A. Freedom and Elasticity
In his fifth chapter Dionysius shows, with no difficulty and with much vivacity, that it is impossible to lay down universal rules governing the order of words in Greek. He admits that he had been inclined to entertain a priori views on the question of the natural precedence of certain parts of speech and to hold that nouns should precede verbs, verbs adverbs, and so forth.
But he had proceeded, with that sound practical judgment which distinguishes him, to test his theories in the light of Homer’s usage. He had then found them wanting. “Trial invariably wrecked my views and revealed their utter worthlessness.” The examples of variety in word-order which he quotes from the Iliad and the Odyssey are most interesting and instructive. But a modern reader, familiar with languages whose paucity of inflexions often offers freedom only at the price of ambiguity, has more cause than any ancient writer to wonder at the liberty which Greek enjoys in this respect. No doubt the long gap between πολὺν and χρόνον in the Frogs has, and is intended to have, a comic effect. But there is no sort of ambiguity in the sentence, since the poet takes care to use no noun with which the adjective could agree until the right noun at length comes and relieves the listener of his suspense and growing curiosity, —
εἰ δ’ ἐγὼ ὀρθὸς ἰδεῖν βίον ἀνέρος ἢ τρόπον ὅστις ἔτ’ οἰμώξεται,
οὐ πολὺν οὐδ’ ὁ πίθηκος οὗτος ὁ νῦν ἐνοχλῶν,
Κλειγένης ὁ μικρός,
ὁ πονηρότατος βαλανεὺς ὁπόσοι κρατοῦσι κυκησιτέφρου
ψευδολίτρου κονίας
καὶ Κιμωλίας γῆς,
χρόνον ἐνδιατρίψει.
Aristophanes Ranae 706-13.
Here as many as twenty-one words divide an adjective from its noun, though noun and adjective are usually placed close together. But, even in serious poetry, the same thing is to be noticed, though on a less surprising scale. For example:
ἦν δ’ οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς οὔτε χείματος τέκμαρ
οὔτ’ ἀνθεμώδους ἦρος οὔτε καρπίμου
θέρους βέβαιον.
Aeschylus Prometheus Vinctus 454-6.
Here the adjective follows the noun, but (as before) there is no ambiguity, though there is much added emphasis due to the apparent afterthought. Similarly:
ἐν δὲ νομὸν ποίησε περικλυτὸς ἀμφιγυήεις
ἐν καλῇ βήσσῃ μέγαν οἰῶν ἀργεννάων.
Homer Iliad xviii. 587, 588.
And in prose the dependence of a genitive may be quite clear, though the distance between it and the words on which it depends be great: e.g.
τῶν μὲν οὖν λόγων, οὓς οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω διακυκῶν ἔλεγε περὶ τῶν παραγεγραμμένων νόμων, οὔτε μὰ τοὺς θεοὺς οἶμαι ὑμᾶς μανθάνειν οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ἐδυνάμην συνεῖναι τοὺς πολλούς.
Demosthenes de Corona § 111 (cp. § 57).
In prose, again, the extremely antithetic and artificial arrangement of words possible (without complete loss of clearness) in a highly inflected language may be illustrated from Thucydides: —
καὶ οὐ περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἄρα οὔτε οὗτοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὔθ’ οἱ Ἕλληνες τῆς ἑαυτῶν τῷ Μήδῳ ἀντέστησαν, περὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν σφίσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκείνῳ καταδουλώσεως, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ δεσπότου μεταβολῇ οὐκ ἀξυνετωτέρου, κακοξυνετωτέρου δέ.
Thucydides vi. 76.
The following sentence of Demosthenes, with its carefully chosen position for the main subject Φίλιππος and the main verb ἐπηγγείλατο, shows how well suspense and the period can be worked in such a language: —
ὡς δὲ ταλαιπωρούμενοι τῷ μήκει τοῦ πολέμου οἱ τότε μὲν βαρεῖς νῦν δ’ ἀτυχεῖς Θηβαῖοι φανεροὶ πᾶσιν ἦσαν ἀναγκασθησόμενοι καταφεύγειν ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς, Φίλιππος, ἵνα μὴ τοῦτο γένοιτο μηδὲ συνέλθοιεν αἱ πόλεις, ὑμῖν μὲν εἰρήνην ἐκείνοις δὲ βοήθειαν ἐπηγγείλατο.
Demosthenes de Corona § 19.
In an analytical language such as English a separate introductory sentence would be almost necessary in order to bring out the point of a familiar passage in the Cyropaedia: —
παῖς μέγας μικρὸν ἔχων χιτῶνα ἕτερον παῖδα μικρὸν μέγαν ἔχοντα χιτῶνα, ἐκδύσας αὐτόν, τὸν μὲν ἑαυτοῦ ἐκεῖνον ἠμφίεσε, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνου αὐτὸς ἐνέδυ.
Xenophon Cyropaedia i. 3. 17.
And the force and variety gained by juxtaposition, or by chiastic arrangement, is obvious in such examples as: —
(1) τίπτε με, Πηλέος υἱέ, ποσὶν ταχέεσσι διώκεις,
αὐτὸς θνητὸς ἐὼν θεὸν ἄμβροτον;
Homer Iliad xxii. 8, 9.
(2) τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὤν;
Plato Apology 25 D.
(3) οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ κρίσει μέν τις δικασθεὶς οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν ἐλεύθερος καὶ ὑγιὴς ἂν κριτὴς γένοιτο· ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῷ δωροδόκῳ τὰ οἰκεῖα μὲν φαίνεσθαι καλὰ καὶ δίκαια.
Longinus de Sublimitate c. xliv.
(4) καὶ τῶν κώλων ... ἀνίσων τε ὄντων καὶ ἀνομοίων ἀλλήλοις ἀνομοίους τε καὶ ἀνίσους ποιούμενοι τὰς διαιρέσεις.
Dionys. Halic. de Comp. Verb. c. xxvi.
The two last examples of elegant variation might, no doubt, be closely reproduced in modern languages. To the more important matter of emphasis, which arises in some of the other instances, a separate section must be devoted later.
B. Normal Order
Though Dionysius does right to deny the existence of a natural or inevitable order in Greek and to emphasize the essential freedom of the language, he might well have recognized more explicitly that there is what may be termed a normal or usual order, and that it is precisely the departure from this normal usage which does much to give a definite character (good or bad, as the case may be) to the style of individual Greek authors. For instance, it is usual in Greek for an adjective to follow its noun, and for a negative to precede the word or words which it qualifies. There are, further, certain customary positions for the article (according as it is attributive or predicative); for the demonstrative pronouns in conjunction with the article; for αὐτός, according to the meaning which it bears; for the particles; for prepositions, conjunctions, and relative pronouns; and so forth. There is, in short, a grammatical order sanctioned by prevailing usage, an order which might be shown to hold good, commonly though not universally, in some of the grammatical constructions indicated by Dionysius in his fifth chapter. Now between this normal order, and lucidity of expression, there exists a close connexion.
C. Lucidity
It might easily be concluded, by a reader who knew the de Compositione alone among Dionysius’ critical essays, that he set little store by that clear writing which, as it presupposes clear thinking, is a rare and cardinal excellence of style. As the noun σαφήνεια occurs but once in the treatise and the adjective σαφής not much oftener, it might be s
upposed that he underrated a quality to which Aristotle and other writers of antiquity assign so high a place. Aristotle, indeed, regards it as a first essential of good style, which must be “clear without being mean” (λέξεως δὲ ἀρετὴ σαφῆ καὶ μὴ ταπεινὴν εἶναι, Aristot. Poet. xxii. 1: cp. Rhet. iii. 2. 1). Similarly Cicero puts clearness (sermo dilucidus) before ornament, asking how it is possible, “qui non dicat quod intellegamus, hunc posse quod admiremur dicere” (Cic. de Orat. iii. 9. 38). Horace’s approving reference to lucidus ordo has become proverbial. And Quintilian allots the primacy to the same great quality: “nobis prima sit virtus perspicuitas, propria verba, rectus ordo, non in longum dilata conclusio; nihil neque desit neque superfluat” (Inst. Or. viii. 2. 22), and puts a high and not always attainable ideal before the orator in relation to his judicial auditor: “quare non, ut intellegere possit, sed, ne omnino possit non intellegere, curandum” (ibid. viii. 2. 24).
If Dionysius in the present treatise says little about lucidity, the sole reason is that he assumes it as a necessary and indispensable quality of style. In the de Thucydide c. 23 it is classed (together with purity and brevity) as one of the ἀρεταὶ ἀναγκαῖαι (in contradistinction to the ἀρεταὶ ἐπίθετοι, such as ἐνάργεια, ἡ τῶν ἠθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις, etc.). The Greek critics recognized, however, that the plainer styles were more likely than the more elaborate ones to excel in lucidity, — that, in this respect, a Herodotus and a Lysias might be expected to surpass a Thucydides and a Demosthenes. Among these authors let us choose Lysias and Thucydides, and see what praise or blame Dionysius awards to them upon this score. In the fourth chapter of the de Lysia, the lucidity of Lysias is contrasted with the obscurity often found in Thucydides and Demosthenes; and it is pointed out that this excellence is, in him, all the more admirable in that it is combined with a studious brevity, an opulent vocabulary, and a mind of great native force. And no finer example of pellucid clearness of narration could well be imagined than that quoted from Lysias in the sixth chapter of the de Isaeo: ἀναγκαῖόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, περὶ τῆς φιλίας τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ τῆς Φερενίκου πρῶτον εἰπεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, κτλ. To the obscurities of Thucydides, on the other hand, as seen in his History and particularly in his Speeches, constant and mournful reference is made in the essay which has the historian for its subject. “You can almost count on your fingers,” says Dionysius, “the people who are capable of comprehending the whole of Thucydides; and not even they can do so without occasional recourse to a grammatical commentary.” Dionysius, further, gives it as his opinion that the language of Thucydides was unique even in his own day; and he combats the view that a historian (as distinguished, say, from an advocate) may plead in excuse for an artificial style that he does not write for “people in the market-place, in workshops or in factories, nor for others who have not shared in a liberal education, but for men who have reached rhetoric and philosophy after passing through a full curriculum of approved studies, to whom therefore none of these expressions will appear unfamiliar.” Obscurity and eccentricity, he says in effect, are not virtues except in the eyes of literary coteries; presumably a speaker speaks, and a writer writes, in order to be understood.
D. Emphasis
Dionysius’ inadequate recognition of a normal order is naturally attended by some uncertainty in his attitude towards that kind of emphasis which a departure from the normal order produces. It may, indeed, be thought that the effect of emphasis, and the best means of attaining it, are considered at the opening of the sixth chapter of the treatise, and that it comes under the heading both of σχηματισμός and of ἁρμονία. In the fifth chapter, however, we should have welcomed a clearer recognition of the emphasis which, as it seems to modern readers, falls upon ἄνδρα, μῆνιν, and ἠέλιος, when they come at the beginning of the line and so are the first words to accost the ear. Certainly in his own writing Dionysius shows that he appreciates the emphasis gained by thrusting a word to the front of the sentence: e.g. καιροῦ δὲ οὔτε ῥήτωρ οὐδεὶς οὔτε φιλόσοφος εἰς τόδε χρόνου τέχνην ὥρισεν (132 21). Towards the end of chapter 7 he quotes from Demosthenes the words τὸ λαβεῖν οὖν τὰ διδόμενα ὁμολογῶν ἔννομον εἶναι, τὸ χάριν τούτων ἀποδοῦναι παρανόμων γράφῃ. He changes the order to ὁμολογῶν οὖν ἔννομον εἶναι τὸ λαβεῖν τὰ διδόμενα, παρανόμων γράφῃ τὸ τούτων χάριν ἀποδοῦναι, and then asks whether the passage will be ὁμοίως δικανικὴ καὶ στρογγύλη. To us it would seem that the chief loss is the loss of emphasis which is entailed (in Greek) by removing from the beginning of the clauses the important and contrasted phrases τὸ λαβεῖν τὰ διδόμενα and τὸ χάριν τούτων ἀποδοῦναι. Possibly this loss of emphasis is implied (among other things) in the words “δικανικὴ καὶ στρογγύλη.”
Where it occurs in Dionysius, the word ἔμφασις bears the sense of ‘hint,’ ‘suggestion,’ ‘soupçon’ (de Thucyd. c. 16 ῥᾳθύμως ἐπιτετροχασμένα καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐλαχίστην ἔμφασιν ἔχοντα τῆς δεινότητος ἐκείνης): a sense which is akin to its technical use of ‘hidden meaning’ (“significatio maior quam oratio,” Cic. Orat. 40. 139; cp. Quintil. viii. 3. 83, ix. 2. 3, 64). In our sense of emphasis due to position, the word ἔμφασις is perhaps hardly used even in the scholiasts; and it is possible that Greek has no single term to express the idea, though it may doubtless be one of the elements in view when a writer uses such expressions as ἁρμονία, σχηματισμός, and ὑπερβατόν.
A modern student of Greek, having to feel his way with practically no help from ancient authorities, will probably reach the conclusion that the rhetorical emphasis he has in mind is attained by placing a word in one of the less usual positions open to it. The word thus emphasized may come at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of a sentence, the real point being that the position should be (for that particular word) a little out of the ordinary. In Greek, however, as contrasted with English, the emphasis tends to fall on the earlier rather than the later words. In delivery, it would seem that the Greeks found it more natural to stress the beginning than the conclusion of a sentence. But an emphatic word may be found at the end as well as at the beginning, and may sometimes be placed neither at the end nor at the beginning.
Allusion has already been made to the rhetorical emphasis which falls upon the opening words of the Iliad and the Odyssey. As with “arma virumque cano” in the Aeneid, the words μῆνιν and ἄνδρα seem to strike the keynote of the following Epics. And, in a less degree, a certain emphasis due to initial position (and contributing either to emotional effect or to logical clearness) is to be discerned throughout the poems: e.g. in the sixth book of the Iliad: —
δυστήνων δέ τε παῖδες ἐμῷ μένει ἀντιόωσιν.
Homer Iliad vi. 127.
and
πέπλον δ’, ὅς τίς τοι χαριέστατος ἠδὲ μέγιστος
ἔστιν ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ καί τοι πολὺ φίλτατος αὐτῇ,
τὸν θὲς Ἀθηναίης ἐπὶ γούνασιν ἠϋκόμοιο, κτλ.
Homer Iliad vi. 271.
Similarly with the following ten miscellaneous examples of various emphasis, taken chiefly from Dionysius’ favourite speech: —
(1) ἐκεῖνος γὰρ πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητὰς καὶ ἀστοὺς καὶ ξένους λαβών, οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀφθόνως ἐπήρκε
ι τῶν ἑαυτοῦ.
Xenophon Memorabilia i. 2. 60.
(2) καὶ ταραχώδης ἦν ἡ ναυμαχία, ἐν ᾗ αἱ Ἀττικαὶ νῆες παραγιγνόμεναι τοῖς Κερκυραίοις, εἴ πῃ πιέζοιντο, φόβον μὲν παρεῖχον τοῖς ἐναντίοις, μάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων.
Delphi Complete Works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Illustrated) (Delphi Ancient Classics Book 79) Page 119