Northern Irish affairs again preoccupied Irish people in the mid-to late-1990s. Paramilitary ceasefires and changes in the leadership of political parties (and, more significantly, changes in the attitudes of political leaders) helped bring about the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. But it was a very difficult path, fraught with potential failure at every stage, and help up by further murderous atrocities.
Large-scale violence was put on hold during late 1994, when both the IRA and loyalist terrorists called for a ceasefire. The struggling peace process seemed to take a step forward, only to be halted over a stand-off about Orangemen marching in a mainly nationalist area of Portadown in County Armagh. Peace talks were suspended while things remained tense. In September 1995, the Ulster Unionist party elected David Trimble (1944– ) as its leader. Trimble (known for his defiant public loyalism, but also his willingness to be more accommodating behind the scenes), was gradually convinced through pressure from the British government and from U.S. President Bill Clinton, to start to bring unionists to the table to talk to nationalists.
1996, however, saw both strong hope and deep despair concerning terrorists. A decommissioning body was created to convince militants to ‘put their weapons beyond use,’ for all parties to embrace democracy, and to reject violence as a political tool. Yet, almost immediately the IRA (frustrated with what it saw as unionist obstruction of the peace process) ended its ceasefire with a bomb in London’s Canary Wharf district. Further, another stand-off over marches at Drumcree in County Antrim led to the SDLP withdrawing from peace talks when the Orangemen were eventually allowed to march.
New political changes in London and Dublin in 1997 pushed the peace process forward somewhat. Tony Blair (1953– ) and his Labour party came to power in London, and Bertie Ahern (1951– ) and his Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coaltion won the election in Ireland. Blair was not beholden to Ulster Unionists within the British House of Commons, as his predecessor, John Major, had been. And Bertie Ahern was well-known to be an excellent diplomat and negotiator. Talks were revived and the IRA resumed its ceasefire. A mood of cautious optimism carried through the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998. Plans for the future of Northern Ireland (including a devolved assembly in Belfast, an intergovernmental ‘Council of the Isles,’ and a north-south ministerial body) were put forth by the Blair and Ahern governments. U.S. Senator George Mitchell, chairman of the talks, kept all parties’ feet to the fire through a lengthy process of negotiations while paramilitary punishment beatings and community tensions continued outside.
Mitchell set a deadline of 9 April 1998 for a conclusion of the talks. ‘The time for discussion’ was over, he said, and it was ‘now time for a decision.’ During very complicated, and at times heated, negotiations, the Ulster Unionists finally accepted the north-south ministerial body to discuss common concerns, and Sinn Féin agreed that the decommissioning of terrorist weapons would begin after the Northern Ireland Assembly was constituted. Intense negotiations in early April led to an agreement being reached at 5:36 pm on 10 April. The Good Friday Agreement was signed on 10 April, and immediately came to symbolize the hope that the politics of Northern Ireland would change. In the thirty years since the Troubles started in 1969, nearly 3,500 people had been killed, and countless injured.
The Agreement addressed constitutional issues concerning Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The right of the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own future was affirmed. The possibility of bringing about a united Ireland by the consent of the population of Northern Ireland was also agreed to, while recognizing that the majority of the people of the north wished to remain within the United Kingdom, and that that desire was legitimate. The British government was to devolve some power to the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the Irish government was to give up its constitutional claim on Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Assembly would consist of 108 members elected by proportional representation, and there would be a North-South Ministerial Council to facilitate relations between the Republic and Northern Ireland. There would also be a British–Irish Council, also called the ‘Council of the Isles’, which would be a consultative body made up of representatives from all the governments in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Human rights and equality of opportunity were also agreed to, as well as providing instruments whereby these would be safe-guarded. An Independent Commission on Decommissioning was set up to deal with the elimination of terrorist weapons, which was to be completed within two years of the Agreement being ratified by votes in the Republic and in Northern Ireland. The Royal Ulster Constabulary, long a point of contention between nationalists an unionists, was also to be reformed. Although held by unionists as an important symbol of the connection with Britain, the RUC had been generally distrusted by nationalists. The vast majority of RUC officers came from the unionist community, and at the very least there was distrust of their impartiality, and at most, extreme nationalists thought of them as state terrorists. Many unionists, however, saw the RUC as a safeguard for remaining part of the United Kingdom. A Policing Commission was to be set up to review the RUC and propose reforms, and British politician Chris Patten (1944– ) was appointed to head it. The criminal justice system was also to be reviewed, and prisoners connected with political groups which had signed the Good Friday Agreement would be released under appropriate circumstances. Although they had put their names to the Agreement, some of the major parties had serious reservations about its provisions. Unionists generally did not trust Sinn Féin’s promise to begin the decommissioning of IRA weapons once the Northern Ireland Assembly had been set up. They were also unhappy with the powers given to the North–South Council and proposals to reform the RUC. Nationalists were wary of the British government’s commitment to hold unionists to the agreement, and were concerned that it would collapse.
The Agreement was then put to a referendum in both Northern Ireland and the Republic. A massive four-week campaign across Ireland saw a revival of some of the major arguments and mistrust amongst the main parties. Nationalists supported the Agreement overwhelmingly. Unionists were split, with Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party being the most bitter critics, but some members of Trimble’s UUP also opposed it. The major figures in British and Irish politics, as well as President Clinton, campaigned vigorously throughout the whole of Ireland; and John Hume and David Trimble campaigned together for the Agreement. They made a special effort to increase youth participation in the referendum (thought to be overwhelmingly in favour of the settlement) by appearing at pop music concerts and with other cultural celebrities. Finally, on 22 May 1998, voters in both the Republic and Northern Ireland voted ‘yes’ strongly (ninety-four percent in the Republic and seventy-one percent in Northern Ireland).
IMPLEMENTING PEACE AND GOVERNANCE
In late June, voters in Northern Ireland elected members to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Like the referendum campaign, the Assembly election was dominated by concerns of the unionists who were uneasy with the Good Friday Agreement. David Trimble urged his party to elect Agreement supporters to the Assembly, and at the same time urged Gerry Adams and Sinn Féin to use the momentum of the referendum to push IRA decommissioning early. Although early decommissioning was not forthcoming from either nationalist or loyalist terrorist groups, pro-Agreement parties won a large majority in the Assembly elections. David Trimble was elected First Minister on 1 July, and Seamus Mallon (1936– ) of the SDLP was elected as his deputy.
Conflict continued, however, especially over the control that the new Parades Commission tried to exert over Orange marches along the Garvaghy Road (a largely Catholic area) in Drumcree in County Armagh on 5 July. Another major stand-off between the Orangemen and the RUC and the British army ensued. As the tension reached breaking-point, three young boys were killed by a petrol bomb thrown through the window of their home in Ballymoney, County Antrim on 12 July. Although they were being brought up as Protestant, their mother was Catholic, a
nd the RUC declared that these were sectarian murders. The tragedy took the force out of the Orange protest, and the marchers dispersed. But just when Northern Ireland seemed not to be able to stand another tragedy, a massive car bomb exploded in Omagh in County Tyrone on 15 August. In the most deadly single incident since the Troubles began in 1969, twenty-eight people were killed and two hundred injured. A wave of revulsion swept through Britain and Ireland. The Real IRA, an extreme nationalist splinter group, claimed responsibility for the attack and was condemned by all sides, including Sinn Féin and the IRA. The British and Irish governments immediately introduced stringent new anti-terrorism laws in an effort to stop the killing.
The disagreements over the timing and extent of the decommissioning of terrorist weapons continued to plague the peace process and stall the setting up of an executive for the Northern Ireland Assembly. International recognition of how far Northern Irish politicians had traveled down the peace road came, however, from the Nobel Committee in October 1998, when they awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to John Hume and David Trimble for ‘laying the foundations of peace.’ Still, the impasse over decommissioning continued in Northern Ireland throughout 1999, and the peace process seemed to be headed the way of previous Anglo-Irish agreements – ultimate abandonment. George Mitchell returned to Northern Ireland to help persuade the parties to agree. They had come so far in the last year that failure to finish their work and to meet as an Assembly would be ‘unforgivable’ in the eyes of the world, he said. After yet another round of negotiations balanced on a razor’s edge, the Ulster Unionists finally agreed in October 1999 to allow IRA decommissioning to start after the Assembly’s executive had met, rather than before.
After this agreement the process of devolution of power to the Northern Ireland Assembly was swift. Within days, the political parties nominated their members for executive seats, the formal act of handing over certain powers to the Northern Ireland Assembly was introduced and passed in the British parliament, and the Irish Republic’s Constitution was amended to remove claims on Northern Ireland. On 2 December 1999, the Northern Ireland Assembly Executive met for the first time, amid high-minded speeches and mundane administrative work. Although Ian Paisley’s anti-Agreement Executive members boycotted the meeting, the other ministers, including Sinn Féin’s two ministerial appointments, attended.
It was not to last, however. Decommissioning still did not proceed as quickly as unionists would like, and nationalists responded that the Assembly’s executive was being held to ransom over this one issue. Further, other issues, such as the highly contentious reform of the RUC and the proposal to change it to the Police Service of Northern Ireland also halted progress throughout the rest of 1999 and early 2000. On 11 February 2000, the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended and direct rule from London reinstated.
The careful steps that had been taken to bring all the parties together, and the constant struggle over using the least inflammatory language in negotiations, all seemed to be for nought during 2000. The Assembly was in abeyance, haggling continued over the terms of decommissioning and the reformed police service. Even issues such as which flag should be flown over the Assembly were hotly debated. Late spring, however, saw another potential bright spot when the IRA announced in early May that it would ‘initiate a process that will completely and verifiably put IRA arms beyond use.’ At least publicly, David Trimble took them at their word and tried to convince unionists that this was progress. He was successful to the extent that a slight majority of Assembly members voted to return to work, and the British government restored devolution to the Northern Ireland Assembly on 30 May. But violence continued, especially during the first half of 2001, when there were almost daily reports of pipe-bomb attacks in Northern Ireland. These mostly seemed to be targeted at individuals and families, rather than political targets, and many commentators wondered whether violence was so much a part of the lives and consciousnesses of some people in Northern Ireland that it could never be eliminated. All the leading politicians in Britain and Ireland went through another round of harried meetings, none of which seemed to work. Trimble resigned as first minister on 1 July 2001, and despite progress in IRA decommissioning, the Assembly was again suspended in August so as to push back the deadline for choosing a new first minister. Tired of what it saw as unionist refusal to take their decommissioning seriously, the IRA withdrew their proposals to destroy arms.
Despite the Assembly being restored on 22 September 2001, and the IRA actually beginning its decommissioning on 23 October 2001 (after being urged to do so by Gerry Adams), the cycle of violence by extremists continued, mostly, as earlier in the year, in the form of attacks on individuals rather than institutions or soldiers. In the next year, British and Irish politicians wearily returned to their shuttle diplomacy, holding meetings in London, Dublin, Belfast, and New York. Mutual understanding between nationalist and unionists was damaged by a sectarian speech made by David Trimble on 9 March 2002, when he described the Republic of Ireland as a ‘pathetic, sectarian, mono-ethnic, mono-cultural state.’ Outrage at the comment prompted Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness to call Trimble ‘a twit’ and unworthy of his Nobel Peace Prize. The IRA issued a statement in July, apologizing for the 650 civilians killed by them since the late 1960s. But this did nothing to slow the deterioration of relations between the two sides. The British government had to suspend the Northern Ireland Assembly again on 14 October 2002. In response to this suspension, the IRA withdrew its contact with arms inspectors who were supervising the disarmament of paramilitaries in the North.
2003 and 2004 were years of further disappointment. Promises and statements from nationalists and unionists continued along the same lines as previous years. Each side seemed willing only to commit themselves to the most minimal concessions in opening up further negotiations leading to the resumption of devolved government in Northern Ireland. Often these statements were simply reworded versions of pronouncements that had been made in the past. Sinn Féin pledged in April 2003 that its ‘strategies and disciplines will not be inconsistent with the Good Friday Agreement,’ but did not bow to demands to renounce support for nationalist paramilitaries. When legislative elections were held in November 2003, while the Assembly was still suspended, it became clear that the electorate was moving away from the moderate centre. The extremist Democratic Unionists won the loyalist vote, away from the more conciliatory Ulster Unionists; and Sinn Féin captured the nationalist vote over the SDLP. The chances of these two parties agreeing to share power in a resumed Assembly were quite remote. And when the IRA were linked to a major bank robbery in December 2004 (presumably to help fund a return to militancy and violence), power-sharing negotiations were put on hold indefinitely.
The hope raised by the Good Friday Agreement was beginning to seem like a distant and faded memory, but things took a drastic turn for the worse when a Belfast Catholic, Robert McCartney, was killed by the IRA (apparently as some kind of punishment). Despite having voted for Sinn Féin in 2004, many IRA sympathizers were outraged at this killing. McCartney’s sisters launched a campaign to hold the IRA responsible, and garnered attention across Ireland, Britain, and the USA. The IRA’s first reaction was almost as shocking as the killing itself. They offered to execute McCartney’s killers, but public reaction was quite the opposite of what they expected. People were revolted at the idea, and the offer was quickly withdrawn. All of the IRA’s pronouncements of recent years about moving towards more peaceful and political means were now treated with great suspicion. Yet again, it looked as if the violence of Northern Ireland might become a permanent and intractable problem.
On 28 July 2005, however, the IRA made its firmest statement about the end of its military drive for a united Ireland. It announced, in essence, an end to its armed struggle. In a strongly worded public statement, it reiterated its commitment to ‘the goals of Irish unity and independence and to building the Republic outlined in the 1916 Proclamation,’ and insisted that ‘the armed st
ruggle was entirely legitimate.’ But in its most significant pronouncements, it stated that: this was the ‘end to the armed campaign’; that all ‘IRA units have been ordered to dump arms’; and that ‘all volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means.’ Not surprisingly, many in Northern Ireland responded to this development with scepticism, worrying that the IRA would, as Ian Paisley said, ‘revert to type’ and renew its violence within a few months.
When that did not happen, and when the IRA admitted to some of the most controversial killings of the Troubles (including that of a 14-year-old Catholic girl in 1973 that they had blamed on the British army), some degree of positive expectation was raised in Dublin, Belfast, and London. The same story of discontent and tension filled the Northern Ireland news for the rest of 2005 and 2006. Orange Order marchers rioted in Belfast in September 2005 when their parade route was blocked by the police, although many commentators argued that the real reason was enflamed unionist anger that, in their view, the British government had made too many concessions to the IRA and Sinn Féin. The British government had, in fact, withdrawn many troops and closed many military bases in Northern Ireland after they were convinced in September 2006 by the commission on arms decommissioning that the IRA were serious and sincere in their statement to end their violence and to put their weapons beyond use. And in an effort to force Northern Ireland’s politicians to form a power sharing administration and to take some of the media attention away from the issue of violence, the Irish and British governments tried to impose a November 2006 deadline for the resumption of a Stormont administration. That was unrealistic, but there were some hopeful signs, including the fact that Ian Paisley met the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Northern Ireland, Archbishop Sean Brady. The fact that Paisley would even meet with Brady was surprising because less than twenty years before (in 1988), he had disrupted Pope John Paul II’s speech to the European parliament, shouting ‘I denounce you as the anti-Christ’.
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