[50.1] “What, then, did this fine populace of ours do after you had granted them this magistracy also? They did not make a prudent use of so great a benefit nor did they receive it with respect and modesty, but, just as if we were in fear and consternation because of their strength . . . then they said this magistracy ought to be declared sacred and inviolable and should be secured by oaths, thus demanding for it a greater honour than you yourselves have conferred upon the consuls. To this also you submitted, and standing over the parts of the sacrificial victims, you invoked utter destruction upon both yourselves and your posterity if you should violate your oath. [2] What, then, did they do when they had obtained this also? Instead of being grateful to you and maintaining our ancestral form of government, they began from these ill-gotten advantages, and making these illegal acts the steps to future encroachments, they not only introduce laws without a preliminary decree of the senate, but enact them without your concurrence; they pay no regard to the decrees you publish; they accuse the consuls of maladministration of the state; and if anything happens contrary to your agreement with them — and there are many things which human reason cannot accurately foresee — they attribute it, not to chance, as they should, but to deliberate intention on your part; and while they pretend that designs are being formed against them by you and that they are afraid you may either deprive them of their liberty or expel them from their country, they themselves are continually forming these very designs against you, and plainly show that their only method of guarding against the mischief they claim to fear consists in being the first to inflict it. [3] This they have often made apparent even before now, upon many occasions which I am prevented from mentioning at present, but particularly by their treatment of Marcius here, a lover of his country and a man who is neither of obscure birth nor inferior himself to any of us in valour, whom they accused of forming designs against them and of going evil advice in this place, and attempted to put to death without a trial. [4] And if the consuls and the more sagacious among you had not become indignant at this action and joined together to restrain their illegal attempts, you would have been deprived in that one day of everything that your ancestors acquired with many labours and left to you, and of everything that you yourselves possess after undergoing on fewer struggles than they — of your prestige, your supremacy, and your liberty; while those of you who had more spirit and would not have been contented with life alone unless you were to live in the enjoyment of those blessings, would, either then or soon after, have chosen to lose your lives rather than lose these privileges. [5] For if once Marcius had been made away with in some shameful and dastardly a manner, like one all alone in a wilderness, what could have hindered me also, after him, and all of you who had ever opposed or were likely to oppose thereafter the unlawful attempts of the populace, from perishing by being torn in pieces by our enemies? For they would not have been satisfied with getting only the two of us out of the way, nor would they, after going thus far, have desisted from their lawless course, if we are to judge the future from the past; but having begun with us, they would have rushed down like a torrent in flood upon all who opposed them and did not submit to them, and would have swept them away and borne them off, sparing neither birth, merit nor age.
[51.1] “These, senators, are the fine returns which the populace have either already made to you, or would have made, if it had not lain in your power to prevent them, for the many great benefits they have received from you. Now consider those things that they did after this magnanimous and prudent action on your part, in order that you may learn how you ought to deal with them. [2] Well then, as soon as they found you resolved no longer to bear their insolence but prepared to join issue with them, they were struck with terror, and recovering themselves slightly, as from a fit of drunkenness or madness, they desisted from violence and had recourse to legal action; and appointing a day, they summoned Marcius to appear then and stand his trial, at which they themselves were to be at once the accusers, the witnesses, and the judges, and the ones to determine the degree of the punishment. [3] And since you opposed this also, because you thought that he was summoned, not to be tried, but to be punished, the populace, perceiving that they have absolute authority in no matter whatever, but only the power of ratifying your preliminary decrees, now abate their arrogance, which then blew so strong, and have come to beg that you will grant them this favour also. [4] Bearing this in mind, therefore, perceive at last and learn that all the privileges you have hitherto granted them, with greater guilelessness than prudent, have brought calamities and harm upon you, but that every courageous stand you have made against their illegal and violent acts has turned out advantageously. [5] What, then, do I advise you to do, now that you understand these things, and what opinion do I express upon the present question? Just this: As regards the privileges and concessions which you made to the populace at the time of your reconciliation, however you came to grant them, I advise you to adhere to them as valid and to abrogate none of the concessions you then made, not because they are honourable and worthy of the commonwealth — how could they be? — but because they are necessary and can no longer be remedied. But as to anything beyond this which they may endeavour to extort from you against your will by violence and illegal means, I advise you not to grant or allow it, but to oppose them both by words and by deeds, not only all of you as a body, but each one individually. [6] For it is not inevitable, if a person has erred once through either deception or necessity, that he should act in like manner in everything else, but mindful of that error, he ought to consider by what means his future conduct may not resemble it. This is the resolution which I think you ought all of you unitedly to have formed, and I advise you to be prepared against the unjust encroachments of the populace.
[52.1] “That this matter, which is the subject of your present consideration, is also of a piece with their other unjust and illegal attempts and not, as the tribune endeavoured to prove in order to deceive you, a just and reasonable request, let those among you now learn who are not yet certain of it. Well then, the law relating to the popular courts, the law upon which Decius relied for his chief support, was not enacted against you patricians, but for the protection of such plebeians as are oppressed, as the law itself, written in unequivocal terms, plainly shows, and as all of you, being perfectly acquainted with it, always declare to be the case. [2] Strong proof of this is afforded by the length of time it has been in force, which seems to be the best criterion in the case of every disputed principle of law; for nineteen years have now passed since this law was enacted, and during all this time Decius cannot point to a single instance of a trial, either public or private, brought against any patrician in virtue of this law. But if he shall assert that he can, let him produce it and we need no further discussion. [3] As to the agreement you recently entered into with the plebeians (for it is necessary that you should be informed about this also, since the tribune has shown himself an unscrupulous interpreter of it), it contains these two concessions — that the plebeians shall be discharged of their debts, and that these magistrates shall be elected annually for the relief of the oppressed and the prevention of injustice toward them; and except these, there is no other provision. [4] But let the greatest indication to you that neither this law nor the compact has given the populace the power of trying a patrician be the present behaviour of the populace themselves. For they ask this power of you today, as not having possessed it hitherto; yet no one would ask to receive from others anything to which he is entitled by law. [5] And how can this, senators, be a natural, unwritten right — for Decius thought you ought to consider this — that the populace shall try all causes in which the plebeians are involved, whether the actions are brought against them by the patricians, or by them against the latter, while patricians, whether plaintiffs or defendants in any suit with the plebeians, shall not decide those controversies, but the plebeians shall be given the advantage in both cases, while we enjoy neither right? [6] But if Marcius or any other p
atrician whatsoever has injured the people and deserves either death or banishment, let him be punished after being tried, not by them, but here, as the law directs. Unless, forsooth, Decius, the populace will be impartial judges and would not show any favour to themselves when giving their votes concerning an enemy, whereas these senators, if they are empowered to vote in his case, will regard the wrong-doer as of more importance than the commonwealth that suffers from his wrongdoing, when as the result of their verdict they are sure to draw upon themselves a curse, the guilt of perjury, the detestation of mankind, and the anger of the gods, and to go through life haunted by dismal hopes! [7] It is unworthy of you, plebeians, to entertain these suspicions about the senate, to whom you acknowledge that you concede honours, magistracies, and the most important powers in the commonwealth on the basis of merit, and to whom you say you feel very grateful for the zeal they showed for your return. These sentiments are inconsistent with one another; and it is not reasonable that you should fear those you commend and entrust the same persons with the more serious responsibilities while at the same time distrusting them in those of less consequence. [8] Why do you not keep to one uniform judgment, either trusting them in everything or distrusting them in everything? But, on the contrary, you think them capable of passing a preliminary decree about principles of right, but not of sitting in judgment concerning these very principles involved in that decree. I had many other things to say concerning the rights of this matter, senators; but let this suffice.
[53.1] “But since Decius undertook to speak also on the subject of advantage, pointing out how excellent a thing harmony is and how terrible a thing sedition, and that, if we cultivate the populace, we shall live together in harmony, but if we hinder them from banishing whomsoever of the patricians they wish or murdering them, we shall be involved in a civil war, though I have many things to say upon this head, I shall content myself with very few. [2] And first I have to marvel at the dissimulation — surely it is not lack of sense — of Decius, if he imagines that he is a better judge of the interests of the state, though he has just entered upon the administration of public affairs, than we who have grown old in it and have made the city a great from a small one; and, in the next place, if he supposed that he could persuade you that you had to deliver up any man to his enemies to be punished, particularly a fellow-citizen of yours and one who is not a person of no consequence or merit, but one whom you yourselves look upon as most brilliant in war, most exemplary in his private life, and inferior to none in handling public affairs. [3] And these things he has dared to say, though he knows street you show the greatest respect for suppliants and do not exclude them from such humanity even those of your enemies who flee hither for refuge. Indeed, if you knew we practised the very contrary of all this, Decius, entertaining impious ideas about the gods and practising injustice towards men, what deed more dreadful than this could you have advised us to commit, by which we shall incur the hatred of both gods and men and be utterly and totally destroyed? [4] We have no need of your advice, Decius, either about delivering up any of our citizens or about any other business we have to transact. Nor do we believe that, in judging of our own interests, we should use a borrowed wisdom of youths — we who, through long experience of both good and evil fortune, have come to our present age. As for the threats of war with which you endeavour to terrify us — not now employed by you for the first time, but flaunted often in the past by many — leaving them to our habitual mildness to deal with, we shall bear them with intrepidity. [5] And if you indeed try to do anything like what you threaten, we shall defend ourselves with the assistance both of the gods, who are always wroth with the aggressors in an unjust war, and of men, no small number of whom will be our allies. For all the Latins, to whom we lately granted equal rights of citizenship, will be on our side, fighting for this commonwealth as for a country now their fatherland, and the many flourishing cities colonized from Rome, counting it imperative that their mother-city should be saved, will come to her defence. [6] And if you reduce us to the necessity of embracing every kind of assistance, Decius, we shall submit to inviting even our slaves to liberty, our enemies to friendship, and all mankind to a share in our hopes of victory, and then join issue with you. But, O Jupiter and all ye gods who guard the Roman state, may there be no occasion for anything of this kind! Rather may these terrible threats go no farther than words and result in no deplorable act!”
[54.1] Thus Appius spoke. Then Manius Valerius, who was the greatest friend to the plebeians of all the senators and had shown the greatest zeal for the accommodation, upon this occasion also openly espoused their cause and delivered a speech, composed with much thought, in which he censured those senators who would not permit the commonwealth to remain united, but sought to divide the plebeians from the patricians and for trifling causes to rekindle the flames of strife. He then commended those who held that there was but one advantage to be considered and that the common advantage, and regarded everything else as secondary to harmony; and he showed them that, if the populace obtained the right to try this man, as they demanded, and received this privilege also with the consent of the senate, possibly they would not even press the prosecution to the end but, satisfied with having got him in their power, would treat him with lenity rather than severity. [2] And even if the tribunes should believe it to be necessary by all means to carry the case through to its lawful conclusion and the populace should thus be empowered to give their votes concerning him, they would acquit him of the charge, partly out of respect for the defendant himself, and partly by way of making this return to the senate for the favour it had granted by giving them this power and by opposing them in nothing that was reasonable. [3] Nevertheless, he advised that not only the consuls, but all the senators and the rest of the patricians as well should be present in a body at the trial and assist Marcius in making his defence and entreat the people to come to no harsh decision concerning him, assure and them that the presence of these men also would contribute not a little toward turning the scales on the side of the defendant’s acquittal’ and he advised that they should not only thus assist him themselves by expressing their views, but that each of them should summon his own clients and assemble his friends, and if they thought that any of the plebeians were attached to them as the result of benefits they had received from them, they should ask these too to show their gratitude for former favours now when they were to give their votes. [4] He showed them also that there would be no small element among the populace which loved the right and hated the wrong, and an even larger number who knew how to sympathize with human misfortunes and to feel compassion for men in position of honour when their fortunes have suffered reverse. [5] But the greater part of his speech was addressed to Marcius himself, in which he joined exhortation to admonition, and entreaty to compulsion. For he begged of him, since he was accused of dividing the populace from the senate and also charged with being tyrannical by reason of his arbitrary manner, and since all men were filled with fear that because of him there would spring up sedition and all the irreparable evils which civil wars bring in their train, that he would not make true and valid the accusations against himself by persevering in his invidious way of life, but would change it to an humble deportment, submit his person to the power of those who complained of being injured, and not decline to clear himself by a just defence of an unjust charge. [6] For that course was not only for saving his life the surest, he told him, but also, as regarded the reputation he coveted, the most brilliant, and it was in keeping with the deeds he had already performed; whereas, if he should show himself arrogant rather than moderate and expect the senate to expose themselves to every danger for his sake, he declared that the defeat he might bring to those who had listened to him would be disastrous, while a victory would be disgraceful to them. He then indulged in many lamentations and enumerated the most important and the most obvious evils that befall states in times of dissension.
[55.1] When he had related all these evils with ma
ny tears — tears that were not feigned and affected, but genuine — this man who was eminent for the dignity both of his years and of his merits, perceiving that the senate was moved by his words, proceeded then with confidence to deliver the remainder of his speech. “If any of you, senators,” he said, “are disturbed by the thought that you will be introducing a pernicious custom into the commonwealth if you grant the populace the power of giving their votes against the patricians, and entertain an opinion that the tribunician power, if considerably strengthened, will serve no good purpose, let them learn that their opinion is erroneous and their surmise is the opposite of what it should be. [2] For if anything is going to be the means of preserving this commonwealth and insuring that she shall never be deprived of her liberty or her power, but shall ever continue to be united and harmonious in all respects, the most effective instrument will be the populace if taken as partners in the administration of affairs; and what will benefit us above everything will be, not to have a simple and unmixed form of government administering the state, whether monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, but a constitution combined out of all of these. [3] For each of these forms by itself alone very easily ends in wantonness and lawlessness; but when all of them are duly combined, the element which is inclined at any time to make innovations and to overstep the customary bounds is held in check by the element which is self-restrained and remains true to its own character. Thus monarchy, when it becomes cruel and insolent and begins to pursue tyrannical measures, is overthrown by a few good men. [4] And an oligarchy composed of the best men, which is your present form of government, when it has become elated by reason of its wealth and its bands of partisans, and pays no regard to justice or to any other virtue, is overthrown by a prudent democracy. And when a democracy that is moderate and governs in accordance with laws begins to be disorderly and lawless, it is taken in hand by the strongest man and set right by force. [5] You, senators, have devised all the precautions possible to prevent the monarchical power from degenerating into tyranny, for you have invested two men instead of one with the supreme power of the commonwealth, and though you have entrusted this magistracy to them, not for an indefinite time, but only for a year, you nevertheless appoint, to keep watch over them, three hundred patricians, at once the best and the oldest, of whom this senate is composed. But you do not seem as yet to have appointed any to watch over you yourselves, to insure your remaining within proper bounds. [6] Now as for you, I have no fear so far that you will permit your minds to be corrupted by the magnitude and number of your blessings, since you have only recently delivered the commonwealth from a long tyranny and because of the long and continuous wars have not yet had leisure to grow insolent and wanton. But with regard to your successors, when I consider how great changes the long course of time brings with it, I am afraid that the men of power in the senate may introduce some change and, unnoticed, transform the government into a tyrannical monarchy.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 67