This argumentation had an effect, the more so in that it received political backing from organized landowning groups close to the Court.85 The latter managed to fend off social legislation injurious to their interests; but in this case, too, life was running in the opposite direction and it would be wrong to ascribe great influence to the conservative gentry on the regime of Nicholas II. The conservatives fantasized about restoring the partnership between the Crown and the gentry, but Russia was moving, however haltingly, toward social egalitarianism and common citizenship.
For one, an increasing number of gentry turned their back on the conservative ideology, adopting constitutional and even democratic ideals. The zemstvo movement, which gave a major impetus to the 1905 Revolution, had in its ranks a high proportion of dvoriane, scions of Russia’s oldest and most distinguished families. According to Witte, at the turn of the century at least one-half of the provincial zemstva, in which nobles played a leading role, demanded a voice in legislation.86 Ignoring these realities, the monarchy continued to treat the gentry as a dependable pillar of absolutism. In 1904–5, when the necessity of granting the country a representative institution of some sort could no longer be ignored, some advisers urged giving the gentry a preponderant number of seats. It took an old grand duke to remind Nicholas that the nobles stood in the forefront of the current disturbances.87
No less important was the fact that the gentry were steadily losing ground in the civil service and in land ownership.
The need for technically proficient administrative personnel forced the government, in hiring civil servants, increasingly to favor education over ancestry. As a consequence, the share of dvoriane in the bureaucracy steadily declined.88
The gentry were pulling out of the countryside as well: in 1914, only 20 to 40 percent of Russian dvoriane still lived on the land, the rest having moved to the cities.89 Under the 1861 Emancipation settlement the gentry had retained about one-half of their land; for the other half, which they were forced to cede to the liberated serfs, they received generous compensation. But the gentry did not know how to manage: some experts thought that in Great Russia it was impossible in any event to make a profit from agriculture using hired (rather than bonded) labor. Whatever the reason, the gentry disposed of their estates to peasants and others at a rate of approximately 1 percent a year. At the beginning of the century, they retained only 60 percent of the properties that had been theirs in 1861. Between 1875 and 1900, the proportion of the country’s privately owned (i.e., non-communal) land held by the gentry declined from 73.6 percent to 53.1 percent.90 In January 1915, the gentry (including officers and officials) owned in European Russia 39 million desiatiny* of economically useful land (arable, woodland, and pasture), out of a total of 98 million—only slightly more than the peasants held in private ownership.91 The landowning gentry were a vanishing breed, squeezed from the countryside by the twin forces of economic pressure and peasant hostility.
Of the several institutions serving the Russian monarchy, the Orthodox Church enjoyed the greatest measure of popular support: it provided the main cultural link with the 80 million Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians professing the faith. The monarchy attached great importance to the Church by bestowing on it the status of the Established Church and granting it privileges not enjoyed by official Christian churches elsewhere.
The religiousness of Great Russians is a matter of dispute, some observers arguing that the peasant was deeply Christian, others viewing him as a superstitious agnostic who observed Christian rituals exclusively from concern for life after death. Others yet hold that the Great Russian population was “bi-religious,” with Christian and pre-Christian elements of its faith intermingled. The matter need not detain us. There is no dispute that the masses of the Orthodox population—the great majority of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians—faithfully observed the rituals of their church. Russia before the Revolution was visually and aurally filled with Christian symbols: churches, monasteries, ikons, and religious processions, the sound of liturgical music and the ringing of church bells.
The link between state and religion derived from the belief that Orthodoxy (Pravoslavie) was the national faith of Russia and that only its adherents were true Russians. A Pole or a Jew, no matter how assimilated and patriotic, remained in the eyes of the authorities as well as the Orthodox population an outsider. Membership in the Orthodox Church was a lifelong bond from which there was no escape:
Everybody is free to remain true to the religion of their fathers, but forbidden to make new proselytes. That privilege is reserved for the Orthodox Church alone; it is explicitly so stated in the text of the law. Everybody may enter that church; nobody may leave it. Russian Orthodoxy has doors which open only one way. The confessional laws fill out several chapters of vols, x., xiv., and xv. of the voluminous collection known as “the Code.” Every child born of Orthodox parents is perforce Orthodox; so is every child born of a mixed marriage. Indeed, such a marriage is possible only on this condition.… One article of the Code forbids Orthodox Russians to change their religion; another states the penalties incurred for such offences. The stray sheep is, in the first instance, paternally exhorted by his parish clergy, then made over to the consistory, then to the Synod. A term of penance in a convent can be inflicted. The apostate forfeits all civic rights; he cannot legally own or inherit anything. His kindred may seize on his property or step into his inheritance.… It is a crime to advise anybody to abandon the Orthodox religion; it is a crime to advise anybody against entering it.
92
The Imperial Government did not interfere with the religious observances of the other faiths, but as if to underscore the indissoluble link between Orthodoxy and Russianness, it classified all the other religions as “foreign confessions.”
The Russian regime was not “Caesaropapist,” in the sense of combining secular and spiritual authority, for the Tsar had no say in matters of dogma or ritual: his power was confined to the administration of the Church. Nevertheless, it is true that since the time of Peter the Great, the Russian Orthodox Church was to an extreme degree dependent on the state. By abolishing the Patriarchate and confiscating Church properties (a task completed by Catherine II) Peter made the Church beholden to the monarchy administratively as well as financially. The highest body regulating its affairs, the Holy Synod, was since Peter’s day chaired by a secular person, often a retired general, who functioned as a de facto Minister of Religion. The administrative structure of the Church paralleled that of the civil administration, in that the boundaries of the dioceses coincided with those of the provinces (gubernii). As was true of the bureaucracy, clergymen could be promoted, in this case from bishop to archbishop and then to metropolitan, without regard to the responsibilities entrusted to them, clerical title being treated like chin—that is, as a personal distinction rather than as an attribute of office.93 The clergy were duty-bound to report to the police any information of conspiracies against the Emperor or the government, including that obtained during confession. They also had to denounce the appearance of suspicious strangers in their parishes.
The Orthodox Church was financially dependent on the government for salaries and subsidies, but derived most of its revenues independently.94 All bishops and higher ecclesiastical dignitaries received generous salaries as well as living allowances, which they supplemented with incomes from Church and monastic properties. The parish clergy, too, was on state pay. In 1900, state appropriations to the Church amounted to 23 million rubles. This sum provided approximately one-fifth of the Church’s income—a respectable amount but hardly an explanation why the clergy stood by the monarchy in the 1905 Revolution.95
The principal political responsibility of the Church was indoctrination. The Imperial Government eschewed in schools and the military establishment anything resembling national or ideological propaganda from fear that arguments used to justify the status quo would invite counterarguments. The fact that the country was a multinatio
nal empire also inhibited appeals to nationalism. The government preferred to act as if the existing political and social arrangement were a given. Only religious indoctrination was permitted, and that was the function the Orthodox clergy, especially in the classroom.
The Orthodox Church became first heavily engaged in popular education in the 1880s, after a decade of revolutionary turmoil. To counteract the influence of both radical propagandists and secular teachers on the rural population, the government charged the Church with operating a network of primary schools. At the turn of the century, slightly more than one-half of the grade schools in the Empire, with approximately one-third of the pupils, were under Church supervision.96 Heavy stress was placed on ethics as well as language training (Church Slavonic and Russian). Their teachers, however, were so miserably paid compared with those employed by secular schools that they had difficulty competing and kept losing pupils to their rivals.
Students of the Orthodox faith in all primary and secondary schools were required to take courses in religion, usually taught by clergymen. (Pupils of other faiths had the option of having religion taught by their own teachers.) The instruction stressed, along with moral precepts, loyalty to and respect for the Tsar. These feeble efforts were the best that the Imperial Government had to offer in the realm of political indoctrination.
In times of internal unrest, the Church played its part in support of law and order through sermons and publications. The Church depicted the Tsar as the vicar of God and condemned disobedience to him as a sin. In this connection, the Orthodox Church frequently resorted to anti-Semitic appeals. The most anti-Semitic of all the Christian churches, it played a major part in excluding Jews from Russia prior to the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century and keeping them confined to the provinces of what had been Poland (the “Pale of Settlement”) afterward. The clergy blamed Jews for the crucifixion of Christ, and without endorsing pogroms, did not condemn them either. In 1914, the Synod authorized the construction of a church to commemorate the victim of Beilis’s alleged “ritual murder.”97 In 1905 and after, Orthodox publications placed on Jews responsibility for the revolutionary ferment, accusing them of conspiring to destroy Christianity and take over the world.
The last decade of the Imperial regime saw developments within the Church that from the government’s point of view augured ill for the future.
The formal monopoly of the Established Church on the dogmas and rituals of the Orthodox religion had long been challenged by two heresies, that of the Old Believers and those known collectively as Dissenters or Sectarians. The Old Believers (staroobriadtsy as they called themselves or raskol’niki—“splitters”—as they were labeled by the official Church) descended from those Russians who in the seventeenth century had rejected the ritualistic changes introduced by Patriarch Nikon. Although persecuted and discriminated against, they held their own and even managed, surreptitiously, to make converts. They developed a strong spirit of cohesion and, as is often the case with persecuted minorities, became successful at business. The Sectarians divided into numerous branches, some of which resembled Protestant sects, others of which reverted to pre-Christian practices, accompanied by all kinds of sexual excesses. Official censuses placed the number of Old Believers and Sectarians at 2 million (1897), approximately one-half of them Old Believers, but their actual number was certainly much higher, for the government, treating adherents of these groups as apostates, did not hesitate to falsify statistics. Some estimates place their memberships as high as 20 million. If correct, this would mean that at the turn of the century approximately one out of four Great Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians was outside the official Church. Not surprisingly, the Church was in the forefront of those urging the persecution of the Old Believers and Dissenters, who were making serious inroads on its membership.
There also developed within the Church, especially among the parish clergy, dangerous oppositional trends. Enlightened clergymen pressed for reforms in the status of the Church: worried about too close an identification with the monarchy, they demanded greater independence. After 1905, the government was disturbed to see some clergymen elected to the Duma take their seats alongside liberal and even radical deputies and join in criticizing the regime.
But the clerical hierarchy remained staunchly conservative, as became evident every time lay Christians wanted the Church to pay less attention to ritual and more to good works. In 1901, the Synod excommunicated Leo Tolstoy, the most influential religious writer in Russia, on the grounds that he incited the population against social distinctions and patriotism.
The close identification of the Orthodox Church with the state proved a mixed blessing. While it gave the clerical Establishment all kinds of benefits, it linked its destiny too closely to that of the monarchy. In 1916–17, when the Crown would come under assault, the Church could do very little to help: and when the monarchy sank, it went down with it.
In the eyes of foreign observers Russia of 1900 was a mixture of contradictions. A French commentator compared her to “one of those castles, constructed at different epochs, where the most discordant styles are seen side by side, or else those houses, built piecemeal and at intervals, which never have either the unity or convenience of dwellings erected on one plan and at one rush.”98 The Revolution of 1905 was an explosion of these contradictions. The fundamental question facing Russia after the October Manifesto was whether the settlement offered by the Crown would suffice to calm passions and resolve social and political conflicts. To understand why the prospect for such a compromise was poor, it is necessary to know the condition and mentality of the two main protagonists, the peasantry and the intelligentsia.
*The origins and evolution of Russian patrimonialism are the theme of my Russia under the Old Regime (London and New York, 1974).
*The zemstva and Municipal Councils, organs of local self-government introduced in 1864–70, performed important cultural and economic functions (education, sanitation, etc.) but had no administrative authority.
†Russia was a multinational empire in which the dominant nation, the Great Russians, constituted at the turn of the century 44.4 percent of the population. The majority were other Orthodox Slavs (Ukrainians, 17.8 percent, and Belorussians, 4.7 percent); Poles (6.3 percent); Muslims, mostly Turkic speaking and Sunni (11.1 percent); Jews (4.2 percent); and various Baltic, Caucasian, and Siberian nationalities. The total population of the Empire, according to the first census taken in 1897, was 125.7 million (exclusive of Finland, which was a separate Grand Duchy under the Russian Tsar, and the Central Asian Muslim protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara). Of the 55.7 million Great Russians, some 85 percent were peasants.
*Compare this with the strikingly similar remark of Louis XVI. On being informed of his father’s death, he exclaimed: “What a burden! And I have been taught nothing! It seems as though the universe were about to fall upon me”: Pierre Gaxotte, The French Revolution (London-New York, 1932), 71.
*In fact, Nicholas himself had hardly any Russian blood in his veins: since the eighteenth century, through intermarriage with German and Danish families, Russian monarchs were Russians in name only. Their opponents liked to taunt them as the “Gottorp-Holstein” dynasty, which, genealogically speaking, was not far from the truth.
* A. A. Mossolov, At the Court of the Last Tsar (London, 1935), 127–31. Witte recalls that when he used the expression “public opinion” in the Tsar’s presence, Nicholas responded with passion: “And what is public opinion to me?”: S.lu. Vitte, Vospominaniia, II (Moscow, 1960), 328.
*The rules governing the Russian bureaucracy were formalized in Volume III of the Code of Laws: Ustav o sluzhbe po opredeleniiu ot pravitel’stva: Izdanie 1896 goda, Svod Zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii (St. Petersburg, 1913). All further references are to this edition. In Imperial Russia the term neblagonadëzhnyi had legal standing and could lead to the dismissal from any state institution, including the universities. It was formally defined by Minister of the Interior N. P. Ig
natev, in 1881: P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia na rubezhe 1870–1880kh godov (Moscow, 1964), 395.
* Bernard Pares, Russia and Reform (London, 1907), 328. According to one contemporary source, some Russian officials believed that treating their own population brutally enhanced the country’s standing abroad. Western powers, which provided Russia with loans, were said to be impressed by strength: “the more cruelly affairs were conducted inside Russia, the more her respect grew in Europe”: Die Judenpogrome in Russland, I (Köln-Leipzig, 1910), 230. There is, indeed, a relevant Russian proverb: “Beat your own people and others will fear you.”
*H.-J. Torke makes the interesting suggestion that the notorious venality of Russian officials was at least in part due to their self-identification with the state and the resulting difficulty of distinguishing private property from public: Jahrbücher, 227.
*It must be noted, however, that in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy it was not uncommon to find officials who resented the existing regime and sympathized with the opposition: Sergius A. Korff, Autocracy and Revolution in Russia (New York, 1923), 13–14.
The Russian Revolution Page 15