by Onasander
[9] Plans and counter-stratagems for victory that are originated at the very moment of battle are sometimes preferable to those which are conceived and contrived by generals in anticipation and before the engagement, and they are sometimes more worthy of remark, in the case of those made by men who are skilled in military science, through they are things which cannot be reduced to rules or planned beforehand. [10] For just as pilots for their voyages, before sailing from the harbour, fit their ship out with everything that a ship requires; yet when a storm blows up they do, not what they wish, but what they must, boldly staking their fortunes against the driving peril of chance and calling to their aid no memory of their past practice but assistance appropriate to the existing circumstances; just so generals will prepare their armies as they believe will be best, but when the storm of war is at hand repeatedly shattering, overthrowing, and bringing varied conditions, the sight of present circumstances demands expedients based on the exigencies of the moment, which the necessity of chance rather than the memory of experience suggests.
XXXIII. THE GENERAL SHOULD NOT HIMSELF ENTER BATTLE
[1] The general should fight cautiously rather than boldly, or should keep away altogether from a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. For even if in battle he shows that he is not to be outdone in valour, he can aid his army far less by fighting than he can harm it if he should be killed, since the knowledge of a general is far more important than his physical strength. Even a soldier can perform a great deed by bravery, but no one except the general can by his wisdom plan a greater one. [2] If a ship’s captain leaving the helm should himself do what the sailors ought to do, he would endanger his ship; in the same way, if the general, leaving his function of wise direction, should descend to the duties of a simple soldier, his neglect of the whole situation, due to his lack of governing, will render useless the common soldier’s mere routine service. [3] Similar, I think, is the notion which the general gets into his heart when he thus disregards the welfare of his whole force in the event of accident to himself; for if he, with whom the safety of the whole army lies, has no care lest he himself should die, he prefers that everyone should die with him, and rightly he would be censured as an unsuccessful rather than a courageous general. [4] He who has accomplished many feats of generalship through his wisdom must be satisfied with the honour for his intellectual successes, but he who is so stupid that, unless he comes to close quarters with the enemy, he believes he has accomplished nothing worthy of mention, is not brave but thoughtless and foolhardy. [5] Hence the general must show himself brave before the army, that he may call forth the zeal of his soldiers, but he must fight cautiously; he should despise death if his army is defeated, and not desire to live, but if his army is preserved he should guard his personal safety, for sometimes the death of a general lessens the glory of his army, since the defeated enemy is encouraged, perceiving that its opponents are without a general, and the successful army is discouraged, feeling the need of its own general. [6] The duty of the general is to ride by the ranks on horseback, show himself to those in danger, praise the brave, threaten the cowardly, encourage the lazy, fill up gaps, transpose a company if necessary, bring aid to wearied, anticipate the crisis, the hour, and the outcome.
XXXIV. CONFERRING REWARDS PROPORTIONAL TO THE VALOUR OF EACH
[1] On returning from battle, the general should first offer to the gods such sacrifice and festal celebrations as the circumstances permit, promising to offer the customary thank-offerings after complete victory; then he should honour those soldiers who have faced danger most bravely with the gifts and marks of distinction which are usually given, and he should punish those who have shown themselves cowards. [2] Honours should be bestowed according to tradition and custom in each case. Those bestowed by generals are the following: full equipments of armour, decorations, spoils, and appointments to commands as over fifties, over hundreds, over companies, over squads, and the other parts of command prescribed by the laws of the country in question. The bravest of the private soldiers should receive the lesser commands, and those of his officers who have distinguished themselves should have the higher commands, since these rewards strengthen the self-esteem of those who have deserved well, and encourage others who desire similar rewards. [3] Whenever honour is paid to the brave and punishment of the cowardly is not neglected, then an army must have fair expectation; the latter are afraid to be found wanting, the former are ambitious to show prowess. [4] It is not only necessary in victory to distribute rewards to individual men but also to make recompense to the army as a whole for its dangers. The soldiers should be allowed to plunder the possessions of the enemy if they should capture a camp or baggage train or fortress, or sometimes even a city, unless the general intends to put it to a more profitable use. [5] This course will serve well the interests of the future, especially if the war is not ended, since the soldiers will be more eager to enter battle, unless we are to believe that, while huntsmen must entice their dogs with the blood of wild beasts and the entrails of the animal which the dogs have caught, nevertheless it is not at all advantageous to give the possessions of the defeated enemy, as encouragement, to the victorious army.
XXXV. (1) INDISCRIMINATE PILLAGE MUST NOT ALWAYS BE PERMITTED; PRISONERS MUST NOT BE REGARDED AS LOOT, BUT MUST BE SOLD BY THE GENERAL
[1] Plundering should not be permitted after every battle nor in the case of all kinds of property, but only in the case of certain things, and least of all of prisoners, for these should be sold by the general. [2] If he lack money and resources to meet a large public expense, he should order that all the plundered property, including the live-stock, be turned over to him. [3] The general will know what is best according to the circumstances, whether to seize everything or a part or nothing, of that on which he chances; certainly it is not the characteristic of war to cause both abundance of wealth to the community and unlimited gain to the private soldiers; in fact it happens sometimes that the gains of a victorious army are proportionate to the wealth of the vanquished and the prosperity of their territory.
(2) PRISONERS
[4] Prisoners, if the war is still in progress, the general should not kill — at the very most he may kill, if he thinks best, the allies of those against whom the war is directed, but least of all those who stand in highest repute and position among the enemy, remembering the uncertainties of chance, and the reversals caused by providence, which usually brings retribution. His purpose should be, if his army should capture certain prisoners for whom there is great desire in their own country, or some stronghold, that he may be able by giving enough in exchange to redeem the property of his friends, or at least then, should the enemy not wish to deal justly with him, that he may protect himself on equal terms. [5] After successful engagements and the dangers of battle, the general should allow feasts and celebrations and holidays, in order that the soldiers, knowing what happens as the result of victory by battle, may patiently undergo all hardships necessary for such victory.
XXXVI. (1) ON THE BURIAL OF THE FALLEN
[1] The general should take thought for the burial of the dead, offering as a pretext for delay neither occasion nor time nor place nor fear, whether he happen to be victorious or defeated. Now this is both a holy act of reverence toward the dead and also a necessary example for the living. [2] For if the dead are not buried, each soldier believes that no care will be taken of his own body, should he chance to fall, observing what happens before his own eyes, and thereby judging of the future, feeling that he, likewise, if he should die, would fail of burial, waxes indignant at the contemptuous neglect of burial.
(2) ENCOURAGEMENT IN DEFEAT
[3] If the general be defeated, by encouraging the soldiers who have survived the battle, he should prepare for another bout, thinking that very likely there is at such a time an even better opportunity to retrieve defeat. [4] For, as a rule, soldiers after victory are accustomed to relax their vigilance, for their contempt for their near-by opponents causes carelessness of
their own interests, and thus good fortune has often done more harm than misfortune. [5] For he who has suffered a defeat has been taught to guard in future against that from which he has suffered, but he who is inexperienced in misfortune has not even learned that it is necessary to guard his success. [6] On the other hand, if victorious, the general should take the same precautions against suffering harm through negligence which he would use in trying to inflict upon the enemy if they were off their guard. Seasonable fear is wise precaution, as ill-timed contempt is recklessness that invites attack.
XXXVII. PRECAUTIONS IN TIME OF PEACE
[1] After making a truce he should neither make an attack nor himself remain unguarded; he should, on the one hand, make no move against the enemy, as in peace, but, on the other, he should be protected against danger, as in war. [2] He must not break faith in a treaty, nor be the first to commit any sacrilegious act, but he must be suspicious enough to watch for festering deceit on the part of the enemy, for the intentions of those with whom the treaty has been concluded are uncertain. [3] Let your part be a firm resolution not to transgress, because of the sacred nature of the treaty, but suspect a breach of faith on the part of the enemy due to their hostility. That general is wise and cautious who affords the enemy, even when they desire to attack, no opportunity to break their compact. [4] Those who leave to the gods revenge for what they have suffered are piously minded but certainly do not act safely. [5] For it is absolute folly to be careless of the danger to oneself in the hope that treaty-breakers will pay the penalty — as if one would himself be saved as soon as the enemy perish! — when it is possible to make trial of the irreligion of the enemy while at the same time safeguarding one’s own interests. With this precaution one will save himself from defeat if plotted against, but the enemy will commit sacrilege both if they attempt a breach of the truce and if they let it be seen that they would have done if it they could.
XXXVIII. (1) TREATMENT OF SURRENDERED CITIES WITH TRUST AND HUMANITY
[1] If any cities should open their gates in surrender early in the war, the general should treat them in a manner both humane and advantageous, for thus he would induce the other cities also to submit. The enticing hope of a similarly fortunate fate leads the majority to surrender voluntarily. [2] But he who acts in a harsh and savage manner, immediately after becoming master of a city, plundering, slaying, and destroying, makes other cities hostile, so that the war becomes laborious for him and victory difficult of attainment. [3] Since they know that the punishment of the conquered by the conqueror is merciless, they are ready to do and suffer anything rather than surrender their cities. [4] For nothing makes men so brave as the fear of what ills they will suffer if they surrender; indeed the expectation of the evils which will ensue from their subjection produces a terrible pertinacity in danger. [5] Moreover, fighting is dangerous against desperate men, who expect from surrender no amelioration of the fate which will be theirs if they continue to fight, and therefore prefer, if they can inflict much harm, also to suffer much. [6] On this account the sieges of such insensate and savage generals become wearisome and long drawn-out, sometimes even fail of accomplishment, and are extremely dangerous and precarious.
(2) HOW TO TREAT TRAITORS
[7] One should keep promises and pledges to traitors, not on account of what they have done but of what others will do, in order that these, knowing that gratitude will be due them, may choose the interests of their country’s enemies and turn to the same sort of service. For he who gives to a traitor receives much more than he bestows. [8] On this account it is necessary to pay the reward cheerfully, for the general is not an avenger of the betrayed city but the commander of the army of his own country.
XXXIX. (1) ON THE GENERAL’S KNOWLEDGE OF THE COURSES OF THE STARS
[1] In night attacks and surprises of towns through treason, the general must know the heavenly courses of the stars by night, otherwise his plans will often be of no avail. [2] For instance, some traitor has appointed the third or fourth, or whatever hour of the night he considers most favourable, for opening the gates or slaying some of the opposing faction in the town or attacking the hostile garrison within the town; then one of two things has happened; the general has reached the camp of the enemy too early and has been detected before the traitors are ready and has been thwarted in his attempt, or else he has arrived too late and has thus been the cause of the traitors’ being detected and put to death and of his own failure to accomplish any of his plans. [3] Accordingly he should form an estimate of the road, deciding at what point he is to set out; then he must determine the distance and the time — how much of each he will have to spend on the journey; — and finally, he must, from his observation of the stars, estimate exactly what part of the night has passed and what part remains, in order that he may arrive neither too early nor too late; then he must get there at precisely the appointed time, so that news of his attack may not reach the enemy until he is actually inside the fortifications.
(2) HOW TO CAPTURE A CITY BY DAY
[4] If setting out by day, he lead his army to capture at an appointed hour towns that are to be betrayed, he should send horsemen ahead to seize every one met on the road, that no native of the country may run ahead and warn of the approach of their enemy but that the army may appear suddenly to the enemy and catch him off his guard. [5] He must fall unexpectedly on an unsuspecting enemy, even if he is not expecting to seize the towns through treachery but to fight openly after a declaration of war, and he must not hesitate but strive in every way to attack fort or camp or town before his advance is known, especially if he knows that his own army is small and inferior to that of the enemy. [6] For unexpected appearances of an enemy, because they are unforeseen, terrify their opponents, even should the latter be stronger; but at length, if those who have been taken by surprise should observe their own forces or get the chance to plan and renew their courage, they gradually and of necessity come to despise their foes; in this way the beginning of a war sometimes seems more terrible than the latter part. [7] On this account, armies have often so terrified their opponents by the unexpectedness of their appearance that they have either quickly subdued them against their will or else have forced them to agree to comply with their own demands.
XL. SIEGES
[1] A siege demands courage on the part of the soldiers, military science on the part of the general, and equipment of machines of war. The general must take no fewer precautions and be no less observant than the enemy; for the army attacked, when it knows just what its danger is, guards especially against the army attacking. [2] The army that believes itself out of danger does what work is at hand when it pleases, but that which is in danger strives to surprise its enemy by dealing him a blow whenever it has an opportunity. Hence it is necessary for the besieging general to fortify his camp with trenches, palisades, and guards. [3] For whatever the besiegers intend to do can be seen from the walls; but the besieged, with the wall as a shield, often without detection pour through the gates and burn the machines or kill the soldiers or do whatever damage comes to their hands.
XLI. AMBUSH LAID BY THE BESIEGER BEFORE THE GATES OF A TOWN
[1] The besieged would by no means attempt this if the besieging general should post at both large and small gates companies of soldiers to prevent sudden sallies, since otherwise the defenders might without warning attack the besiegers. [2] Attacks by night are generally advantageous to the besiegers, since the besieged are unable to see what is happening, on account of the darkness, and everything seems more terrible to them, and they are compelled to regard the attack as more dangerous than it really is. Hence tumult and confusion arise; no one is able to use sober judgement in such circumstances, but many things that are not happening are said to be happening; and the besieged is not able to know from what direction the enemy is attacking, nor in what numbers, nor with what forces, and men run hither and thither, while the shouting and consternation cause disorder and panic.
XLII. (1) FEAR IS A
FALSE PROPHET
[1] Fear is a false prophet and believes that what it fears is actually coming to pass. At night every trifling occurrence seems more terrible to the besieged, for on account of the darkness no man tells what he sees but always what he hears. If one or two of the enemy appear somewhere on the walls, the defenders, believing that the whole army has already mounted the walls, turn and flee, leaving the battlements and gates undefended.
(2) THE GENERAL MUST SET A GOOD EXAMPLE TO HIS SOLDIERS
[2] If the general is in haste to finish some enterprise that he has on hand, he should not hesitate to be prominent in the work, for soldiers are not forced to activity so much by the threats of their immediate superiors as by the influence of men of higher rank. For a soldier seeing his officer the first to put his hand to the task not only realizes the need of haste too but also is ashamed not to work, and afraid to disobey orders; and the rank and file no longer feel that they are being treated as slaves under orders but are moved as though urged by one on the same footing as themselves.