By November of 2002, we were ready for another visit from the vice president and his team. There was extensive preparation, practice sessions called “murder boards,” and total collaboration between regional and terrorist analysts. The November meeting was described by a participant this way:
Scooter Libby approached it like an artful attorney. An analyst would make a point and Libby would say, okay this is what you say. But there are these other things happening. So if this were true, would it change your judgment? And the analyst would say, well if that was true, it might. And Libby would say, well if that’s true, what about this? And six “if that were trues” later, I finally had to stop him and say, “Yes, there are other bits and pieces out there. We’ve looked at these bits and pieces in terms of the whole. And the whole just does not take us as far as you believe. And everything else is just speculation. That was a push by policy makers to see how far we would go.”
Some analysts viewed this kind of grilling as being pressured, but most did not. Their view was, if a country is about to go to war, policy makers are going to ask tough questions to understand all the elements of the issue. One senior analyst said to me, “Were they trying to push us and drive us? Absolutely. By the questions they asked and by the way they asked the questions again and again with changed nuances. They were trying to pull out every last iota of what we might say that supported where they wanted to go. But they are policy makers. It is our job to consider what they say, think about it, and write what we think. We stuck to our guns.”
The truth is we were not ready to take a position on the Iraq–al-Qa’ida question because there were differing views within the Agency about how to think about the issue. The division was between analysts who focused on specific regions and those who specialized in terrorism. This uncertainty was played out earlier in the year on June 21, 2002, when we produced the paper “Iraq & al-Qa’ida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship.” In contrast with every other type of analysis, because of the nature of the threat, terrorism analysis by design takes weaker information and makes more aggressive conclusions, sometimes from information that regional analysts might discard.
The “Murky Relationship” paper was an academic exercise. Its “scope note” at the beginning explained that the paper was an effort to see what our conclusions might be if the most forward leaning explanations of our intelligence turned out to be true. The note read in part: “This intelligence assessment responds to senior policy maker interest in a comprehensive assessment of Iraqi regime links to al-Qa’ida. Our approach is purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw connections, on the assumption that any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States” (emphasis added).
Regional analysts who focus on geographic areas believed that fundamental distrust stemming from stark ideological differences between Saddam and Usama bin Ladin, and the potential fear that Islamic extremism posed for Iraq, significantly limited the cooperation that was suggested by the reporting. The terrorism analysts who specialized in the broad range of terrorism and who wrote the paper took note of the ideological differences but believed to be credible the reporting that suggested a deeper relationship. The paper made clear that there were no conclusive signs between Iraq and al-Qa’ida with regard to terrorist operations. Yet it posited that there were enough data with regard to safe haven, training, and contacts to at least require us to be very concerned. Jami Miscik, our chief analyst, believed that the analysis should be published because of the risks to the United States, and it was.
In our shop, many saw this as almost too aggressive. Some analysts involved complained informally to an ombudsman, whom we had earlier appointed to deal with claims of politicization, that we had gone too far in coming up with our “murky” conclusion. As described to me by a senior analyst, “Barry [the ombudsman] sat us down and said: ‘Grow up. This is not politicization. This is misunderstanding and hurt feelings.’ The two groups need to sit down and hash it out.”
Despite the fact that some of our analysts felt we had gone too far, many in the administration, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby, believed that the “Murky Relationship” paper had not gone far enough. Within a couple months the classified document was being mocked in a Jim Hoagland column in the Washington Post. Hoagland’s piece led with the rhetorical slap: “Imagine that Saddam Hussein has been offering terrorist training and other lethal support to Osama bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida for years. You can’t imagine that? Sign up over there. You can be a Middle East analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency.”
Other senior administration officials questioned our preliminary analysis. The Senate Intelligence Committee later uncovered an internal Pentagon memo sent to both Paul Wolfowitz and Doug Feith saying that although the facts represented in the “Murky Relationship” paper were good, CIA’s analysis attempted to “discredit, dismiss, or downgrade” much of the reporting, and our interpretations “should be ignored.”
During the late summer of 2002, we started working on a more comprehensive paper that would explain what we knew and suspected about Iraq’s involvement with terrorism. While we could not make the al-Qa’ida connection, there was no doubt that Saddam was making large donations to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers and was known to be harboring several prominent terrorists, including Abu Nidal, a ruthless killer responsible for attacks on El Al ticket counters in Rome and Vienna in 1985, resulting in 18 deaths and injury to 120 people. Saddam also gave refuge to one of the individuals still being sought for the first World Trade Center bombing.
We were still gathering material for the comprehensive paper when we received an offer from a Pentagon group working under Doug Feith to share with us their observations on the case for a connection between Iraq and terrorism. Although the suggestion was a bit odd—since it was coming from people in the policy shop, not people in intelligence positions—we agreed to hear them out. A small group of Pentagon officials showed up at CIA headquarters on August 15, 2002.
Present from the Pentagon were Feith; Richard Haver, a longtime civilian intelligence professional who had worked for Dick Cheney in the first Bush administration; Vice Admiral Jake Jacoby, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and several others from Feith’s shop. Haver had been the one who dropped by my office in late December 2000 and hinted broadly that I was soon to be replaced by Don Rumsfeld. That had not been his only off-the-mark assessment. Shortly before September 11, 2001, he gave a speech at the National Security Agency during which he told the audience that the intelligence community was spending far too much time on terrorism.
Attending the meeting on our side with me were Ben Bonk, the deputy chief of our Counterterrorism Center; several analysts from Ben’s staff; and a number of analysts from CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence who were coordinating the forthcoming Iraq terrorism paper.
Feith’s team, it turned out, had been sifting through raw intelligence and wanted to brief us on things they thought we had missed. Trouble was, while they seemed to like playing the role of analysts, they showed none of the professional skills or discipline required. Feith and company would find little nuggets that supported their beliefs and seize upon them, never understanding that there might be a larger picture they were missing. Isolated data points became so important to them that they would never look at the thousands of other data points that might convey an opposite story.
Tina Shelton, a naval reservist on Feith’s team, gave the presentation, which was titled “Iraq and al-Qa’ida—Making the Case.” She started out by saying that there should be “no more debate” on the Iraq–al-Qa’ida relationship. “It is an open-and-shut case,” she said. “No further analysis is required.” This statement instantly got my attention. I knew we had trouble on our hands.
The briefing slides she used were equally self-certain. One slide said that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a “mature, symbiotic relationship.” Wrong. There was nothing in the intelligence t
o suggest a mature, symbiotic relationship. Another slide said there were “some indications of possible Iraq coordination with Al Qaeda specifically related to 9/11.” By this point, the “Atta in Prague” story, which CIA had brought forward after 9/11, was eroding.
I listened for a few more minutes, trying to be polite, before saying, “That’s very interesting.” This was one of my rare moments of trying to be subtle. What I was really thinking was, This is complete crap, and I want this to end right now.
Shortly thereafter I excused myself and pulled Jacoby aside. As an active-duty vice admiral and head of DIA, he worked for both Don Rumsfeld and me. Reverting to my normal blunt self, I told him, “This is entirely inappropriate. You get this back in intelligence channels. I want analysts talking to analysts, not people with agendas.” Pentagon officials were later quoted anonymously in the media describing the same meeting but claiming that “the scales fell away” from the CIA’s eyes when we saw their fine analysis. In fact, their analysis had little, if any, impact on us whatsoever.
Only much later did we learn that “Team Feith” had been going around briefing officials at the White House, the NSC, and the Office of the Vice President with a story similar to the one we found so weak in August. In these briefings they added an extra slide titled “Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community Is Assessing Information.” The slide went on to complain that we were being too picky and applying a standard of proof that we would not normally require. But we weren’t too impressed with their work, either, especially their willingness to blindly accept information that confirmed preconceived notions. We came to call their approach “Feith-based analysis.”
When the Pentagon’s inspector general issued a report in February 2007 calling some of Feith’s efforts “inappropriate” (which to my mind is the kindest thing you could say about it), Feith shot back. He said peddling his alternative intelligence was simply an exercise in “good government.” Nonsense. This was an example of bad government. Policy makers are entitled to their own opinions—but not to their own set of facts. Feith’s charts mischaracterized the intelligence. If policy makers want to reach their own judgments they can do so, so long as they say, “The views I am about to express are not supported by the DCI and his analysts.” And Feith should have had the courage to tell us that his opening slide, shown to the White House, said in essence that CIA analysis stinks.
Our second paper on Iraq and al-Qa’ida, published in September 2002, was shared with only a small number of senior officials. As often happens, shortly after that report went out, new intelligence came in suggesting that there might have been greater contact regarding training between Iraq and al-Qa’ida. In light of that, we set out to vet and add these new details for an upgraded report that would be given wider dissemination among administration and congressional officials than the first, closely held document. Agency analysts went so far as to show a draft to Feith’s team and to ask if they had any comments or objections to it. Feith’s staffers said they did “but would make their views known through other channels.” In retrospect this was a pretty clear warning that we were being second-guessed and undermined.
By December the revision was done, and we titled the report, “Iraqi Support of Terrorism.” I asked, out of courtesy, that a copy of the draft be forwarded to the White House before it was shared with other senior officials. We were explicit in saying that we were not soliciting proposed edits; we just didn’t want the administration surprised when we issued the paper. Despite those caveats, a series of calls from the White House continued to pour in asking us to revise or withdraw the paper. John McLaughlin was on the receiving end of one such call, from a testy Scooter Libby asking for more revisions. The answer was no—we would make no more revisions. Jami Miscik received the brunt of those calls. She, too, stood firm. Jami believed that she had pushed her analysts to ensure they employed every analytic best practice and that no solid reporting had been ignored. But she would not go beyond where the intelligence took us.
After Steve Hadley called Jami from the NSC, wanting to engage her in yet another discussion on the paper, she stormed into my office and said she would resign before she would delay or amend the paper again. Completely supportive of her, I picked up my white secure telephone and punched Hadley’s number. “Steve,” I said, “knock this off. The paper is done. It is finished. We are not changing it. And Jami is not coming down there to discuss it anymore.”
Message received. A day or two later Jami was at the White House—for an entirely different reason—and got word that the president wanted to see her. He clearly had heard about the flap and asked if “his guys” had “stepped over the line.” Not wanting to prolong the controversy, Jami told me that she assured the president that it was nothing that we couldn’t handle.
On January 28, 2003, the paper was published. So what did it say? Our analysts believed that there was a solid basis for identifying three areas of concern with regard to Iraq and al-Qa’ida: safe haven, contacts, and training. But they could not translate this data into a relationship where these two entities had ever moved beyond seeking ways to take advantage of each other.
The intelligence told us that senior al-Qa’ida leaders and the Iraqis had discussed safe haven in Iraq. Most of the public discussion thus far has focused on Zarqawi’s arrival in Baghdad under an assumed name in May of 2002, allegedly to receive medical treatment. Zarqawi, whom we termed a “senior associate and collaborator” of al-Qa’ida at the time, supervised camps in northeastern Iraq run by Ansar al-Islam (AI).
AI, a radical Kurdish Islamic group, was closely allied to al-Qa’ida. Kurdish Islamists and al-Qa’ida had come together in the summer of 2000 to create a safe haven for al-Qa’ida in an area of northeastern Iraq not under Iraqi government control, in the event Afghanistan was lost as a sanctuary. The area subsequently became a hub for al-Qa’ida operations. We believed that up to two hundred al-Qa’ida fighters began to relocate there in camps after the Afghan campaign began in the fall of 2001. The camps enhanced Zarqawi’s reach beyond the Middle East. One of the camps run by AI, known as Kurmal, engaged in production and training in the use of low-level poisons such as cyanide. We had intelligence telling us that Zarqawi’s men had tested these poisons on animals and, in at least one case, on one of their own associates. They laughed about how well it worked. Our efforts to track activities emanating from Kurmal resulted in the arrest of nearly one hundred Zarqawi operatives in Western Europe planning to use poisons in operations. What was even more worrisome was that by the spring and summer of 2002, more than a dozen al-Qa’ida–affiliated extremists converged on Baghdad, with apparently no harassment on the part of the Iraqi government. They had found a comfortable and secure environment in which they moved people and supplies to support Zarqawi’s operations in northeastern Iraq.
More al-Qa’ida operatives would follow, including Thirwat Shihata and Yussef Dardiri, two Egyptians assessed by a senior al-Qa’ida detainee to be among the Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s best operational planners, who arrived by mid-May of 2002. At times we lost track of them, though their associates continued to operate in Baghdad as of October 2002. Their activity in sending recruits to train in Zarqawi’s camps was compelling enough.
There was also concern that these two might be planning operations outside Iraq. Credible information told us that Shihata was willing to strike U.S., Israeli, and Egyptian targets sometime in the future. Shihata had been linked to terrorist operations in North Africa, and while in Afghanistan he had trained North Africans in the use of truck bombs. Smoke indeed. But how much fire, if any?
Could we prove that this was Iraqi complicity with Zarqawi and the two Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives? No. Do we know just how aware Iraqi authorities were of these terrorists’ presence either in Baghdad or northeastern Iraq? No, but from an intelligence point of view it would have been difficult to conclude that the Iraqi intelligence service was not aware of their activities. Certainly, we believe that at leas
t one senior AI operative maintained some sort of liaison relationship with the Iraqis. But operational direction and control? No.
In the laborious exercise undertaken by analysts to understand the history of a potential Iraq–al-Qa’ida relationship, they went back and documented the basis of a variety of sources—some good, some secondhand, some hearsay, many from other intelligence services. There were, over a decade, a number of possible high-level contacts between Iraq and al-Qa’ida, through high-level and third-party intermediaries. Our data told us that at various points there were discussions of cooperation, safe haven, training, and reciprocal nonaggression.
During the mid-1990s, Sudanese national Islamic Front Leader Hasan al-Turabi reportedly served as a conduit for Bin Ladin between Iraq and Iran. Turabi in this period was trying to become the centerpiece of the Sunni extremist world. He was hosting conferences and facilitating the travel of North Africans to Hezbollah training camps in the Bekaa Valley, in Lebanon. There was concern that common interests may have existed in this period between Iraq, Bin Ladin, and the Sudanese, particularly with regard to the production of chemical weapons. The reports we evaluated told us of high-level Iraqi intelligence service contacts with Bin Ladin himself, though we never knew the outcome of these contacts.
A senior al-Qa’ida detainee told us in 2002 that he believed it unlikely that Bin Ladin would ally himself with Baghdad and thereby compromise al-Qa’ida’s mission and independence. He also said that several of Bin Ladin’s lieutenants had urged cooperation with Iraq, believing that the benefit of possible training, safe haven, and help with al-Qa’ida’s WMD efforts outweighed any risks to al-Qa’ida’s independence. According to the detainee, Saddam became more interested in al-Qa’ida after the East Africa and Cole bombings. But certainly by that time, al-Qa’ida had demonstrated its prowess to conduct conventional attacks, and was well established in its sanctuary in Afghanistan.
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA Page 37