by Onasander
[3] For whatever the besiegers intend to do can be seen from the walls; but the besieged, with the wall as a shield, often without detection pour through the gates and burn the machines or kill the soldiers or do whatever damage comes to their hands.
XLI. Περὶ τοῦ ἔχειν ἐνέδρας τὸν πολιορκοῦντα πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν
XLI. AMBUSH LAID BY THE BESIEGER BEFORE THE GATES OF A TOWN
[1] Ἥκιστα δ’ ἂν τοῦτο τολμήσαιεν, εἰ παρὰ πύλαις καὶ πυλίσι μικραῖς λόχους ὁ πολιορκῶν προκαθίσῃ στρατηγὸς τοὺς τὰς αἰφνιδίους ἐκδρομὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἀποκωλύσοντας, ἐπεὶ κἂν πολλάκις λάθοιεν ἐπιθέμενοι τοῖς ἐκτός.
[1] The besieged would by no means attempt this if the besieging general should post at both large and small gates companies of soldiers to prevent sudden sallies, since otherwise the defenders might without warning attack the besiegers.
[2] χρήσιμοι δὲ τὰ πολλὰ νύκτωρ τοῖς πολιορκοῦσιν αἱ προσβολαί· τοῖς γὰρ ἔνδον οὐ δυναμένοις ὁρᾶν τὰ γιγνόμενα διὰ τὸ σκότος δεινότερα δοκεῖ τὰ πραττόμενα, καὶ τὴν πρόληψιν ἀναγκάζονται χαλεπωτέραν ἔχειν τῶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐνεργουμένων, ὅθεν ταραχαί τε καὶ θόρυβοι γίγνονται οὐδενὸς δυναμένου σωφρονεῖν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν οὐ δρωμένων ὡς γίγνεται λεγόντων, οὔθ’ ὅπῃ προσβαλοῦσιν εἰδέναι δυναμένων, οὔθ’ ὁπόσοι, οὔθ’ ὁποίοις μέρεσι, διαδρομαὶ δὲ δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε καὶ βοαὶ καὶ θάμβη Πανικὸν ἔχοντα τάραχον.
[2] Attacks by night are generally advantageous to the besiegers, since the besieged are unable to see what is happening, on account of the darkness, and everything seems more terrible to them, and they are compelled to regard the attack as more dangerous than it really is. Hence tumult and confusion arise; no one is able to use sober judgement in such circumstances, but many things that are not happening are said to be happening; and the besieged is not able to know from what direction the enemy is attacking, nor in what numbers, nor with what forces, and men run hither and thither, while the shouting and consternation cause disorder and panic.
XLII. α´. Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ὁ φόβος ψευδὴς μάντις ἐστίν
XLII. (1) FEAR IS A FALSE PROPHET
[1] Ὁ γὰρ φόβος ψευδὴς μάντις, ἃ δέδοικε, ταῦτ’ οἰήσεται καὶ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐν νυκτί, κἂν μικρὸν ᾖ, φοβερώτερον τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις· οὐδεὶς γάρ, ὃ βλέπει, λέγει διὰ τὸ σκότος, ἀλλὰ πᾶς, ὃ ἀκούει· καὶ ἑνός που φανέντος ἢ δυεῖν ἐπὶ τείχους πολεμίων τὸ πᾶν ἤδη στράτευμα τῶν τειχῶν ἐπιβεβηκέναι δόξαντες ἀπετράπησαν, ἐρήμους καταλιπόντες ἐπάλξεις καὶ πύλας.
[1] Fear is a false prophet and believes that what it fears is actually coming to pass. At night every trifling occurrence seems more terrible to the besieged, for on account of the darkness no man tells what he sees but always what he hears. If one or two of the enemy appear somewhere on the walls, the defenders, believing that the whole army has already mounted the walls, turn and flee, leaving the battlements and gates undefended.
β´. Ὅτι αὐτὸν χρὴ παράδειγμα τὸν στρατηγὸν γίγνεσθαι τοῖς στρατιώταις
(2) THE GENERAL MUST SET A GOOD EXAMPLE TO HIS SOLDIERS
[2] Εἰ δέ τι διὰ χειρὸς ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐξεργάσασθαι σπεύδοι, μὴ ὀκνείτω πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὀφθῆναι ποιῶν· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπειλαῖς ἀναγκαζόμενοί τι ποιοῦσιν, ὡς ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν σεμνοτέρων διατροπαῖς· ἰδὼν γάρ τις τὸν ἡγεμόνα πρῶτον ἐγχειροῦντα καὶ ὅτι δεῖ σπεύδειν ἔμαθε καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν ᾐδέσθη καὶ ἀπειθεῖν ἐφοβήθη· καὶ οὐκ ἔθ’ ὡς δοῦλον ἐπιταττόμενον διετέθη τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐξ ἴσου παρακαλούμενον διετράπη.
[2] If the general is in haste to finish some enterprise that he has on hand, he should not hesitate to be prominent in the work, for soldiers are not forced to activity so much by the threats of their immediate superiors as by the influence of men of higher rank. For a soldier seeing his officer the first to put his hand to the task not only realizes the need of haste too but also is ashamed not to work, and afraid to disobey orders; and the rank and file no longer feel that they are being treated as slaves under orders but are moved as though urged by one on the same footing as themselves.
γ´. Περὶ πολιορκητηρίων μηχανημάτων
(3) SIEGE ENGINES
[3] Πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ποικίλων ἐκ τῶν μηχανῶν πολιορκητηρίων χρήσεται κατὰ δύναμιν ὁ στρατηγός. οὐ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐμοὶ τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι δεῖ κριοὺς ἔχειν ἢ ἑλεπόλεις ἢ σαμβύκας ἢ πύργους ὑποτρόχους ἢ χελώνας χωστρίδας ἢ καταπέλτας· τῆς γὰρ τῶν πολεμούντων τύχης καὶ πλούτου καὶ δυνάμεως ἴδια ταῦτα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἑπομένων ἀρχιτεκτόνων ἐπινοίας εἰς τὰς ὀργανικὰς κατασκευάς.
[3] Of the many and various siege engines the general will make use according as he has opportunity. It is not my part to say that he must use battering rams or ‘city-destroyers’ or the sambuca, or wheeled towers or covered sheds or catapults; all this depends upon the luck, the wealth, and the power of the combatants, and upon the skill of the workmen who accompany the army for the purpose of building engines.
[4] στρατηγοῦ δ’ ἰδίας ἀγχινοίας ἔργον τοιόνδε ἂν εἴη, εἰ βούλοιτο προσβάλλειν μηχανάς· καθ’ ἓν μὲν ἀποχρήσθω μέρος τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς — οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλως ἄν τις εὐπορήσειεν ἐν κύκλῳ παντὶ τῷ τείχει περιστῆσαι μηχανάς, εἰ μὴ πάνυ μικρὰ πόλις εἴη — , εἰς πολλὰ δὲ τάγματα διελὼν τὸ στράτευμα κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα τοῦ τείχους μέρη κελευέτω τὰς κλίμακας προσφέρειν· οὕτως γὰρ εἰς ἀμηχανίαν οἱ πολιορκούμενοι πολλὴν ἐμπίπτουσιν·
[4] The task of a general’s peculiar skill, if he wishes to employ engines, is to use them at some one locality — for he would not have a sufficient supply of engines to place them in a circle completely about the wall unless the city were very small, — and, dividing his army into many parts, he should [station his engines at certain points and should] command his men to bring forward their ladders against the other parts of the wall, since in this manner the besieged are rendered helpless.
[5] ἄν τε γὰρ ἀμελήσαντες τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τὰς προσβολὰς τῶν μηχανῶν ἀμύνωσιν, ἅπαντες οἱ κατὰ τὰς κλίμακας μηδενὸς ἀποκωλύοντος ῥᾳδίως ἐπιβαίνουσι τῶν τειχῶν, ἄν τε διελόντες σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπιβοηθήσωσι κατὰ μέρη, σφοδρ
οτέρας ἐνεργείας γιγνομένης κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς τῶν ὀργάνων οἱ καταλειφθέντες οὐδὲ μάχεσθαι τούτοις τολμήσαντες ἀδυνατήσουσι τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον κακὸν ἀποκρούεσθαι.
[5] For if the besieged disregard the other parts of the wall and only make a defence against the attacks of the engines, all the besiegers who attack with ladders will easily climb over the wall without opposition, but if the defenders divide their forces and send aid to each part as the battle grows more violent through the attack of these engines, those who are left and who do not venture to fight with them will be unable to repel the advancing menace.
[6] διόπερ καθάπερ ἀγαθὸν παλαιστὴν προδεικνύειν μὲν καὶ σκιάζειν εἰς πολλὰ μέρη δεῖ περισπῶντα καὶ ἐπισφάλλοντα δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε πρὸς πολλὰ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους, ἑνὸς δὲ ζητεῖν ἐγκρατῶς λαβόμενον ἀνατρέψαι τὸ πᾶν σῶμα τῆς πόλεως.
[6] On this account, just as a good wrestler, the general must make feints and threats at many points, worrying and deceiving his opponents, here and there, at many places, striving, by securing a firm hold upon one part, to overturn the whole structure of the city.
δ´. Πῶς χρὴ διατελεῖν ἐπείγοντα τὰ τῆς πολιορκίας
(4) ON ENDING SIEGES BY VIGOROUS ACTION
[7] Εἰ δ’ ἐν τάχει σπεύδοι τις ἐξελεῖν φρούριον ἢ πόλιν ἢ χάρακα καὶ αὐτῷ κάμνοι ἡ δύναμις μηδὲ μίαν ὥραν ἀποστῆναι βουλομένῳ τῶν ἐρυμάτων, εἰς τάγματα διελὼν τὸ στράτευμα, ὅσ’ ἂν ἱκανὰ εἶναί οἱ δοκῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ πλήθους καὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς πολιορκουμένης πόλεως, νυκτὸς ἀρξάμενος εὐθὺς τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ προσβαλλέτω τάγματι τῷ δευτέρῳ κελεύσας ἐφεδρεύειν καὶ ἑτοίμῳ εἶναι, τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ, καὶ εἰ τύχοι πέμπτον ὄν, παραγγελλέτω τρέπεσθαι κατὰ κοῖτον·
[7] If a general desire quickly to capture a fort or city or camp and his force grow weary, while he wishes not to spare one hour from attacking the defences, he should split his army into divisions, as many as he considers sufficient, according to the number of his men and the extent of the besieged city, and then he should attack immediately at nightfall with the first division, ordering the second to remain near in readiness, but the third and fourth and fifth, if there chance to be a fifth, he should order to sleep.
[8] εἶτα, ὅταν τῷ πρώτῳ καταπειράσῃ τινα χρόνον, τούτους μὲν ἀνακαλεσάμενος ἀποπεμπέτω κοιμησομένους, σημαινέτω δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ προϊέναι τοῦ χάρακος, ὁ δὲ τρίτος ταγματάρχης ἀναστήσας ἐν τούτῳ καθοπλιζέτω τὸ ὑφ’ ἑαυτὸν τάγμα·
[8] Then when the first division has attacked for some time, he should recall it and send it to its quarters to sleep, but he should give the signal to the second division to march out from the camp; at this point the commander of the third division should arouse and arm his troops.
[9] καὶ μετὰ τοὺς δευτέρους τὴν ἴσην ὥραν τοῖς πρώτοις ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἄξει τὸ τρίτον, κοιμάσθω δὲ τὸ δεύτερον τάγμα, μετὰ τοῦτο δ’ αὖ τὸ τέταρτον, εἶθ’ ἑξῆς τὸ πέμπτον, ἐν μέρει τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀναπαυομένων.
[9] After the second division has fought as long a time as the first, he will lead out his third division and order the second to rest; after this the catapults, then in order the fifth, while the soldiers in turn rest from fighting.
[10] ὁμοίως δ’ ἐπισυναπτούσης τῆς ἡμέρας οἱ πρῶτοι τῇ νυκτὶ προσβαλόντες ἕωθεν πάλιν πρῶτοι προσαγόντων· εἶθ’ ὥρας, εἰ μὲν ἓξ εἴη τάγματα, δύο κινδυνεύσαντες, εἰ δὲ πέντε, δυσὶν ἔτι μικρὸν ἐπιθέντες, εἰ δὲ τέτταρα, τρεῖς, εἰ δὲ τρία, τέτταρας, ἀπιόντες ἀριστοποιείσθων, ἑξῆς δ’ οἱ μετ’ αὐτοὺς καὶ πάλιν οἱ μετὰ τούτους ἄχρι τῶν τελευταίων, ὥστε κύκλον τινὰ περιάγεσθαι.
[10] Thus, at daybreak, those who attacked first at night should again attack first at dawn, remaining at the front two hours, if there are six divisions, but a little longer if five; three hours if four divisions, and four hours if three divisions; on their return they should receive their rations in order, the first division, then the second, and so on to the last, like the revolution of a wheel.
[11] τούτου γὰρ συμβαίνοντος ἀμφότερα ἂν γίγνοιτο. καὶ αἱ προσβολαὶ καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μέθ’ ἡμέραν ἀδιάλειπτοι προσαχθήσονται, καὶ οἱ προσβάλλοντες ἀκμῆτες καὶ νεαροὶ τὰς ἀναπαύσεις ἐν μέρει ποιούμενοι μαχοῦνται.
[11] With this plan, there are two results: unceasing attacks by night and day, while the attackers, taking their turns at rest, will fight freshly and vigorously.
[12] τοὺς μέντοι πολιορκουμένους, μηδ’ ἂν πάνυ πολλοὶ τυγχάνωσιν, οἰέσθω τις τὸ αὐτὸ στρατήγημα ἀντεισοίσεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ κινδυνεῦον, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐπιτρέπῃ τις, ὕπνῳ χαρίζεσθαι βούλεται· φόβῳ γὰρ τῷ δεινοῦ, παρ’ ὃν ἀναπαύεται χρόνον, ὡς ἁλωσομένης τῆς πόλεως ἐγρήγορε· καὶ τὸ πολιορκούμενον, κἂν ὀλίγον ᾖ τὸ πολιορκοῦν αὐτό, πασσυδὶ προσαμύνει, καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἐντειχίδιόν ἐστι κεκίνηται, ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον φοβερώτερον, ὡς, εἰ παρὰ μικρὸν ἀμελήσαιεν, ἀπολούμενοι πάντες.
[12] But no one should believe that the besieged, even if very numerous, could use this same stratagem, for in danger no one would wish to enjoy sleep even if it were permitted, since from fear of peril, during the time at which one is resting, he lies sleepless, as though the city were on the point of capture. The besieged, moreover, even if their assailants are few, defend themselves with all their strength, and everything within the walls of the city is in a state of excitement, in even greater terror of the future, as though if one minute detail were overlooked, they would all be lost.
[13] ὅθεν δὴ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τρυχομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ μηδὲ μίαν ὥραν ἀνάπαυλαν ἴσχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγρυπνίαις καὶ πόνοις κάμνοντας, εἶτα καὶ πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα τεταλαιπωρηκότας ἀσθενέστερον τοῖς σφετέροις προσαμύνειν ἢ τοὺς δεησομένους καὶ παραδώσοντας τὴν πόλιν ἐκπέμπειν.
[13] On this account there is every reason why men wearied, without an hour’s rest, tired by guard-duty and labour, and fearful for the future, should defend themselves more weakly, or should send out messengers to discuss the surrender of the city.
ε´. Πῶς χρὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀναπαύεσθαι
(5) HOW THE GENERAL SHOULD REST
[14] Αὐτὸς οὖν ὁ στρατηγός, ἴσως φήσει τις, ἐξ ἀδάμαντος ἢ σιδήρου κεχάλκευται μόν�
�ς ἄγρυπνος ἑστὼς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔργοις; οὐ δῆτα· ἀλλὰ παρ’ ὃν ἀναπαύεται χρόνον — οὕτος δ’ ὀλίγος ἔστω καὶ σύντομος — , ἕνα τῶν ἐν δόξῃ πιστοτάτων καὶ ἀνδρειοτάτων ἡγεμόνα τῶν καὶ τὰ δευτέρα τῆς στρατηγικῆς ἀρχῆς ἐχόντων ἐπιστησάτω τοῖς ἔργοις.
[14] “But has the general himself, then,” some one may perhaps say, “been made of adamant or iron to have remained alone without sleep throughout all these deeds?” Certainly not; but during the time that he sleeps — and this must be little and cut short — he should hand over the command of the army to one of his most trusted and courageous officers, who is also second only to himself in military rank.
ϛ´. Πῶς τὰ δοκοῦντα τῆς πόλεως μέρη ἀνάλωτα εἶναι πολλάκις εὐάλωτα γίγνεται
(6) PARTS OF A CITY SEEMINGLY MOST IMPREGNABLE ARE OFTEN EASY TO CAPTURE
[15] Ἐνίοτε δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα μέρη πόλεως εἶναι κρημνώδη καὶ πέτραις ἀποτόμοις ὠχυρωμένα τῶν διὰ χειρὸς ἀνεστηκότων τειχῶν ἔδωκε τοῖς πολιορκοῦσιν ἀφορμὰς μείζονας εἰς τὸ νικᾶν· εἴωθεν γάρ πως ὡς τὰ πολλὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πόλεων, ὅσα φύσει πιστεύεται τὸ ἐρυμνόν, ἀφυλακτεῖσθαι καὶ ἥκιστα φροντίδι παραγρυπνεῖσθαι στρατιωτῶν.