You trust Alexandra Fedorovna, this is quite natural. Still, what she tells you is not the truth; she is only repeating what has been cleverly insinuated to her. If you are not able to remove this influence from her, at least protect yourself from constant systematic maneuvers attempted through the intermediacy of the wife you love.… When the hour comes—and it is already near—from the height of the throne you could make the ministers responsible to yourself and to the legislative institutions, and to do that simply, naturally, without pressure from the outside, and differently from the memorable act of October 17, 1905…. You stand on the eve of an era of new troubles, on the eve of an era of outrages [
attentats
.] Believe me, if I insist so much of your freeing yourself from the chains that have been forged, I do so … only in the hope of saving you and saving the throne of our dear country from the irreparable.
86
Without bothering to read it, Nicholas forwarded the letter to Alexandra, whom it sent into a paroxysm of rage: she asked that Nikolai Mikhailovich be exiled from Petrograd.87
On November 7, the Tsar received Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, now in command of the Caucasian Front, who urged him to let the Duma choose the cabinet.88 Incredibly, even the United Nobility, the staunchest pillar of the monarchy, passed in Moscow and in Petrograd resolutions supporting the program of the Progressive Bloc.89 Indeed, it would be difficult to find any prominent individual or group, including those on the most conservative, nationalist end of the political spectrum, who did not join in the clamor for fundamental changes in the structure and personnel of the government.
Stürmer felt justified, not only on personal grounds but also those of state security, to request that the Duma be dissolved and Miliukov placed under arrest.90 But he did not find the support he had expected: the Tsar and the cabinet were paralyzed with fear. In the Council of Ministers only Protopopov sided with him. The others wanted to avoid anything rash. Nicholas did not want a break with the Duma and sought to appease it without giving in on the critical issue of a responsible ministry. On November 4 he sent the Ministers of War and of the Navy to the Duma to deliver conciliatory speeches.91 Alexandra was urging him to stand firm, but Nicholas no longer had the will. So instead of defending his Prime Minister against slanderous accusations—whose real target was the Crown—he decided to sacrifice him and put in his place someone more acceptable to the Duma. On November 8, Stürmer was dismissed. He never understood what had happened to him, why he was accused of treason which he had not committed, and why the Tsar did not defend him against these false charges. Shortly afterward, the French Ambassador saw him on the street, shuffling along, lost in thought.92 He died the following year, a broken man.
The Duma rejoiced over Stunner’s dismissal, which it took as proof that no minister whom it did not want could stay in office.93 This feeling received encouragement from the appointment, as Stunner’s successor, of the Minister of Transport, A. F. Trepov. The new Prime Minister, relatively young (fifty-two) by the standards of the late Imperial government—which saw in dotage assurance of loyalty—descended of an old servitor family. He wanted to emulate Stolypin, being similarly convinced that Russia could no longer be properly governed without the parliament’s cooperation. To secure it, he was prepared to make far-reaching concessions: forming a cabinet acceptable to the Duma, putting a stop to legislating through Article 87, and improving the status of workers, Jews, and Finns.94 In private meetings with Duma leaders during the recess (November 6–17), he obtained promises of support, on condition that he get rid of Protopopov.
In the first half of November 1916, Nicholas, for all practical purposes, capitulated to revolutionary demands; to his entourage he appeared apathetic and indifferent.95 If Russia’s liberal politicians had been able to view the situation rationally, they would have realized that they had achieved, in substance if not in form, their principal demands. By firing Stürmer for no good cause and replacing him with a Prime Minister amenable to the program of the Progressive Bloc, by keeping the revolutionary Duma in session instead of dissolving it, the Tsar had surrendered to the opposition. But the opposition, smelling blood, wanted more.
For all his good intentions, therefore, Trepov had little success. On November 19, when the Duma reconvened, he delivered to it a programmatic speech. The left, led by Kerensky and Chkheidze, received him with abusive screams that went on for forty minutes during which he could not utter a word.* When order was finally restored, he gave a conciliatory address very reminiscent, in tone and content, of Stolypin’s Duma speeches. He promised to put an end to illegality. He asked for help:
Let us forget our quarrels, let us postpone our feuds.… In the name of the government, I declare directly and openly that it wishes to commit its energies to constructive, pragmatic work in cooperation with the legislature.
96
The duty of patriots was not to destroy the government but to strengthen it. Trepov used the occasion to reveal that the Allies had promised Russia Constantinople and the Straits.
It was to no avail. Heckled and disrupted, Trepov faced an audience that spurned conciliation: now that Stürmer had been sacrificed, it wanted Protopopov’s head. When he had finished, Vladimir Purishkevich asked for the floor. Cheered on by the socialists, this extreme monarchist demanded that the government cease “selling Russia out to the Germans” and rid itself of Rasputin and “Rasputinism.”
The sessions that followed gave no sign that passions were cooling. The radical deputies now shed such few inhibitions as had constrained them in the past and openly incited the country to rebellion. The Mensheviks and the other socialists walked out of parliament on December 2, after the Progressive Bloc had unanimously supported the government’s rejection of German proposals for a separate peace. Two weeks later, Kerensky exhorted the population to disobey the government.97
Nor did Trepov obtain countervailing support from the Court. Alexandra intrigued against him out of fear of losing influence. In letters to Nicholas she branded him a liar who deserved to be hanged.98 Nicholas for once ignored his wife’s advice and agreed with Trepov that Protopopov had to go. On November 11, he informed Alexandra that Protopopov was unwell and would be replaced: he asked her not to involve Rasputin in this matter because the responsibility for the decision was entirely his. Alarmed, Alexandra requested Nicholas by telegram not to act until they had had a chance to talk, and the next day departed with the children for Mogilev. Face to face, she promptly turned her husband around. When Trepov arrived in Mogilev to have the Tsar approve Protopopov’s successor, Nicholas curtly informed him that Protopopov would stay, after all. Not even Trepov’s threat of resignation would make him relent. A. I. Spiridovich cites this incident as the most glaring example of Rasputin’s influence.99
As 1916 drew to a close, all the political parties and groupings united in opposition to the monarchy. They agreed on little else. The extreme left would be satisfied with nothing short of a radical transformation of Russia’s political, social, and economic system. Liberals and liberal-conservatives would have been content with parliamentary democracy. Both, for all their differences, thought in terms of institutions. The extreme right, which by now had also joined the opposition, by contrast, dwelled on personalities. In its view, Russia’s crisis was the fault, not of the system, but of the individuals in charge, notably the “German” Empress and Rasputin. Once these two were out of the way, all would be well. It was not possible to get at the Empress directly, since this would have required a palace coup, but some monarchists believed they could attain the same end by isolating her from Rasputin. Alexandra’s well-known emotional attachment to the starets suggested that separation from him would induce in her a psychic breakdown. Freed from his wife’s baneful influence, Nicholas would come to his senses and yield power to the Duma. Should he fail to do so, he could be replaced with a regent chosen from among the grand dukes, most likely Nikolai Nikolaevich. Such talk was common in November and Dec
ember of 1916 in the capital’s highest social circles: at the Yacht Club, frequented by the grand dukes, in the halls of the Duma and the State Council among monarchist deputies, in aristocratic salons, even at Army Headquarters in Mogilev. It was a repetition of February 1801 when the plot against Paul I, which ended in his murder, was the talk of St. Petersburg society.
Rasputin was a natural target of right-wing critics because of his influence on the Imperial couple and through them, on ministerial appointments. Stürmer, Protopopov, and Shuvaev, holders of the most important posts in the administration, owed their positions to him. True, his protege Stürmer was replaced by an enemy, Trepov, but even so it was widely believed that crossing Rasputin’s path meant a broken career. Rasputin was even suspected of meddling in military operations. Indeed, in November 1915 he had given, through the Empress, strategic advice to headquarters. “Before I forget,” Alexandra wrote Nicholas on November 15, 1915,
I must give you a message from our Friend, prompted by what he saw last night. He begs you to
order
that one should
advance near Riga
, says it is necessary otherwise the Germans will settle down so firmly through all the winter, that it will cost endless bloodshed and trouble to make them move.
100
Neither Nicholas nor his generals paid attention to such counsel. Rasputin was strictly forbidden to come near headquarters. Still, the fact that this semi-literate peasant felt free to give advice on military matters incensed the conservatives.
At Tsarskoe Selo, his word was law. Rasputin frequently prophesied that should any harm befall him, Russia would go through another Time of Troubles. He had visions of rivers of blood, of fire and smoke, an uncanny and rationally inexplicable foreboding of what would soon, in fact, occur.101 His predictions alarmed the Empress and made her more than ever anxious to protect him from his enemies, who, in her eyes, were also the enemies of the dynasty and of Russia.
Rasputin basked in his power. His drinking bouts, his boasting and insolence, grew more scandalous with each day. Ladies of high society were fascinated by the brute with the hypnotic eyes and gift of prophesy. Rasputin belonged to the sect of Khlysty, who preached that sinning reduced the quantity of sin in the world. At his private villa, with the ever-present gypsies, liquor flowed freely. Whether Rasputin really possessed the sexual prowess with which he was credited is more than questionable. A physician named R. R. Vreden, who examined him in 1914 after he had been knifed by a jealous mistress, found Rasputin’s genitals shriveled, like those of a very old man, which led him to wonder whether he was even capable of the sexual act: he ascribed this to the effects of alcohol and syphilis.*
Rasputin could behave so scandalously because he felt above the law. In March 1915, the chief of the Corps of Gendarmes, V. F. Dzhunkovskii, had the courage to inform the Tsar that his agents had overheard Rasputin boast at a dinner party in Moscow’s Praga Restaurant that he “could do anything he wanted” with the Empress. His reward was to be sacked and sent to the front. After this incident, the police thought it prudent to keep to itself adverse information on Rasputin. Sycophants and aspirants to office fawned on him; honest patriots risked disgrace if they dared to incur his displeasure. Guchkov and Polivanov, who had done the most to revitalize Russia’s war effort after the debacle of 1915, were kept at arm’s length and, in the case of Polivanov, fired because of Rasputin’s enmity. That such a charlatan had a hold on the monarchy offended the monarchists most of all.
Nicholas’s attitude toward Rasputin was ambivalent. He told Protopopov that while he had not cared for Rasputin at first, in time he had grown “accustomed to him.”102 He rarely saw the starets, however, leaving him to Alexandra, who always received Rasputin in company, usually that of Vyrubova. Nicholas told Kokovtsov in 1912 that “personally he hardly knew ‘this peasant’ [muzhichek], having met him, in passing, no more than two or three times, and, moreover, at considerable intervals.”103 Even so, the Tsar would not listen to any criticism of Rasputin, treating him strictly as “une affaire de famille,” as he told Stolypin, requesting him never again to allude to this matter.104 Rasputin was a “family affair” in the sense that he had the unique ability to stop the bleeding of the tsarevich, whose illness never left the family’s thoughts. The imperial children adored the old man. But Nicholas insisted Rasputin stay out of politics.105
By the end of 1916, the Imperial couple had concluded that the opposition, determined to unseat them, attacked their appointees and friends as a matter of principle: every choice of the monarchy, whatever his merits, was bound to come under fire. The true target of these attacks was the dynasty. That this was so Nicholas and Alexandra concluded from the example of Protopopov, who had been named to placate the opposition but upon assuming office became the target of its abuse. Alexandra wrote Nicholas:
Remember that the question is not Protop[opov] or X, Y, Z. The question is
the monarchy and your prestige
.… Don’t think that it will end with this. They will remove one after another all who are
devoted to you
, and then, ourselves.
106
When Rodzianko assured Nicholas that Protopopov was mad, the Tsar responded, smiling: “Probably from the time I appointed him minister.”107 The same held true for Rasputin. Alexandra, and to some extent her husband, came to believe that enemies abused their “Friend” only to get at them.
29. Rasputin with children in his Siberian village.
Rasputin’s influence reached its apogee late in 1916 following an unsuccessful attempt to bribe him. Trepov was told by the Duma leaders that the price for their cooperation was the removal of Protopopov. He accordingly informed Protopopov that he wished him to give up the Ministry of the Interior and take over that of Commerce. As soon as he learned of this development, Rasputin concluded that a Trepov-Rodzianko intrigue was in the making and intervened with the Empress on Protopopov’s behalf.108 Protopopov stayed on the job. The incident persuaded Trepov that unless Rasputin was removed he would not be able to carry out his duties. Rasputin was known to take bribes left and right: Protopopov alone paid him a monthly subsidy of 1,000 rubles from the funds of the Department of Police.109 Aware of these facts, Trepov decided to tempt Rasputin with a bribe to end all bribes. Using as intermediary his brother-in-law, General A. A. Mosolov, who happened to be one of Rasputin’s drinking companions, he offered Rasputin up to 200,000 rubles in cash as well as a monthly allowance, if he would return to Siberia and stay out of politics. Rasputin promised to consider the offer, but sensing an opportunity to bring down Trepov and enhance his own reputation with the Court, he informed the Empress. This marked the beginning of the end for Trepov.110 Rasputin’s prestige at the Court rose commensurately, for he now had proven that he was, indeed, an “incorruptible man of the people.”
The failure of Trepov’s maneuver persuaded right-wing enemies of Rasputin that they had no choice but to kill him. A conspiracy was hatched in Petrograd in early November, before Trepov’s ill-fated venture, and got underway the following month. Implicated were persons from the very highest strata of St. Petersburg society, including a grand duke and the husband of a grand duchess. The central figure was twenty-nine-year-old Prince Felix Iusupov. Educated in Oxford, handsome in an effeminate way, an admirer of Oscar Wilde, he was known as a superstitious coward. Iusupov initially hoped to influence Rasputin to change his ways and to this end befriended him, but when this effort failed, he decided on drastic action, having become convinced that Rasputin was drugging the Tsar as well as maintaining contact with enemy agents. His mother, Zinaida Iusupov-Elston, the richest woman in Russia (her family income for 1914 was estimated at 1.3 million rubles, equivalent to nearly one ton of gold), had once been friendly with the Empress, but the two had fallen out over Rasputin. Suggestions have been made that it was she who persuaded her apolitical son to organize the plot.111 But it is more likely that the main influence on Iusup
ov was twenty-five-year-old Grand Duke Dmitrii Pavlovich, a favorite nephew of the Tsar and a leading contender for the hand of Grand Duchess Olga, who filled Iusupov’s head with stories of Rasputin’s alleged treachery.
Once he had made up his mind to kill Rasputin, Iusupov looked for accomplices.* Having heard Vasilii Maklakov attack Rasputin in the Duma, Iusupov invited him to join the conspiracy. He assured Maklakov that no later than two weeks after Rasputin’s death, the Empress would be confined to a mental institution:
Her spiritual balance depends entirely on Rasputin: the instant he is gone, it will disintegrate. And once the Emperor has been freed of Rasputin’s and his wife’s influence, everything will change: he will turn into a good constitutional monarch.
112
Iusupov told Maklakov that he intended to hire either revolutionary terrorists or professional assassins, but Maklakov dissuaded him: if the deed must be done—and he did not dispute that—then Iusupov and his accomplices had to do it. Maklakov offered to provide advice and legal help, but regretted being unable personally to take part in Rasputin’s murder, because on the night when it was to occur (December 16) he had a speaking engagement in Moscow. “Just in case,” he gave Iusupov a rubber truncheon with a lead tip.
The Russian Revolution Page 42