Much recent historical work has shown that there were strong differences between the two main political groups in the Free State/Republic, which were greater than generally thought, and that these differences come from long-standing divisions in ideas about the nature of the country and its political future. Jeffrey Prager argued that one of the fundamentally important political aspects of the Free State was the difference between those who supported the Treaty (and eventually became Cumann na nGaedheal) and those who opposed the Treaty (and who became Fianna Fáil). This was a difference in political ideological background, which has not received adequate attention from scholars (who have concentrated on divisions surrounding the Treaty and the civil war). Free Staters, he argues, belonged to an ‘Irish Enlightenment’ background, which can be traced all the way back to the 1790s. Republicans belonged to a ‘Gaelic-Romantic’ ideology, which had its roots in the cultural and militant nationalism of the late eighteenth century. Since the supporters of the Treaty were the first governing party in the Free State, they set the early political agenda, and later Fianna Fáil governments had to respond to it. This agenda was preoccupied with building an Irish democracy, and the ‘national question’ (over partition and the border) was sidelined (Jeffrey Prager, Building Democracy in Ireland, 1986).
In The Making of Fianna Fáil Power in Ireland, 1923–1948 (1995), Richard Dunphy further advances the argument that the national question did not completely define party politics in the Free State and the Republic during this period. Internal party-political issues and questions also had a broad impact on events. One of the problems that Cumann na nGaedheal had was that they not only let Fianna Fáil capture the ‘more nationalist’ label, but also they did not concentrate sufficiently on party politics, to the detriment of their electoral successes. Cumann na nGaedheal, he argues, spent a great deal of time ensuring that the Free State population became generally loyal to the new institutions of Irish government, and not enough time defining themselves as a political party and building up a core base of support. One way of looking at the early years of independent Ireland, therefore, was that Cumann na nGaedheal toiled to build institutions that Fianna Fáil were then able to use to gain further support after their first term in government. In other words, Fianna Fáil were able to capitalize on the popular good will that Cumann na nGaedheal had built up with governmental institutions. This helped to cause the general wandering of Cumann na nGaedheal/Fine Gael in the political desert.
In his big book, Ireland 1912–1985: Politics and Society (1989), Joseph Lee argues that the national question was not pursued forth-rightly by either nationalists or unionists. He emphasizes that there was a great deal of self-deception amongst nationalists (and unionists, although he does not treat them as extensively since the book is mainly about the Free State and the Republic). This deception meant that meaningful dialogue between the south and north was delayed much further than it should have been, which gave the extremists on both sides time to solidify their opinions.
Lee also carefully examines economics. His main argument is that the Irish Free State and the Republic in the twentieth century failed the Irish people through mis-management of the economy. He claims that Ireland was behind all western European countries, even Britain, in economic performance. His comparative analysis with other European countries did much to break the historio-graphical tradition of looking at modern Irish political and economic history as a relationship between Britain and Ireland alone. On government economic policy before 1960, Mary Daly has argued that the much-lauded semi-state (or state-sponsored) industries were not as successful as generally perceived. In the first place, the Irish industries of this type were not as extensive as they had been in other European countries, and this prevented them from making sufficient economic impact. In the second place, because they could rely on a certain level of state support, they did not really compete with private businesses. This led them to become sluggish and non-innovative. Joseph Lee termed them ‘rats who could not run’. (See Mary Daly, Industrial Development and Irish National Identity, 1922–1939, 1992, and Joseph Lee (ed.), Ireland 1945–1970, 1979.) In other ways that influenced economics, Lee argues, the Free State and the Republic remained behind Europe. Academic life and the flourishing of universities in Ireland only began in the second half of the twentieth century. In many other European countries, even those ravaged by the two world wars, universities had begun to expand earlier and were more professionally run in the first half of the century. This not only caused problems in Irish education, but in economic and industrial life.
Religious life in the Free State and Republic has also gained much attention, partly because it was so important to the defining of southern society, and also because it became a significant aspect of how the south was viewed in Northern Ireland. Most historians agree that the influence of the Catholic Church on society and politics in the Free State and the Republic increased from 1922 until after the Second World War, and that it has decreased since the early 1950s. John Whyte’s Church and State in Modern Ireland, 1923–1979 (1980) shows that there was close dialogue between the Church and government ministers in the Free State period. Importantly, public opinion generally supported this connection. During the 1950s and 1960s, however, church influence suffered a few important blows. One was the public’s reaction to what was seen as church interference over the Mother and Child Scheme in 1951. Book bans and other censorship were also reduced during these years, which Whyte analyses carefully. Dermot Keogh’s The Vatican, the Bishops, and Irish Politics, 1919–46: International Relations, Diplomacy, and Politics (1986) also shows the strong influence that the Church hierarchy had over government policy. His research in government archives has shown that, during the 1920s and 1930s, church attempts at influencing government policy were even greater than was publicly admitted. Tom Inglis, while agreeing with Whyte and Keogh about the depth of church influence and involvement in Free State politics and society, goes further to condemn the church for ‘limiting’ Irish society during this period. His Moral Monopoly: the Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in Modern Ireland (1988) argues this strongly, saying that the church was a ‘coercive organization’ during this period, and that it hemmed in the development of Irish society.
Northern Ireland has also received extensive critical scrutiny. Some of the strongest criticism of the Northern Ireland government in the period between the Treaty and the Troubles relates to the question of discrimination against the Catholic minority. The State in Northern Ireland, 1921–72: Political Forces and Social Classes (1979), written by Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, argues that discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland was serious, deliberate and part of the policy of the Northern Ireland government. Patrick Buckland, in his The Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921–39 (1979) details this more extensively. This discrimination, however, was more complicated than might appear on the surface, and all of the above writers (Bew, Gibbon, Patterson and Buckland) are careful to make distinctions between government officials who were extreme in their ideas of defending Northern Irish Protestantism by restricting Catholics, and those who were much less discriminatory and who tried to implement even-handedness. Some politicians and commentators on both sides in Northern Ireland have tried to exaggerate the levels of discrimination. Some nationalists compared it to South Africa under apartheid, and some unionists claimed that there was very little discrimination, and that, where it did exist, it was justifiable to discriminate against a disloyal minority. The majority of scholarly opinion, however, agrees with Patrick Buckland, who wrote in his History of Northern Ireland (1981) that,
The fact remains that, owing to local conditions, the power of the government was used in the interests of Unionists and Protestants, with scant regard for the interests of the region as a whole or for the claims and susceptibilities of the substantial minority. (p. 72)
Interpretations of this period of Irish history, therefore, have shown
that the great diversity which defined Irish politics, culture and society was reflected in the events of the time. This diversity continued to the end of the twentieth century, and was the base upon which the troubles and triumphs of the following chapter were built.
NINE
Troubles and Triumphs, 1966–1994
The second half of the twentieth century saw great troubles in Ireland, as well as economic and cultural triumphs. Sectarian violence in Northern Ireland reached a peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Northern Ireland parliament was suspended and direct rule from London reimposed. The Republic entered the European Monetary System in 1979, and enjoyed a crescendo of prosperity in the 1990s. These decades also saw the export of Irish culture and music throughout the west, and Irish artists became some of the best known in the world.
THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND, 1966–82
Economic change continued to be the preoccupation of the Republic during this period. Sean Lemass had resigned as taoiseach in November 1966, and was succeeded by Jack Lynch (1917–99). The economic plans that had been put in place in the earlier 1960s had to be abandoned or reformed. Several times during these two decades, the Republic’s economy went through serious difficulty, such as in 1974–5, when the oil crisis and other worldwide economic problems hit small countries like Ireland very hard. The recession of the late 1970s and early 1980s had similar effects, one of which was increased emigration. But there seemed to be a fundamental stability in the Republic’s economy though it might not have been very noticeable during each crisis. Average growth during this period remained steady. The work of the Industrial Development Authority in attracting new industries seemed to have diversified the Republic’s economy. Lynch and Fianna Fáil won the 1969 general election, and began working for Ireland’s introduction into the European Community. Fianna Fáil ran into difficulty, however, when two of its important ministers, Charles Haughey (1925– 2006) and Blaney (1922–1995), were implicated in an IRA arms-smuggling operation in 1970. Lynch removed them from the government, and they were arrested on these charges, but they were acquitted in October. All this showed that difficulties in Northern Ireland continued to impinge on politics in the Republic.
A new focus emerged in the life of the Republic when it became a member of the European Community on 1 January 1973 (along with Britain and Denmark). This brought immediate benefits, especially for farmers (who received nearly half of their income from European and government subsidies). In the late 1970s, Ireland was receiving over £400 million from the EEC, while contributing just over £40 million. The net gain from the EEC climbed even higher by the mid-1980s, to over £500 million. This meant that farming would remain a large part of the economy, and that farming incomes rose dramatically. But the economic benefits of EEC membership that were to become so apparent in later decades could not help the Republic during the economic slump of the early 1970s. The oil crises of the 1970s hit the Republic’s economy hard, but the responses of the various governments probably did not help. Having seen the benefits that expansion and government borrowing had brought during the 1960s, they pursued more or less the same policies. Budget deficits were allowed to rise out of control, and governments seemed to think they could spend their way out of the problems of the 1970s. Inflation and unemployment were two important reasons for the rejection of Fianna Fáil at the 1973 election. A Fine Gael–Labour coalition came into power under Liam Cosgrave (1920– ). One of the most important things that the new government did was to declare a state of emergency during the revival of IRA terrorism in Britain and Northern Ireland. Police and the military were given increased powers to arrest and detain suspected terrorists, and many militant republican organizations were banned.
The election of 1977 proved to be a Fianna Fáil victory. Fine Gael had spent a lot of time between 1973 and 1977 improving their electoral and political organizations, and were widely expected to win the 1977 election, but the election result showed that there was little perception of ideological difference between the two parties, and often very minor issues (such as certain types of property and vehicle taxes in 1977) could sway the electorate. Jack Lynch became taoiseach again, but many of his own supporters disagreed with his moderate stance towards unionists in Northern Ireland. Further, there were sharp economic difficulties in the immediate aftermath of the Republic joining the European Monetary System in late 1978 and early 1979. This broke the market connection between the Irish pound and the British pound, and tied the value of the Irish pound to other European currencies. As with the Republic’s entry into the European Community, the idea behind the move to the European Monetary System was to free the Irish economy from the overwhelming influence of the British economy. This would reduce the Republic’s dependency on British markets, and open up more markets in Europe. Initially, however, the move to the European Monetary System caused the value of the Irish pound to fall dramatically. Trade union problems also plagued the country (the postal service was on strike for nearly six months in 1979), and fuel shortages were severe in the wake of another international oil crisis. Also, by the end of the 1970s, the degree of European support for agriculture reduced significantly, and prices fell sharply. The late 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by massive public debts, and failed attempts to solve the problems that they created.
Jack Lynch resigned unexpectedly as taoiseach in December 1979, and was replaced by Charles Haughey. Haughey’s priorities were to improve the economy and to tackle Northern Irish and British relations. Agreements were reached with trade unions and others in October 1980, which ended many disputes and meant that services were renewed. Haughey met with the new British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (1925–2013), on 21 May 1980, and held discussions on Northern Ireland. Although no agreements were reached (none had been proposed at this stage), the meeting was said to be friendly. They met again in December, and took the step of agreeing to an examination of the ‘totality of the relationship within these islands’. Some unionists in Northern Ireland expressed alarm at this statement, and Thatcher was forced to state publicly that the British government would never force Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic if a majority of the people did not wish it. The strength of this statement caused many nationalists in the south to withdraw their support for Haughey. This, combined with the stubborn recession, led to Haughey losing the 1981 election, and a Fine Gael–Labour coalition coming in under Garrett FitzGerald (1926–2011). FitzGerald had productive meetings with Thatcher (they set up the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to discuss common concerns), and he brought up the subject of amending the Irish constitution to make it less objectionable to Northern Ireland unionists (which faced serious opposition in the Dáil). But FitzGerald’s remedy for the economy was strict, and his austere budget of January 1982 was rejected by one vote in the Dáil. He called an election in February 1982. This time, Haughey and Fianna Fáil were more successful in building a coalition.
Haughey’s previous good relations with Thatcher were highly strained when he rejected the idea of a devolved assembly for Northern Ireland (which he thought would not provide security for Catholics) and he asked the UN Security Council to intervene in the Falklands war between Britain and Argentina. But Haughey’s government was plagued by administrative scandals, and the continued recession did much to bite into his government’s acceptability in the country. He lost a no-confidence vote on 4 November 1982, and had to call another general election (the third in an eighteen-month period). The Haughey–Fitzgerald see-saw swung back in favour of FitzGerald, who put together another Fine Gael–Labour coalition in early December. From 1982 onwards, the pace of dialogue between Dublin and London increased dramatically, and social issues in the Republic again became prominent.
In addition to these rapid-fire political changes, there were also important social and economic changes during this period. The population of the Republic grew dramatically. It increased by over half a million between 1961 and 1981 (from 2,818,000 to 3,440,000
). Other social factors changed. Marriage age fell, but married couples were having fewer and fewer children. The population became younger, a fact that was exploited in the Republic’s advertisements to attract industry and development from abroad during the 1980s – ‘We’re the Young Europeans’. Emigration to countries on the European continent increased, providing an alternative to the traditional patterns of leaving Ireland for the USA, Britain and Australia. Educational reforms were sweeping. Many smaller schools were closed or amalgamated with larger ones nearby. Provision for equipment was improved, and secondary schools became free for most students, which, among other things, improved retention. Universities were given funds to expand, and technical and vocational colleges spread. Censorship of what had been considered indecent or obscene books and magazines was relaxed in 1966. Contraception, long banned in the Republic, was permitted (with certain restrictions) in 1979. By the mid-1980s, however, this policy was seen to have many difficulties, and in 1985 condoms were made legal for all those over eighteen. And the bans on divorce and abortion were coming under criticism. Women’s groups formed and pushed for greater equality, and equal pay and equal opportunity legislation was passed in this period.
The Catholic Church tried to make itself ‘more relevant to modern times’ during the 1960s and 1970s. Dictates from the Second Vatican Council, which contained many liberalizing measures, meant that Irish Catholicism could not continue to be as inward-looking as it had been. There was also a gradual relaxation of censorship. Religion still retained a strong hold on Irish life, however. More than ninety percent of Catholics described themselves as ‘practising’ (that is, they attended mass at least once per week) in the early 1970s. There was some evidence, and fear, that young Catholics were not as devout as older generations, and that this might cause a decline in religious practice in later decades (which turned out to be true).
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