[4] When the consuls had led their forces close to the city of Veii, they encamped on two hills not far apart. The enemy’s army, which was both large and valiant, had also taken the field and lay encamped before the city. For the most influential men from all Tyrrhenia had joined them with their dependents, with the result that the Tyrrhenians’ army was not a little larger than that of the Romans. [5] When the consuls saw the numbers of the enemy and the lustre of their arms, great fear came upon them lest, with their own forces rent by faction, they might not be able to prevail when arrayed against the harmonious forces of the enemy; and they determined to fortify their camps and to prolong the war in the hope that the boldness of the enemy, encouraged by an ill-advised contempt for them, might afford them some opportunity of acting with advantage. After this there were continual skirmishes and brief clashes of the light-armed troops, but no important or signal action.
[6.1] The Tyrrhenians, being irked by the prolongation of the war, taunted the Romans with cowardice because they would not come out for battle, and believing that their foes had abandoned the field to them, they were greatly elated. They were still further inspired with scorn for the Roman army and contempt for the consuls when they thought that even the gods were fighting on their side. [2] For a thunderbolt, falling upon the headquarters of Gnaeus Manlius, one of the consuls, tore the tent in pieces, overturned the hearth, and tarnished some of the weapons of war, while scorching or completely destroying others. It killed also the finest of his horses, the one he used in battle, and some of his servants. [3] And when the augurs declared that the gods were foretelling the capture of the camp and the death of the most important persons in it, Manlius roused his forces about midnight and led them to the other camp, where he took up quarters with his colleague. [4] The Tyrrhenians, learning of the general’s departure and hearing from some of the prisoners the reasons for his action, grew still more elated in mind, since it seemed that the gods were making war upon the Romans; and they entertained great hopes of conquering them. For their augurs, who are reputed to have investigated with greater accuracy than those anywhere else the signs that appear in the sky, determining where the thunderbolts come from, what quarters receive them when they depart after striking, to which of the gods each kind of bolt is assigned, and what good or evil it portends, advised them to engage the enemy, interpreting the omen which had appeared to the Romans on this wise: [5] Since the bolt had fallen upon the consul’s tent, which was the army’s headquarters, and had utterly destroyed it even to its hearth, the gods were foretelling to the whole army the wiping out of their camp after it should be taken by storm, and the death of the principal persons in it. [6] “If, now,” they said, “the occupants of the place where the bolt fell had remained there instead of removing their standards to the other army, the divinity who was wroth with them would have satisfied his anger with the capture of a single camp and the destruction of a single army; but since they endeavoured to be wiser than the gods and changed their quarters to the other camp, leaving the place deserted, as if the god has signified that the calamities should fall, not upon the men, but upon the places, the divine wrath will come upon all of them alike, both upon those who departed and upon those who received them. [7] And since, when destiny had foretold that one camp should be taken by storm, they did not wait for their fate, but of their own accord handed their camp over to the enemy, the camp which received the deserted camp shall be taken by storm instead of the one that was abandoned.”
[7.1] The Tyrrhenians, hearing this from their augurs, sent a part of their army to take possession of the camp deserted by the Romans, with the intention of making it a fort to serve against the other camp. For the place was a very strong one and was conveniently situated for intercepting any who might come from Rome to the enemy’s camp. After they had also made the other dispositions calculated to give them an advantage over the enemy, they led out their forces into the plain. [2] Then, when the Romans remained quiet, the boldest of the Tyrrhenians rode up and, halting near the camp, called them all women and taunted their leaders, likening them to the most cowardly of animals; and they challenged them to do one of two things — either to descend into the plain, if they laid claim to any warlike valour, and decide the contest by a single battle, or, if they owned themselves to be cowards, to deliver up their arms to those who were their betters, and after paying the penalty for their deeds, never again to hold themselves worthy of greatness. [3] This they did every day, and when it had no effect, they resolved to block them off by a wall with the purpose of starving them into surrender. The consuls permitted this to go on for a considerable time, not through any cowardice or weakness — for they were both men of spirit and fond of war — but because they feared the soldiers’ wilful shirking of duty and their apathy, which had persisted among the plebeians ever since the sedition over the allotment of land. For they still had ringing in their ears and fresh before their eyes the shameful behaviour, unworthy of the commonwealth, which the soldiers, because of their begrudging the honour that would come to the consul, had been guilty of the year before, when they had yielded up the victory to the vanquished and endured the false reproach of flight in order that their general might not celebrated the triumph awarded for victory.
[8.1] Desiring, therefore, to banish sedition from the army once and for all and to restore the whole rank and file to their original harmony, and devoting to this single end all their counsel and all their thought, since it was not in their power by punishing some of them to reform the rest, who were numerous, bold, and had arms in their hands, or to attempt by the persuasion of words to win over those who did not even wish to be persuaded, they assumed that the following two motives would bring about the reconciliation of the seditious: first, for those of a more reasonable disposition (for there was an admixture of these also among the mass of the troops), the shame of being taunted by the enemy, and second, for those who were not easily led to adopt the honourable course, the thing of which all human nature stands in dread — necessity. [2] In order, however, to accomplish both these results, they allowed the enemy not only to shame them by words, but also by repeated deeds of scorn and contempt to compel those to show themselves brave men who were not disposed to be so of their own accord. For if these insults should be continued, they had great hopes that all the soldiers would come to headquarters, giving vent to their indignation, reproaching the consuls, and demanding that they lead them against the enemy; and that is just what happened. [3] For when the enemy began to block the outlets of the camp with ditches and kinds, the Romans, growing indignant at their action, ran to the tents of the consuls, first in small numbers and then in a body, and crying out, accused them of treachery, and declared that if no one would lead them in a sortie, they themselves would take their arms and without their generals sally out against the enemy. [4] This being the general cry, the consuls thought the opportunity for which they had been waiting had now come, and they ordered the lictors to call the troops to an assembly. Then Fabius, coming forward, spoke as follows:
[9.1] “Long delayed is your indignation at the insults you are receiving from the enemy, soldiers and officers, and the eagerness which you one and all have to come to grips with your opponents, by showing itself much too late, is untimely. For you should have done this still earlier, when you first saw them come down from their entrenchments and eager to begin battle. Then, no doubt, the contest for the supremacy would have been glorious and worthy of the Roman spirit; as things are, it is already becoming a matter of necessity, and however successful its outcome may be, it will not be equally glorious. [2] Yet even now you do well in desiring to atone for your slowness and to retrieve what you have lost by neglect, and great thanks are due to you for your eagerness to follow the best course, whether this springs from valour — for it is better to begin late to do one’s duty than never — or whether indeed you have all come to the same logical conclusions as to what is example, and the same eagerness for rushing into battle has se
ized all of you. [3] But as it is, we are afraid that the grievances of the plebeians against the authorities over the allotment of land may be the cause of great mischief to the commonwealth. And the suspicion has come to us that this clamour and indignation about a sortie do not spring from the same motive with all of you, but that while some desire to go out of the camp in order to take revenge on the enemy, others do so in order to run away. [4] As for the reasons which have induced us to entertain these suspicions, they are neither divinations nor conjectures, but overt deeds, and deeds, too, that happened, not long ago, but only last year, as you all know. For when a large and excellent army had taken the field against this very enemy and the first battle had had the most successful outcome for us, so that your commander at the time, the consul Caeso, my brother here, could not only have taken the enemy’s camp, but also have brought back a most glorious victory for the fatherland, some of the soldiers, begrudging him the glorious because he was not a friend of the people and did not constantly pursue such a course as was pleasing to the poor, struck their tents the first night after the battle and without orders ran away from the camp, neither taking thought for the danger they would incur in retreating from a hostile country in disorderly fashion and without a general, and that too in the night, nor taking into account all the disgrace that was sure to come upon them for yielding the supremacy to the enemy, as far at least as in them lay, and yielding it, moreover, as victors to the vanquished. [5] Being afraid, therefore, tribunes, centurions, and soldiers, of these men who are neither able to command nor willing to obey, who are numerous and bold and have their weapons in their hands, we have been unwilling hitherto to join battle and dare not even now, with such men to support us, engage in a life-and-death struggle, lest they prove hindrances and detriments to those who are displaying all the alacrity in their power. [6] If, however, Heaven is turning the minds of even these men to better ways at the present time, and if, laying aside their seditious spirit, from which the commonwealth is suffering very great harm, or at least postponing it till times of peace, they wish to redeem their pas disgraces by their present valour, let there be no further hindrance to your advancing against the foe, setting before your eyes the fair hopes of victory.
[7] “We have many resources for winning, but greatest and most decisive are those afforded us by the folly of the enemy. For though they far exceed us in the size of their army, and for that reason alone might have withstood our courage and experience, they have deprived themselves of their only advantage by using up the greater part of their forces in garrisoning the forts. [8] In the next place, when they ought to act with caution and sober reason in everything they do, bearing in mind against what kind of men, actually far superior to them in valour, the hazard will be, they enter the struggle recklessly and incautiously, as if forsooth they were some invincible warriors and as if we stood in terror of them. At any rate, their digging of ditches round our camp, their riding up to our entrenchments, and their many insults both in word and actions indicate this. [9] Bearing these thoughts in mind, then, and remembering the many glorious battles of the past in which you have overcome them, enter with alacrity into this contest also. And let every one of you look upon the spot in which he shall be posted as his house, his lot of land, and his country. Let him who saves the man beside him feel that he is effecting his own safety, and let him who forsakes his comrade feel that he is delivering himself up to the enemy. But, above all, you should remember this, that when men stand their ground and fight their losses are small, but when they give way and flee very few are saved.”
[10] While he was yet uttering these encouragements to bravery and accompanying his words with many tears, calling by name each one of the centurions, tribunes, and common soldiers whom he knew to have performed some gallant action in battle, and promising to those who should distinguish themselves in this engagement many great rewards in proportion to the magnitude of their deeds, such as honours, riches, and all the other advantages, shouts arose from all of them as they bade him be of good cheer and demanded that he lead them to battle. [2] As soon as he had done speaking, there came forward from the throng a man named Marcus Flavoleius, a plebeian and a small farmer, though not one of the rabble but one celebrated for his merits and valiant in war and on both these accounts honoured with the most conspicuous command in one of the legions — a command which the sixty centuries are enjoined by the law to follow and obey. These officers the Romans call in their own tongue primipili. [3] This man, who, besides his other recommendations, was tall and fair to look upon, taking his stand where he would be in full view of all, said: “Since this is what you fear, consuls, that our actions will not agree with our words, I will be the first to give you in my own name the greatest pledge I can give. And you too, fellow citizens and sharers of the same fortune, as many of you as are resolved to make your actions match your words, will make no mistake in following my example.” [4] Having said this, he held up his sword and took the oath traditional among the Romans and regarded by them as the mightiest of all, swearing by his own good faith that he would return to Rome victorious over the enemy, or not at all. After Flavoleius had taken this oath there was great applause from all; and immediately both the consuls did the same, as did also the subordinate officers, both tars and centurions, and last of all the rank and file. [5] When this had been done, great cheerfulness came upon them all and great affection for one another and also confidence and ardour. And going from the assembly, some bridled their horses, others sharpened their swords and spears, and still others cleaned their defensive arms; and in a short time the whole army was ready for the combat. [6] The consuls, after invoking the gods by vows, sacrifices, and prayers to be their guides as they marched out, led the army out of the camp in regular order and formation. The Tyrrhenians, seeing them come down from their entrenchments, were surprised and marched out with their whole force to meet them.
[11] When both armies had come into the plain and the trumpets had sounded the charge, they raised their war-cries and ran to close quarters; and engaging, horse with horse and foot with foot, they fought there, and great was the slaughter on both sides. The troops on the right wing of the Romans, commanded by Manlius, one of the consuls, repulsed the part of the enemy that stood opposite to them, and quitting their horses, fought on foot. But those on the left wing were being surrounded by the enemy’s right wing, [2] since the Tyrrhenians’ line at this point outflanked that of the Romans and was considerably deeper. Thus the Roman army was being broken in this sector and was receiving many blows. This wing was commanded by Quintus Fabius, who was a legate and proconsul and had been twice consul. He maintained the fight for a long time, receiving wounds of all kinds till, being struck in the breast by a spear, the point of which pierced his bowels, he fell through loss of blood. [3] When Marcus Fabius, the other consul, who commanded in the centre, was informed of this, he took with him the best of the centuries, and summoning Caeso Fabius, his other brother, he passed beyond his own line, and advancing a long way, till he had got beyond the enemy’s right wing, he turned upon those who were encircling his men, and charging them, caused great slaughter among all whom he encountered, and also put to flight those who were at a distance; and finding his brother still breathing, he took him up. [4] The man lived only a short time after that; but his death filled his avengers with still more and greater anger against the foe and, heedless now of their own lives, they rushed with a few followers into the densest ranks of the enemy and made large heaps of their dead bodies. [5] In this part of their line, therefore, the Tyrrhenians were hard pressed, and those who earlier had forced their enemies to give ground were now repulsed by those they had conquered; but those on the left wing, where Manlius was, though they were already in distress and beginning to flee, put their opponents to flight. For when Manlius had been struck in the knee with a javelin by an opponent who thrust the point through to the hamstrings, and those about him took him up and were carrying him back to the camp, the enemy, bel
ieving the Roman commander to be dead, took heart and, the rest coming to their assistance, pressed hard upon the Romans who now had no commander. [6] This obliged the Fabii to quit their left wing once more and rush to the relief of the right; and the Tyrrhenians, learning that they were approaching in a strong body, gave over further pursuit, and closing their ranks, fought in good order, losing a large number of their own men, but also killing many of the Romans.
[12.1] In the meantime the Tyrrhenians who had possessed themselves of the camp abandoned by Manlius, as soon as the signal for battle was given at headquarters, ran with great haste and alacrity to the other camp of the Romans, suspecting that it was not guarded by a sufficient force. And their belief was correct. For, apart from the triarii and a few younger troops, the rest of the crowd then in the camp consisted of merchants, servants and artificers; and with many crowded into a small space — for the struggle was for the gates of the camp — a sharp and severe engagement followed, and there were many dead on both sides. [2] During this action the consul Manlius was coming out with the cavalry to the relief of his men, when his horse fell; and he, falling with him and being unable to rise because of his many wounds, died there, and likewise many brave young men at his side. After this disaster the camp was soon taken, and the Tyrrhenians’ prophecies had their fulfilment. [3] Now if they had husbanded the good fortune that was then theirs and had kept the camp under guard, they would have got possession of the Romans’ baggage and forced them to a shameful retreat; but as it was, by turning to plundering what had been left behind and from then on refreshing themselves, as most of them did, they allowed a fine booty to escape out of their hands. For as soon as word of the taking of the camp reached the other consul, he hastened thither with the flower of both horse and foot. [4] The Tyrrhenians, informed of this approach, formed a circle round the camp and a sharp battle occurred between them, as the Romans endeavoured to recover what was theirs and the enemy feared being annihilated if their camp should be taken. When considerable time passed and the Tyrrhenians had many advantages, since they fought from higher ground and against men spent with fighting the whole day, [5] Titus Siccius, the legate and proconsul, after communicating his plan to the consul, ordered that a retreat should be sounded and that all the men should assemble in a single body and assault one side of the camp where it was most easy of attack. He left free from attack the parts next the gates, reasoning plausibly — and in this he was not deceived — that if the Tyrrhenians saw any hope of saving themselves, they would abandon the camp, whereas, if they despaired of this, finding themselves surrounded on all sides and no way of escape left, necessity would make them brave. [6] And when the attack was directed against one point only, the Tyrrhenians no longer resisted, but opening the gates, made their way back in safety to their own camp.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 83