A Western intelligence service came to us in the fall of 2001 with a remarkable piece of information that helped break the case open. A source had told them that in August 2001, just weeks before the 9/11 attacks, UTN officials Mahmood and Majeed met with Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Afghanistan. There, around a campfire, they discussed how al-Qa’ida should go about building a nuclear device. CIA pressed the Pakistanis to confront Mahmood and Majeed with this new information. We put the Libyan information on the table. We also passed new information that had been collected by other intelligence services. To no avail.
Then 9/11 struck, and there was no slowing down in this pursuit. The stakes were too high to accept the lack of progress that the Pakistanis were making. In late November 2001, I briefed the president, vice president, and national security advisor on the latest intelligence, our concerns, and the likelihood we would be unable to resolve this issue satisfactorily without intervention by the president. I brought along with me my WMD chief, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, and Kevin K., our most senior WMD terrorism analyst. During the ensuing conversation, the vice president asked if we thought al-Qa’ida had a nuclear weapon. Kevin replied, “Sir, if I were to give you a traditional analytical assessment of the al-Qa’ida nuclear program, I would say they probably do not. But I can’t assure you they don’t.” The vice president then made a comment that in my view has since been misinterpreted: “If there’s a one percent chance that they do, you have to pursue it as if it were true.”
I am convinced the vice president did not mean to suggest, as some have asserted, that we should ignore contrary evidence and that such a policy should be applied to all threats to our national security. On the contrary, the vice president understood instinctively that WMD must be managed differently because the implications were unique—such an attack would change history. We all felt that the vice president understood this issue. There was no question in my mind that he was absolutely right to insist that when it came to discussing weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists, conventional risk assessments no longer applied; we must rule out any possibility of terrorists succeeding in their quest to obtain such weapons. We could not afford to be surprised.
Photographic Insert
Being sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence by FBI Director Louis Freeh, July 11, 1997. Wife Stephanie Glakas-Tenet and son John Michael holding the bible. (Official FBI Photo)
At a White House meeting with President Bill Clinton. Seated are Chief of Staff John Podesta and Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen. (Official White House Photo)
With one of the great historical figures in modern Middle East history, His Majesty King Hussein of Jordan. (Author’s personal collection)
With former president George H. W. Bush and Mrs. Bush at a ceremony renaming CIA headquarters in honor of President Bush, April 26, 1999. (Official CIA Photo)
A new generation of leader in the Middle East, His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan. (Author’s personal collection)
With President George W. Bush addressing CIA workforce in Agency headquarters lobby, March 20, 2001. (Official CIA Photo)
In the White House bunker on September 11, 2001, watching as the president addresses the nation on television. Behind me is Richard Clarke, and to the right is the vice president’s wife, Mrs. Lynne Cheney. (Official White House Photo)
At Camp David, Maryland, briefing the president, Condoleezza Rice, and Andrew Card on CIA operations against al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, September 30, 2001. (Official White House Photo)
In a meeting with Attorney General John Ashcroft (right) and FBI Director Robert Mueller (left), October 29, 2001. (Official White House Photo)
An overhead view of a presidential daily briefing in the Oval Office. Clockwise from bottom left: President George Bush, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, me, a CIA briefer, and Vice President Dick Cheney. (Official White House Photo)
With John McLaughlin, who served as deputy director of Central Intelligence from 2000 to 2004 and was acting CIA director from July to September 2004. (Official White House Photo)
Making a point to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in the White House Situation Room, January 16, 2002. (Official White House Photo)
Having a discussion with White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, May 11, 2002. John McLaughlin is in the background. (Official White House Photo)
In a meeting with the president in the White House Situation Room, May 20, 2002. On the president’s left are Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers. To the president’s right are Vice President Dick Cheney, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and me. (Official White House Photo)
Briefing the president in the Oval Office, June 11, 2002. (Official White House Photo)
On the phone at Camp David, September 7, 2002. (Official White House Photo)
An example of the leaflets released over Iraq just prior to and in the first few days of the war; millions of such documents were dropped on Iraqi military units. U.S. officials later argued that the Coalition Provisional Authority proclamation to disband the Iraqi Army had no effect because the units had “self-demobilized.” In fact, they were following U.S. instructions, and many would have come back after the war to provide security if they had been ordered to do so. (U.S. Department of Defense)
Al-Qa’ida mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed minutes after he was captured in Pakistan on March 1, 2003. (AP Images)
Secretary of State Colin Powell addressing the U.N. Security Council on the case for going to war in Iraq, February 5, 2003. (AP Images)
With FBI Director Bob Mueller at my CIA farewell ceremony, July 8, 2004. (Official CIA Photo)
With eight other former Directors of Central Intelligence, August 16, 2005 (from left to right): Porter Goss, John Deutch, Robert Gates, William Webster, Stansfield Turner, James Woolsey, James Schlesinger, George H. W. Bush. (Official CIA Photo)
CIA’s senior management team in July 2004 just prior to my departure. (Official CIA Photo)
In front of a container of P2 centrifuge casings turned over to the United States by the government of Libya. The P2 photo was taken December 9, 2005, at an event commemorating the third anniversary of Libya renouncing its WMD programs. The Libyans ordered more than 10,000 such casings. Only 1,200 are needed to produce enough enriched uranium for a Hiroshima-size nuclear weapon each year. (Manuel G. Gillispie, Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
The president directed that I go to Pakistan the next day and share our concerns with President Musharraf. We did not know how far UTN had gone in providing assistance to al-Qa’ida, but any fireside chat between Pakistani nuclear officials and the al-Qa’ida leadership about a nuclear weapon posed grave concerns. A U.S. Air Force 707 that at one time had served as Air Force One flew Rolf, Kevin, and me to Pakistan. During the long, restless flight, I wrote out my intended talking points on a yellow legal pad, drawing from updated information that I was receiving from Langley on the plane. Some leads were beginning to emerge concerning UTN connections to the United States, and in other countries. I intended to lay it all out for Musharraf; there was no option other than full transparency to help him make the required decisions to resolve our concerns.
We arrived in the middle of the night. After a short rest, I reviewed my plan with our senior officer in Pakistan and discussed with him the next steps he would have to take with Pakistani intelligence after I left the country—assuming we could win Musharraf’s cooperation. Our senior officer stressed that our hosts were tense; they were unsure of the nature of this unusual visit for which they had received barely one day’s notice. He pointed out that although things were calm in the capital city of Islamabad, the threat level was high and no one was quite sure what might happen next in those uncertain weeks that followed 9/11. The U.S. ambassador, Wendy Chamberlin, later joined us, and we were whisked away in a heavily armed motorcade for the
short but tense ride to the presidential palace.
After a few pleasantries, I explained to President Musharraf that I had been dispatched by the U.S. president to deliver some very serious information to him. I launched into a description of the campfire meeting between Usama bin Ladin, al-Zawahiri, and the UTN leaders. “Mr. President,” I said, “you cannot imagine the outrage there would be in my country if it were learned that Pakistan is coddling scientists who are helping Bin Ladin acquire a nuclear weapon. Should such a device ever be used, the full fury of the American people would be focused on whoever helped al-Qa’ida in its cause.”
Musharraf considered my words carefully but opened with the response we had expected: “But Mr. Tenet, we are talking about men hiding in caves. Perhaps they have dreams of owning such weapons, but my experts assure me that obtaining one is well beyond their reach. We know in Pakistan what is involved in such an achievement.”
I knew that among his expert advisors was A. Q. Khan, someone who had long been under investigation for his illicit nuclear proliferation efforts. However, I didn’t want the discussion to veer off toward Khan at this point. There would be another day for that topic. The issue at hand was UTN, and they were quite a different matter.
“Mr. President, your experts are wrong,” I said. I told him that the current state of play between weapon design and construction and the availability of the needed materials made it possible for a few men hidden in a remote location—if they had enough persistence and money, and black enough hearts—to obtain and use a nuclear device. I turned the briefing over to Rolf, who proceeded to explain in detail how plausible the threat had become, and how our thinking had changed in terms of dealing with it. When he finished there was a brief uncomfortable silence in the room. President Musharraf was clearly reflecting on this new information. Responding with quiet confidence, he asked why we had assumed al-Qa’ida would look to Pakistan for such assistance. He recalled information he had been briefed on about “loose nukes” in Russia and the availability of nuclear material in the former Soviet Union as a more likely source of material and assistance. Still, I sensed that we had made our case.
“Let me tell you, sir,” I said, “what steps we need to take.” I laid out a series of steps that required immediate action. I counseled him to look at certain elements in the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. In addition to asking for a more vigorous investigation of UTN, I suggested it might be a good time for Pakistan to perform a thorough inventory of its nuclear material. If any had gone missing, both he and I needed to know. “Can I report to President Bush that we can count on you?” I asked. “Yes, of course,” he replied.
Even though we were on the ground for fewer than twenty-four hours, a picture of our big 707 with the words “United States of America” emblazoned across the fuselage had quickly appeared in the Pakistan media. With the war across the border in Afghanistan only a few weeks old and fighting still raging, U.S. and Pakistani officials were worried that terrorists might be waiting somewhere just beyond the end of the runway with a surface-to-air missile ready to bring down this symbol of American power. On takeoff, the crew executed a climb steeper than anything I imagined an old 707 could pull off. We had been advised to pull down the window shades in the darkened cabin for security reasons, but I could not refrain from lifting mine. If our plane was going to be attacked, I wanted to see it coming. Fortunately, the departure was uneventful, and I relaxed as we crossed the snowcapped Himalayas in brilliant sunlight.
By the time I got back to Washington, it was clear that President Musharraf was true to his word. Pakistani authorities had redoubled their efforts in questioning the UTN leadership. They were methodically running down all the leads we had passed. With the arrival of a team of U.S. experts, they conducted polygraph investigations of the key UTN members and eventually obtained confessions that added important new details to the story. Mahmood confirmed all we had heard about the August 2001 meeting with Usama bin Ladin, and even provided a hand-drawn rough bomb design that he had shared with al-Qa’ida leaders. He told his interrogators that he had discussed the practicalities of building a weapon. “The most difficult part of the process,” he told Bin Ladin, “is obtaining the necessary fissile material.” “What if we already have the material?” Bin Ladin replied. This surprised Mahmood. He said he did not know if this was a hypothetical question or if Bin Ladin was seeking a design to use with fissile material or components he had already obtained elsewhere.
According to the account, an unidentified senior al-Qa’ida leader displayed a canister for the visitors that may or may not—the account was frustratingly vague—have contained some kind of nuclear material or radioactive source. This al-Qa’ida operative shared his ideas of building a simple firing system for a weapon using commercially available supplies. Over the next several months, we ran down every lead and turned over every rock in an effort to make a judgment as to whether UTN had provided WMD to al-Qa’ida. We followed a number of serious U.S. leads. It appears we had disrupted the organization in the early stages of its efforts to ply trade with al-Qa’ida. CIA, FBI, and dozens of foreign partners had worked together in unprecedented ways in an effort to prove a negative, as best as one can do so. This effort was a success in terms of working out a new modus operandi to deal with the new threats that had emerged in the wake of 9/11. What we did not know then, and do not know now, is how many other groups like UTN are out there.
The cause for my lightning trip to Pakistan was not an aberration but part of an emerging series of nuclear-related threats. At the same time, our threat matrix was carrying unsubstantiated rumors from several reliable foreign intelligence services that some sort of small nuclear device had been smuggled into the United States and was destined for New York City. The Department of Energy quietly dispatched detection equipment to New York to possibly detect an unexpected source of radiation before such a device could be detonated. It was a pattern that would repeat itself over time. Adding fuel to the fire, detained al-Qa’ida senior paramilitary trainer Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi had provided the Egyptians with information that he later recanted, that al-Qa’ida had collaborated with Russian organized crime to import into New York “canisters containing nuclear material.” We could not rule out that these vague, unsubstantiated streams of information were only partially right, and that Washington might be the intended target. It did not matter whether al-Qa’ida was indeed planning a WMD attack or a large-scale conventional attack, as many feared in those days and weeks after 9/11. In this period of high threat, the decision was made that the vice president and the president should not be in the same location, if at all possible. For the sake of continuity of government, the vice president was spending a lot of time at an “undisclosed location.” Anyone who mocks the practice of securing the national leadership in times of crisis has not shared the reality of the threats we handled on a daily basis. None of us had any doubt that we were engaged in a war.
Our fears of imminent attack did not go away as 2001 slid into 2002.
Suleiman Abu Ghaith, a cleric of Kuwaiti origin and spokesman for al-Qa’ida, posted a statement on the Internet in June 2002 saying that “Al-Qa’ida has the right to kill four million Americans, including one million children, displace double that figure, and injure and cripple hundreds and thousands.” Ghaith’s rationale for such grisly figures was based on some sort of sick math extrapolating his estimates for the number of Muslims killed and wounded at the hands of the United States over the years. It would have been easy to dismiss his ranting as the hyperbole of a deranged man. But we had to consider the possibility that Abu Ghaith was attempting to justify the future use of weapons of mass destruction that might greatly exceed the death toll of 9/11. Such weapons could be nuclear. They could be biological. They could be an unconventional massive attack on our infrastructure. But any attack would have to be big to deliver on al-Qa’ida’s persistent promises to “destroy our economy.”
To do so, they would n
eed to develop a plan as intricate as the 9/11 plot, most likely planned over a long period of time by sleeper cells operating in the United States. We began what became an endless search for any leads to individuals who might fit this description. There turned out to be no shortage of radicalized Muslims who had been educated in American universities, who spoke flawless English, and who had the capability and perhaps the motive to hurt this country. Two individuals in particular represented this breed. There would be others to follow, who came to our attention in an endless stream of investigations by CIA and FBI.
Muhammed Bayazid, also known as Abu Rida al-Suri, and Mubarak al-Duri had attended the University of Arizona in the 1980s. As students, they became radicalized along with others who identified with the “jihadists” who fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Bayazid and al-Duri attended prayer group meetings with students who would become al-Qa’ida associates—men like Wadi al-Hage, who was later linked to the 9/11 plot. With such friends, it was no surprise when we learned that al-Duri and Bayazid had joined Usama bin Ladin after he had relocated from Afghanistan to Sudan in the early 1990s.
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA Page 29