very successful in inspiring a number of important unionist-influenced histories throughout the middle decades of the twentieth century. Like the Easter Rising for nationalists, gun-running for the defence of unionism in 1914 has been seen as a seminal event for unionists. F.H. Crawford, one of the leading gun-runners, wrote Guns for Ulster in 1947 as not only a defence of the practice, but as a celebration of unionist backbone. Crawford was sponsored by the Northern Ireland government to publish his memories of these events, as was the case with several unionist historians who enjoyed official or semi-official patronage.
The most professional successor of McNeill, however, was A.T.Q. Stewart, whose Ulster Crisis (1967) was well received by the public. Although a professional historian who employed professional techniques, Stewart was openly sympathetic to unionism as both an historical movement and an enduring political ideology in the years just before the Northern Ireland Troubles broke out (see chapter nine). The main thrust of his Ulster Crisis was that the political separation of Northern Ireland from the south was an inevitability, based on major differences between the two parts of the island. Further, he argued that unionists such as Carson and Craig were heroes in standing up for this difference and demanding to remain within the Union.
After the start of the Troubles, however, more professional and academic historians became interested in unionism. Generally speaking, these scholars were not unionists themselves (or at least they did not discuss their political leanings). Much of this work concerned the state of Northern Ireland in the latter decades of the twentieth century, and so will be discussed in the Interpretations section of chapter eight. But several historians have tackled the issue of unionism during the period discussed in this chapter. Peter Gibbon’s Origins of Ulster Unionism (1975) focuses on the different types of unionism found in town and country in Ulster. During this period, he argues, rural unionism (that is, the unionism of the landed elite which was generally preoccupied with issues of land) was gradually taken over by urban unionism (which was dominated by industrialists and merchants and not only catered for the economic demands of those interests, but also tried to enhance the image of Ulster as an industrial centre more like Britain than the rest of Ireland).
Perhaps the most important historian of unionism, however, has been Alvin Jackson, whose work has shown the extent and diversity of unionist ideology and action. Jackson has reminded historians that unionism sprang from many different sources (including the south of Ireland). For instance, its intellectual heart, he argues, was Trinity College Dublin, where many notable unionists (including Isaac Butt) were educated, and where a culture of ‘advanced’ (i.e. non-sectarian) unionism prevailed. He has also shown that many unionist myths and celebrated historical events (such as the siege of Derry in 1689, the Battle of the Boyne in 1690, and Ulstermen’s participation in the First World War) have parallels among nationalists, and are held in the same esteem and veneration. Most importantly, like Gibbon and others, he has drawn out the complexities of unionism and the differences of opinion among unionists, to show that they were not a monolithic group of ‘No Surrender’ men, that even Carson had moments when he would have considered a compromise with nationalists over Home Rule, and that unionism never represented the unified threat to Britain that it was feared it did during that crisis. (See his The Ulster Party: Irish Unionists in the House of Commons, 1884–1911, 1989; Sir Edward Carson, 1993; and Colonel Edward Saunderson: Land and Loyalty in Victorian Ireland, 1995; as well as his Ireland 1798–1998, 1999.)
EIGHT
The Making of Two Irelands, 1922–66
The formal partition of Ireland happened in 1921, but the northern and southern parts of the island became more and more politically independent of each other in the first half of the twentieth century. Mutual mistrust and hostility, as well as very different economic and social circumstances, ensured that two very different societies would emerge. There were some ways in which the two Irelands co-operated, including agricultural and fishing policy, and cultural entities (in sport, music, art, and even professional history) were often founded on an ‘All-Ireland’ basis. This co-operation was not as well-noticed as the more prominent political differences, and therefore has not received the same attention from scholars.
The Irish Free State went through two further constitutional transformations between 1922 and 1949, emerging as the modern and fully independent Republic of Ireland. Northern Ireland remained part of the United Kingdom, although it had its own parliament and governing executive. The Free State and the Republic had much economic difficulty in these years, as it struggled between defining itself as a largely agricultural nation or as a modern industrial country. Northern Ireland already had a relatively modern industrial economy. But Northern Irish society was based on inequalities between Protestants and Catholics, which would cause lasting resentment, and ultimately violence, from the late 1960s to the end of the century. The economic histories of both Irelands during this period varied widely between boom and bust, and protectionism and free trade. But even in the economic sphere, the national question was prominent. In Northern Ireland, there was a good deal of pride in its industrialization and higher living standards than in the Free State, as well as constant emphasis on the connection with Great Britain (it enjoyed free trade with Britain, of course, while Free State goods were charged a duty). Ideas of nation were reflected in the Free State’s economic policies as well. Especially during the 1930s, economic policies were designed to create a self-sufficient, largely agricultural country, which to many politicians embodied the ideal of Ireland. Eamonn de Valera, the Prime Minister from 1932 to 1948, publicly discussed the ‘Ireland which we dreamed of’. This was ‘a land whose countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sound of industry, with the romping of sturdy children … and the laughter of comely maidens, whose firesides would be the forums of wisdom and serene old age.’ This romantic vision was as completely out of step with European modernization as it was reflective of the hopes of Irish nationalists. In reality, neither the south’s self-sufficiency agenda, nor Northern Ireland’s mirroring many of the British economic policies, effected the desired outcomes. In the south, protectionism (although initially successful and probably necessary) and self-sufficiency created many more problems than they solved. And Northern Ireland was hampered by Britain’s general economic woes in the post-war period. In the immediate years after the Treaty which partitioned the island, Northern Ireland was granted subsidies for farming and social security. The Free State no longer had to pay taxes to the British government and did not have to worry about funding Belfast’s industrial unemployment. So at first it appeared as though both Irelands would benefit economically from partition.
THE IRISH FREE STATE, 1922–32
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bsp; The Dáil’s debate over the Anglo-Irish Treaty set the tone for the confrontational Irish politics that were to plague the early years of the Irish Free State. Those who supported the treaty called themselves Cumann na nGaedheal and the anti-treaty members under de Valera retained the name Sinn Féin. De Valera and Sinn Féin thought that the treaty was a betrayal of the Republic that had been proclaimed by Patrick Pearse during the Easter Rising. Since the Dáil had ratified the treaty, de Valera and his followers refused to recognize its authority and withdrew from it. Arthur Griffith, as the head of Cumann na nGaedheal, was elected president of the Dáil on 10 January 1922. In addition to this constitutional struggle, there was a serious problem with the IRA. Once the British forces and police started removing themselves from various posts across the country, they were usually taken over by the IRA. Michael Collins still had control of much of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, many of whom were in high positions in the IRA. He was able, therefore, to convince about half of the IRA to join the new Free State Army. The other half were more militantly republican and stayed loyal to the anti-treaty forces. This polarization of the main militant forces in the Free State led gradually to a destructive civil war between the pro- and anti-treaty groups. Anti-treaty IRA members created their own military formations (and were dubbed ‘The Irregulars’ by the pro-treaty side). In April 1922, the Irregulars occupied the Four Courts building in Dublin and set it up as their headquarters. After failed negotiations, Michael Collins, as head of the Free State Army, shelled the Four Courts on 28 June 1922. Although successful after two days of shelling, this attack further polarized opinion, and many non-militant Sinn Féiners, including de Valera, joined the Irregulars.
The Irish civil war had started, and, although the Free State Army easily won battles around Dublin, the Irregulars quickly began a guerrilla war in other areas of the country. The Church urged people to accept the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 and said that the killing of Free State soldiers during the civil war was ‘murder’, and that those who did so could not receive absolution through confession or take communion. The church’s stance on nationalism and the national ideal, however, was not as clear-cut as this would seem to indicate. Some priests were sympathetic to the anti-treaty forces, and there was a major disagreement between bishops in Ireland and the Vatican about the Church and the government hindering the nationalist movement. The heaviest fighting took place during the summer, and Michael Collins was killed in an ambush on 20 August in County Cork. But the Free State Army was eventually too much for the Irregulars. They called a cease-fire on 30 April 1923, and de Valera told his followers to lay down their arms on 24 May. In the meantime, Arthur Griffith had died of a brain haemorrhage on 12 August 1922. The deaths of Collins and Griffith left the Free State without its main leaders. The new leader of the Free State, William Cosgrave (1880–1965), and his minister for defence took a hard line with captured Irregulars, interning many and executing nearly eighty, including some who had fought in the Easter Rising. During the next decade, the Irish Free State under Cosgrave and the Cumann na nGaedheal party tried to repair the damage that the Anglo-Irish War and the civil war had caused, as well as form a police service (Gárda Siochána [garda she-ah-caw-nah], founded 8 August 1923), and other state infrastructure. Also, the Boundary Commission set up in the Anglo-Irish Treaty met in October 1924 to establish the future of the border between the Irish Free State and the province of Northern Ireland. Tense and controversial negotiations took place throughout 1924 and most of 1925.
These culminated in a meeting in London in late November and early December 1925, in which the Free State accepted that Northern Ireland would never willingly join a United Ireland, and with the provision of financial concessions from the British government, agreed that the border would remain in place. In reaction to the Boundary Commission’s report, Cosgrave tried to prevent nationalist opinion from deserting him by implementing a nationalist cultural policy. The first attempt was to use the Irish language to ‘re-gaelicize’ the country through the educational system. The Irish language became a required part of elementary and secondary education, and an acceptable degree of fluency was required for the civil service and some of the professions and university positions. Irish history was to be taught in schools in a nationalistic way, arguing that independence had been the primary goal of all nationalists since Theobald Wolfe Tone and his United Irishmen in the 1780s and 1790s. Much of this effort coincided with public opinion in the Free State, which increasingly saw Irishness as synonymous with rural life, an agricultural economy, and the Catholic religion.
After their defeat in the civil war, de Valera and Sinn Féin stayed out of the Dáil for most of the 1920s. In March 1926, however, de Valera and Sinn Féin met to discuss whether they should return to mainstream politics and re-enter future Dáil elections. The IRA had withdrawn its support for de Valera because it thought he had not been militant enough against the Free State during the civil war. De Valera had maintained a fairly moderate stance (even though he had enlisted in the Irregulars), and he often tried to reach an agreement with the Free State by negotiation during the war. Freed from the extreme militancy of the IRA, de Valera thought that Sinn Féin would also be free to return to normal politics. But his proposals were largely rejected by Sinn Féin, and he decided to form a new party, Fianna Fáil [feena foil], on 16 May 1926. Many moderate Sinn Féiners and others joined de Valera, and they won forty-four seats in the election of June 1927. But the Fianna Fáil members refused to take the oath to the British crown, which was still required under the dominion status that the Free State held in the British Commonwealth. This meant they could not take their seats in the Dáil. Cosgrave held on to his administration. The government then decided that Fianna Fáil’s refusal to take the oath (which left some Dáil seats empty) was unfair to other parties, and passed a bill which made the practice illegal. This forced de Valera to chose between taking an oath he despised or being left out of official politics permanently. On 10 August 1927, de Valera and his party took the oath and entered the Dáil. Fianna Fáil held enough seats, in coalition with some smaller parties, to force a no-confidence motion in Cosgrave’s Cumann na nGaedheal government. This was passed, and another election was held in September 1927. At this election, Fianna Fáil won fifty-seven seats and Cumann na nGaedheal sixty-seven (staying in government). The major effect of this election, however, was that the other, smaller parties that had held seats before Fianna Fáil came back into the Dáil lost much of their representation. From this election, then, the Free State was to have a (mainly) two-party system. At the next election in 1932, de Valera’s Fianna Fáil party won seventy-two seats and formed a government made up of many of the men who had taken up arms against the pro-treaty Free State ten years previously.
The strength of the political tension between the pro- and anti-treaty sides during this period meant that the ideological division in Irish politics was largely based on ideas of the nation, rather than on economic or social theories as in other European countries. Throughout the rest of the twentieth century, it became nearly impossible to talk about Irish politics in left/right or conservative/socialist terms. The long struggle for some sort of independence, combined with limited social and economic reforms brought in by the British, meant that it was the sovereignty question that preoccupied Irish political minds for nearly fifty years. Another influential element in the process, however, was the fact that, in its early years, Fianna Fáil cast itself as a populist party and (within the limits of a heavily Catholic and largely conservative country like the Free State) adopted many of the more moderate policies of the Irish Labour Party. Fianna Fáil, therefore, marginalized the labour movement. The electorate then saw no real reason to support the Labour Party in significant numbers. Now that Fianna Fáil had come in from the cold, and the major dispute over the Anglo-Irish Treaty was over, the difficult questions of building a nation could begin to be addressed.
Throughout the 1920s, the Free State government purs
ued generally conservative economic policies. The Department of Finance kept a fairly tight grip on government spending, only loosening the purse strings when a project showed overwhelming need and popular support. One such project was the massive hydro-electric power plant built on the River Shannon. Further, the Free State more or less adopted British economic models during the 1920s. The Irish pound was tied to the British pound. The Free State passed the Land Purchase Act in 1923, the effect of which was that nearly all farms became owned by the people who worked them. A similar act was passed in Northern Ireland. Generally speaking, the conservative nature of economic policies benefited farmers with large holdings, as well as cattle ranchers. This angered smaller farmers. But agriculture in the south suffered during this period. Spending on the poor in the 1920s was not extensive. Proposals for unemployment insurance were rejected, hospitals and health care systems were antiquated and stayed that way without an increase in government spending, and old-age pensions were reduced. Overall, though, the 1920s were good years economically (even though agricultural prices remained low). Wages rose, and the Wall Street crash in 1929 and subsequent financial panic did not affect the Free State immediately. But these facts hid the uneven distribution of economic success across the country, and de Valera and Fianna Fáil were able to exploit them during the election of 1932.
NORTHERN IRELAND, 1922–32
King George opened the first Northern Ireland parliament on 22 June 1921. It contained an overwhelming number of unionist members, who had been elected on 21 May. Sir James Craig (1871–1940) was the first Prime Minister of the province. Nationalists were represented by the Nationalist Party of Northern Ireland and Sinn Féin, but they only held twelve seats between them. Sinn Féin refused to take their seats, but the Nationalist Party entered parliament in 1924. The ultimate difficulty for political nationalists was that they generally refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Northern Ireland parliament. Even the Nationalist Party, who sat in the parliament, did not act as an official opposition since that would mean that they supported the idea of a separate Northern Ireland government. This only reinforced the idea held by some unionists that nationalists were not able to handle governmental affairs, and that the largely nationalist Catholic population of Northern Ireland were not loyal to the government, nor were they good citizens. This is not to say, however, that unionists and Protestants were always united in their aims for Northern Ireland. There was much diversity of opinion among them, and the Northern Irish governments of the 1920s often had to contend with discontented Protestant churches and the revived Orange Order (who, for instance, agitated against non-denominational schools set up in 1923), as well as temperance reformers fighting for local power over licensing laws. Political measures were taken throughout the 1920s to lessen the effectiveness of these groups, and to forestall any political power that Northern Ireland Catholics might build up. Although elections were originally designed using proportional representation (which usually provides minorities with more potential for electing people to parliament), the Northern Ireland parliament abolished this system for local and central government by 1929. Business owners (mainly unionist) were given an extra vote for owning business property, and constituency boundaries were often redrawn to guarantee unionist majorities. But the abolition of proportional representation also ensured that only the main unionist parties would be successful. Smaller, fringe unionist parties (as well as socialist parties) were marginalized into oblivion. This system generally produced what Prime Minister James Craig called ‘a Protestant parliament for a Protestant people’.
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