by Onasander
(8) ON THE INSPECTION OF THE ENEMY’S CAMP
[16] Ὁράτω δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων παρεμβολὴν ἐμπείρως· μήτε γάρ, ἐὰν ἐν ἐπιπέδῳ καὶ κατὰ κύκλον ἴδῃ κείμενον βραχὺν τὴν περίμετρον καὶ συνεσταλμένον χάρακα, δοκείτω τοὺς πολεμίους ὀλίγους εἶναι — πᾶς γὰρ κύκλος ἐλάττω τὴν τοῦ σχήματος ὄψιν ἔχει τῆς ἐξ ἀναλόγου στερεομετρουμένης θεωρίας, καὶ πλείους δύναται δέξασθαι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ περιγραφόμενον εὖρος, ἢ ἰδὼν ἂν τις ὄψει τεκμήραιτο — , μήτε, ἂν αἱ πλευραὶ τοῦ χάρακος ἐπὶ μῆκος ἐκτείνωσι καὶ κατά τι μέρος στεναὶ τυγχάνωσιν ἢ σκολιαὶ καὶ πολυγώνιοι καὶ ὀξυγώνιοι, πολὺ πλῆθος ἐλπιζέτω· τῆς μὲν γὰρ στρατοπεδείας ἡ ὄψις μεγάλη φαίνεται, τοὺς δ’ ἐν αὐτῇ περιειλημμένους ἄνδρας οὐ πάντως πλείονας ἔχει τῶν ἐν κύκλῳ περιγραφομένων.
[16] The general should skilfully inspect the camp of the enemy. If he sees a circular palisade contracted into a small circumference, lying in a plain, he should not conclude that the enemy are few in number; for every circle appears to contain less than it actually does by the theory of proportionate geometrical contents, and the space enclosed within a circle can hold more men than one would think to see it. If the sides of the palisade happen to be long and close together in certain parts, or crooked with many acute angles, he should not conclude that the camp contains a great number of men; for this type of camp appears large but has no more men within its walls in every case than circular camps have.
[17] οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρῶν καὶ λόφων χάρακες, ἐὰν μὴ συμφυεῖς ὦσι πάντῃ, μείζους μὲν ὁρῶνται τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις, ἐλάττους δὲ ἢ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἄνδρας περιέχουσιν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἐντὸς ἀπολείπεται γυμνά μέρη· τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων τόπων ἀνάγκη πολλὰ μὲν εἶναι βάραθρα, πολλὰ δὲ κρημνώδη καὶ τραχέα καὶ ἀκατασκήνωτα, τοῦ δὲ χάρακος πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τιθεμένου, τούτου τὸ μῆκος εὐλόγως ἐπεκτείνεται.
[17] Palisades on hills and mountains, unless compact in every respect, appear greater than those in plains, but they contain fewer men than the eye judges; for many parts of such camps are bare of men, since there must be many ravines in them and many steep and precipitous banks unsuitable for pitching tents, and as the palisade is built to defend the men, its length must be accordingly greater.
[18] μήτ’ οὖν, ἐπειδὰν ἴδῃ βραχὺν καὶ συνεσταλμένον, καταφρονείτω συλλογιζόμενος καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, μήτ’, ἂν καὶ παραμήκη, καταπληττέσθω.
[18] The general, therefore, judging merely the position and shape of a camp, should not be emboldened at the sight of a small contracted camp nor downhearted at the sight of an extended one.
[19] Ταῦτα μέντοι γιγνώσκων εὐκαίρῳ ποτὲ στρατηγίᾳ χρησάσθω, καὶ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ κατὰ τὸ προειρημένον σχῆμα, καί, εἰ δέοι, καὶ συνθλίψας τὸ στράτευμα μὴ προαγέτω μήτε δεικνύτω τοῖς ἀντεστρατοπεδεύκοσι, καὶ δὴ προκαλουμένοις εἰς μάχην μὴ ἐξαγέτω· δοκείτω δὲ καὶ δεδιέναι.
[19] With this knowledge he should make use of opportune strategy. Stationing his army in a small camp, according to the above-mentioned plan, and if necessary, even crowding the soldiers together, he should not lead them from the camp nor show them to the enemy encamped opposite, nor lead them into battle if the enemy challenge, but he should even give the impression that he is afraid.
[20] πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ πολέμιοι καταφρονήσαντες ὡς ὀλίγων ὄντων τῶν ἐναντίων, ὄψει καὶ οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ στρατηγικῇ τὰ πράγματα κρίνοντες, ῥᾳθυμότερον ἀνεστράφησαν, ἀφυλάκτως καὶ ἀτάκτως τῆς ἰδίας προϊόντες παρεμβολῆς, ὡς οὐ τολμησόντων σφίσι τῶν πολεμίων ἐπεξελεύσεσθαι, ἢ καὶ τῷ χάρακι περιστάντες πολιορκοῦσιν ἀπροσδόκητοι τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκχυθήσεσθαι πλήθους· ἡ δ’ ἀνελπιστία τῶν δεινῶν ἀμελεστέρους ἐποίησε τοὺς στρατιώτας. ἔνθα δεῖ τὸν καιρὸν ἁρπάσαντα κατὰ πολλὰς ἐκδραμόντα τοῦ χάρακος πυλίδας ἐν τάξει τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀνδρείως ἔχεσθαι πραγμάτων.
[20] For often the enemy, growing bold in the belief that their opponents are few, judging by sight and not by strategic experience, behave thoughtlessly. They go forth from their camp carelessly and without discipline, believing that their opponents will not dare to come out and attack; or they even surround and blockade the palisade, unaware of the multitude of men about to pour forth upon them; and with no expectation of danger soldiers become heedless. Then, seizing a favourable opportunity, the army must rush forth from the many little gates of the palisade, and in battle array courageously grapple with the task before them.
[21] Ὁ δὲ εἰδὼς οὕτως στρατηγεῖν εἴσεται, κἂν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καταστρατηγῆται, καὶ δρᾶσαί τι φρόνιμος ἔσται καὶ φυλάξασθαι προμηθής· ἐξ ὧν γὰρ αὐτὸς εἴσεται, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκ τούτων ἑτέρου ποιοῦντος γνώσεται, τί χρὴ μὴ παθεῖν· αἱ γὰρ ἰδίαι πρὸς τὸ λυπεῖν ἐμπειρίαι καὶ τὰς τῶν πέλας ἐπινοίας τεκμαίρονται.
[21] The general, having this knowledge, will know how to do his part, and even if he is out-generaled in these same matters, will be both wise in action and prudent in devising protection; for from the knowledge that instructs him in what he must do, he will know, when his opponent is trying to do this to him, what he must not himself suffer, since personal experience in inflicting damage warns of the designs of others.
θ´. Περὶ ἀπορρήτων
(9) SECRET PLANS
[22] Προάγειν δ’ εἰ δέοι νύκτωρ ἢ μέθ’ ἡμέραν ἐπί τι τῶν ἀπορρήτων, ἡ φρούριον ἢ πόλιν ἢ ἄκρα ἢ παρόδους καταληψόμενον ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων δράσοντα, ἃ διὰ τάχους λαθόντα τοὺς πολεμίους, ἄλλως δ’ οὐκ ἔστι πρᾶξαι, μηδενὶ προλεγέτω, μήτ’ ἐπὶ τί μήτε τί ποιήσων ἄγει τὴν στρατιάν, εἰ μή τισι τῶν ἡγεμόνων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νομίζοι προειπεῖν.
[22] If the general must make a march by night or by day for some secret purpose, to seize a fortress, city, height, or pass, or to do anything else that must be done quickly without the knowledge of the enemy, which otherwise could not be done at all, he must tell no one beforehand against what place or for what purpose he is leading his army, unless he considers it necessary to warn some of the higher officers in advance.
[23] γενόμενος δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν τόπων ἐγγὺς ὄντος τοῦ παρ’ ὃν δρᾶσαί τι δεῖ κα�
�ροῦ διδότω τὸ παράγγελμα καὶ τί δεῖ πράττειν σημαινέτω· ταχὺ δὲ τοῦτο ἔστω καὶ δι’ ὀλίγης ὥρας· ἅμα γὰρ οἱ ἡγεμόνες ἀκούουσι καὶ οἱ ὑποτεταγμένοι τούτοις ἴσασιν.
[23] But when he has reached the spot and the moment is near at hand when he must act, he must give his orders and point out what is to be done. These orders must be quick and brief, for at the same instant that the leaders receive instructions their subordinates also know them.
[24] ἄφρων δὲ καὶ ἀτελής, ὅστις ἂν πρὸ τοῦ δέοντος εἰς τὸ πλῆθος ἀνακοινώσηται τὴν πρᾶξιν· οἱ γὰρ πονηροὶ μάλιστα περὶ τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτομολοῦσι καιρούς, παρ’ οὓς ἐροῦντές τι καὶ μηνύσοντες οἴονται τιμῆς καὶ δωρεὰς τεύξεσθαι παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων· οὐκ ἔστιν δ’ ἀφ’ οὗ στρατεύματος οὐκ ἀποδιδράσκουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους δοῦλοί τε καὶ ἐλεύθεροι κατὰ πολλὰς προφάσεις, ἃς ἀνάγκη παρέχεσθαι πόλεμον.
[24] Thoughtless and futile is he who communicates his plan to the rank and file before it is necessary; for worthless scoundrels desert to the foes especially at critical times, when, by revealing and disclosing secrets, they believe they will receive honour and reward from the enemy. There is no army in which both slaves and freemen do not desert to the other side on the many occasions that war necessarily affords.
ι´. Περὶ τῆς πρὸ μάχης ἐπισκέψεως τῶν ἱερῶν
(10) TAKING THE OMENS BEFORE BATTLE
[25] Μήτε δὲ εἰς πορείαν ἐξαγέτω τὸ στράτευμα μήτε πρὸς μάχην ταττέτω, μὴ πρότερον θυσάμενος· ἀλλ’ ἀκολουθούντων αὐτῷ θύται καὶ μάντεις. ἄριστον μὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμπείρως ἐπισκέπτεσθαι δύνασθαι τὰ ἱερά· ῥᾷστόν γε μὴν ἐν τάχει μαθεῖν ἐστιν καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ σύμβουλον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι.
[25] The general should neither lead his army on a journey, nor marshal it for battle, without first making a sacrifice; in fact, official sacrificers and diviners should accompany him. It is best that the general himself be able to read the omens intelligently; it is very easy to learn in a brief time, and thereby become a good counsellor to himself.
[26] γενομένων δὴ καλῶν τῶν ἱερῶν ἀρχέσθω πάσης πράξεως καὶ καλείτω τοὺς ἡγεμόνας πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν ὄψιν τῶν ἱερῶν, ἵνα θεασάμενοι τοῖς ὑποταττομένοις θαρρεῖν λέγοιεν ἀπαγγέλλοντες, ὡς οἱ θεοὶ κελεύουσι μάχεσθαι· πάνυ γὰρ ἀναθάρρουσιν αἱ δυνάμεις, ὅτ’ ἂν μετὰ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ἐξιέναι νομίζωσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς κινδύνους· αὐτοὶ γὰρ ὀπιπεύονται κατ’ ἰδίαν ἕκαστος καὶ σημεῖα καὶ φωνὰς παρατηροῦσιν, ἡ δ’ ὑπὲρ πάντων καλλιέρησις καὶ τοὺς ἰδίᾳ δυσθυμοῦντας ἀνέρρωσεν.
[26] He should not begin any undertaking until the omens are favourable, and he should summon all his officers to inspect the offerings, that, after seeing, they may tell the soldiers to be of good courage, since the gods command them to fight. Soldiers are far more courageous when they believe they are facing dangers with the good will of the gods; for they themselves are on the alert, every man, and they watch closely for omens of sight and of sound, and an auspicious sacrifice for the whole army encourages even those who have private misgivings.
[27] ἐὰν δ’ ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον τὰ ἱερὰ γένηται, μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, κἂν σφόδρα τι ἐπείγῃ, πᾶν ὑπομένειν τὸ δύσχρηστον — οὐθὲν γὰρ δύναται παθεῖν χεῖρον, ὧν προμηνύει τὸ δαιμόνιον — , ὡς, ἄν γέ τι κρεῖττον ἔσεσθαι μέλλῃ τῶν παρόντων, ἀνάγκη καλλιερεῖν, θύεσθαι δὲ τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας πολλάκις· ὥρα γὰρ μία καὶ ἀκαρὴς χρόνος ἢ φθάσαντας ἐλύπησεν ἢ ὑστερήσαντας.
[27] But if the omens are unfavourable, he must remain in the same place, and if he is hard pressed for time he must patiently submit to every inconvenience — for he can suffer nothing worse than what Fate indicates beforehand, — since, if his condition is going to improve, he must have favourable signs in a sacrifice and he must sacrifice several times on the same day; one hour, even one minute, ruins those who start too soon or too late.
[28] καί μοι δοκεῖ τὰς κατ’ οὐρανὸν ἀστέρων κινήσεις καὶ ἀνατολὰς καὶ δύσεις καὶ σχημάτων ἐγκλίσεις τριγώνων καὶ τετραγώνων καὶ διαμέτρων ἡ θυτικὴ διὰ σπλάγχνων ἀλλοιομόρφῳ θεωρίᾳ προσημαίνειν, ὧν αἱ παρὰ μικρὸν διαφοραὶ καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ ἀποθειώσεις ἐν ἡμέρᾳ μιᾷ μᾶλλον δὲ ὥρᾳ καὶ βασιλεῖς ἐποίησαν καὶ αἰχμαλώτους.
[28] And it seems to me that the motions of the heavenly bodies, their risings and settings, and their positions — trine, square, and in opposition — are indicated by the art of extispicy, through another form of observation, and that trifling differences in these things have, in a single day, or rather in a single hour, led to power and deification, and have made both kings and captives.
XI. α´. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι δεῖ τῶν πολεμίων σχηματιζομένων φεύγειν μὴ ἁπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν ἔχεσθαι τῆς διώξεως
XI. (1) PURSUIT OF AN APPARENTLY FLEEING ENEMY MUST NOT BE CARELESS AND HAPHAZARD
[1] Ἐπειδὴ δὲ πολλάκις θυομένοις ὡς μὲν εἰς μάχην καλὰ γίγνεται τὰ ἱερά, διὰ δὲ μάχης ὅλον ἐνίοτε στρατευμάτων ὄλεθρον προσημαίνει, τῶν ἀναγκαιοτάτων ἡγοῦμαι περὶ τούτου φράσαι.
[1] Since frequently the omens from a sacrifice are favourable for battle and yet sometimes foretell the complete destruction of the army through battle, I have considered it of the utmost necessity to say a few words on this point.
[2] τῆς γὰρ συμπάσης οἰκουμένης πολλὰς καὶ παντοίας εἶναι συμβέβηκεν ἰδέας τόπων, ἄδηλον δέ, ἐν ὁποίοις ἕκαστοι πολεμήσουσιν· καὶ τῆς μὲν σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐμπειρίαν ἔχουσι χώρας ἄνθρωποι, τὴν δ’ ἀλλοτρίαν οὐκ ἴσασι.
[2] The topography of the inhabited world differs widely in its various parts, and it is impossible to foresee in what sort of country a war will occur. Every man is well acquainted with his own country but not with foreign countries.
[3] πολλάκις δ’ εἰ στρατηγὸς ἀκούσας μιᾶς ἡμέρας ὁδὸν ἀπέχειν τοὺς πολεμίους ἀναστήσας ἄγει τὸν στρατόν, ἐπειγόμενος διὰ μάχης ἐλθεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, τῶν δ’ ὑποχωρούντων ἐπίτηδες καὶ μὴ μενόντων, ὡς κατορρωδοῦσιν ἕπεται, τῶν δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο ποιούντων, ἕως ἔλθωσιν εἰς δυσχωρίας καὶ περικεκλεισμένους ὄρεσι τόπους, ἐπίκειται μηδὲν ὑφορώμενος, εἶτα ἐμβαλὼν εἰς τοὺς τόπου
ς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπεκλείσθη τῆς εἰσβολῆς, ᾗ τὸ στράτευμα εἰσῆλθε, καὶ καταλαβόμενοι τάς τε εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν διόδους καὶ κύκλῳ τὰ μετέωρα πάντα κατασχόντες, ὥσπερ ἐν ζωγρείῳ τινὶ συνεπέδησαν μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους, ὁ δὲ παριὼν μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐφέρετο δοκῶν ἐπικεῖσθαι φυγομαχοῦσι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οἷς προσελθὼν οὐκ ἔγνω, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περιβλεψάμενος τά τε πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω καὶ παρὰ πλευράν, καὶ πάντα πλήρη θεασάμενος πολεμίων ἢ συνηκοντίσθη μετὰ τοῦ στρατεύματος, ἢ ἀπομάχεσθαι μὴ δυνάμενος καὶ μὴ παραδιδοὺς λιμῷ διέφθειρεν πάντας, ἢ παραδοὺς κυρίους ἐποίησε τοὺς πολεμίους τοῦ ὅ τι βούλονται διαθεῖναι.
[3] Often a general, on hearing that the enemy are but a day’s march distant, will call out his troops and lead them forward, hurrying to come to close quarters with the enemy, who, purposely retreating, do not make a stand against him; and so he assumes that they are afraid and pursues them. This continues until they come into a broken country, surrounded by the mountains on all sides, and the general, unsuspecting, still attacks them; next, as he marches against their positions, he is cut off by the enemy from the road by which he led his army in. They seize the passes in front of him, and all the heights round about, and thus confine their enemies in a sort of cage. But the general is carried away by his impetuosity, in the belief that he is pursuing a fleeing enemy, without noticing whom he is approaching; and later, on looking before and behind and on both sides, and seeing all the hillsides full of the enemy, he and his army will be destroyed by javelins, or, unable to fight and unwilling to surrender, he will cause all to die of hunger, or by surrender enable the enemy to dictate whatever terms they wish.